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Abstract  
In Germany, private retirement provision is a topic of increasing importance. 
The ageing population in combination with unemployment, an increasing 
number of temporary work contracts, more individuals who work part-time or 
in jobs not subject to social insurance contributions, make it problematic to fi-
nance the pensions of the retired in a pay-as-you-go financed pension system. 
Besides, the number of individuals not able to acquire sufficient pension claims 
exceeding the needs- oriented basic pension is increasing. Several pension re-
forms have taken place in order to alleviate the pressure on the pay-as-you-go 
system. In 2001, a voluntarily funded part was introduced to close the pension 
gap which has slowly been rising due to a declining replacement rate in the 
statutory pension system. Individuals now have to decide if they start to provide 
for retirement privately, how much they are going to save and where to invest. 
Such decisions require a sound knowledge of the German pension system and 
general financial knowledge in order to be able to approximate retirement needs 
and to compare financial products. 
Based on the theory of saving and its behavioral refinements, a decision model 
has been developed in this thesis which describes each step from thinking about 
retirement to actually saving for retirement. Each of these steps has been inves-
tigated empirically in order to find out more about the hurdles individuals face 
on their way towards private retirement savings.  
Based on an instrumental variable estimation, it will be shown that providing 
information about retirement provision alone will not be sufficient to make 
people think about an appropriate retirement income, to induce people to make 
concrete retirement plans and to increase the number of individuals who trans-
late their plans into action. Instead of providing general pension knowledge, 
offering concrete and targeted information at the time it is needed might be a 
more successful strategy. These idea, results and conclusions stem from Oehler 
and Wilhelm-Oehler 2009a, 2011 who analyze the data from „Altersvorsorge 
macht Schule” („retirement planning goes school”).1 They recommend a prac-
tice-oriented, case-based financial education as well as a „meta education” to 
improve the „meta literacy” as shown by Oehler (2004, 2009a, 2011, 2012a, 
2012d-e, 2013a-b). „Meta literacy” in this sense means that it is more important 
to know methods or people who can solve the problem when it appears, than 
acquiring all knowledge themselves being prepared to solve all possible prob-
 
1 For an evaluation of the course “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” see also Frommert 2008. 
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lems (Oehler/Wilhelm-Oehler 2009, 2011; Oehler 2011, 2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-
b). 
This strategy may also be successful to solve the problem of time constraints 
which many individuals stated to be the main reason why they would not partic-
ipate in a retirement seminar. Furthermore, the confidence in one’s own 
knowledge seems to be more important than actual knowledge which requires 
measures to increase consumer confidence. Such a measure could be, for ex-
ample, a hypothetical situation in which seminar participants have to evaluate 
the offer they received from a financial advisor (Oehler 2004, 2005b, 2006, 2011, 
2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b).  
According to the literature findings in the last five decades it is known that indi-
viduals fall back to heuristics in order to simplify decision. This behavior has 
also been observed in this work. Even though they own a pension product, they 
stated they did not try to figure out how much retirement wealth would be nec-
essary to live an adequate retirement life. Hence, they must have followed some 
kind of decision rule to decide, among others, about the amount they save. Us-
ing heuristics was more prevalent among individuals owning a “Riester Pen-
sion” than among individuals owning a company pension. Since individuals 
with a company pension often receive information about the pension plan 
through the employer or via employer sponsored retirement seminars, such 
seminars seem likely to have the potential of increasing the number of individ-
uals who engage in retirement planning before starting to save. 
The second one is that individuals who admit that they tend to procrastinate on 
financial decisions are more likely to join a retirement seminar than individuals 
who indicate that they would rather not procrastinate. Making people aware of 
the widespread problem of procrastinating retirement savings might increase 
the number of individuals who realize that they have procrastinated retirement 
planning and henceforth increase the number of individuals participating in 
retirement seminars.2 
 
2 These results confirm previous findings in connection with the first evaluation of the Ger-
man retirement seminars „Altersvorsorge macht Schule” by Frommert 2008 and Oeh-
ler/Wilhelm-Oehler 2009, 2011). 
18 
Zusammenfassung 
In Deutschland ist die private Altersvorsorge ein immer wichtiger werdendes 
Thema. Die Alterung der Gesellschaft in Zusammenhang mit Arbeitslosigkeit 
und befristeten Arbeitsverhältnissen sowie eine wachsende Anzahl an Arbeit-
nehmern in Teilzeitbeschäftigung oder nicht sozialversicherungspflichtigen 
Beschäftigungs-verhältnissen erschweren es, die lebensstandardsichernden 
Renten der Rentner in einem umlagefinanzierten Rentensystem weiter aufrecht 
zu erhalten. Des Weiteren führt diese Art von Arbeit und die damit verbunde-
nen unterbrochenen Erwerbsverläufe dazu, dass in Zukunft die Zahl der Men-
schen, die nicht in der Lage sein werden genügend Rentenansprüche zu erwer-
ben, um später eine Rente über der Grundrente zu erhalten, steigen wird. In 
den letzten Jahren hat es einige Rentenreformen gegeben, die die Belastungen 
gerecht zwischen den Generationen verteilen sollten. Im Jahre 2001 wurde eine 
zusätzliche freiwillige private Altersvorsorge eingeführt, welche dazu gedacht 
ist, die Rentenlücke, welche durch das Absenken des Rentenniveaus entsteht, 
zu schließen. Individuen müssen sich nun selbst entscheiden, ob sie sparen, 
wie viel sie sparen und wie sie ihr Geld investieren. Solche Entscheidungen 
setzten zum einen gute Kenntnisse des deutschen Rentensystems und zum an-
deren finanzielles Grundwissen voraus.  
Auf der Grundlage der Theorie des Sparens und ihrer verhaltenswissenschaftli-
chen Verfeinerungen wird in dieser Arbeit ein Entscheidungsmodell entwickelt, 
welches die einzelnen Schritte zwischen den ersten Überlegungen zum Alter 
bis zum tatsächlichen Altersvorsorgesparen abbildet. Jeder dieser Schritte wird 
empirisch untersucht, um mehr über die Hürden, vor denen die Individuen bei 
der Altersvorsorge stehen, herauszufinden. Basierend auf einer Instrument-
Variablen-Schätzung wird gezeigt, dass die Bereitstellung von allgemeinen In-
formationen zur Altersvorsorge allein nicht ausreichend ist, um die Menschen 
dazu zu motivieren, über ihre eigene Altersvorsorge nachzudenken, für das Al-
ter zu planen und diese Planungen dann in die Tat umzusetzen. Eine bessere 
Strategie kann es sein, gezielte Informationen genau dann bereitzustellen, 
wenn der Konsument sie benötigt. Diese Ideen und Schlussfolgerungen gehen 
auch aus den Arbeiten von Oehler und Wilhelm-Oehler (2009a, 2011) hervor. 
Sie analysieren Daten einer Befragung von Teilnehmern des Kurses „Altersvor-
sorge macht Schule“.3 Oehler und Wilhelm-Oehler schalgen eine praxisorien-
tierte, fallbezogene finanzielle Bildung sowie „Meta Bildung“ vor um die „Meta 
Literacy“ zu verbessern (Oehler 2004, 2009a, 2011, 2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b). 
 
3 Die erste Evaluation des Kurses “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” wurde von Frommert (2008) 
durchgeführt. 
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Das Konzept der „Meta Literacy“ besagt, dass es für die Lösung eines bestimm-
ten Problems wichtiger ist Methoden und Personen zu kennen, mit welchen 
man dieses Problem lösen kann, als selbst allumfassend informiert zu 
sein(Oehler/Wilhelm-Oehler 2009, 2011; Oehler 2011, 2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b). 
Der Hauptgrund, warum Individuen nicht an Altersvorsorgeschulungen teil-
nehmen, ist laut der zugrundeliegenden Befragung, dass sie keine Zeit haben. 
Genau dieses Zeitproblem könnte durch die „Meta Bildung“ reduziert werden. 
Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass die Selbsteinschätzung bezüglich 
des eigenen Wissens zur Altersvorsorge bei der Altersvorsorgeplanung und 
Umsetzung wichtiger ist, als das tatsächlich vorhandene Wissen. Es sollten also 
zudem Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, um den Konsumenten mehr Sicherheit 
im Umgang mit Altersvorsorgeprodukten zu vermitteln. Möglich wäre so etwas 
zum Beispiel durch hypothetische Situationen in Seminaren, in welchen die 
Teilnehmer aufgefordert werden Angebote einzuholen, um diese daraufhin in 
der Gruppe zu diskutieren (siehe auch Oehler 2004, 2005b, 2006, 2011, 2012a, 
2012d-e, 2013a-b). 
In der Literatur der vergangen Dekaden wurde herausgefunden, dass Menschen 
Heuristiken verwenden um Entscheidungen zu vereinfachen. So konnten auch 
in dieser Arbeit Hinweise darauf gefunden werden, dass einige der befragten 
Personen Heuristiken verwendet haben. Diese Personen gaben an, dass sie ein 
Altersvorsorgeprodukt besitzen ohne sich vorher Gedanken darüber gemacht zu 
haben, wie viel Altersvorsorgevermögen notwendig ist, um eine ausreichende 
Rente zu erzielen. Daher müssen sie eine Art von Entscheidungsregel befolgt 
haben, welche ihnen dabei half, die richtige Altersvorsorgeentscheidung zu tref-
fen. Die Verwendung von Heuristiken konnte häufiger bei Individuen mit 
„Riester-Rente“ beobachtet werden als bei Personen mit einer betrieblichen Al-
tersvorsorge. Personen mit einer betrieblichen Altersvorsorge erhalten häufig 
über ihren Arbeitgeber, zum Beispiel bei Informationsveranstaltungen oder 
Seminaren, Informationen zur betrieblichen Altersvorsorge. Diese Seminare 
können dazu beigetragen haben, dass sich die Arbeitnehmer mehr Gedanken 
über ihre eigene Altersvorsorge machen als Personen, denen diese nicht zur 
Verfügung stehen.  
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1 Introduction 
In the United States, individuals have been partially responsible for providing 
for their own retirement for a long time. Private retirement saving plans and 
company pensions are an inherent part of retirement income. Old age provision 
in Germany is composed of three pillars: the statutory pay-as-you go pension, 
company pension, and private pension. For a long time most Germans relied 
almost solely on their statutory pension entitlements. In the year 2007 about 
75% of retirement income was pay-as-you-go financed (Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales 2008a).  
In the light of an aging population, many researchers projected rising contribu-
tion rates to the statutory pension insurance (Bofinger 1999). To distribute the 
burden more equally among the generations several pension reforms have taken 
place. The first and most prominent pension reform took place in 2001 which is 
named after the then minister of employment and social affairs, Walter Riester. 
This reform initiated a system change by slightly reducing the pay-as-you go 
pension and introducing subsidized private funded pension (Honekamp 2007). 
The introduction of the subsidy was intended to foster individual savings in pri-
vate pension plans. Generally the pension reform in 2001 and the following re-
form in 2004, which will be described in more detail in the background in chap-
ter 1, have led to a decreasing pension level. 
Pension reforms are not the only reason why pension entitlements for future 
cohorts will decline. Work histories have changed during the past years, long 
spells of unemployment, part-time work and other atypical forms of employ-
ment decrease pension entitlements in the future. In its national strategy report 
“Social security and social integration 2008-2010” the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Affairs argues that it is certain, that the accustomed standard of liv-
ing during retirement can only be achieved if individuals engage in supple-
mental savings in the form of company pensions or other kinds of private old 
age provision (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2008b). Therefore it 
has been stated that it is the goal of the Federal Government to achieve the larg-
est possible spread of state subsidized supplemental retirement provision.  
The responsibility of ensuring sufficient financial resources during retirement 
has to some extent been shifted from the government to the consumer. The 
younger an individual, the lower the expected replacement rate from the statuto-
ry pension system and therefore the greater the need for private pension provi-
sions. After the reforms banks and insurance companies started to offer savings 
products which had to be certified and to meet certain criteria in order to be eli-
gible for the “Riester-Subsidy”. The variety of these savings contracts, called 
“Riester-Pension” have increased rapidly since the reforms.  
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According to classical economic theory of consumption and savings, an optimal 
savings decision which maximizes life time utility requires individuals to be far-
sighted, rational and informed about all available consumption and savings op-
portunities (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). A lack of knowledge about the 
pension system and financial matters and the inability to apply this knowledge 
would lead to suboptimal savings decisions. In practice these assumptions are 
rarely met. Considering the decision to save for retirement, individuals have to 
calculate their retirement needs in order to determine how much they should 
save during their working-life. Having done this they are confronted with a 
range of different products. In the light of many uncertainties in life it is unlike-
ly that consumers can perfectly predict their life-time income and their retire-
ment needs. Another problem is the assumption that individuals are completely 
informed about all the options available to them. In the light of an increasing 
number of financial products on the market even financial experts would rarely 
be able to claim that they are perfectly informed about every single product. 
Even if individuals could be entirely rational and possess all relevant infor-
mation most of them would not be able to solve the problem of dynamic optimi-
zation. 
In behavioral and new institutional economics research the classical theory of 
savings has been enriched by psychological and behavioral insights in order to 
be better able to explain an individual’s savings behavior. It has been observed 
that individuals often procrastinate with regards to retirement provision, and 
many people do not engage in retirement savings even though they know that 
they should save (Honekamp and Uehleke 2012, Laibson 1998). The reason for 
this observation could be procrastination, whereby present orientated individu-
als continuously delay the decision to save to a later point in time (Laibson 1998, 
O’Donoghue and Rabin 1998, 1999). The decision to start planning and saving 
for retirement depends on an individual’s evaluation of the costs and benefits 
this action would entail and thus the likelihood of starting saving today rather 
than next month can be increased by either reducing the costs of planning or by 
increasing the costs of not planning. 
There are many measures which could be taken in order to decrease the costs of 
planning. The most important measures are notably the simplification of choic-
es, for example, through the provision of heuristics or standardized product in-
formation, and the provision of information through retirement seminars 
(Leinert 2005, Oehler 2009a, 2012c). A measure which increases the costs of fail-
ing to plan is the lost return on the investment. Besides the interest payments 
which would not be claimed there are also lost subsidies or tax advantages.  
In this thesis the hurdles which prevent individuals from planning and saving 
for retirement play an important role. For this reason a decision model has been 
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developed describing each step on the path towards private retirement savings, 
starting with the first thought about retirement and ending with active retire-
ment savings. Within this model pension knowledge plays an important role, 
which according to the theory should decrease planning costs and foster retire-
ment savings (e.g. O’Donoghue and Rabin 1998, Shefrin and Thaler 1981).  
Hung, Parker and Yoong (2009) reviewed the literature in which financial litera-
cy has been measured and detected that there is no consensus about how finan-
cial literacy is defined. Sometimes financial literacy refers to a specific form of 
knowledge, the ability to apply that knowledge, perceived knowledge, good fi-
nancial behavior or financial experience. Based on their findings Hung, Parker 
and Yoong (2009) provided the following definition for financial literacy: 
“knowledge of basic financial concepts, as well as the ability to use that 
knowledge and other financial skills to manage financial resources effectively 
for a lifetime of financial well-being”. In order to integrate pension knowledge 
into this definition, I have developed the following figure. 
Figure 1: Defining Financial Literacy 
 
In this research only the knowledge aspect of financial literacy can be approxi-
mated by variables which will be generated out of questions designed to meas-
ure actual knowledge of basic financial literacy but more importantly to measure 
actual knowledge of the German pension system. In the same sense it is possi-
ble to approximate perceived financial and pension knowledge. According to 
Hung, Parker and Yoong’s definition, what will be investigated here is individu-
al knowledge, rather than ability, which is only one part of the definition for fi-
nancial literacy. Throughout this thesis financial or pension literacy have gener-
ally been approximated by the knowledge of financial concepts or the pension 
system, and this is also the case for the literature reviewed in chapter 2.3. How-
ever, as soon as researchers integrate financial knowledge into a regression ex-
plaining for example retirement planning, a positive coefficient would imply 
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that the individuals were able to apply their knowledge.4 Generally the terms 
financial literacy, pension literacy, financial knowledge and pension knowledge 
will be used interchangeably.  
Existing research has shown that financial illiteracy is especially pronounced for 
women, the low educated and individuals with low income (e.g. Leinert 2004, 
Lusardi and Mitchell 2008, Rooij van et al. 2011a). For this group of people the 
expected income from the statutory pension system will be especially low, there-
fore they are most in need to provide for retirement privately (e.g. Bundesminis-
terium für Arbeit und Soziales 2008b, Coppola and Gasche 2011, Schmähl 
2008). In order to inform individuals about the German pension system the 
government has initiated the course “Old-age provision goes to school” in coop-
eration with other actors. The course supports individuals by calculating retire-
ment needs and indicates what costs are to be expected in old-age (see the first 
evaluation these retirement seminars by Frommert 2008 and Oehler and Wil-
helm-Oehler 2009, 2011). Furthermore individuals receive information about 
the statutory pension system, the “Riester-Pension”, company pension, housing 
equity and other vehicles that provide for retirement. 
After such a course, individuals will know if they are going to face a pension 
gap, what savings vehicle is best suited for their needs and know to whom they 
can turn if they need further advice. Furthermore they are then well prepared to 
assess offers from banks or insurance companies depending on their choice of 
product. The evidence of the effectiveness of seminars concerning its effect on 
behavior is mixed. While some researchers only report modest effects, others 
found that after the seminar individuals adjusted their expected retirement age 
and that the seminar increased the number of individuals contributing to a pen-
sion plan (Bayer et al. 2009; Duflo and Saez 2003). The effectiveness of a semi-
nar should, however, not just be rated based on behavior changes with respect to 
increased or optimized retirement savings. Instead retirement seminars are of-
ten targeted at specific groups of people. If it is not possible to get these individ-
uals to participate in the seminar it would be rated as not effective in this respect 
(e.g. Honekamp and Uehleke 2012). The aim of this work is to analyze data on 
individual retirement savings behavior in order to examine why many individu-
als know that they should save more but still fail to start saving. The data had 
been generated in the connection with a research project in 2010 and 2011.5 In 
the light of existing theoretical and empirical research it will be discussed which 
measures might be taken by the government, by other institutions or by the in-
 
4 As long as there is no variable measuring the ability to apply knoweldge. 
5 A detailed description of the data can be found in chapter 3. 
24 
dividual him-/herself in order to increase the number of individuals who are 
successfully reaching their aspired level of retirement income. 
One of the proposed measures for decreasing the cost of planning and saving 
for retirement is the provision of retirement seminars. There are many relevant 
und future-oriented results from the first evaluation of the German retirement 
seminars “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” by Frommert (2008) and Oehler and 
Wilhelm-Oehler (2009, 2011) which are the basis for further projects. The data 
analyzed in this thesis offers the unique opportunity to analyze why individuals 
refrain from participating in a retirement seminar. These findings will help to 
provide evidence about how existing retirement seminars could be adjusted and 
how new seminars could be organized in order to attract these individuals. Fur-
thermore, it is possible to show how different sources of information can influ-
ence product choice. In this respect, the effects of joining a retirement seminar 
and other information channels on the probability of applying for a specific sav-
ings product will be analyzed. The research in this thesis is based on data which 
has been generated within a project investigating the effect of a retirement sem-
inar on savings behavior (Honekamp and Uehleke 2012). Questions concerning 
their knowledge, perception and behavior concerning retirement provision were 
answered by 1016 individuals. A decision model describing each step to be tak-
en from the first thought about retirement to actual retirement savings has been 
developed using the insights of theory on saving and its psychological and be-
havioral advancements. This model provides the basis for the empirical analysis. 
Assuming diminishing marginal utility of consumption and a decreasing pen-
sion level, saving for retirement increases life-time utility for most individuals.6 
Each step on the way towards private retirement provision constitutes a hurdle 
and bears the risk that individuals will not continue retirement planning to the 
extent that they will never start to save. This would be the case if the cost of 
planning is greater than the expected utility which could be derived from plan-
ning. The empirical analysis will provide information about why individuals 
might not engage in retirement planning and why individuals choose to save 
using specific savings products. 
The findings in this thesis contribute to the existing literature in several im-
portant ways. Firstly, German research into the effects of financial literacy on 
 
6 Even though these assumptions hold, there could be a case whereby private retirement sav-
ings do not increase life-time utility. For very poor individuals the utility of future consump-
tion may not outweigh the sacrifice of present day consumption. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that retirement planning is not necessary. It might be worth thinking about life in re-
tirement, like living in a multi-generation house or engaging in an association of pensioners 
who support each other (see also chapter 2.1.4). 
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retirement savings behavior is rare. Extending the research on financial literacy 
and its effect on retirement behavior is important because findings from the US 
and other countries are not readily applicable to Germany because those coun-
tries differ in important aspects. The most important differences are notably the 
organization and development of financial markets and the organization of the 
pension system. 
Secondly, the hurdles preventing individuals in Germany from planning and 
saving for retirement have been investigated and specific suggestions have been 
made to decrease them. The measures which have been suggested to encourage 
people to deal with retirement issues and to educate people are not new, and the 
empirical results of this thesis can be seen as further evidence for the potential 
positive effect these measures could have at specific stages on the way towards 
private retirement savings. The fact that many individuals still lack basic pen-
sion knowledge also implies that existing programs providing retirement educa-
tion are not sufficient for reaching all individuals and especially those most in 
need to receive this information (see also Oehler and Werner 2008 and Coppola 
and Gasche 2011).  
The research in this thesis also provides explanations about why individuals do 
not participate in retirement seminars, and on the basis of these findings con-
crete suggestions are formulated to show how to modify existing seminars or 
how to organize new seminars. Thirdly an attempt has been made to test four 
hypotheses which have been derived from the theory discussed in chapter 2.1. 
The first hypothesis claims that financially literate people are more likely to plan 
and save for retirement than individuals who are less literate. Within this hy-
pothesis an endogeneity problem arises since the path of causality is not clear. It 
could be that financial literacy encourages individuals to plan and save for re-
tirement but on the other hand it is also likely that an individual’s literacy level 
increases because he/she plans and saves for retirement. In order to circumvent 
this potential problem, a specific question on economics education at school has 
been implemented into the survey which makes it possible to create an instru-
ment variable for financial literacy. This approach has already been applied suc-
cessfully in American and Dutch research (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007b, Rooij 
van et al. 2011).  
The reasoning of hypothesis 1 will be taken further in hypothesis 2 by question-
ing one of the assumptions underlying the model of endogenous time prefer-
ences from Becker and Mulligan (1997), which states that financial literacy is 
more effective in decreasing the discount rate for individuals with an initially 
low discount rate. A similar hypothesis has been tested before (Howlett and 
Kees 2008).  
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The third hypothesis tests the theory of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1998) who find 
that “procrastination does not arise from present-biased preferences per se, but 
rather from present-biased preferences combined with naïveté” (O’Donoghue 
and Rabin, 1998). Findings which either verify or falsify these hypotheses are 
important since they provide information about the potential effectiveness of 
providing retirement seminars for individuals who are present orientated. Fur-
thermore, it will be possible to show if the knowledge of a self-control problem 
concerning procrastination behavior influences decisions relating to retirement 
provision. If the hypothesis can be verified then measures can be taken in order 
to call attention to the problem of procrastination. 
The fourth hypothesis states that individuals who participated in retirement 
seminars are more likely to save for retirement than individuals who did not 
complete the seminar. In order to test this hypothesis, which is similar to the 
reasoning in hypothesis 1, the effect of different sources of information on the 
probability of saving using different retirement savings vehicles will be ana-
lysed. Within this analysis it is possible to distinguish between the effect of a 
retirement seminar for individuals who like dealing with financial matters and 
for individuals who do not like to deal with financial matters. The use of further 
control variables makes it possible to check for a potential selection bias which 
arises when individuals choose either to join a seminar or to use other kinds of 
information sources.  
Outline  
In the following chapter, chapter 1, important theoretical and empirical findings 
about the decision to save and the effect of financial literacy on retirement out-
comes will be presented. Furthermore key features of the German pension sys-
tem will be outlined (2.2). The theory is going to start with the first psychological 
research which has dealt with the subject of the intertemporal substitution of 
consumption and saving, then its formalization and its use within an optimiza-
tion framework of life-time utility will be discussed. Finally the revival of psy-
chological concepts in the research of new institutional and behavioral econom-
ics research to enrich classical economic models will be presented (2.1). Based 
on the insights from the economic models hypothesis will be formulated and a 
theoretical decision model to analyze retirement savings will be developed. The 
last part of the background is devoted to the literature review of empirical find-
ings which examine the degree of financial literacy, the influence of financial 
literacy on retirement outcomes, the effectiveness of retirement education and 
further measures which have been taken in order to increase retirement savings 
(2.3). 
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Chapter 3 describes the data generating process, comprising the survey method 
(3.1.1), a short description of the sample (3.1.2), the response rate (3.1.3) and the 
imputation of missing values (3.2). The methods section will describe how im-
portant concepts like financial literacy (4.2) and time preferences (4.1) will be 
measured and how the hypothesis will be operationalized (4.3). Furthermore, 
the estimation technique (4.4) and the model variables (4.5) will be described  
Financial and pension knowledge are a part of financial literacy and will be ana-
lyzed in chapter (5) which is the first chapter presenting empirical findings 
based on the data used in this thesis. This chapter shows how well the Germans 
who participated in the survey are informed about general financial concepts 
and pension matters. On the one hand actual knowledge has been measured 
using a short quiz on pension issues (5.1), and perceived knowledge has been 
measured by asking individuals how they rate their knowledge of different pen-
sion related concepts (5.2). 
The sixth chapter translates the theoretical model into an empirical model and 
investigates which individual characteristics are beneficial for thinking (6.1), 
planning (6.2) and saving (6.4) for retirement. This chapter is therefore designed 
to look closer at the hurdles which prevent individuals from investing in private 
retirement provision. Chapter 6.3 tries to find out why individuals often fail to 
translate their plans into action and chapter 6.5 analyses the reasons why many 
individuals decide not to participate in retirement seminars. Chapter 6.6 looks at 
the effect that different sources of information have on savings decisions. Each 
of the topics analyzed in chapter 6 is then followed by a discussion of the respec-
tive results. 
Based on the findings, the concluding chapter 7 provides suggestions and advice 
concerning measures which could be taken in order to help people to negotiate 
each hurdle on the way towards private retirement provision. Furthermore, sug-
gestions regarding directions for future research will be provided. 
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2 Background 
The background is composed of three different parts. The first part discusses 
the early developments of the theory of saving and consumption. The most im-
portant concept will be time preferences which present the desire for present 
and future consumption. Individuals who are future orientated place more 
weight on utility in the future and will therefore be more likely to save for re-
tirement than individuals who are present orientated. The theoretical review 
focuses on research which will make it possible to formulate predictions about 
the effects that financial or pension literacy have on savings decisions. At the 
end of the theoretical discussion a model will be developed which comprises 
each action to be taken in order to start private retirement provision and to fig-
ure out which role financial and pension literacy may play in this process.  
The second part of the background provides an overview about the latest pen-
sion reforms and the pension system in Germany in general. The third part of 
the background chapter is the literature review, reviewing literature investigat-
ing the extent of financial and pension illiteracy in the population, the effects of 
financial and pension literacy on retirement behavior and the effectiveness of 
retirement seminars and other measures to induce people to save.  
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The first part discusses the early developments of the theory of saving and con-
sumption (2.1.1). Early theories were highly psychological and later transferred 
into mathematical formulations before being applied, for example, to the life-
cycle model of saving which constitutes the second part of the theoretical 
framework (2.1.2). Several empirical findings point to deviations from the 
standard-life cycle model to the extent that models have been developed which 
relax assumptions in order to improve explanatory power. Nevertheless, there 
are two assumptions which are less easy to relax than others, namely, perfect 
information and rationality, both of which are especially relevant for private re-
tirement provision. Theories which explicitly address these issues are New Insti-
tutional and Behavioral Economics, both of which will be outlined in chapter 
2.1.3. (see also the literature review and empirical results in Oehler 1992, 1994, 
1995, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2011). The final chapter (2.1.4) infers what these theoret-
ical and empirical findings imply for financial literacy and its effect on retire-
ment saving decisions. Furthermore, a decision model will be developed which 
guides the empirical analysis in chapter 6. 
2.1.1 The History of Intertemporal Choice 
The question of how individuals evaluate present and future consumption has 
played an important role in classical and neo-classical theory for a long time. 
 29 
The first approaches where highly psychological in identifying different motives 
which ought to influence time preferences. Later these motives were continu-
ously abstracted and finally integrated into a mathematical formulation. Nowa-
days an increasing number of economists go back to apply psychological mo-
tives to explain intertemporal choices. Since I also follow this approach in my 
thesis, it is necessary to briefly describe the development of the study of inter-
temporal choice.  
In 1834 the economist John Rae explained why wealth differed among nations 
and argued that the reason for different levels of savings and investments in a 
society is determined by “the effective desire of accumulation”. He established 
three factors that promote the effective desire for accumulation (Rae 1905 p.58). 
Frederick et al. (2002) interpreted the first factor as the bequest motive and the 
second as the propensity to exercise self-restraint. The third notion can be de-
scribed as certainty of human life, a feature that is important to consider be-
cause uncertainty induced by, for example, financial crises or political unrest is 
likely to affect the savings and investment decisions of many consumers.  
This analysis formed the basis for investigations into how individuals make 
temporal choices, and based on the psychological factors identified by Rae 
(1834), Senior (1836) developed the abstinence perspective. His approach is 
characterized by the assumption that individuals treat the future and the present 
equally; hence there is no discounting of the future. He thus argues that the on-
ly reason why the present is overweighed is the self-denial which is needed to 
delay gratification (Senior 1836). Instead of associating time preferences with 
the pain induced by deferred consumption, Jevons (1965) argues that individu-
als anticipate the utility of future consumption, whereby consumption which 
has been transferred into the future causes immediate pleasure which increases 
present utility.  
“The anticipatory-utility and abstinence perspectives share the idea that inter-
temporal tradeoffs depend on immediate feelings – in one case, the immediate 
pleasure of anticipation, and in the other, the immediate discomfort of self-
denial.” (Frederick et al. 2002). Intertemporal choices, therefore, depend on pre-
sent utility in which the future is taken into consideration through psychological 
mechanisms.  
As with the approaches of Rae, Senior and Jevons, Böhm-Barwerk (1889) also 
employs psychological explanations to describe the determinants of inter-
temporal choice. He argues that individuals systematically underestimate their 
future wants, and they do so because of the inability of individuals to imagine 
the future and to abstract from it, or their reluctance to make the effort to con-
sider the future (Böhm-Bawerk 1889). These considerations were again taken up 
by psychologists and economists, focusing on behavioral aspects of decision-
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making which are not in line with the classical model of rational decision mak-
ing (Simon 1955, 1959). Among others the related concepts are bounded ration-
ality and the theory of self-control which will be discussed later on in this re-
view. Böhm-Bawerk (1889) also described intertemporal choices as an allocation 
of resources over different points in time. Decisions are no longer based solely 
on present utility, instead utility which can be realized in the future will also be 
part of the decision-making process. This method of reasoning constitutes an 
important step towards its formalization. 
Fisher (1930) refined Böhm-Bawerk’s idea and established the fisher diagram, 
which is still taught as a basic concept in economics. It centers around a dia-
gram which depicts a representative individual’s decision to allocate consump-
tion between the current year, on the abscissa, and the following year, on the 
ordinate axis (Figure 2). One possible decision of the consumer would be to 
choose C1< Y1, whereby in this case the consumer would be saving. In the sec-
ond period, the individual is able to consume that saving plus the interest 
earned and the second-period income. Fisher describes the pure time prefer-
ence as the marginal rate of substitution at the point where consumption is 
equal in both periods. In addition he stresses the presence of diminishing mar-
ginal utility of consumption which entails a desire to smooth consumption over 
time.  
Figure 2: Intertemporal Choice (Fisher 1930) 
 
Notes: Y1 = income in period 1, Y2 = income in period 2, C1 = consumption in period 1, 
C2 = consumption in period 2, r = the interest rate.  
Fisher emphasizes that his model depends on the assumptions of perfect fore-
sight. He appreciates that in the real world individuals will not act like the ra-
tional agent modelled in his diagram of intertemporal choice. Thaler (1997) ar-
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gues that, “[w]hile it is impressive that Fisher essentially anticipates the life-cycle 
theory of saving, it is perhaps more impressive that he also anticipates the be-
havioral critique of this model”. Like his predecessors, Fisher describes psycho-
logical factors which determine time preferences. On the one hand impatience 
depends on personal income, and more precisely on its size, time shape, com-
position and risk. On the other hand he identifies six personal factors, which are 
self-control, foresight, habit, expectation of life, concern for the lives of others 
and fashion7. Although Fisher formalized intertemporal choice he did not ne-
glect the psychological motives that explain differences in time preferences. 
In 1937 Samuelson (1937) developed the discounted utility model (DU model) 
which allowed the analysis of intertemporal choices over multiple time periods. 
As a cardinal measure of an individual’s rate of time preference he employed a 
discount rate which integrates all psychological concerns discussed above into 
one notation. The psychological determinants of time preferences proposed by 
the scientists discussed previously are rendered irrelevant for the economic 
analysis of temporal choices based on the discounted utility model, as discount-
ing utility by a constant factor allows a comparison of costs and benefits to be 
made occurring at different points in time. The utility function can be described 
as follows: 
𝑈(𝑥) = ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝑈(𝑥𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0   (1) 
where 𝑥𝑡 is the consequence of option x in period t. The discount factor is 𝜌, 
such that 𝜌 = 1/(1 + 𝑑), where d is referred to as the discount rate. A patient 
person would therefore have a high discount factor and a low rate of time pref-
erence. In his short paper “A Note on Measurement of Utility”, however, Samu-
elson (1937) also expressed concerns about the validity of his assumptions when 
applying them to the real world. He explained that, “in the analysis of the supply 
of savings, it is extremely doubtful whether we can learn much from consider-
ing such an economic man, whose tastes remain unchanged, who seeks to max-
imize some functional of consumption alone, in a perfect world, where all 
things are certain and synchronized. “ (Samuelson 1937, p. 160) Despite Samu-
elson’s doubts, researchers quickly integrated the discounted utility model as 
the framework of choice into their studies of intertemporal choice (Frederick et 
al. 2002). 
𝑈(𝑥) = ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝑈(𝑥𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0  (2) 
 
7 For Fisher (1930) fashion means that individuals imitate others, and an example given by 
Fisher is that millionaires seem to be induced to live in an ostentatious manner, while poorer 
individuals are led to work hard and save to become millionaires one day. 
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2.1.2 The Life-Cycle-Model of Saving 
Samuelson (1937) argued that the determinants of an individual’s savings deci-
sion are seldom certain. In fact an individual encounters several uncertainties. 
He or she is for example not able to predict his/her future employment pro-
spects, the development of the economy or the stock market nor is he/she able 
to predict how politicians will influence capital markets and the pension system 
in the future. Decisions under uncertainty depend on the probability with which 
alternative outcomes occur. If the probabilities are known it is about decision 
under risk. In expected utility theory, which dates back from Bernouli, decision 
makers choose between risky prospects by comparing their expected utility val-
ues. These expected utility values are the weighted sums obtained by adding the 
utility values of outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities. In order to 
derive rational behavior from the expected utility theory, the axioms from von 
Neumann und Morgenstern (1947) have to be met (Bitz 1981, Oehler 1995, We-
ber 1990). These axioms describe decision rules to which rational agents would 
adhere.  
In contrast to the decision under risk, in which case the probabilities are known, 
it is also possible that probabilities are not known. In the previously described 
case in which an individual decides how much to save for retirement it is likely 
that probabilities are uncertain. In subjective expected utility theory an individu-
al derives probabilities and outcomes simultaneously (Oehler 1995, Savage 
1954). An individual is not able to determine probabilities exactly. Ambiguity 
can range from complete uncertainty about the probability of occurrence to al-
most complete certainty about the probability (Oehler 2005, Weber 1990). 
The prominent model of intertemporal choice, the life cycle model of saving is 
the first economic model which concentrates predominantly on saving for re-
tirement as the most important savings motive (Werner 2009). This model is 
grounded in expected utility theory and is still the foundation for much of the 
theoretical and empirical research on consumption and saving behavior. Accord-
ing to this model agents are rational and farsighted. They are optimally in-
formed about all actions available to them and they know which implications 
these might have. Such individuals then maximize the expected utility of their 
lifetime subject to the resources available over the course of their lives. The re-
sult of the model is that individual’s smooth consumption over their life cycle. 
In times of high income, usually during prime working age, individuals save a 
fraction of their income and borrow against future earnings or do not save in 
times of low or zero income, as is the case for individuals just starting their 
working career or just ending it when they reach retirement age. In Figure 3 the 
pattern of saving and consumption over the life cycle is described visually. 
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Empirical evidence has shown that real savings patterns generally deviate from 
these model predictions. The reason offered is the large number of simplifying 
assumptions that underlie the basic life cycle model.8 Empirical studies have 
shown that individuals may not engage in dissaving as has been predicted by the 
standard life-cycle model (e.g. Porterba 1994, Börsch-Supan et al. 2003). Fur-
thermore, young individuals and households are often reluctant to take on credit 
to finance consumption even if they face an increasing wage profile (e.g. Alessie 
et al. 1997, Börsch-Supan and Lusardi 2003, Browning and Crossley 2001, Dea-
ton 1991, Jappelli and Pagano 1994, Thurow 1969). Additionally, there has been 
evidence that many people approach retirement with too little wealth (e.g. Lu-
sardi and Mitchell 2007a, Mitchell and Moore 1998, Munnell 2005). This means 
that their standard of living during retirement is likely to be lower than before.  
Figure 3: Income, consumption and life-cycle saving 
Source: Based on Börsch-Supan and Lusardi 2003.  
Some of the studies investigating savings behavior during retirement have been 
criticized by Jappelli and Modigliani (2005) for using an incorrect definition of 
savings. Social security contributions like the mandatory contributions to a pay-
as-you-go financed pension scheme have been treated as taxes, and pension 
 
8 The term basic or standard life-cycle model will refer to the life-cycle model designed by 
Brumberg and Modigliani 1954. There are many variants of the life-cycle model today, which 
relax one or more of the assumption of the standard model. These models will be part of the 
following overview. 
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benefits have been treated as income. Instead one should treat social security 
contributions as mandatory savings and pension benefits as a mixture of capital 
income and capital decumulation. The same definition should be applied to 
health expenditures, which generally increase with age. An empirical estimation 
conducted by Brugiavini and Padula (2003) has shown that retirees in Italy in-
deed dissave, when their pension is defined as capital decumulation. Treating 
pensions as earned income on the other hand has led to a positive saving rate of 
20 per cent of retirement income. A negative savings rate for retired people has 
also been confirmed by a study in New Zealand in which 50 per cent of pen-
sions have been treated as income and 50 per cent as dissaving (Coleman 2006). 
Despite considering the proposed definition of savings, Börsch-Supan et al. 
(2003) found a positive savings rate even for most retired low-income house-
holds. This positive saving rate has been explained by the generous statutory 
pension and health insurance or habit formation, to the extent that individuals 
have not wanted to change their accustomed standard of living (Börsch-Supan 
2003). Börsch-Supan and Stahl (1991) suggest that poor health conditions may 
be responsible for a positive savings rate because individuals who are seriously 
ill are not able to spend money.  
Furthermore, individuals might be reluctant to start dissaving because of the 
uncertainty about their own and/or their partner’s future health prospects, 
hence they save to pay for better health treatment later. After the death of a 
partner individuals may also gain less utility from spending money such that 
they save all money which is not spent on the necessities of daily life. This posi-
tive saving rate may change in the future and converge to match the results in 
the USA where many people approach retirement with too little wealth (Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2007a, Mitchell and Moore 1998, Munnell 2005). The reason for 
this convergence is the declining replacement rate from the statutory pension 
system. In Germany private retirement savings will become increasingly im-
portant, just as they already are in the United States.9  
These examples show that the definition of savings can cause huge differences 
in empirical estimations. Another source of inaccuracy is the data on savings 
and wealth itself. These issues are very sensitive and if information is collected 
through a questionnaire it is common for many people refuse to answer these 
questions or to make guesses. Use of this data needs to take such conditions 
into account as estimation results are likely to be distorted. 
 
9 Further information obout pension reforms and the declining replacement rate in Germany 
will be provided in the following chapter 2.2 on pension reforms and their impact. 
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When looking at an earlier period in the life-cycle, it can be observed that many 
young households are reluctant to borrow against future income as proposed by 
the basic life-cycle model. The three widely accepted explanations are liquidity 
constraints, precautionary savings and demographic changes such as the birth 
of a child (Börsch-Supan and Lusardi 2003, Browning and Crossley 2001). It has 
been assumed that young individuals spend more if they do not face borrowing 
constraints (Alessie et al. 1997, Deaton 1991, Jappelli and Pagano 1994, Thurow 
1969). According to Browning and Crossley (2001) prudence is the precaution-
ary motive for saving. For Young households’ future income is uncertain, hence 
many of them decline to borrow money when repayment is uncertain (Carroll 
1994, 1997, Nagatani 1972). The presence of children drives up expenditure for 
young households including the savings for the children’s education in the fu-
ture.10  
These were not the only empirical evidence which contradict the predictions of 
the basic life-cycle model of consumption. A review of empirical studies investi-
gating the retirement preparedness in the USA concluded that, compared to 
their pre-retirement living standards, about half of the retirees are likely to expe-
rience a drop. For half of these individuals this would imply a huge decline in 
their standard of living, the other half will only experience a modest fall (Mun-
nell 2005). To summarize, there has been a lot of empirical evidence which re-
jects the basic life-cycle model, but does that render it of no use for future re-
search on intertemporal savings and consumption decisions? Browning and 
Crossley (2001) and others argue that this is not the case. Instead a lot of hetero-
geneity present in the data can be modelled within the life-cycle framework. 
They argue that it can be seen as a challenge for model builders to enrich the 
life-cycle model with realistic features while maintaining rejectability. In the 
years following the introduction of the basic life-cycle model by Brumberg and 
Modigliani (1997) researchers have relaxed one or more of the assumptions un-
derlying the standard life-cycle model to make it more realistic. Mechanisms to 
allow for precautionary savings, liquidity constraints, endogenous labour choice, 
tax rules, uncertainty over income, children, social safety nets and others have 
been incorporated into the model. These refinements also include the theoreti-
cal considerations mentioned above, which explain why the data did not match 
with the predictions of the standard life-cycle model.11  
 
10 Studies that account for children are for example Attanasio et al. 1999 and Browning, 
Ejrnaes 2002. 
11 References to authors which deal with these refinements of the standard life-cycle model can 
be found in the preceding theoretical overview regarding why empirical evidence might not be 
in line with the standard life-cycle model. 
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Many features of inter-temporal decisions have been incorporated into the 
standard-life-cycle model. These refinements also revived some of the psycho-
logical motives which have been the core elements of understanding temporal 
choice in the years before the discounted utility model appeared. One important 
explanation of time preferences put forward by Rae (1834) is the uncertainty of 
life. Nowadays there are models that account for various life uncertainties, for 
example, income uncertainty, uncertainty about the time of retirement and un-
certainty over health and mortality.12 However, psychologists and behavioral 
economists point to behavioral aspects which they argue cannot be integrated 
into the framework of a life-cycle model. Browning and Crossley 2001 also ad-
mit that there are psychological concepts, especially rule of thumb behavior, 
which the model rules out. 
2.1.3 New Institutional and Behavioral Economics 
New institutional economics and information economics are closely related to 
be-havioral economics. New and institutional economics and information eco-
nomics employ concepts such like asymmetric information, bounded rationality 
and transaction costs. Behavioral economists generally develop their theories 
based on observations of individual savings behavior either in the real world or 
in an experimental setting (see the literature review and empirical results in 
Oehler 1992, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2011).  
New institutional economics emerged in the 1970s and analyses how institu-
tional frameworks and trade organizations emerge and what their existence im-
plies for the individual and society. This is different from a neoclassical point of 
view because here the institutional framework is assumed to be given (Gabler 
Verlag 2012). New institutional economists often work within a modified neo-
classical framework and use a different set of assumptions such as bounded ra-
tionality which are closer to real world behavior than the assumptions made in 
the original neoclassical theory. Many aspects of economic arrangements and 
behavior have been analysed in current new institutional research, and the as-
pects of most interest with respect to the topic of this work are asymmetric in-
formation, bounded rationality and transaction costs. A strand which has arisen 
out of new institutional economics is information economics which has as its 
main focus on these three aspects.  
 
12 References for uncertainty of income: Pemberton 1997; Irvine and Wang 2001; uncertainty 
about time of retirement: Blau 2008; uncertainty over health and mortality: Milevsky et al. 
2011. 
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Information economics considers the implications of incomplete information in 
decision-making concerning the present and the future. This incompleteness 
arises from the uncertainty of the future, boundedly rational agents and asym-
metric information between economic agents. In order to avoid a suboptimal or 
costly decision, contracting parties may gather information to reduce uncertain-
ty about the quality of a product. Information gathering, however, is not cost-
less, a fact which has to be considered by both contracting parties. Information 
economics considers two models of decision making as relevant for their re-
search. This is on the one hand Marschak’s model (1954) which is based on a 
neoclassical microeconomic framework. He relaxes the assumption that the in-
stitutional environment can be taken as given and furthermore allows for a vari-
ation in the availability of information about this environment. It is therefore 
possible that decisions are not based on the true state of the environment but on 
the information which the individual has about it. 
On the other hand Simon (Simon 1955, 1956, 1959) developed a model in which 
an individual is not perfectly informed about his/her environment, about the 
kind and number of all available options, about their outcomes and about the 
benefits and costs of additional information. He concludes that individuals are 
boundedly rational because of their limited capability of acquiring and pro-
cessing information. Simon assumes that each individual has an aspiration level 
which he/she tries to attain and which can vary depending on the experience 
and knowledge of the individual. As soon as an individual has gathered all the 
relevant information to achieve the goal or as soon as he/she realizes that the 
aspired aspiration level cannot be achieved, he/she stops searching for more 
information. He called this kind of behavior “satisficing,” which refers to the 
fact that the individual intentionally stops the information gathering process as 
soon as an option is available that allows his/her aspiration level to be attained. 
Behavioral economics research as well as the research around new institutional 
economics focuses on cases in which decisions do not adhere to the predictions 
made by the standard neo-classical model. Instead of assuming that individuals’ 
decisions are rational in the sense of the homo oeconomicus, it has been as-
sumed that individuals act boundedly rational. Individuals have problems in 
processing information if a problem is too complex, which leads to decisions 
which are often only based on the incomplete set of information which would be 
available. If such individuals have worked out a strategy or plan they often fail to 
carry it out. They may know that they should save more for retirement but they 
frequently do not start to save more. Behavior like this has been called bounded 
will-power (Barr 2012). When presenting the behavioral findings which are rele-
vant for savings decisions it is difficult to differentiate between information 
economics and behavioral economics because the boundaries are flawed. Both 
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research directions have something to say about bounded rationality as well as 
about bounded will-power. For that reason the anomalies which do not adhere 
to the assumptions of rational behavior and/or perfect information will now be 
outlined while resisting assigning the findings to either of the two theoretical 
approaches. 
Framing 
The situational context in which the information is presented and the presenta-
tion itself is important in showing how willing individuals are to understand, 
process and implement this information (Oehler and Reisch 2008). Applying 
prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman (Tversky and Kahneman 1986) con-
firmed the dependence of choices on the language of presentation, the context 
of the choice and on the nature of the display in an experimental setting. Empir-
ical evidence derived from field data has been presented by Iyengar and Ka-
menica (2006) who found that the number of funds in an individual’s 401(k) 
plan affected the allocation of funds. They observed that greater funds encour-
aged an increased allocation to money market and bond funds at the expense of 
equity funds. 
Information/Choice overload 
Experiments as well as field data have shown that too much choice can derogate 
rational choice, to the extent that more information does not necessarily entail 
better decision-making. Too much information can even lead individuals to 
make no decision at all, to procrastinate, or fall back on heuristics to simplify 
decisions. Lyengar and Kamenica (2006) argue that the benefit of information 
would decrease as the information load and complexity increases. They found 
that individuals who face a large choice set have strong preferences for simple, 
easy to understand options.  
That too much choice can cause individuals to make no decisions at all has been 
shown by, among others, Lyengar and Jiang Wei (2003) who found that the par-
ticipation in 401(k) is higher in plans offering about five funds than in plans 
offering ten or more options.13 Lyengar and Lepper (2000) conducted choice ex-
periments in a grocery store and found that more choice not only lessens the 
motivation to choose but also the subsequent motivation to commit to a choice.  
The decision in a grocery store about which marmalade to choose is not preced-
ed by substantial time and effort costs to acquire information about the product 
nor is the wrong decision associated with any great loss. This, however, can be 
 
13 See also Huberman and Jiang (2006) who finds that as the number of funds available in 
401(k) plans increases, the percentage of individuals who participates declines. 
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different with other products such as retirement investments. Lyengar and Jiang 
Wei (2003) argue that too much information would matter more in those cases 
in which the cost of a wrong choice is large and acquiring further information 
would be time consuming and demand a lot of effort. As a result individuals 
may decide not to make a decision at all, use a heuristic, or to turn to an expert 
who suggests how to decide. 
Heuristics / Rule of Thumb 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) describe a heuristic as “[...] a strategy that 
ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, 
frugal, and/or accurately than more complex methods.” Generally, it had been 
claimed that heuristics trade off some loss in accuracy for faster and simpler 
decisions (Shah and Oppenheimper 2008). One commonly used heuristic when 
allocating money among assets is the 1/N rule, which states that money should 
be allocated equally to each of N funds. Empirical evidence has shown that 
about 50% of people rely on this heuristic (DeMiguel and Garlappi 2009). Re-
search which investigated the 1/N rule by comparing asset allocations which 
resulted from this heuristic with asset allocations which followed complex opti-
mization rules found that often the heuristic performed better (DeMiguel and 
Garlappi 2009, Fischer and Gallmeyer 2012). The probability of a heuristic out-
performing an optimization solution increases with an increasing number of 
assets and increasing uncertainty. DeMiguel and Garlappi (2009) conclude that 
neither model can guarantee an optimal outcome, instead they both entail a 
good or a bad outcome.  
A further heuristic frequently used is the recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier 2011). This implies that that if one of two alternatives is recognized 
and the other is not, then the recognized alternative will be chosen. Evidence for 
this heuristic has for example been found by the publishing companies der Spie-
gel and the manager magazine who carried out a study focusing on financial 
services in Germany (Wienke 2004, Stuhr 2004). They surveyed more than 
10.000 individuals aged 14 years and above. 91% of the respondents stated that 
they would prefer money investment which bore no risk and 88% looked for an 
investment which they knew very well. Oehler (2012b) rated these heuristics as 
behavior of a rather short sighted nature.14 A negative example for choosing the 
familiar alternative is the Enron worker who heavily invested in the stock of En-
ron and when Enron went bankrupt he/she not only lost his/her wage but 
his/her pension claims as well. 
 
14 Further evidence on the recognition heuristic has been found by Coates et al. (2004) and 
Marewski et al. (2010). 
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Status Quo Bias 
The status quo bias is a preference for the current state of affairs which is taken 
as a reference point. Hence individuals tend to stick to their current choice or 
previous decision even though a better alternative exists.15 Kempf and Ruenzi 
(2005) found evidence for the status quo bias in the US equity mutual fund 
market. Individuals who already had a plan were reluctant to adjust this plan 
even though it was no longer the optimal choice. They also detected that the sta-
tus quo bias increased with the number of alternatives, thereby also delivering 
evidence for the behavioral implications of choice overload. Therefore they con-
firmed earlier results from Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) who proved the 
status quo bias experimentally and using field data. Individuals who participated 
in retirement plans could choose to allocate their premium between two funds. 
Even though large variations in the rate of return had been observed between 
the two funds, they did not find any significant change in asset allocations.  
Peer Effects / Herding 
Peer effects or herding behavior arises from the sensitivity with which individu-
als react to the decisions and actions of others. Individuals often take an action 
or decision because others do so, without any planned direction. Burke et al. 
(2010)) investigated the brain processes evident in the event of participants ob-
serving someone else buying stocks, and found that an area of the brain respon-
sible for reward feelings had been activated. Experimental evidence for herd be-
havior had been provided among others by Banerjee (1992) who showed that the 
decisions of other individuals has a much greater influence on an individual’s 
choice than his/her own information.16 Raafat, Chater and Frith (2009) pro-
posed an integrated approach to herding, “[…] describing two key issues: mecha-
nisms of transmission of thoughts or behaviour between agents, and patterns of 
connections between agents.” 
Mental accounts 
Another concern of behavioral economists is the assumption of the life-cycle 
model that wealth is perfectly fungible. This assumption is often not met in the 
real world, instead the marginal propensity to consume varies between different 
wealth accounts (Shefrin and Thaler 1988, Thaler 1990, 1999), which Shefrin 
 
15 Further evidence for the status quo bias in be found in Kahneman et al. (1991). 
16 Further literature finding evidence for herding behavior or peer effects for example 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) Beseley and Banarjee (1990), Akerlof (1980), peer effects on the date 
of retirement has been found by Chalmers et al.(2008) and implications of peer effects on re-
tirement savings decisions has among other been analysed by Beshears et al.(2010). 
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and Thaler (1988) called mental accounts, which are arranged according to how 
tempting it is for an individual to spend the money held in them. Spending 
money from a checking account is, for example, more tempting than spending 
money from a retirement account. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) found that the 
propensity to consume from a checking account, which belongs to the “current 
assets” category, is nearly 1.0 whereas spending out of a retirement account, 
which is categorized as “future income”, has a marginal propensity to consume 
close to zero. In fact they introduced three classes of accounts, which are called 
“current assets”, “current wealth” and “future income”. Browning and Crossley 
2001, however, argue that it could be possible to relax the fungibility assumption 
in the life-cycle model if theoreticians refine the model by relating behavior “to 
the properties of assets in a theoretically consistent way”.17 
Self-Control 
Thaler and Shefrin (1981) developed the Economic Theory of Self-Control, 
whereby they modelled an individual as having two conflicting selves. Each time 
individuals have to decide if and how much to save, conflict occurs because one 
of the selves, the doer, is myopic and the other, the planner, is farsighted. The 
planner would like to save for retirement but the doer does not. Individuals gen-
erally have a preference for short term gratification, and place more weight on 
current utility than on future utility. Subsequently they prefer to spend money 
today rather than save for the future. As a result, forgoing consumption today is 
associated with psychological costs for the individual.  
Procrastination 
Procrastination is a concept closely related to self-control problems. Individuals 
agree that they should save more for retirement but continually delay increasing 
savings or starting to save (Choi et al. Laibson et al. 1998). Procrastination is not 
only an important concept in retirement savings decision but also in many other 
areas such as losing weight, giving up smoking or preparing for an exam. 
A descriptive theory of choice, which considers the above outlined anomalies 
and heuritsics, is the prospect theory which has been developed by Kahnemann 
and Tversky (1979, Tversky and Kahnemann 1992). This theory refines the ex-
pected utility theory and has been intensely discussed among researchers and 
empirically tested (Oehler 1995, Weber 1990). The decision process of an indi-
vidual consists of two phases, the framing or editing phase and the valuation 
phase. During the editing phase individuals “organize and reformulate the op-
 
17 Empirical evidence for mental accounting and rule of thumb has been provided by Bern-
heim and Skinner (1997), Zeisberger, Langer and Weber 2012. 
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tions so as to simplify subsequent evaluation and choice” (Kahnemann and 
Tversky 1979, p. 274). An individual determines a reference point, the starting 
point which is relevant for evaluating the results of lotteries. Furthermore, parts 
of the outcome which are certain in each of the lotteries will be separated. Then 
the lotteries will be evaluated based on their stochastic dominance. The prospect 
theory, therefore, requires an individual to edit the choice situation before they 
finally value each of the options (Weber 1990). The final choice is than part of 
the valuation phase in which the individual assesses the value of each prospect. 
The two main elements of the prospect theory are a value function which is con-
cave for gains and convex for losses and a nonlinear transformation of the prob-
ability scale (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979). The consequences of a value func-
tion which is concave for gains and convex for losses is that gains and losses are 
valued differently, depending on a reference point (Kahnemann and Tversky 
1979, 2000). Individual decisions will therefore be influenced by the reference 
point they have chosen because of the different valuation of losses and gains.18 
In fact an individual’s utility will not depend on total wealth of the alternative 
outcomes, a proposed by expected utility theory, but on the value which the in-
dividual attaches to each of the results.19 This also implies that individuals 
would suffer more if they lose 100€ than they would be happy if they won 100€.  
The nonlinear transformation of the probability scale is a further aspect which 
distinguishes the prospect theory from expected utility theory. These probabili-
ties, also called decision weights “measure the impact of events on the desirabil-
ity of prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood of these two events” 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, p. 280). Such a transformation entails that small 
probabilities are overweighed and moderate and high probabilities are under-
weighted. There is empirical evidence that individuals overestimate low proba-
bilities in relation to impossible events and underestimate high probabilities in 
relation to certain events (e.g. Oehler 1995, Tversky and Fox 2000). Another de-
scriptive theory of choice, the behavioural life cycle hypothesis, which also con-
siders the above outlined anomalies and heuristics, will be discussed in the next 
sub chapter, relating the findings to financial literacy. 
2.1.4 Implications for Financial Literacy 
The previous chapters have reviewed those theories which are relevant for an 
analysis of retirement savings behavior. What these theories have to say about 
the implications of financial literacy on retirement savings behavior will now be 
 
18 For empirical evidence see Kaufmann and Weber 2013 
19 More information about expected utility theory see chapter 2.1.2. 
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examined. Individuals have to decide if they start to save, how much they save 
and which product to choose. In relation to the latter point information asym-
metry plays an important role. There are a variety of financial products on the 
market from which individuals can choose. Since the quality of these products 
can often be assessed only after several years, these goods are credence goods 
for which a wrong decision because of information asymmetries could be espe-
cially costly. One possible solution to reduce asymmetries is to gain more in-
formation. But the findings of information economics and behavioral econom-
ics have shown that more information can cause an information overload, which 
may deter individuals from dealing with private retirement provision in the first 
place. 
However, the potentially adverse results from more information leading to inac-
tive-ness do not necessarily have to mean that providing individuals with basic 
information about finance and the pension system is wrong. Knowing roughly 
what to expect from the statutory pension, the direction in which reforms alter 
the system, that inflation decreases purchasing power and that compound inter-
est increases savings, might have different effects on retirement savings behav-
ior than providing detailed information on each potential saving plan.  
Maki (2004) was concerned about the channels through which financial educa-
tion might influence the optimization problem of the individual in the neo-
classical framework. Indeed it will be shown that refinements which have been 
incorporated into the classical life cycle framework will facilitate predictions 
which are in line with empirical observations from previously presented behav-
ioral and information economics. Maki (2004) put forward three considerations. 
Firstly, financial education may lead to higher savings by reducing the house-
hold’s discount rate. Secondly, financially literate consumers might be less risk 
averse since they know that riskier assets do better than other investments over 
the long term. Lastly, financial education may increase knowledge about possi-
ble actions and their implications.  
The assumption of the life-cycle model that consumers are fully informed while 
maximizing their utility is therefore not applicable, while the first two explana-
tions would mean that financial education changes parameters of the utility 
function. Maki (2004) admitted that it is unlikely that time preferences and risk 
aversion will be influenced by financial education, as, on the one hand, he/she 
argues that there is no existing link between education on pension plans and 
time preferences. While on the other hand most models of saving under uncer-
tainty would predict lower savings in the case of decreasing risk aversion. 
he/she concludes that the third explanation is the most likely one, namely that 
financial education increases the knowledge of an individual’s set of choices.  
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Clark et. al. (2006) also criticizes the assumption that individuals are correctly 
informed about the various factors that determine wealth accumulation. If peo-
ple are not correctly informed it would follow that they will not achieve their re-
tirement objectives. For their analysis they use the classical life-cycle framework 
and describe how financial education influences different parameters of either 
the utility function or the budget constraint. Each time an individual acquires 
new knowledge in some period of his/her working life, when, for instance, 
he/she re-discovers that the return on stock is lower than previously known, 
then he/she can chose to keep the fraction of wage income he/she wants to con-
sume during retirement unchanged and retire later, or reduce the fraction. 
Within their model they also allow for the possibility that financial education 
changes the time and risk preference parameters.  
Inspired by Rae (1834), Jevons (1931), Böhm-Bawerk (1891) and Fisher (1930), 
Becker and Mulligan (1997) developed their “model of patience formation”. 
They combined classical economist’s theory with the psychological insides from, 
among others, the anticipatory utility theory. In their model they endogenize 
time preferences and argue that “[e]ven rational people may ‘excessively’ dis-
count future utilities, but we assume that they may partially or fully offset this 
by spending effort and goods to reduce the degree of over discounting.” (Becker 
and Mulligan 1997). They argue that this spending increases the “future orien-
tated capital” of the individual which helps them to imagine the future.  
Individuals can invest in future orientated capital through reading newspapers, 
listening to the news on TV, participating in a retirement seminar or choosing 
private retirement insurance with stringent rules to save regularly. A newspaper 
article about upcoming pension reforms could, for example, increase awareness 
of the need to provide for retirement. Saving rules introduced by the private sec-
tor or the government can act as disciplinary devices. Retirement provision is, 
therefore, present in the mind of the individual and seems less remote than be-
fore. Formally the model appears as follows.20 
𝑈 = ∑ 𝜌(𝑆)𝑡 × 𝑢𝑡(𝑐𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1  (2) 
∑ 𝑅𝑡𝑐𝑡 + 𝜋𝑆 = 𝐴0
𝑇
𝑡=0  Budget Constraint (3) 
According to the model, an individual lives T periods and discounts future utili-
ty at rate 𝜌(𝑆). The underlying discount function is exponential and depends on 
the level of resources S spend on imagining the future. More resources spent on 
future orientated capital increase the discount factor but at a decreasing rate. 
𝜌(0) is the endowed discount factor which is assumed to be <0. Individuals are 
 
20 The notation has been adjusted for reasons of consistency throughout this thesis. 
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assumed to maximize their objective function U subject to the budget constraint 
depicted in equation (3). In this equation 𝑅𝑡 is the interest rate factor, 𝜋 the 
price of S and the initial wealth endowment is represented by 𝐴0. It has been 
assumed that the costs of S are constant and equal for everyone regardless of 
wealth and preferences.  
Additional assumptions are that the stock does not appreciate over time and that 
consumers face a perfect capital market. One important implication of the mod-
el is the complementarity between future utilities and investments in future ori-
entated capital. High perceived future utilities encourage investments in future 
orientated capital. Individuals associating negative feelings with old age would 
therefore invest less in acquiring S. 
A similar reasoning underlies the growth model by Michel and Vidal (2003) that 
allows time preferences to be endogenous in a small open economy with an in-
finite time horizon. They assume that individuals differ in their ability to reduce 
the rate at which they discount the future, as some individuals are endowed with 
a higher ability to increase future orientation than others. In their model not 
only is the initial investment in future orientated capital (the authors call it per-
sonal capital) costly but also maintaining it.  
From the two preceding models it can be deduced that financial education in-
fluences the rate at which individuals discount the future. Individuals who heav-
ily discount the future may invest in acquiring financial knowledge or discipli-
nary devices. If they do so it might be possible that financially literate people 
save for retirement despite having a high initial discount rate. Investment in 
future orientated capital therefore postulates that individuals know that their 
high discount rate is irrational. They know that they would have a lower income 
during retirement than they wished to have, if they saved as little as their initial-
ly high discount rate suggests them to save.  
Consumers with a high discount rate, not realizing that this discount rate might 
be too high, would make suboptimal savings decisions approaching retirement 
with insufficient wealth. Nevertheless this does not have to happen as according 
to the theory there is still the possibility that these individuals accidentally in-
crease their future orientation. This could happen through watching TV, read-
ing newspapers, visiting grandparents, increased interest rates, receiving infor-
mation about retirement planning after being hired or through mandatory re-
tirement savings introduced by the government. Hence there are many 
measures which could be taken by the government or other parties involved in 
retirement provision.  
An argument which leads to a similar conclusion as the model discussed before, 
is Thaler and Shefrin’ s Economic Theory of Self-Control (1981). Inspired by the 
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psychological treatment of the concept of self-control and the principal agent 
theory, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) modeled an individual as having two conflict-
ing selves. Each time individuals have to decide if and how much to save, con-
flict occurs because one of the self’s, the doer, is myopic and the other, the 
planner, is farsighted. The planner would like to save for retirement but the do-
er does not. In such a case the planner has the opportunity to discipline the do-
er. This action generally bears effort costs. One example would be that the plan-
ner eliminates choices of the individual. For this purpose Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981) suggested, among others, self-imposed rules of thumb like not buying 
consumption goods on credit, a prohibition of dissaving or saving devices which 
require regular contributions. 
All these measures would have a similar effect on savings behavior in the theory 
of self-control that they would have in the model from Becker and Mulligan 
(1997) discussed earlier, namely they would increase retirement savings. The 
endogenous time preference model would predict future orientated capital to 
increase which in turn would reduce the discount rate and increase retirement 
savings. The theory of self-control would also predict increasing retirement sav-
ings. Based on the theory of self-control Shefrin and Thaler (1988, 1992) devised 
the Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis. Besides self-control they introduced men-
tal accounts, which demonstrate the non-fungibility of wealth, an assumption of 
the standard life-cycle model.  
These mental accounts are “current income”, “current assets”, and “future in-
come”. The marginal propensity to consume differs between these accounts. It 
is for example much more tempting to spend out of the “current income” ac-
count than from the “current assets” account. In conjunction with self-control it 
implies that a strong willpower is needed to restrict spending out of the “current 
income” account. In the case that “current income” is exhausted and the indi-
vidual would like to invade his/her “current assets“ account, the self-control 
technology produces a fixed disutility penalty for the first unit consumed out of 
this account. The same holds if the “future income” account is invaded.  
As a result, mental accounts support the planner in restricting consumption at 
low effort costs if the planner is able to convince the doer to place some money 
aside into long term saving contracts.21 To relate mental accounts to the theoret-
ical argument above, the “current asset” account and especially the “future in-
come” account have a similar function as the disciplinary devices discussed pre-
 
21 Shefrin and Thaler (1992) argue that it is also possible to exert self-control by formulating 
internal rules such as the self-imposed prohibition on borrowing to finance consumption. 
These kinds of self-enforced internal rules require greater willpower than mental accounting.  
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viously. However, beyond the monetary penalty of withdrawing money from, for 
example, a private pension account, which is the disciplinary device, Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988, 1992) argue that there are additional psychological costs. Thaler 
(1999) found empirical evidence that the marginal propensity to spend a dollar 
from the “current income” account is nearly one, and the propensity to spend a 
dollar from a “future income” account is almost zero. 
Closely linked to the concept of self-control is the problem of procrastination. 
People plan, for example, to stop smoking or to join the gym next year but as 
time goes by and the next year appears, they procrastinate with regards to their 
new year’s resolution. Laibson et al. (1998) reviewed research that found that a 
minority of the surveyed persons aged 26 and above had tried to figure out their 
retirement needs and that most consumers think that they save too little for re-
tirement. Since these individuals know that they save too little but do nothing 
about it, it seems appropriate to assume that they procrastinate in planning and 
saving for retirement because these are unpleasant tasks.  
Such behavior follows as a consequence of present-biased preferences (O'Dono-
ghue and Rabin 1998). Present bias means that individuals discount events in 
the near future at a higher implicit discount rate than events in the distant fu-
ture. As with the theory of self-control, present biased preferences entail a con-
flict between immediate gratification and the long run desire to be patient. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1998) distinguish between two different extremes. On 
the one hand, there are the sophisticates; people who are fully aware of their 
self-control problem and thus know that their discount rate will change in the 
future. On the other hand, there are the naïves, individuals who believe that 
their current good intentions will definitely be implemented by their future 
selves (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1998).  
An individual’s discount function mapping such behavior looks like a general-
ized hyperbola (Laibson et al. 1998). Most research on intertemporal choice does 
not use this generalized hyperbola discount function but an approximation of it 
which is analytically easier to handle. This approximation is the discrete-time 
quasi hyperbolic function. Formula 4 shows the quasi hyperbolic discount rate 
as part of an utility function (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1998, 1999). 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡, 𝑈𝑡(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑡+1, … , 𝑢𝑇) ≡ 𝜌
𝑡𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽 ∑ 𝜌
𝜏𝑢𝜏
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1   (4) 
where 0 < 𝛽, 𝜌 ≤ 1 
In this model 𝜌 represents time-consistent impatience, whereas 𝛽 denotes the 
bias for the present. If 𝛽 = 1 an individual would simply use time consistent 
exponential discounting of the future. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1998) examine 
whether individuals would switch from one retirement savings account into an-
other account because he or she knows that the return on investment would be 
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higher. They find that naïves would procrastinate, not putting in the effort, to 
transfer the money, even if their taste for immediate gratification were small. 
This is because the forgone interest on savings of delaying the transfer for one 
day is low compared to the immediately incurred effort costs.  
Naïves do not realize that they have a self-control problem and believe that fu-
ture selves will act in the interest of current selves when in fact they will procras-
tinate again. The same is true if individuals were to receive a higher return on 
their saving by expending effort to find a better investment. In contrast, sophis-
ticated persons are aware of their present-biased preferences and account for a 
larger loss of investment returns since they know that they would repeatedly 
procrastinate: “[K]nowing about future misbehavior increases your perceived 
cost of current misbehavior, thereby encouraging you to behave yourself now.” 
(O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). According to the authors’ education and, in par-
ticular, retirement seminars reduce the effort costs incurred with retirement 
planning. Reduced effort costs make it more likely that naïves abstain from 
immediate gratification and save for retirement. 
An important result from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1998) is the observation that 
“[s]evere procrastination does not arise from present-biased preferences per se, 
but rather from present-biased preferences combined with naivete.” This result 
confirms the model implications from Becker and Mulligan (1997). Individuals 
who know that they heavily discount the future can compensate for it by invest-
ing in future orientated capital. Hence a lack of retirement savings does not 
necessarily result from a high discount rate. While both models differ in im-
portant aspects they nevertheless reach the same conclusion.  
Based on the theory above a theoretical decision model and hypotheses will be 
developed which will be the basis for the empirical part of this thesis. Figure 4 
describes the decision process from starting to think about retirement towards 
actual saving for retirement (see for a process-oriented figure on the decision 
process of private investors Oehler 2011; see also Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 
Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Schmidt-von Rhein 1996; Oehler 1995, 2005b, 
2006). Each of the decision points in this model will now be described in some 
detail. 
1. The first obstacle towards an adequate retirement income is taking time 
to think about old-age provision and the desired life during retirement. 
Since time is a scarce commodity for most individuals, it could also be 
devoted to much more enjoyable things than old-age provision. Continu-
ing with lessons from Becker and Mulligans’ (1997) findings, individuals 
in the present might ascribe a low utility to consumption as a retiree 
which may be derived from the negative association with old age and the 
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unpleasant task of thinking about it. It is possible to change this percep-
tion by experiencing certain events which increase future utilities. Such 
events could be visiting grandparents who might complain about their 
low retirement income and explain what they could afford if they had put 
more money aside. The same could be attained by the media if it high-
lights the importance of private retirement income. Other channels 
through which future utility could be raised are the introduction of saving 
incentives or increasing returns on investment. As future utility goes up, 
the profitability of investments in future orientated capital increases as 
well, this in turn decreases the discount rate.  
Figure 4: The Path Towards Private Retirment Provision 
 
 
According to the theory of self-control imbedded in the behavioral life-
cycle hypothesis and the theory of procrastination, effort costs are im-
portant determinants in the decision to think and later to plan for retire-
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ment (Thaler and Shefrin 1981, Shefrin and Thaler 1988, 1992). Effort 
costs are especially high, if someone dislikes dealing with old-age and re-
tirement provision. Decreasing effort costs is essential to encourage, in 
particular, the so-called “naïve” consumer to think about retirement. Ef-
fort costs could be decreased through media reports about retirement life 
and old-age provision, a talk with experienced friends or a job change 
which requires employees to think about joining a retirement plan. When 
this obstacle is resolved, it is time to think about the desired retirement 
income and about how much of this income will be covered by the statu-
tory pension. 
2. Collecting all the relevant information individuals have to estimate if they 
are going to face a pension gap. The pension gap is that part of the de-
sired retirement income which will not be covered by the statutory pen-
sion. People who do not expect a pension gap do not have to take any fur-
ther action. If a pension gap is to be expected it is necessary to check if 
this gap can be closed through existing saving plans or other wealth op-
tions.  
3. This comprises a review of total assets. These are for example expected 
income from saving plans like life-insurance policies, retirement plans or 
housing equity. The individual has to determine if these saving measures 
close the pension gap. Estimating future retirement income, however, is a 
difficult task and an exact estimation of retirement income is impossible 
as there are too many uncertainties which can affect outcomes. The statu-
tory pension system is prone to government reforms and the contracts 
with the private sector are also not immune against government interven-
tion. Additionally there is the volatility of financial markets and asymmet-
ric information between the consumer and the bank or insurance com-
panies. Consumers might be wrongly informed about the costs of their 
private pension contract or about the rate of return, both of which could 
decrease their expected pay-off. Furthermore, individuals may act on the 
assumption that they are able to contribute regularly to the pension or 
savings plan if they unexpectedly become unemployed or if future pen-
sion prospects change. As a result individuals can only roughly assess 
whether the statutory pension plus present private savings will suffice to 
secure an adequate standard of living when old. If this is the case and 
provided that these savings are dedicated for retirement purpose, no fur-
ther action is necessary. Otherwise the next step has to be taken.  
4. Now individuals have to check if they can afford additional retirement 
savings. This is the second obstacle for many people. If no financial re-
sources are left at first glance then one should think about reducing costs 
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in other areas. For this purpose it might be beneficial to ask someone like 
a debt advisor for assistance. Such a counselling session can help to avoid 
liabilities which could arise by saving at the wrong place to finance old-
age provision. Even if no financial sources can be redirected towards re-
tirement savings it is possible to take further action to reduce the pension 
gap (5a) otherwise planning can continue as described in (5).  
5. At this point concrete retirement planning should start. First of all this 
comprises the collection of information about different savings vehicles 
in order to find the one which best suits individual needs. This infor-
mation can be gathered through, for example, retirement seminars, the 
statutory pension insurance, consumer advice centres, financial advisors, 
newspapers or the internet. There is a huge variety of products available 
on the market which starts with “Riester saving plans” to Life-insurance 
policies and up to homeownership. The theory predicts that too many op-
tions to choose from prevent naïve consumers from starting retirement 
planning.22 The reason is that the wide range of products increases the ef-
fort costs incurred by individuals when collecting information and decid-
ing on the product. Effort costs could be reduced through for example a 
retirement seminar or a trustworthy person, who gives a hint as to which 
product is the best idea to choose. For the theory of endogenous time 
preferences the same issues apply that were discussed earlier. Where in-
dividuals have to overcome their temptation to spend their time doing 
more enjoyable things than thinking about old age provision. (Becker and 
Mulligan 1997). 
5a. Even if no financial resources are left for (additional) private retirement 
savings, it is still possible to engage in retirement provision. It is neces-
sary to think about retirement and about how it would be possible to live 
economically. Means of reducing costs could be for example moving into 
a cheaper flat and living in a town with a good infrastructure for pension-
ers. It might be possible to sell the car, to organize flat sharing or to move 
into a multiple generations house (“Mehrgenerationenhaus”). Such living 
arrangements can save costs in the form of supporting each other like 
taking care of children, going shopping, cooking, doing minor repairs 
and so on (Schiekiera 2011). Another possibility would be to join or to 
 
22 The theory of procrastination with hyperbolic discounting is not the only theory that predicts 
that too much choice may deter individuals from engaging in retirement planning. In infor-
mation economics this relationship has also been confirmed. For empirical evidence see for 
example Huberman 2006 and Iyengar and Jiang Wei 2003. 
52 
found a registered cooperative society (Genossenschaft). As long as the 
members are young and healthy they help the elderly. Each hour that an 
individual spends supporting others will be added to his/her time ac-
count. In the future the member might need help him-/herself; in this 
case he/she will receive costless support from younger society members 
for each hour the needy society member had helped elderly when he/she 
was young ( Kopp-Wichmann 2010, Bigalke 2009). These are only some 
examples about how someone can economize his/her life independent of 
any financial resources. Trying to gather information from the local 
community, the internet, the government or the debt advisor may also be 
helpful in gaining advice for an economical retirement life.  
6. Having found an appropriate product, individuals have to compare differ-
ent providers in order to achieve the best possible cost performance ratio. 
People who decide in favor of a private retirement plan such as the 
“Riester-Pension” are now confronted with a variety of providers and of-
ten hidden contract costs which make a decision difficult (Oehler 2009). 
In this case it can be an advantage to make use of product and provider 
comparisons in journals like “Stiftung Warentest” or the “Wirtschafts-
woche”.  
7. After the consumer has chosen a product and provider, he or she can 
start saving for retirement. 
Actually taking out a retirement savings contract is a bumpy road where the 
temptation to spend time and money for more pleasurable things than for old-
age insurance can be a big problem. Most individuals lack the ability and re-
sources to formulate and process a maximization problem which is necessary to 
arrive at an optimal solution. Instead they try to simplify the choices they have to 
make. Such simplifications could be, for example, heuristics or rules of thumb. 
An illustration of this would be if individuals decide to save four per cent of 
gross income for retirement on the basis that this is perceived as a good deal 
because the government assigned this amount to be eligible for the full “Riester-
Subsidy”. These consumers may not be able to arrive at an optimal solution be-
cause of limited intellectual capabilities, and so they are termed boundedly ra-
tional (Simon 1955, 1959, Thaler 1990, 1994). Many individuals have a self-
control problem, even if they would be able to engage in optimal planning, they 
may not start to save any amount for retirement because they cannot resist the 
temptation of current consumption (Laibson et al. 1998, Thaler 1994, Thaler and 
Shefrin 1981). Besides the decision model above which will be relevant for the 
empirical analysis, four hypotheses shall be developed based on the theory dis-
cussed above in chapter 4.3. Within chapter 4.3 it will also be outlined how the 
hypotheses can be tested empirically. 
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2.2 Pension Reforms and their Impact23 
The industrial revolution in Germany during the 19th century attracted notice to 
the economic and social problems of the workforce. 1889 the German Reichstag 
under Otto von Bismarck approved a law introducing a pension and invalidity 
insurance. Every employee aged 16 to 70 years had to contribute to the statutory 
pension insurance. The contribution rate was 1.7% and shared between em-
ployer and employee. Contributions have been invested such that each employ-
ee accumulates a capital stock. At the age of 70 years employees received their 
pension if they had contributed at least 30 years. Not many employees received a 
pension because the average life expectancy was 40 years at that time.  
In 1916 the eligibility age had been reduced to 65 years. The first financial prob-
lems of the pension system occurred in 1921 in conjunction with the world eco-
nomic crisis. At that time the pensions have been pay-as-you go financed for a 
short period. In 1957 Konrad Adenauer abolished the funded pension system 
completely in favor of a pay-as-you go scheme.24 In 1986 Norbert Blüm started a 
campaign to increase the acceptance of the statutory pension insurance within 
the population. He stated that the pension from the statutory pension insurance 
would be save. After the German unification the pension insurance was in fi-
nancial problems again and in 1992 the government changed the pension ad-
justment formula, such that pension increases would be based on net income 
instead on gross income, which leads to a decline for future pensions. This re-
form was not able to able to stabalize contribution rates which had been predict-
ed to increase to about 23% in 2020 (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2006).  
The possible implications of this projected increase were that the working popu-
lation would bear a disproportionate amount of the increasing imbalance be-
tween the working population and the pensioner. Due to the defined benefit 
character of the statutory pension scheme in 2001, pensioners would not have 
had to sacrifice income. To divide the burden more equally between generations 
a major pension reform, named after former labour minister Walter Riester, 
was enacted in 2001. This reform changed the pension adjustment formula to 
make a decrease in the pension level possible. Pension increases would be 
slowed by a fictitious contribution rate assumed to be contributed to a private 
pension plan. This new part of the pension adjustment formula is called the 
"Riester-Factor”. 
 
23 For an overview on different stages in pension reforms in Germany see Wilke 2009 and 
Oehler 2009. 
24 More information about the history of the German pension system can be found in Ruland 
1990. 
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Additionally, increases in the contribution rate to the statutory pension scheme 
reduce pension adjustments and therefore reduce the future pension level. The 
objectives were that contributions to the public pension scheme should stay be-
low 20% until 2020 and below 22% until 2030; and that the pension level should 
not fall below 46% until 2020 and below 43% until 2030. Both goals are imple-
mented into the Social Security code (Federal Republic of Germany 2009, SGB 
IV § 154). Additionally, a savings subsidy (“Riester-subsidy”) was introduced to 
make supplemental private and company pensions more attractive.  
In principle, everyone saving at least 4% of his or her income within a “Riester-
Pension” plan is entitled to a saving subsidy of 308 € plus 185 € for each child. 
For children born after 2007, the child subsidy has been increased to 300 €. An 
alternative to the subsidy is receipt of a tax deduction, depending which is more 
advantageous to the individual. “Riester-Pension” plans are certified products 
which have to meet certain criteria set by the government. Criteria are, for in-
stance, that the provider has to guarantee at least a retirement wealth equivalent 
to the contributions (individual plus subsidy) and that he or she has to convert 
the retirement wealth into a life-long annuity. The self-employed are amongst 
one of the groups of people that are not entitled to a Riester-subsidy.  
Coppola and Reil-Held (2009) calculated how much of yearly savings flowing 
into the “Riester-Pension” were contributed from the individual and what per-
centage of total savings were contributed by the government in the form of the 
“Riester-Subsidy”. They found that the percentage contributed by the govern-
ment is especially high for individuals with low income or families with chil-
dren. These groups of people often receive a “Riester-Subsidy” which is worth 
50% of total savings. Hence the government seems to be able to increase the 
number of savers among low income individuals with the subsidy. 
At present there are several different “Riester-Pension” contracts available: bank 
savings plan, fund savings plan, classical pension insurance, fund based pen-
sion insurance and two further forms with different regulations, especially, con-
cerning the out-payments. These two are the “Company Riester” pension and 
the “Housing Pension” (Eigenheimrente). Individuals are entitled for a housing 
pension if they intend to buy or build a house. The “Riester-Subsidies” will be 
paid either for a certified housing loan or a building savings contract. Instead of 
filing a company pension with tax deferred contributions it is also possible to 
receive a “Riester-Subsidy” for most company pension plans. The company pen-
sion with “Riester-Subsidy” has one disadvantage over the other “Riester-
Pension” plans. This disadvantage is that at the time the pension is due, indi-
viduals have to pay health insurance contributions on their out-payments which 
classical “Riester-Savers” do not have to pay. 
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In 2004, another pension reform followed which again modified the pension 
formula by implementing a sustainability factor. This factor accounts for the 
relationship between the number of individuals paying contributions to the 
statutory pension system and the number of pensioners. In the case of an in-
crease in the number of pensioners relative to the number of contributors, up-
ward pension adjustments will be slowed. At present, it is predicted that the 
contribution rate will rise from 19.9% in 2008 to 20.4% in 2022 and the pension 
level will decrease from 50.5% in 2008 to 46.2% in 2022 (Bundesministerium 
für Arbeit und Soziales 2008a). Figure 5 depicts the situation for the replace-
ment rate. Additionally the figure shows that under certain assumptions the pri-
vate “Riester-Pension” is able to stop the fall in the replacement rate.25 
Figure 5: The Pension Gap, Replacement Rate before Taxation in Percentage 
 
Source: Rentenversicherungsbericht 2007 (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und  
Soziales 2007) 
The German pension system is composed of three pillars. The first and most 
important pillar is the pay-as-you-go pension scheme. Everyone who is subject 
to social insurance contributions is covered by this scheme. The contribution 
rate is 19.9% and divided equally between employee and employer. As described 
in the introduction, the pension level of the pay-as-you-go scheme has decreased 
as a result of the pension reforms in 2001 and 2004. Those who are self-
employed and individuals earning less than 400 € a month are not covered but 
could voluntarily participate in the scheme. Another group of employees not 
covered are civil servants who receive a non-contributory state pension.  
 
25 Assumptions for the calculation of the replacement rate were: 45 years of contribution to the 
statutory pension system, earning an average income, percentage contributed to the Riester-
Pension increases from 1 percent in 2002 to 4 percent in 2008, Riester-Pension yields 4 per-
cent interest p.a., Riester-Penison will be adjusted like the statutory pension, assumption that 
pensioner retirering before 2010 have not filed a Riester-Pension contract. 
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The term “civil servants” is used here to refer to a specific group of public serv-
ants, as in Germany, public servants could be civil servants, white-collar or blue-
collar workers (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2004, Kuhlmann and Röber 2006). The 
state pension for civil servants has also experienced some reductions in the re-
placement rate. In 2010, the pension for a civil servant employed full-time who 
has worked 40 years is 71.75% of his or her last salary. The average pension for 
individuals subject to social insurance contribution who contributed for 45 years 
to the statutory pension insurance and always earned an average income, receive 
a pension (net before taxation) which is 51.6% (1.106€ old federal states) of the 
average income employees earned in 2010 (German Federal Pension Insurance 
2010). A direct comparison of the civil servant pension and the statutory pension 
is not possible because the pension level of the statutory pension system is not a 
percentage of the employee’s last salary and civil servants enjoy other special 
privileges and duties aside from their pension system. In general, civil servants 
receive a pension which is higher than a comparable employee pension (Fuest 
2007). Based on the German Socio-Economic Panel 2007, Frick and Grabka 
(2010) calculated the present value of the ac-cumulated pension wealth for civil 
servants and blue- and white-collar workers. Civil servants aged 63-67 accumu-
lated on average pensions worth 400,000 euros while a comparable blue- or 
white-collar worker accumulated only 160,000 euros, a figure that is merely 40 
percent of what civil servants were able to accumulate. Hence, there is less need 
for supplemental retirement savings for civil servants.  
Even taking into account recent pension reforms, statutory pensions will con-
tinue to be the most important source of retirement income. Nevertheless, in 
view of the decrease in pension level for most individuals, supplementary 
measures are necessary to maintain their accustomed standard of living when 
old. Schmähl (2008) states that it will become increasingly difficult to acquire 
sufficient pension claims which exceed the need-orientated old-age basic in-
come support. This is especially the case for individuals who have been unem-
ployed for a long time.  
Company pension schemes constitute the second pillar of the pension system. 
Since 2002, every employee has the right to take advantage of deferred taxation 
for contributions to an occupational pension scheme. This means that employ-
ers have to provide a vehicle through which employees can save for their retire-
ment. Employers, however, can decide which type of pension scheme they offer. 
White- and blue-collar workers employed in the public services are offered a 
special form of company pension which is generally mandatory. The lion’s 
share of the contributions is paid by the public employer. The majority of em-
ployees in the private sector on the other hand have to pay contributions to a 
company pension plan completely out of their own pocket.  
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The third pillar is private pension which covers all kinds of voluntary supple-
mental long-term savings contracts. Among these are for example “Riester-
Pension” plans, life-insurance policies and other private pension plans. The 
pension reforms described above have fundamentally changed the character of 
German statutory pension system. Before the reforms it was classified as a de-
fined benefit scheme. It could now be classified as a notional defined contribu-
tion (NDC) plan (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2006). For individuals it is now in-
creasingly difficult to predict how much income they can expect from statutory 
pensions.  
For that reason, the statutory pension authority sends out pension statements 
on an annual basis. Since 2005, everyone who is 27 years old and has been con-
tributing to the statutory pension system for at least five years receives such a 
statement, which provides information about the expected pension entitlement 
in the case that one continues to pay contributions which are worth the average 
of the past five years until one retires. However, the statement also points to the 
decreasing pension level relative to wage increases as well as to the loss of pur-
chasing power of the accumulated wealth. Therefore, even despite this state-
ment for many individuals it is unclear as to what to expect with regards to the 
future replacement rate. Not only is the calculation of the pension gap trouble-
some, choosing the most appropriate product is challenging as well. Soon after 
the reforms, the financial sector reacted by offering a large variety of pension 
products. Since many individuals have no experience with such products they 
are often overwhelmed when attempting to choose the right product. 
Nevertheless, individuals who do not save in the form of a private retirement 
account may have real estate which saves on rent payments during retirement. 
Indeed, a study on behalf of the Versicherungskammer Bayern (2009) found 
that 43% of the respondents judge real estate as the best way to provide for one’s 
old age. The “Riester-Rente” was chosen by 30% of the respondents to be a good 
measure to save for retirement. A Postbank (2012) study supports the previous 
finding that the demand for real estate as a source of retirement income is in-
creasing and the monthly amount individuals save for retirement decreased 
from 204€ in 2005 to 185€ in 2012. The reasons put forward are the financial 
crises and the constantly low interest rates. For similar reasons the attractive-
ness of the “Riester-Pension” decreased. Only 24% of the respondents in the 
Postbank study think that the “Riester-Rente” is a good vehicle to provide for 
retirement compared to 31% in 2007. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2013) has 
shown that the number of newly filed “Riester-Penison” fond saving plans de-
creased from 690,000 in 2007 to 139,000 in 2011. According to the 
Gesamtverband der Versicherer (2013), the newly filed life-insurance plans also 
declined from 6,900,000 in 2008 to 6,300,000 in 2012. The percentage of indi-
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viduals who terminated their contract, however, declined form 4% in 2008 go 
3,48% in 2012. While the attractiveness of life insurance plans and the “Riester-
Penison” decreases, the number of of filed company pension plans (Direktversi-
cherung, Pensionskasse and Pensionsfonds) is continuously increasing from 
2002 to 2012 (Gesamtverband der Versicherer 2013). 
2.3 Literature Review 
The first part of the literature review, chapter 2.3.1, is devoted to literature as-
sessing financial literacy levels. If financial illiteracy would be asserted to be 
wide spread the follow up question would be if financial literacy influences re-
tirement planning and savings. This is the question which will be pursued in 
chapter 2.3.2. In the case that research detects an influence of financial literacy 
on retirement savings decisions it would be advisable to increase financial liter-
acy of the population to avoid suboptimal saving decisions. Since the focus of 
this thesis are retirement savings, chapter 2.3.4, reviews research which evalu-
ates the effectiveness of retirement seminars. The last part of the literature re-
view, chapter 2.3.5 is devoted to other measures which could be taken in order 
to increase retirement planning and saving. 
2.3.1 Is financial illiteracy a problem? 
In Germany, the concept of financial literacy gained importance after the de-
cline of the American and German stock market index (DJIA, DAX) and the in-
solvencies of a large number of major American and German companies in 
2002. Many individuals lost their savings, and more importantly, their accumu-
lated pension wealth. An article from a major German newspaper stated that, 
“[o]nly in times of crises do we realize how much we depend on others. That we 
are not able to help ourselves. Because we are illiterate: financially illiterate.” 
(Brost and Rohwetter 2002).  
The question researchers have to answer is: Who is financially literate and what 
do people have to know in order to be classified as financially literate? The 
common procedure to measure financial literacy has been to ask a sample of 
individuals’ knowledge questions concerning finance and retirement provision. 
The more questions they answer correctly, the more literate they are. There is, 
however, no consensus about the kind of questions to be asked. As a result the 
questions individuals have to answer in order to be classified as financially lit-
erate vary between studies. This chapter firstly presents research and surveys 
conducted in Germany in order to assess the level of financial literacy in Ger-
many. Secondly, international evidence will be reviewed and lastly shortcomings 
which can be observed in the design of most of these studies will be discussed. 
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The first scientific coverage of the topic followed in 2003 with a book on finan-
cial literacy and its effect on preventing poverty (Reifner 2003). The financial 
literacy level of the German population was assessed in 2003 using a representa-
tive survey among 1,000 Germans aged 18 to 65 years. This research was con-
ducted by NFO Infratest Finanzforschung on behalf of the Commerzbank 
(2003). Respondents had to answer 35 questions related to money management, 
credit and financial investments. It was found that although 80 per cent felt con-
fident about their understanding of financial issues, 42 per cent were not able to 
answer at least half of the questions correctly.  
A lack of financial knowledge was also confirmed by Reifner, Tiffe, and Turner 
(2003a), who analysed Data from the Bertelsmann Stiftung old-age provision 
survey from 2002. Questions about their behavior concerning old age provision 
have been answered by 2002 respondents born between 1952 and 1972. Addi-
tionally, questions were asked to measure financial knowledge. They detected 
deficits in compound interest calculations among all respondents. The majority 
of the population overestimated pension entitlements from the statutory pen-
sion system and only 44% were able to state which type of investment experi-
enced the greatest appreciation during the past 20 years. All questions were 
evaluated for subgroups of the population which were classified according to 
family status and income. They concluded that financial literacy increases with 
income. Using the same data, Leinert (2004) confirms these results and adds 
that the fraction of correct responses increases with education. 
Further evidence on widespread financial illiteracy in Germany was found by a 
representative TNS-Emnid study on behalf of Canada Life (2007) among 1012 
respondents aged 18 to 60. The study found that about half of the respondents 
were not able to explain a “Riester-Pension”. This result is surprising given that 
the “Riester-Pension” has been advertised since its introduction after the reform 
in 2001 and its importance in the second and third pillars of the German old-age 
insurance system. Using data from the 2007 wave of the German SAVE-Panel, 
Honekamp (2010) also confirms a lack of financial literacy among the German 
population. Not even half of the respondents were able to answer three basic 
financial knowledge questions about inflation, interest calculation and risk di-
versification correctly.26 Another study based on the same dataset showed that 
about 40% of the respondents were not able to approximately give an estimate of 
their expected replacement rate from the statutory pension system (Honekamp 
 
26 These three questions were formerly implemented in the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) 2004 by Lusardi and Mitchell (2006), see also Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, Pahnke and 
Honekamp 
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and Schwarze 2010). A 2011 survey revealed that 26% of the respondents aged at 
least 18 find it increasingly difficult to manage private finances (Ollrog 2011). 
In Germany also several surveys have been conducted to assess financial 
knowledge of young consumers. The conclusions drawn from most of the sur-
veys is that the financial knowledge of young individuals is low and that about 
half of the surveyed individuals don`t like to deal with financial matters. Based 
on the results of a study conducted by Hurrlemann and Gensicke (2010) it has 
been concluded that many young individuals are unable to cope with financial 
matters. This conclusion has been drawn because among others they found that 
only 12% of young individuals aged 17-27 years were able to explain that contri-
butions to a company pension plan are exempted from income tax and social 
insurance contributions (ability to explain what is meant by “Bruttoentgel-
tumwandlung”).  
A German newspaper attested that young individual find financial topics annoy-
ing because of the result of a survey conducted by the F.A.Z. Institut (2010) 
(Oehler 2012b). In this survey respondents aged 18-39 years had to choose be-
tween two possible answers “I like dealing with financial matters” and “money 
is necessary but that they are not interested in money related issues”. 44% of the 
respondents indicated that they are not interested. The F.A.Z. Institut also in-
vestigated the responses to some of the questions for subgroups of the sample. 
One subgroup is individuals who left the parents’ home to live for their own 
during the past two years. In this case 66% of the respondents answered that 
they like to deal with financial matters. This might be evidence that preferences 
concerning financial topics change as changes in the life of an individual occur. 
Analyzing data from a WDR (2011) study Oehler (WDR 2012) compares the re-
sults of a survey among young adults (14-29 years) with the results from a simi-
lar survey conducted without an upper age limit. He clarifies that young adults 
are not less interested in financial matters than the overall population. Addi-
tionally young adults see financial matters and money as an important and up-
to-date topic. Of course young adults find the topic more exhausting and com-
plicated than adults and they also do not feel as confident when dealing with 
financial matters as the overall population does. This however, Oehler (WDR 
2012) argues, is not surprising and the differences observed today will automati-
cally disappear as young adults’ age and gain more experience with financial 
topics. 
Leaving Germany and having a look abroad, several surveys have shown that 
financial illiteracy is widespread. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) added a module 
on financial literacy into the 2004 US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The 
respondents of this longitudinal datasets are Americans over the age of 50. They 
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found that half of these respondents were not able to answer two simple ques-
tions about interest rates and inflation correctly. Low financial literacy was espe-
cially prevalent among those with low education, women and the elderly. Also 
based on the 2004 HRS Lusardi and Mitchell (2010) investigated the respond-
ents tried to estimate how much they need to save for retirement, if they made a 
retirement plan and whether they were able to stick to this plan.  
Table 1: Financial Literacy in the Netherlands, Italy, the USA and Germany 
  The   
  
  
  Netherlands Germany 
 
USAc Germany 
  22-90 years 22-90 years 
 
>=50 years >=50 years 
Correct on interest 90.8 71.3   67.1 69.1 
Correct on inflation 82.6 73.6   75.2 78.4 
Correct on diversifi-
cation 48.2 44.9   52.3 41.3 
 
  USAd Germanya Italye 
  18+ 20+ 18+ 
Correct on interest 92.9 71.3 39.6 
Correct on inflation 91.4 72.7 60.5 
Correct on diversifi-
cation 77.0 44.4   
 
Source:  a weighted data, German SAVE Survey 2007; b results for the Netherlands 
taken from Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007);  c results for the USA taken from Lu-
sardi and Mitchell (2011), Health and Retirement Study 2004; d  results for the USA 
taken from Lusardi and Mitchell (2007c), RAND American Life Pa nel; e  results for 
Italy taken form Monticone (2010), Bank of Italy's Survey of Households Income 
and Wealth 200627 
They found that less than one-third of the respondents devised a retirement 
plan and only two-thirds of these individuals succeeded at the plan. Using 
among others the same financial literacy questions as Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2011), Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2007) investigated financial knowledge of 
Dutch households. They implemented basic and advanced literacy questions 
 
27 Question from the Dutch and the American survey see Table 6; Questions from the Italian 
survey: Q 1: Imagine leaving 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 1% interest and has no 
charges. Imagine also that inflation is running at 2%. Do you think that if you withdraw the 
money in a year’s time you will be able to buy the same amount of goods as if you spent the 
1,000 euros today? 
i. Yes ii. No, I will be able to buy less iii. No, I will be able to buy more iv. Do not know 
Q 2: Imagine leaving 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 2% annual interest and has no 
charges. What sum do you think will be available at the end of two years? 
i.Less than 1,020 euros ii. Exactly 1,020 euros iii. More than 1,020 euros iv. Do not know 
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into the 2005 DNB Household survey. Their finding is that most of the re-
spondents got the two questions on inflation and interest rates right (82.6% and 
90.8% respectively). When it comes to answering questions on the time value of 
money and money illusion the percentage of right answers decreases to about 
70%. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007c) also added a set of similar questions into the 
Rand American Life Panel covering respondents who are aged 40 to 60, relative-
ly high educated and earning relatively high income. About 25% of the respond-
ents were not able to correctly answer the questions on interest compounding 
and the time value of money. 
They found that not only gender, education, race and income determines how 
financial literate an individual is but also the exposure to economics at school 
and company based financial education programs. A similar set of questions 
assessing financial literacy had also been implemented in the survey on house-
hold income and wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy in 2006. The 
SHIW is a representative sample of the Italian population and Monticone (2010) 
reveals a lack of financial knowledge especially for women and low educated. 
Furthermore, the age profile of correct answers increased up to ages 41-60 and 
then declined. Since the same three questions have been implemented into sur-
veys in the Netherlands, the USA and Germany a first comparison of financial 
literacy between countries is possible (Table 1). The results of Italy will also be 
compared to the other three countries, keeping in mind, that the questions in 
Italy are similar but not identical to the interest calculation and inflation ques-
tion of the other countries. Furthermore results have to be interpreted with cau-
tious because even the same questions in different languages may lead to a dif-
ferent response pattern. The high literacy level of Americans in the RAND 
American Life Panel can be attributed to an oversampling of highly educated 
individuals (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007). 
On the two questions, interest calculation and inflation, the Dutch have the least 
problems followed by the Americans and Germans who are almost equally 
knowledgeable. The principle of risk diversification, however, is best understood 
by Americans, followed by the Dutch and then Germans. These results could be 
explained by differences in stock market experiences in these three countries. In 
the US individuals have been responsible for ensuring an adequate retirement 
income for a long time, since the state pension and the social insurance system 
in general are less generous than in many European countries. Hence Ameri-
cans are used to saving for retirement, to privately insure against health prob-
lems and unemployment. They have to invest their money wisely and deal with 
financial markets more often than for example Germans. In the Netherlands 
individuals also have more responsibility, especially to provide for their retire-
ment than individuals in Germany.  
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The pillar of most importance in the Dutch pension system is company pen-
sion. Here the contributions are likely to be invested in stocks or similar assets. 
These instances may explain why Germans still lack knowledge of risk diversifi-
cation. A further explanation for the differences in financial knowledge between 
countries may also be attributed to the educational system. American and Dutch 
schools may place a greater weight on financial education than German schools 
do. Monticone (2010) relates the low levels of financial literacy among the Ital-
ian population back to historical and institutional grounds. Italians generally 
rely on the generous state pension system. Private retirement provision is not 
necessary. For that reason many Italians are more cautious concerning financial 
markets than for example the Americans or the Dutch. Monticone (2010) argues 
that the use of pension funds has been rare and many Italians do not have a 
debit or credit card. 
Besides the knowledge of basic and advanced financial concepts, an understand-
ing of the countries pension system is vital to retirement savings decisions. 
Gustmann and Steinmeier (2002) found that many individuals are poorly in-
formed about their pensions even though they are already approaching retire-
ment. Only half of the respondents were able to state if their pension plan was 
defined benefit or defined contribution. 40% reported that they did not know 
their pension wealth and 80% of those with a defined benefit plan did not know 
how much pension would be reduced in case of early retirement. Lusardi (2003) 
found that just over 25% of older respondents in the Health and Retirement 
Study have ever asked the Social Security authority to calculate their retirement 
benefits. Moreover, only 18% of workers know at which age they are eligible to 
full Social Security benefits.  
The pension knowledge results discussed so far have been based on American 
data. Whitehouse and Edward (2000) conducted a survey among 3,800 consum-
ers in the United Kingdom. Their results provide evidence for a lack of 
knowledge of the pension system. Only half of the respondents knew that the 
basic pension is price indexed and 75% think that age is the only prerequisite to 
receive the basic pension. Investigating the German SAVE-panel which focuses 
on the financial behavior of individuals Honekamp and Schwarze (2010) found 
that about 40% of the respondents were not able to approximate their expected 
pension from statutory pension. Knowledge of the expected pension entitlement 
has been found to increase with age, income, education and working time. 
Working time implies that full-time workers are better informed than part-time 
workers and those are more likely to approximate the pension level than indi-
viduals who are not or marginally employed. A survey conducted in 2011 on be-
half of Fidelity among 1.000 employed individuals aged 18 to 55 supports the 
findings of Honekamp and Schwarze (2010). The Fidelity study “Old-Age Provi-
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sion in Germany” (Fidelity International 2011) states that 71% of the respond-
ents have no or only a vague conception of their future retirement income. Fur-
thermore, 60% have never heard about the three pillars of the German pension 
system.  
The factors determining the level of pension knowledge have also been investi-
gated by Gustman and Steinmeier (2012). Their study revealed that low-income 
households, African-Americans and Hispanics, women and individuals with low 
education lack knowledge about social security and pensions. Based on a Chile-
an population study, Skog (2006) found that older, healthier, higher income and 
more educated men display greater pension literacy. They also state that indi-
viduals are more likely to seek information if that knowledge becomes more rel-
evant for them. More evidence on the widespread financial illiteracy on an in-
ternational level can be found in Lusardi and Mitchell (2007d) and a study of 
financial education by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development 2005) which provide a review of studies conducted in several 
countries like the US, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom.  
The review of studies attempting to measure the degree of financial literacy 
among the population leaves the image of countries in which the population 
severely lacks financial literacy. There are however reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that some but not all surveys exaggerated the low level of financial literacy 
among the population. Firstly, questions have been asked for which the answer 
coded as wrong must not necessarily be wrong. Secondly, many of the studies 
focussing on only a subgroup of the population, like some of the cited studies 
concentrating on young adults, lack a control group. Thirdly, questions have 
been asked which might even an economist is not able to answer correctly.28  
An example for the first critique would be the survey conducted by the Com-
merzbank (2003) asked invidiual how they would handle their life-insurance if 
the would encounter a financial emergency. The correct answer to this question 
was that individual should reduce their contributions towards the risk element 
of premiums (Risikobeitrag). The reason for reducing the contribution instead 
of cancelling the life insurance contract in order to spend the money accumulat-
ed within the contract is the high cost of cancelation. Nevertheless, depending 
on the nature of the financial emergency it might be even more wisely to cancel 
the life insurance contract instead of selling a house or taking on an expensive 
credit. Another survey asked pupils about the purpose of a bank giro account. 
The correct answer was that it is used for incoming and outgoing payments 
 
28 For a critique on financial literacy surveys see Oehler (2012b). 
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(Forsa 2010). Pupils themselves, however, do not have much incoming and out-
going payments. For them it is a free bank account which they may use to safe 
some of their pocket money in order to buy an expensive shirt the next month. 
The answer that a bank giro account is needed as a flexible savings account, 
however, has been counted as wrong. 
The two surveys conducted by the F.A.Z. Institut (2010) and Hurrelmann and 
Gensicke (2010) serve as an example for the second critique mentioned above. 
Both studies focus on young adults only and the conclusions drawn are that the 
surveyed individuals are not well informed and not interested in financial mat-
ters. What is missing in these studies is a comparison of the youth sample with 
the whole population. There needs to be a comparison between the answers of 
young adults and the answers from the whole population in order to draw any 
conclusions about financial attitudes of the young (Oehler 2012b). The WDR 
(2011) study providing two samples: a youth sample and a sample without age 
constraints has been analysed by Oehler (WDR 2012) who did not find, that the 
young are less interested in financial matters than the overall population. 
Several different questions have been asked to assess financial literacy. Is some-
one financially literate, if he or she knows what a stock market or a mutual fund 
is about (advanced literacy questions from Rooij van, Lusardi and Alessie 2007)? 
Hurrelmann and Gensicke (2010) asked young adults if they knew that contri-
butions to a company pension plan are exempted from income tax and social 
insurance contributions (ability to explain what is meant by “Bruttoentgel-
tumwandlung”). The Commerzbank (2003) asked individuals about the inflation 
rate, about the seat of the European Central Bank and if the Euro was a legal 
tender in Ireland.  
There have been plenty of questions which raise the question if they are suitable 
to classify individuals into literate and not literate people. Here an alternative 
way of classifying individuals’ as financially literate and not literate will be sug-
gested. Oehler argues that generally consumers will never possess competences 
in all areas of life. Advancements in each of these areas would require the indi-
vidual to always be up-to-date. That’s why he argues, consumers will be reliant 
on the competences, judgments, evaluations and advice from independent 
trustworthy institutions. Individuals should not be required to be knowledgeable 
in all areas of life, instead individuals should be provided with a tool box which 
helps them to solve their respective problems (Meta Literacy see Oehler 2004, 
2005b, 2006, 2011, 2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b, Oehler and Wilhelm-Oehler 2009, 
2011).  
Individuals who know where to find trustworthy institutions who know to 
whom they can turn with their problem, who know when they can trust an ad-
66 
vice and who know what they should know before they consult an expert are re-
sponsible consumers in the same manner as individuals who have a high finan-
cial literacy score are (see also Oehler 2012b). Henceforth these individuals who 
asked for information at the time they have to solve a problem might also be 
classified as financially literate consumers. 
The following chapter provides a review of research which investigate the influ-
ence of financial literacy on variables like wealth, retirement planning and re-
tirement provision. A discussion about the purpose of different modes to assess 
financial literacy on the one hand and financial ability on the other hand can be 
found in chapter 4.2., which also describes how financial literacy has been 
measured in this thesis.  
2.3.2 The Effect of Financial Literacy on Planning and Saving for Retirement 
According to the theory discussed before financial literacy decreases the effort 
costs connected with retirement planning. Individuals who have a sound finan-
cial and/ or pension knowledge will find it easier to search for relevant infor-
mation and to process it in order to make a retirement plan and stick to it. Fi-
nancial and especially pension literacy can also be seen as an investment in fu-
ture orientated capital. As pension literacy increases it becomes easier for indi-
viduals to imagine the future. Generally the theory would predict a positive rela-
tionship between the extent of financial or pension literacy and behaviors like 
retirement planning and saving. 
While evidence leaves no doubt that there is widespread financial illiteracy in 
many countries, empirically the results from measuring the effect of financial 
literacy on wealth accumulation are less clear. The difficulty in measuring the 
causal effect of financial literacy on variables like wealth, retirement saving 
planning or stock ownership is simultaneity bias combined with omitted varia-
bles and measurement error problems. Research that finds a positive relation-
ship between financial literacy and the above mentioned variables can therefore 
not easily be interpreted as causal effect. A high degree of financial literacy may 
induce individuals to save and plan for retirement but it could also the other way 
round. If individuals are concerned about retirement income and start planning 
they may become more financial literate because they are planning. The most 
prominent solution to the above mentioned problems is instrumental variables 
estimation to assess the causal effect. Indeed several empirical contributions 
have been emerged which employ this method in their research on financial 
literacy.  
The following part of the literature review first concentrates on empirical evi-
dence which supports the idea that financial literacy influences wealth accumu-
lation, planning, saving or stock ownership and the second part of this review 
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will then present the research which shows that causality may also run the other 
way round. Empirical contributions which explicitly address the endogeneiety 
problem of financial literacy are Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011a) who investi-
gate the relationship between financial literacy and stock ownership, Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2006) and Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011b) who concentrate on 
wealth accumulation and Lusardi and Mitchell (2007c, 2011) and Bucher-
Koenen and Lusardi (2011) who analyse how financial literacy effects planning 
Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011a) investigate the relationship between financial 
literacy and stock market participation. The dataset used is the DNB Household 
Survey (DHS) which is constructed as a panel containing over 2,000 house-
holds.i For this survey they devised special financial literacy module from which 
they constructed two literacy indexes. One based on basic literacy questions and 
the other on more advanced questions concerning the stock market. As an in-
strument for the advanced literacy index they used the amount of education de-
voted to economics at school. According to the second stage estimation, the ef-
fect of financial literacy on stock market participation is positive and significant. 
Another variable which is exogenous to stock market participation and therefore 
a candidate as instrument is if the respondent received advice from parents on 
how to budget and save money. However, they did not find that this variable 
influenced advanced literacy. Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011a) argue that this 
is evidence that earlier cohorts were seldom engaged with the stock market to 
the extent that they were not able to pass this experience down to their children. 
The DNB Household survey has also been used to analyse the effect of financial 
literacy on wealth accumulation. Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011b) employed 
the same approach as before, instrumenting advanced literacy index by the 
amount of education devoted to economics at school. Controlling for other fac-
tors potentially affecting saving behavior, such as patience and risk aversion, 
they find a positively and significant effect of financial literacy on wealth.  
Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) confirm a positive relationship between financial 
literacy and stock ownership with data from the 2004 Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS). Especially they observe a high correlation between the knowledge 
of risk diversification and stock ownership. Furthermore, they investigated the 
effect of financial literacy on wealth and planning. In both cases a positive rela-
tionship between these variables was found. The finding of a positive correlation 
between financial literacy and wealth is significant for the first two quartiles of 
the wealth distribution. The endogeneity problem of financial literacy was en-
countered in regressions on quartiles of the wealth distribution. Therefore it is 
possible to account for different financial literacy levels which could have been 
the result of experiences in saving and the accumulation of wealth.  
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An instrument variable approach to analyse the effect of financial literacy on 
planning was employed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007c). They use data from the 
Rand American Life Panel and created a financial literacy index by combining 
basic and sophisticated financial literacy questions. They estimate the relation-
ship between financial literacy and retirement planning by OLS and two stage 
least squares thereby considering a set of socio-demographic control variables. 
Their instrument for financial literacy is the amount of school education which 
had been devoted to economics, which is the same instrument as in the three 
studies above. After carrying out the instrumental variable approach, they found 
the financial literacy index to be significant positive and much larger than it was 
in the OLS regression. Another instrument employed is the availability of finan-
cial education seminars at one of the respondents’ previous employers. Using 
this instrument affirms previous results. 
Using self-reported data on the amount of education devoted to economics at 
school or the availability of financial education seminars might not be reliable 
instruments for two reasons. The first reason is simply the respondents 
memory, such that they are not able to remember each subject taught at school 
and in addition how much time was devoted to it. A similar argument also holds 
for financial education at previous employers. The second concern with these 
kinds of instruments is that individuals who are and were always interested in 
financial matters and/or retirement planning are more likely to remember that 
this subject had been taught at school. On the other hand, less financially inter-
ested individuals with low financial literacy may underestimate the amount of 
time devoted to economics at school. Additionally, individuals who are not in-
terested in financial matters may overlook offers of financial education from 
their employer and are therefore unable to report it, despite its availability. The 
authors above mitigated these concerns by including variables in the regression 
accounting for some of the heterogeneity accounting for preference differences 
in dealing with financial matters. 
Another variable to instrument financial literacy had been employed in a study 
by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) who investigated the effect of financial literacy 
on planning. They used the information that some states mandated high school 
financial education and others did not. Besides this information they also used 
the length of that mandate to instrument financial literacy. This approach con-
firmed the positive and significant effect of financial literacy on retirement 
planning.  
Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011) use data from the representative German 
SAVE survey from which 667 non retired individuals are included in their anal-
ysis. Within their equation to estimate the determinants of retirement planning 
they instrument financial literacy with the share of individuals who voted for the 
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FDP or the leftist party in the region, the respondent lives. Bucher-Koenen and 
Lusardi (2010) assume that financial information is a determinant of an indi-
vidual’s financial literacy level, therefore they use differences in financial infor-
mation as an instrument for financial literacy. Since the FDP is associated with 
free markets and individual responsibility and the leftist party for the opposite, 
they use the voting shares of these parties in the 2005 national election as the 
administrative district level as instruments. They furthermore assume that more 
financial information is available in regions were more individuals vote for the 
FDP and that these voters are more likely to participate in the stock market. 
Employing these instruments in their regression Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi 
(2010) find a positive impact of financial knowledge on retirement planning.29 
Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011b) argue that financial literacy influences wealth 
through two channels. One is that a high degree of financial knowledge lowers 
information costs and facilitates processing new information. The second is that 
financial literacy is positively related to retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitch-
ell 2007b, 2009). Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003) confirm the positive effect of 
planning on wealth accumulation. They analyse two econometric models, one 
explaining how specific attitudes and skills influence financial planning and one 
which investigates the impact of increases in financial planning on wealth ac-
cumulation. They used a survey especially designed for the analysis of these two 
research questions, such that they were able to use instruments for planning in 
the wealth equation. They state that, “[t]hose with a high propensity to plan may 
be better able to control their spending, and thereby achieve their goal of wealth 
accumulation.”30 Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) also found that households who 
calculate the income they need during retirement often set up a retirement plan 
which helps individuals to stick to their plans. Therefore the retirement plan 
could be seen as a commitment device which controls spending and fosters sav-
ing for an individual retirement goal. 
An interesting finding concering the potential different effects of financial liter-
acy and financial education has been derived by Pahnke and Honekamp (2010). 
The underlying data is the German SAVE survey which had also been investi-
gated by Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi (2011) as reviewed before. It has, however, 
be admitted that Pahnke and Honekamp (2010) did not employ instrumental 
variable estimation to account for potential endogeneity. There dependent varia-
 
29 F-value of the eluded instruments: 4,38, Prob>F = 0,0125. Instruments are jointly signifi-
cant. 
30 For a general psychological discussion about the effect of planning on goal achievement see 
Gollwitzer 1999. 
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ble is binary and measures if someone engages in private retirement saving or 
not. They devided the sample into two subsamples. One of the subsamples in-
cluded individuals with earning below the mean income and the other individu-
als with earnings above the mean income. They find that the effect of financial 
literacy, measured by an index of the three knowledge questions desiged by Lu-
sardi and Mitchell (2006), significantly influences retirement savings for high 
income earners but not for low income earners. Furthermore, they investigated 
the effect of consulting an expert from a bank or insurance company on the 
probability to save for retirement. Receiving advice from an expert was assumed 
to be similar to receiving finanical education. It is likely that these counselling 
sessions not necessarily increase the financial literacy of individuals with below 
the mean income (Mandell 2003) but empirical evidence has shown that it in-
creases the probability of retirement savings (Pahnke and Honekamp 2010). 
It has been argued that the fact that financial literacy has not effect on the deci-
sion to save for retirement for below average income individuals can be ex-
plained by the high will-power these individuals have to exert. Saving 100€ a 
month for someone earning 4,000€ a months is associated with a much lower 
will-power effort than for someone who only earns 2,000€ a month. Educational 
events like a councelling session or a retirement seminar are likely to help the 
individual to overcome inertia and a lack of will-power. This explains the posi-
tive effect of the councelling session on retirement savings for individuals with 
below average income (Pahnke and Honekamp 2010). 
Making an optimal retirement savings decision does not only depend on basic 
and advanced literacy rather an optimal decision also depends on the knowledge 
of the countries pension system. In chapter 2.3.1 it has for example been shown 
that many individuals do not know which kind of pension plan they own and 
that many Germans have never heard about the three pillars of the German 
pension system (Gustmann and Steinmeier 2002, Fidelity 2011). Retirement 
plans which are based on wrong or incomplete information may not to be opti-
mal in the sense that they maximize an individual’s life-time utility. Since there 
is much less literature on pension literacy than there is on financial literacy, the 
part of the literature revue devoted to pension knowledge is rather small. 
Clark, Morrill and Allen (2010) have conducted a survey among 1,500 workers 
nearing retirement at three large companies. They find that wrong information 
about the official retirement age and retirement income influence the workers 
planned age of retirement. Furthermore, knowing the pension plan type (de-
fined contribution, defined benefit) is positively associated with wealth holdings 
relative to lifetime earnings (Gustman and Steinmeier 2004). Further evidence 
which suggests that pension knowledge effects retirement decisions has been 
provided by Chan, Huff and Stevens (2008).  
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Measuring the effect of pension literacy on retirement savings behavior poses 
the same problem of reverse causality as financial literacy. To account for the 
potential endogeneity of pension literacy Landerretche and Martinez (2011) em-
ployed an instrumental variable estimation. Their instrument for pension litera-
cy was, having a parent pensioner in the household. A pensioner in the house-
hold is assumed to increase the understanding of the pension system. They 
found that higher pension literacy increased the probability of fund switching 
but not fund administrator switching. Having additional savings was also posi-
tively influenced by pension knowledge. In contrast to this result, the participa-
tion in voluntary pension plans offered by the pension authority itself were not 
influenced by pension knowledge. Lastly, the self-employed were more likely to 
join the pension system voluntarily if their pension knowledge was high. 
Until now the review has concentrated on research which underlines the fact 
that financial or pension literacy influences stock ownership, retirement plan-
ning and wealth. There are, however, also several researchers who were able to 
show that the way of causality could also be the other way round. Ameriks, Cap-
lin and Leahy (2003) discuss reasons why wealth might influence financial 
knowledge and offer one reason that, namely, wealthy people have access to 
more investment opportunities and hence they have to deal with more complex 
financial matters and also spend more time on it. Another reason is that wealthy 
people enjoy planning because they look forward to a prosperous life after re-
tirement. On the other hand they argue that the reasoning could also be the oth-
er way round. Individuals having not accumulated much wealth may profit 
more from increased financial knowledge, planning and the efficient use of re-
sources in terms of utility than wealthy people. Furthermore wealth is often also 
correlated with a high income which increases the opportunity costs of plan-
ning. Therefore wealthier people may hire financial advisors and therefore do 
not engage in planning themselves. 
Bernheim’s (1998) findings support the idea that individuals with more re-
sources have a greater incentive to learn about finances. This conclusion was 
based on the empirical finding that financial scores rose with the earnings of 
respondents, while macroeconomic scores, however, did not. Empirical evi-
dence that wealth influences knowledge also comes from Gustman, Steinmeier 
and Tabatabai (2010) who based their analysis on the 2004 HRS data, concen-
trating their analysis on individuals aged 51-56. They found that individuals hav-
ing a more valuable company pension are more knowledgeable about their pen-
sion than employees with less valuable pensions. Furthermore they have shown 
that cognition and especially numeracy is associated with greater retirement 
wealth. However, they did not find evidence that more numerate people also 
necessarily have a greater pension knowledge. They conclude that the causality 
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is more likely to run from pension wealth to pension knowledge than the other 
way round.  
Based on the Italian survey on household income and wealth (SHIW) Monti-
cone (2010) employs instrumental variables regression to remove wealth en-
dogeneity and finds that households holding larger financial assets are more 
likely to invest in financial knowledge. The effect of financial literacy on wealth 
was very small but significant. Guiso and Jeppelli (2006) and Peress (2004) ar-
rived at similar results. Guiso and Jappelli (2006) find that financial wealth posi-
tively influences the investment in information and Peress (2004) shows in his 
theoretical model that the demand for information increases with wealth.  
Furthermore, Donkers and van Soest (1999) show that interest in financial mat-
ters increases with income. This finding is supported by Meier and Sprenger 
(2008) who detect a positive relationship between financial knowledge and the 
income level. These findings support the indication that investments in finan-
cial education or information is more profitable for high income and wealthy 
individuals. Skog (2006) similarly found that seeking information has been 
found to become more likely as the specific knowledge becomes more relevant 
to the individual.  
The conclusion reached from reviewing this literature is that causality can in-
deed go in both directions. On the one hand financial literacy induces individu-
als to plan and save for retirement and on the other hand wealth and also more 
specifically pension wealth fosters the acquisition of financial knowledge. This 
problem has to be accounted for in the empirical literature. Since it is often 
problematic to identify appropriate instruments and to limit unobserved hetero-
geneity, results have to be interpreted carefully.  
Further evidence which highlights the importance of financial literacy with re-
spect to retirement savings has been presented by Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) 
and Oehler (2009). Analysing data from the German SAVE-Panel Börsch-Supan 
et al. (2006) found that the number of “Riester-Savers” in the two lowest income 
quintiles was very low during the first years after the introduction of the 
“Riester-Pension”. Only since 2004 the number of contracts filed by low income 
individuals increased slowly. Their argument is that it takes longer until the new 
information about the pension reforms and new products reaches this group of 
low income and low educated individuals. High educated seem to be much like-
lier to file a “Riester-Pension” than low educated individuals. Additionally, they 
detect that the knowledge of an individuals expected statutory pension level is 
more important for the decision to save for retirement than the ability to save.  
Oehler (2009) investigated the quality of advice given by financial advisors and 
detected important deficiencies which were likely to negatively influence the 
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monetary outcome of investment decisions. For example about half of the 
“Riester-Plan” providers which were tested did not provide appropriate infor-
mation about the costs of the plan. He also found that deficiencies were most 
prominent for individuals with low financial literacy, who would need high qual-
ity counselling most. Customers who are financially literate receive higher quali-
ty advice and more time is spent with their counselling session. Similar results 
have also been presented by Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011), who confirm 
that advisors provide better service if the customer is financially sophisticated. 
Furthermore, they find that individuals with a high degree of financial literacy 
are more likely to seek advice from financial experts but at the same time they 
are less likey to follow this advice than individuals with a lower degree of finan-
cial literacy. This means that financially literate individuals are less prone to 
follwow the advice of a financial expert who intends to steer the choice of the 
customer towards savings vehicles which are most profitable for the advisor 
himself.  
Müller and Weber (2010) also conclude that financially less knowledgable cus-
tomers seek assistance from a fincial advisor and rely on their recommendation 
because they are more likely to chosse an actively managed fund which often 
entails high fees. Financially sophisticated consumers instead rely more on oth-
er information channels, like the internet and avoid sales commissions. While 
they find that the number of sophisticated indivudals holding an actively man-
aged fund is still surprisingly high, none the less sophisticated individuals are 
more likely to choose a passively managed fund than financially less sophisticat-
ed consumers. In general research in behavioural finance shows that less finan-
cially literacy consumers’ are more prone to investment biases which often en-
tail significantly lower returns on their investments.31 Kotz and Weber (2007) 
reviewed research which investigates the influence of individual biases on mar-
ket outcomes. They conclude that these individual biases could also translate 
into general or overall market outcomes or impact social welfare via the social 
security system such that these individual biases are not only a private but also a 
social problem. 
The question raised at the beginning of this part of the literature review was 
whether everyone has to be financial literate in order to make appropriate re-
tirement decisions or is it sufficient that financial experts possess this 
knowledge. The evidence reviewed so far has shown that individual financial 
literacy is an important determinant of retirement planning and fosters wealth 
accumulation. Furthermore, research has shown that financial literacy is even 
 
31 See for example Brown et al. (2007), Dhar and Zhu (2006) and Shapira and Venezia (2001) 
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beneficial when consulting financial experts. However, research also shows that 
people are often uncertain about where to go to get trustworthy advice about 
pension issues. Whitehouse and Edward (2000) state that more than half of the 
respondents of their survey among 3,800 consumers in the United Kingdom 
stated that they found it to be at least somewhat difficult to get independent ad-
vice. 
2.3.3 Private Retirement Provision a Case for Governemnt Intervention 
The reviewed behavioural economics and finance research suggests that an ap-
propriate decision concerning private old-age provision can be seen as merit 
good. Additionally, evidence has shown that individual biases are likely to be-
come a social problem besides the negative effects biases have on individual de-
cisions concerning retirement provision. According to Barr (2012) government 
intervention can be justified either for efficiency reasons or for equity reasons. 
In the case of private retirement provision both justifications apply. Information 
asymmetries entail market failure and together with information overload, self-
control problems and procrastination it is likely that individuals end up with a 
suboptimal savings decision. Some individuals may never start to save, choose 
the wrong product, or save too little for retirement. In this case they would rely 
on social assistance during retirement. Government intervention in this case 
may increase efficiency by reducing information asymmetries and biases which 
consumers encounter. 
There are also equity reasons which justify state intervention. Consumers are 
heterogenic and even if all consumers where equally interested in private re-
tirement provision there would be differences in the ability with which they 
gather and process information. While one consumer joins a retirement semi-
nar and afterwards feels confident when looking for an appropriate retirement 
product, another consumer might not have been able to follow the advice pro-
vided in the seminar. Since the evidence in chapter 2.3.2 has shown that indi-
viduals who are confident and signal a high level of financial literacy will receive 
higher quality advice than individuals with a low level of financial literacy. This 
can be seen as unfair because everyone should be provided the same high quali-
ty of advice. 
One approach of government intervention is libertarian paternalism. Within 
this approach Behavioural Law and Economics favours political strategies which 
improve individual welfare without limiting choice.32 Thaler and Sunstein 
 
32 Further approaches with different degrees of governmental intervention have been dis-
cussed in Werner (2009) see also Sunstein (2003). 
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(2003) suggest nudging, meaning to steer individuals in their best interest to a 
behaviour which maximizes their welfare. This can for example be reached by 
introducing defaults. This kind of intervention can be subsumed under the con-
cept of libertarian paternalism (see also O´Donoghue and Rabin 2003).  
The following example showing how libertarian paternalism has been pursued 
in the market for private retirement plans is leaned on an example discussed in 
Kotz and Weber (2007). An average consumer would not know how much to 
invest and which allocation between bonds and stocks would be optimal in his 
or her situation. He or she would choose something that is “normal”. Hence an 
average individual turns to a financial expert from a bank or insurance company 
for advice. The financial advisor is therefore the one who determines what is 
“normal”. Without effective rules and regulations provided by the government, 
the advisor defines what is “normal” as to maximize his or her profits instead of 
maximizing the utility of the consumer. The German government acting in a 
liberal paternalist fashion would suggest a “normal” default portfolio, optimiz-
ing an average consumer’s welfare. Examples which can be seen as such sug-
gestions are the “Riester-Rente” or the “Rürup-Rente”. Individuals are not 
forced to join these plans, however, if they join these plans they will receive a 
state subsidy or tax advantages. 
In order to correct for market inefficiencies and to decrease equity problems in 
the market for private retirement provision measures to increase the financial 
literacy of the population have been pursued widely. To achieve a higher literacy 
level of the population, several measures have been applied. Many American 
companies offer regular retirement seminars for their employees or distribute 
written information material. In Germany the number of companies offering 
retirement seminars is also growing rapidly.33 Focusing on Germany after the 
pension reform in 2001 the media (TV, Internet, Newspapers and Journals) has 
also highlighted the decreasing pension level which is expected for future co-
horts and the importance of private retirement savings. Furthermore the subsi-
dised “Riester-Pension” had been advertised by insurance companies and banks 
and in this instance a lot of information about the size of the subsidy and eligi-
bility had been distributed. In 2007 the government initiated a large scale re-
tirement education campaign in cooperation with German pension insurance 
companies, the German adult education centre (Volkshochschule, VHS) and 
others, to provide objective information on the three pillars of the German old-
age insurance system. 
 
33 I am grateful to Pension Solutions, a company offering retirement seminars for companies 
and administering their pension plans, for sharing this information with me. 
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2.3.4 The Effectiveness of Retirement Seminars and Other Information 
Theoretically, retirement seminars promise to improve and increase savings 
behavior. The extent to which seminars are effective depends on the individuals 
taking part in the seminar. If participants are generally interested in retirement 
issues and may already have a private pension plan then the effect of the course 
in terms of behavior change will be smaller than if the participants were not 
previously engaged in any form of retirement provision. Bernheim and Garrett 
(2003) have shown that it is even possible to observe a negative effect of seminar 
participation and savings because of such selection effects. 
Research has shown that a lack of financial and pension literacy is likely to en-
tail sub-optimal retirement decisions. In Germany and many other countries a 
school subject called financial or pension education is seldom part of the school 
curriculum. Young people who leave school may underestimate the importance 
of dealing with retirement issues because they may still believe that the statutory 
pension will provide for an adequate retirement life. While many good savings 
habits are passed on from parents to children this is not the case for retirement 
savings behavior.34 The replacement rate of the statutory pension system is de-
creasing slightly year by year to the extent that many older individuals are not 
able to pass on their experience with private retirement provision because pri-
vate retirement provision was not necessary to secure for an adequate retire-
ment life. 
The present situation in Germany and many other countries makes retirement 
seminars for adults an important tool for increasing consumer awareness and 
knowledge of the pension system and the products offered to supplement statu-
tory pensions. A recent research project to evaluate the effect of the retirement 
seminar “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” on behalf of the German pension insur-
ance research network, found that many course participants were highly educat-
ed and aged between 50 to 60 years (Honekamp and Uehleke 2012), implying 
that there is a problem motivating the lower educated and individuals aged be-
tween 30 and 40 years to join the course. The effectiveness of the course has 
been analysed by using a propensity score matching which makes it possible to 
circumvent the counterfactual situation that it is not possible to observe how the 
behavior of the participant had changed, had he or she not participated in the 
course. Each of the course participants were matched with a person with similar 
characteristics such that as a result causal inference about course effects was 
possible. It has for example been found that objective and subjective knowledge 
 
34 One habit past on from parents to children would be to save money before buying a mobile 
phone, a TV or the like and abstain from buying on credit.  
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increased, more people are able to assess if their present retirement savings suf-
fice for an adequate retirement life and more people value fixed interest bonds, 
real estate, the “Riester-Pension” and the company pension as appropriate vehi-
cles to provide for retirement than before the course. A further result was that 
31% of the individuals adjusted their pension age up or down after the course.35 
A previous study by Oehler and Wilhelm-Oehler (2011) evaluate the seminar 
“Altersvorsorge macht Schule”. Two questionnaires had been distributed among 
the course participants, one right after the course and another after three 
months. Based on the findings from the first questionnaire they conclude that 
women, the young and individuals with low income could not be reached ade-
quately by the course. The expectations of these individuals were often not met, 
their perception that they have been well informed is below average and they 
often find that the course was not a useful planning add. Retirement seminars 
should theirfore be adjusted in order to meet the requirements of these target 
groups. 
They furthermore found that women, low income and the young (<30 years) are 
less likely to have a kind of private retirement provision when joining the course 
than men, high income or older individuals. The questionnaire distributed three 
months after the course, however, revealed that women especially and individu-
als with low income took action concerning private retirement provision (see 
also Frommert 2008). 
Based on the American Health and Retirement Study (HRS) Lusardi (2004) in-
vestigated the behavior of retirement seminar participants. The study comprises 
detailed information on individual characteristics of the participants like infor-
mation about the past, future expectations, preferences and social security in-
formation. It has been shown that seminar participation led to increased savings 
activities especially for individuals with low income and low education. Duflo 
and Saez (2003) conducted an experiment and randomly assigned departments 
of a university to a treatment and a control group. The treatment group received 
an invitation for a benefit fair which provides information about company pen-
sion plans and 20$ if they attended the fair. They found only modest effects of 
participation on the participants. An interesting result was the observed peer 
effect. Colleagues of individuals who received an invitation were also more likely 
to attend the seminar than individuals who did not receive an invitation. 
Peer effects have also been detected by Duflo and Saez (2000, 2003) who ob-
served that plan participation varied between 14 and 73% across libraries of a 
 
35 See also Honekamp (2011) 
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large university. Since employees were randomly assigned to one of the librar-
ies, the vast difference in participation rate can be interpreted as strong peer ef-
fect. Benartzi (2007) evaluated the observations of plan provider who noticed 
that plan participation and investment strategies were heterogonous between 
supermarkets of a supermarket chain but homogenous in each of the super-
market. The explanation of this observation was that employees turned to the 
supermarket butcher for advice on retirement provision.  
A further experiment testing the effectiveness of financial education had been 
conducted by Howlett and Kees (2008). In their experiment the experimental 
conditions were much stricter than the ones in the analyis conducted by Duflo 
and Saez (2003).36 The strict experimental character of the analyis and the ran-
dom allocation of individuals to different treatment groups or to the control 
group of the analyis conducted by Howlett and Kees made it possible to isolate 
the effects of financial education and time preferences from other factors influ-
encing retirement decisions. They found that the information about a 401 (k) 
plan which had been provided to one of the experimental groups positively in-
fluenced the intention to invest in a 401 (k) plan. The drawback of this research 
it that is measures only the intentions to invest and not acutal investments. 
Clark et al. (2006) analysed the effect of a financial education seminar. Their 
empirical strategy does not allow to account for the possible selectivity of semi-
nar participants, hence the results can be interpreted as conservative. To assess 
the effectiveness of the seminar they distributed three questionnaires among 
the participants, one before the course, one afterwards and one three month lat-
er. They found that the desired income replacement rate changed after the sem-
inar but the estimated retirement age was not influenced due to participation. 
40% of those who did not save for retirement before the seminar decided to start 
saving afterwards, however, three months after the seminar only a modest 
number of individuals have put their plans into action. A similar observation 
was also made by Choi et al. (2006) who found that at the employee seminar 
everyone expressed to save more but actually only 14% joint the plan, compared 
to 7% who join the plan without participating in the seminar. Moreover they 
find little correlation between time after the seminar and behavior change. Sem-
inar participants either changed their behavior immediately or not at all. Hence 
 
36 Strict means that the participants, 89 graduate seniors at a public university were allocated to 
the experimental conditions just in time and that they did not know that there were also other 
experimental conditions, furthermore, the purpose of the study was not communicated in ad-
vance. 
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they conclude that seminars are not effective in the sense that they encourage 
401(k) savings.37  
A different conclusion concerning the effectiveness of retirement seminars can 
be found in the research of Bayer et al. (2009). While the previous research on 
seminar effectiveness was based on individual level data, it is also possible to 
use firm-level data as Bayer et al. (2009) did. However, using firm-level data en-
tails an additional selection treatment effect. The authors argue that seminars 
are more likely when employees show insufficient interest in the plan instead of 
offering seminars because employees ask for information concerning the com-
pany pension plan. Bayer et al. (2009) found that retirement education influ-
ences the saving behavior of participants especially if the seminars are offered 
frequently. The seminars had a strong effect for non-highly compensated work-
ers of whom the likelihood of participating in a 401k plan increased after the 
course.  
Hathaway and Khatiwada (2008) review literature which evaluates the effective-
ness of financial education programs. They find that research so far was not able 
to establish the extent of benefit provided by financial education seminars and 
that they cannot conclude that there is any effect of financial education pro-
grams at all. According to Hathaway and Khatiwada (2008) the diverse picture 
which the research conveys could be attributed to poorly designed and adminis-
tered education programs or to the inability of the evaluation technique to de-
termine if course was effective or not (see also Atkinson 2008). These findings 
have also been supported by Collins and O’Rourke (2010) who argue that future 
research using field experiments to analyse the effects of financial education 
may be more promising than many of the evaluation techniques they encoun-
tered in their review.  
The research presented so far found mixed evidence on the effectiveness of re-
tirement seminars. Clark, Morril and Maki (2011) do not evaluate a retirement 
seminar, instead they conduct a controlled experiment with one employer inves-
tigating the effect of written information. Employers, hired between 2008 and 
2010, not currently participating in the 401(k) plan were randomly assigned to 
the treatment or the control group. Individuals allocated to the treatment group 
received a flyer which was send to them. This flyer provided information about 
the wealth that could be accumulated with small contributions over a long time. 
Some months later the employer provided information about the enrolment sta-
tus of the respective employees. 6.8% of those receiving the flyer started to con-
 
37 More evidence of financial and retirement planning seminars can be found in Atkinson 
(2008) who provides a review of financial education evaluations.  
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tribute to the retirement plan and 5.9% of those who did not receive this infor-
mation. The difference is not significant for the overall sample but when con-
centrating only on the employees aged 18-24 the difference was significant. 
7.7% of the individuals who received the flyer decided to participate and 3.3% of 
the individuals who did not receive the flyer. This research has shown that even 
a flyer might have the potential to influence retirement savings decisions.  
Since 1995 the Social Security Administration in America sends out an annual 
social security statement. Mastrobuoni (2011) found that this information had a 
significant impact on the workers’ knowledge about their pension entitlements 
but the statement did not have any effect on retirement behavior. Mastrobuoni 
(2011) argues that the statement might not affect savings behavior either be-
cause most workers already behave optimally such that the statement consti-
tutes only a minor benefit for these individuals or that the information in this 
statement is not sufficient to improve retirement savings behavior. 
In Germany the statutory pension insurance also provides a pension statement, 
a one DIN A4 piece of paper, with information about among other a pension 
projection stating the monthly pension someone would receive if he/she con-
tinues working as he/she did the last five years and if he/she worked until the 
statutory pension age. Individuals who are member of the statutory pension sys-
tem for at least 60 months and 27 years or older receive this information on a 
yearly basis. In order to improve and to evaluate the acceptance of this infor-
mation within the population, questionnaires were sent out to some of the indi-
viduals who received a pension information (Drechsler 2006). 31% of the re-
spondents stated that the pension information is a very valuable source of in-
formation concerning retirement planning and 58% found that the pension in-
formation is at least of some use. Furthermore 16% of the respondents planned 
an additional private or company pension because of the information provided 
through the statutory pension insurance. The group of people, however, for 
whom the risk of a low statutory pension is highest, stated that they would not 
provide for retirement privately because they do not have sufficient financial 
resources to do so. Both studies above have shown that even short information 
like a flyer could have a positive effect on retirement decisions. 
2.3.5 Other measures to induce people to save for retirement 
Researchers, especially behavioral economists, find it doubtful that financial 
education could be the solution to the lack of financial capability (Chater et al. 
2010, Meza de et al. 2008). They instead argue that it is not information or 
knowledge which limits financial capability but instead cognitive biases. In re-
cent years the findings related to the status quo bias and choice overload have 
been used to formulate heuristics for consumers in order to simplify their 
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choices and to direct their choice to an outcome which is socially desirable. Sun-
stein and Thaler (forthcoming) argue that “[…] libetarian parternalists should 
attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions without elimi-
nating freedom of choice.”  
That it is in the interest of consumers to be provided with suitable heuristics has 
been shown by Lyengar and Kamenica (2006), who found that individuals’ de-
sire for simple easy-to-understand options increases with the number of choic-
es. Heuristics often used in this sense are called Default heuristics. If an individ-
ual comes across a default, which is for example a predefined asset allocation, 
he/she accepts the default without doing anything about it. This behavioral im-
plication has also been observed with automatic enrolment in pension plans.  38 
Once enrolled, few people take action in order to leave the plan (Madrian and 
Shea 2001, Choi et al. 2006).  
Default options are found to be very successful for several reasons. Firstly they 
reduce effort costs which individuals would incur if they had to make an active 
choice. Secondly individuals may trust a default because they believe that it is a 
suggestion in their best interest by the policy maker or the company. Lastly, in-
dividuals who are automatically assigned to a default perceive this state as their 
status quo and each action which has to be taken to opt out or to change the de-
fault are associated with costs.39 Johnson and Goldstein (2003) describe the 
power of defaults in the case of organ donations. They compare the fraction of 
organ donors between different countries and find that countries which launch 
campaigns in order to change public attitudes towards organ donation are less 
successful in increasing the rate of donors than countries who have chosen the 
opt-out variant for organ donations.40  
Several theoretical models have been developed which allow for behavioral 
anomalies to be taken into account, whereby anomalies means behavior that is 
not in line with the assumptions and predictions of the traditional life cycle 
model of saving. Thaler and Shefrin (1981) were dealing with the self-control 
problem, Becker and Mulligan (1997) investigated the endogeneity of time pref-
erences, Shefrin and Thaler (1992) developed the behavioral life-cycle hypothesis 
 
38 For experiments supporting the “Status Quo Bias” see Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988); 
Kahneman et al. (1991) 
39 Automatically assigned to a default, means that individuals do not have to take any action to 
be assigned to, for example, a pension plan. They can, however, choose to opt-out, if they do 
not wish to participate in the plan. For this reason these plans are also called opt-out plans as 
opposed to opt-in plans in which case individuals have to take action in order to join the plan. 
40 For an overview about campaigns to increase the number of organ donors see Wolf et al. 
(1997). 
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and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1998) showed that hyperbolic discount rates are 
able to explain procrastination behavior. What all these models have in common 
is their implication that every intervention that reduces effort costs, increases 
future utility of savings or increases the psychological costs of not planning 
would increase the likelihood of planning and saving for retirement. 
Iyengar and Jiang (2003) found that the number of investment choices was neg-
atively correlated with the participation rate in the pension plan. The participa-
tion rate decreased by 2 percentage points, when 10 more funds were added 
from which the employees could choose. Just as decreasing the opportunity set 
of the individual it is also possible to simplify investment products and to intro-
duce a few common quality criteria which individuals can use to compare prod-
ucts in order to decrease the costs of retirement saving (Leinert 2005, Oehler 
2009, Oehler 2012a). Choosing an appropriate savings rate and investment can 
also be simplified by providing heuristics (Thaler 1990, 1994). The German gov-
ernment for example signals that saving four per cent of gross income is appro-
priate since this is the percentage to be eligible to the full “Riester-Subsidy” and 
additionally the statutory pension will be reduced accordingly. Nevertheless it 
has been found that many individuals do not employ this heuristic and save less 
than four per cent or not at all (Coppola and Gasche 2011, Oehler 2012c). An-
other heuristic which can be used is to save as much as to receive the full em-
ployer match or picking the maximum deferral rate allowed by the plan.41 Fur-
thermore, individuals could adopt the round number heuristic, saving for ex-
ample 5% of gross salary instead of 4% (Benartzi and Thaler 2007). 
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) argue that even though heuristics process 
less information they can result in more accurate decisions than more complex 
decisions (see also Gigerenzer 2008). The accuracy of a heuristic, they argue, 
depends on the structure of the environment, namely the specific situation in 
which the heuristic is suitable. People may learn to select an appropriate heuris-
tic from their “adaptive toolbox”. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) proposed the notion of 
an “adaptive toolbox” containing several special tools (heuristics) for different 
tasks. Bröder and Newell (2008) admit that it might be appropriate to character-
ize individuals as intelligent if they are able to select the right strategy out of the 
“adaptive toolbox” depending on the specific situation (the structure of the envi-
ronment). Gigerenzer et al. (1999) provide the following analogy for their con-
 
41 In America it is common that employers match contributions paid by employees at a rate 
50% up to some cap threshold, which could be 6% of salary (Benartzi and Thaler 2007). The 
maximum deferral rate refers to the maximum tax deferred contributions possible. This is for 
example a regulation for company saving plans in Germany. 
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cept of the “adaptive toolbox”: “Just as a car mechanic uses specific wrenches, 
pliers and spanners in maintaining a car engine rather than hitting everything 
with a hammer, so too the mind relies on unique one function devices to pro-
vide serviceable solutions to individual problems.” 
Oehler (2004, 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b) has introduced a similar 
concept, the “Meta Bildung” (Meta Literacy) which can also be perceived as a 
box containing information which helps to solve problems and to make a deci-
sion in a specific circumstance.42 However, “Meta Bildung” does not mean that 
the box is full of heuristics which can be employed for each specific piece of in-
formation. „Meta literacy” in this sense means that it is more important to know 
methods or people which/who can solve the problem than increasing infor-
mation and teaching each individual to become an expert (Oehler and Wilhelm-
Oehler 2009, 2011; Oehler 2011, 2012a, 2012d e, 2013a-b).” Instead they rec-
ommend a practice-oriented, case-based financial education as well as a „meta 
education” to improve the „meta literacy” as shown by Oehler (2004, 2009, 2011, 
2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b). 
One example of translating among others the idea of “meta-literacy” into praxis 
has been provided by a study by Oehler (WDR 2012). This study is based on the 
data gathered in connection with a survey conducted on behalf of the German 
television broadcasting transmitter WDR (2011). Oehler (WDR 2012) argues 
that an analysis of individual consumer behaviour is necessary if radio and tele-
vision broadcasts about household finances shall be successful in reaching a 
specific group of consumers. Based on the data he arranges the young adults 
into five types of behaviour according to their expressed attitudes towards fi-
nances.43 According to Oehler (WDR 2012) television or radio broadcast about 
finances addressing these specific types of consumers should try to provoke 
consternation about a specific topic and then provide practical advice about how 
to tackle that problem. The broadcasts should be on a modular basis reflecting 
the concept of “meta-education” and provide support in order to solve the prob-
lem in principle. 
Lusardi at al. (2009) take a Social marketing approach and developed a seven 
point instruction to file a savings plan. They addressed three barriers which they 
identified in in-depth interviews with low income employees. These barriers 
included insufficient information on how to save, insufficient income and self-
control. In order to address this information they provided a simple and con-
 
42 For an application and discussion of „Meta-Bildung“ see also Micklitz et al. (2010) 
43 These five types are “careless”, “resurgent”, “sensitized”, “problem-conscious”, “informed” 
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crete seven point planning tool for filing a company pension plan. This tool pro-
vides information on the minimum amount necessary to start savings, infor-
mation which will motivate individuals with a low income to get started with 
retirement savings. It has been argued that the plan in itself reduces the self-
control problem. This effectiveness of planning had also been acknowledged by 
Gollwitzer (1999) who suggests that individuals who are planning or who are 
provided with a planning aid are more likely to follow through their intentions 
than without any specified plan. Lusardi et al. (2009) find that the planning tool 
significantly motivated employees to start saving for retirement. 
In conjunction with the German initiative “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” a 
small, 12 page leaflet, was provided as a planning tool for starting private re-
tirement saving (Bundesregierung 2009). Firstly, this tool provides information 
about the facts a bank or insurance agent needs to know in order to suggest ap-
propriate products. Secondly it tells the consumer what information the agent 
has to provide before a contract can be filed. Thirdly, the planning tool suggests 
how to identify an appropriate product and how to make an informed decision. 
Presently there is no evidence of the effectiveness of this planning tool since an 
evaluation has not taken place. 
Carrol et al. (2005) simplified the decision for employers to join the retirement 
plan, which reduces the effort costs of filing a plan even more than providing a 
planning aid. They provided an enrolment form on which new employees only 
had to check a yes box for joining the plan. The savings rate (2%) and the asset 
allocation was set at a default by the employer. Carroll et al. detected an increase 
of participation from 9 to 34% in the first four month.44 
While employees still have to make an active choice to join the plan in the ex-
ample of Carrol et al. (2005), an emerging literature especially in the US has also 
examined the effects of retirement plans with automatic enrolment. This means 
that at the time an employer is eligible for the plan, he/she will be notified that 
he/she has been enrolled in the plan. He/she also receives information about 
the pre-selected contribution rate and the fund selection. Retirement plans with 
automatic enrolment are also called opt out plans because the individual can 
only choose not to participate (opting out) after he/he has been assigned to the 
plan. Opting in on the other hand would imply that individuals have to make an 
active choice to join the plan as it is the case in Germany. 
Benartzi and Thaler (2007) provide evidence from the UK employers who pay 
the complete contributions to a defined benefit plan. The plan, however, re-
 
44 Lusardi et al. 2009 developped a short instruction about how to file a company pension plan. 
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quires the employees to sign in. It was found that only half of eligible employees 
joined the plan. In such and many other cases, opting out plans could help indi-
viduals to improve their retirement savings decisions. Choi et al. (2001) provide 
evidence that the introduction of automatic enrolment leads to a dramatic in-
creased participation rate. Before its introduction between 26 and 69% of the 
employees had joined the plan, depending on job tenure. After the introduction 
more than 85% participated, independent of job tenure. Generally research pro-
vides evidence that participants join sooner and that eventually also more partic-
ipants join (Madrian and Shea 2001, Choi et al. 2002, 2004). Madrian and Shea 
(2000) detected that increasing participation were especially high for women and 
individuals with low income. Leinert (2003) found that the statutory right for 
deferred contributions in connection with a company plan implementation 
within the opting in framework increased participation especially for individuals 
with higher income and men. 
Researchers, however, also point to the risks and problems associated with au-
tomatic enrolment. Benartzi and Thaler (2007) for example discuss a study that 
asked individuals working at employers with opting in plans why they would not 
participate. Many answered that they would not have any money left or that they 
would prefer repay dept. In the case that individuals participate in a opting out 
plan despite having a low income such that they have to take on expensive con-
sumer credits or have to repay debt, the participation in the plan would certainly 
decrease utility for these individuals. To avoid this to happen, employers have to 
provide clear information about how much is deducted from employees’ salary.  
Benartzi and Thaler (2007) also point to the low default savings rate of 2-3% 
which is often chosen in opting out retirement plans. Madrian and Shea (2001) 
report that many employees continue to save at the default. The reason for this 
finding is the same as the reason for not joining the plan if individuals have to 
take action, the effort costs to change something are too high and the path of 
least resistance is to stay in the plan. Saving at such a low rate until retirement 
would imply an undersaving.  
One proposed solution to the problem of undersaving has been proposed by 
Choi et al. (2003). They suggest to choose an extreme value like the maximum 
deferral rate as the default contribution rate. Such a high rate they argue would 
induce employees to take action to think about an appropriate savings rate be-
cause the costs of contributing such a large monthly amount would be even 
more painful. A second solution, “Save more Tomorrow” has been developed by 
Benartzi and Thaler (2004). Individuals starting to save in a retirement plan 
commit themselves to increase contributions in the future. The costs of in-
creased contributions are therefore deferred into the future because individuals 
prefer to restrict themselves in the future rather than today. Leinert (2005) pro-
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vides evidence for procrastination based on two surveys conducted in Germany 
in 2002 and 2003. He found that 8% of those who thought they should save 
more, planned to do so during the following three month and in 2003 this were 
12% of the participants respectively. The rest of the individuals postponed the 
starting date to some later point in time.  
The concept of the “Save more Tomorrow” plan draws on the finding that indi-
viduals tend to procrastinate and that individuals value losses more than gains. 
Losses have almost twice the impact of gains (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979, 
1992). Based on the finding of Kahnemann and Tversky (1979, 1992) and 
Benartzi and Thaler (2004) decided that the savings increase should take place 
each time, the employee gets a pay rise. In this respect he/she never sees is take 
home pay to decrease and he/she does not experience any losses. The dropout 
rate of these plans is fairly low. There are some individuals who drop out or 
suspend the automatic increases of their contribution but overall most employ-
ees remained in the plan for the whole period (Benartzi and Thaler 2007). In 
combination with automatic enrolment, “Save more Tomorrow” plans can in-
crease participation and contributions rates. Choi et al. (2001) point to the risk 
of oversaving which could lead individuals to take out expensive consumer cred-
its. 
2.3.6 Discussion 
The preceding discussion of the literature indeed suggests that financial educa-
tion and financial literacy itself are likely to be only one piece of the cake neces-
sary to support individuals on their way towards an appropriate amount and 
type of retirement provision. For various reasons there was only weak evidence 
that retirement seminars foster savings. Oehler and Kohlert (2008), however, 
found that financial literacy has a significant effect on the advice a consumer 
receives in an investment counselling session at a bank or insurance company.45 
Individuals with a higher degree of financial literacy received a higher quality of 
counselling than individuals with a low degree of financial knowledge. The 
counselling sessions for the more literate individuals lasted longer, more prod-
ucts were presented, even products which could not directly be assigned to the 
banks’ own products, and these consumers were better advised concerning their 
individual retirement needs. 
Furthermore, Chater et al. (2010) argued that several of the biases or deviations 
from rational behavior of the homo oeconomicus which have been discussed in 
chapter 2.1.3 would affect behavior more strongly, or even only when people 
 
45 See also Oehler and Kohlert (2009a), (2009b); Oehler et al. (2009); Oehler (2009) 
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lacked the necessary knowledge and skills to make an informed decision. An 
example would be that retirement education or seminars induce people to think 
about the problem from a different angle which he or she would not have done 
without this information. It might be that a present-orientated, myopic individ-
ual starts placing more weight on his or her future consumption than he or she 
did before (Becker and Mulligan 1997). Another example would be that a re-
tirement seminar at the time employees face the decision to join the retirement 
plan may enable them to assess whether choosing a predefined default is ap-
propriate in their individual circumstances. Providing information at the time 
the consumer needs it is also important because at that time they need infor-
mation and they are more willing to follow advice and suggestions from neutral 
experts.46 In the context of informational programs on television or radio, Oeh-
ler (WDR 2012) suggests the need to provoke consternation about a specific top-
ic and then provide practical advice about how to tackle that problem.  
A survey on behalf of the ING-DiBa (ING-DiBa AG and Kauselmann 2010) 
found that 87% of the 2.500 respondents aged 16-64 would have liked simple 
and easy to understand investment opportunities. Oehler (2012b) advocates the 
demand for simpler products and more transparency, especially concerning the 
costs which come with each product.47 A further step towards simplifying deci-
sions for German consumers would be if they received information about their 
pension entitlements from the statutory pension, the company pension and any 
private pension within one account statement instead of separate statements for 
each retirement savings device. Oehler (2009) goes even further and suggests a 
regular statement comprising of entitlements within the whole social insurance 
system and not just old age insurance. 
The measures presented in the discussion so far leave the decision to save for 
retirement by the individual. If such measures are not found to be effective in 
encouraging individuals to save sufficiently for retirement, an alternative strate-
gy has to be thought about to foster retirement savings. This strategy could then 
be one of automatic enrolment. The potential problems with this mechanism, 
however, have to be taken into account. Individuals who would never have start-
ed to save for retirement may find themselves contributing to a company pen-
sion plan while taking out a loan, for instance, to finance a new washing ma-
chine. The same behavioral phenomenon of inertia, also called status quo bias 
which has been used to increase life-time utility through automatic enrolment, 
 
46 See also Whitehouse (2000), Oehler 2004, 2009, 2011, 2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b. 
47 See also Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (2010), Bundesministerium für 
Ernährung (2012). 
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can also work in the opposite direction. Targeted information connected with 
automatic enrolment would be more likely to enhance welfare.  
Oehler and Reisch (2008) propose different strategies to use the knowledge of 
behavioral economics in consumer policy. Besides defaults and consumer edu-
cation they suggest making private retirement savings mandatory. Mandatory 
private retirement savings, however, is problematic, because it may override in-
dividual preferences, if for example capital-life insurance is considered as re-
tirement savings while another investment (e.g. housing, stocks, bonds), which 
may be the preferred retirement savings vehicles of some individuals, is not. 
Recently, an increasing number of German researchers and politicians have 
criticized the reforms and suggest strengthening the statutory pay-as-you go 
pension system in order to prevent poverty in old age (ARD 2012). 
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3 Data 
In a venture of the project to evaluate the effectiveness of the adult education 
seminar “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” (Retirement provision goes to school), 
two data sets have been generated. The first data set should refer to everyone 
who attended the education seminar in the year 2010. Each received paper and 
pencil (PAPI) questionnaires and had to answer several questions concerning 
their behavior and attitudes towards retirement savings. The highly selective 
nature of the seminar participants made it difficult to conclude anything con-
cerning the effectiveness of the seminar, and so a computer-assisted telephone 
interview (CATI) was conducted. This sample was generated from randomly 
chosen individuals with landline or mobile phone connections and was used as 
the control group, while the seminar participants were the treatment group. The 
following analysis is restricted to the data generated by the telephone interview 
because the response rate from the adult education seminars was very low and a 
detailed analysis can be found in the project report (Honekamp and Uehleke 
2012). Since the research project had been founded by the “Forschungsnetzwerk 
Alterssicherung” (FNA), the research department of the German statutory pen-
sion authority, I will refer to the data as FNA-Data. The following paragraphs 
describe how the data was generated, if there was a problem of item non-
response and how missing data is to be handled. 
The design of the questionnaire and the wording of the questions was partially 
influenced by previous evaluations of the course. The questionnaires distributed 
among seminar participants needed to encompass the exact wording of the 
questions which have been employed in previous course evaluations (Frommert 
2008, Oehler and Wilhelm-Oehler 2011). The remaining space has been filled 
with questions which where necessary to meet the requirements of the new and 
extended course evaluation (Honekamp and Uehleke (2012)). These additional 
questions consisted of already approved questions taken from either the SAVE-
Study (Börsch-Supan et al. 2008) or the Old-Age Provision Report from the Ber-
telsmann-Stiftung (Reifner et al. 2003) and of questions especially designed for 
the course evaluation by the authors. In general, the design of the question-
naires of both CATI interviews had to be designed in the same way as the ques-
tionairse for seminar participants because the participants of the CATI interview 
had the purpose to serve as the control group. The CATI guildelines and ques-
tions of both questionnaires can be found in the appendix. 
3.1 Telephone-Survey 
The survey participants of the randomly selected households in the telephone 
survey were interviewed in two waves. The first wave of the survey took place 
from May-June 2010 and the second wave exactly one year later, May-June 2011. 
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In both surveys the subjects were asked about their knowledge of pensions and 
their retirement savings and attitudes. 
3.1.1 Survey Method CATI 
The two surveys were administered using computer-assisted telephone inter-
views (CATI). Since Germany has a particularly dense grid of landline and mo-
bile phone connections, the problem of selectivity seen in the interview mode 
reduced (Diekmann 2010), and therefore generating a representative survey 
would be possible if the majority of individuals participated. Households which 
could not be reached were placed on resubmission for different days and times. 
The advantage of a telephone survey compared to sending a written question-
naire is that knowledge questions can be asked as respondents are not able to 
look up the solution in books or the internet during the telephone interview. A 
disadvantage of telephone interviews is the selectivity of the participants. Indi-
viduals, who are bothered by telephone marketing, may also refuse to participate 
in the survey. 
3.1.2 Sample 
The selected sample consisted of 54,602 telephone numbers including mobile 
and unlisted numbers. The sample was stratified after the 16 German federal 
states. At the beginning of the interview everyone was filtered and so only those 
aged between between 20 and 60 years old or already retired were interviewed. 
The elderly were not considered because private retirement provision plays a 
less important role for these individuals and it had also been assumed that it 
would be unlikely that these indiviudals would attend the retirement seminar 
“Altersvorsorge macht Schule”. To evaluate the program as intended in the pro-
ject, it was desirable that the telephone respondents had similar characteristics 
as the participants in the seminar. For the analysis in this work, however, the 
similarity is not important since the focus is only on the data generated through 
the CATI. Individuals who are younger than 20 years have not been taken into 
account, because many are still in school or vocational training and hence are 
less likely to be dealing with retirement issues or to invest in private pension 
plans. 
3.1.3 Response Rate 
In the first wave, 1,016 usable telephone interviews were conducted. Of these 
individuals 565 persons also participated in the second survey. However, three 
people stopped the interview during the first fifth of the survey. Another three 
respondents discontinued the interview when they were asked to answer the 
pension knowledge questions. 
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In order to detect a possible selection process in the data, some general demo-
graphic variables are compared directly to the micro-census data, which is a rep-
resentative survey of the German population. The breakdown of respondents 
into high, middle and low educational achievement shows that 55% are highly 
educated.48 In the micro-census only 31% of the population aged between 20 to 
60 years has a high educational degree. The average age of respondents is 45, 
and the sample is composed of 622 females and 394 males. The telephone sam-
ple is therefore rather well educated and women are oversampled, and for this 
reason a weighting variable based on the micro-census data has been generated 
which takes into account age, gender and education. These weights have been 
generated separately for both telephone interviews. For descriptive statistics in 
this work weights will generally be used in order to mitigate the selection. In the 
case were descriptive statistics are presented as the first step in the process of 
generating a new variable, weights will generally not be applied.  
The interviewers reported that many of those who participated in the interview 
revealed a special interest in pension issues. There were also some respondents 
who were employed in insurance companies or banks which operate pension 
products. It is possible to account for this kind of selection in multivariate anal-
ysis by including the variable "How happy are you dealing with financial mat-
ters" in the regression or by controlling for the subjective and objective pension 
knowledge of the participants. 
3.2 Imputation 
In surveys it is common that participants refuse to answer one or other of the 
questions. Refusal rates are particularly high for sensitive question relating to 
income or wealth. Non-responses were coded as missing values in the data set 
(.). Table 2 shows the variables which will be of interest in the empirical analysis 
and the respective number of missing values. In this survey there are several 
variables with missing values, which would considerably reduce the sample in 
empirical estimations because many estimation procedures use only complete 
cases (respondents who answered all the relevant questions).  
There are various methods to replace missing values. Here I opted for multiple 
imputation because it produces estimates with less bias compared to the “mean 
imputation” or the “conditional mean imputation”. The two imputation meth-
ods which will not be considered here generate imputed values by employing 
models that use only observed data. The imputed values are then treated as if 
 
48 Low education: no school degree or Hauptschule; middle education: Realschule or compara-
ble; high education: Abitur or comparable. 
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they were observed, but estimates are in fact imputations. Such an approach 
reduces the variance and possibly destroys the relationship between the varia-
bles, and the standard errors obtained are too small (University of California, 
Los Angeles (UCLA): Academic Technology Services). In order to achieve a 
greater variation, multiple imputation (MI) is proposed in which the imputed 
values are drawn from a distribution. Using this method takes into account the 
uncertainty associated with the replacement of missing values. Each missing 
value will be replaced by a set of imputed values taking into account the infor-
mation in the original dataset. For this project ten imputed data sets have been 
generated. The variance between the imputations ensures that the standard er-
ror will not be underestimated in such a way as in the two other methods de-
scribed above. For the calculation of standard errors not only the variance within 
the imputations, but also the variance between imputations will be used. With 
an appropriate imputation model, MI coefficients will be obtained, which are 
less biased than the coefficients resulting from an analysis based only on com-
plete cases. 
Multiple imputations will be performed, like all other analyses conducted in this 
work, using STATA. This software on the one hand provides imputation using 
the "multivariate normal approach" and on the other hand "multiple imputation 
by chained equations (MICE)" (Little and Rubin 2002). I opted for the imputa-
tion via MICE, because almost all variables of interest in the following analyses 
are ordinal or binary, such that the underlying assumption of a multivariate 
normal distribution underlying the "multivariate normal" approach cannot be 
met. 
Now the question emerges concerning which variables should go into the impu-
tation model. In this work an imputation will be carried out for each specific 
analysis containing the variables, occurring in this analysis. Thus interaction 
terms and other non-linear terms were included in the model. Additionally, the 
respective dependent variable is part of the imputation model.49 In the analysis 
with imputed data sets, however, the imputations of the dependent variable will 
again be treated as missing, as suggested by Hippel (2007). Thus, the inclusion 
of the dependent variable in the model is used only to improve the estimation of 
the independent variables. 
After imputation, the data sets are ready to be analysed using the conventional 
methods. The estimates of the individual data sets are then merged. Thus, the 
regression coefficients are calculated, for example, by determining their mean 
 
49 A detailed discussion of the treatment of interaction terms and other non-linear terms in 
imputation models see von Hippel 2009, Wagstaff et al. 2009. 
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values over (in our case) all ten imputed data sets. Overall, this procedure makes 
it possible to account for the uncertainty of the imputed values. 
In the following section those variables and their missing values which are rele-
vant for the main analysis of this work will depicted in Table 2. Overall 1016 re-
spondents have taken part in the first telephone interview and all variables hav-
ing more than 100 missing values will now briefly be discussed. The most item 
non response have been counted for wealth with 324 (32%), and income with 
253 (25%) missing values. 15% of the respondents exhibited missing values in 
both cases. 
Table 2: Missing Values 
Variable Missing Complete 
Like dealing with financial matters 17 999 
Sufficient time to deal with financial matters   3 1,013 
Care only about urgent matters 13 1,003 
I fear that I fall into disuse when retired      10 1,006 
I associate aging with illness and care dependency  13 1,003 
procrastinate on financial matters 7 1,009 
Savings suffice for adequate retirement live 117 899 
Planning concrete measures concerning retirement provision 17 999 
Thought about adequate retirement income 12 1,004 
Subjective knowledge index 39 977 
Objective knowledge: Pension Reduction 23 993 
Objective knowledge: Company Pension 6 1,010 
Objective knowledge: "Riester-Pension" 65 951 
Objective knowledge: Interest 12 1,004 
Objective knowledge: contribution rate 27 989 
Objective knowledge: statutory pension 23 993 
Objective knowledge index 110 906 
Individual net income 253 763 
Wealth 324 692 
Age 2 1,014 
Married/cohabiting 1 1,015 
Children 1 1,015 
Education 11 1,005 
Concerning income and wealth the question often arises whether the MAR 
(missing at random) assumption is met or whether the missing values are not 
random, but in the nature of the variables (MNAR missing not at random). One 
might assume, for example, those with a high income are less likely to answer 
questions concerning income than middle-income people. The two previously 
described imputation methods in STATA are both subject to the MAR assump-
tion. A test of whether a variable is MNAR is not possible because the infor-
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mation necessary to confirm this assumption cannot be observed. However, in-
vestigating the relationship between an indicator variable for missing income 
and other variables implying a high income, does show that here these variables 
are only moderately correlated. These variables are, for example, housing equity 
(-0.14), wealth (-0.13) or the monthly contributions to private retirement plans 
(0.04). Assuming that only individuals with a high income are more likely to 
refuse to answer, the low correlation could support the MAR-assumption. Gen-
erally MAR will be assumed for all variables which will be part of the multiple 
imputations. 
Furthermore, there are many missing values in the question relating to whether 
private savings suffice for an adequate retirement life if the individual continues 
saving as before. There are 117 missing values for this question which could be 
explained by uncertainty and a lack of knowledge. Some individuals may not 
know how much they save each month, how much wealth they have already ac-
cumulated or how much they would need for an adequate retirement life. Addi-
tionally there is the uncertainty of financial markets especially in the light of the 
financial crises. This uncertainty makes it difficult to predict how much a pen-
sion plan would be worth in, say, 20 years time. 
Finally, with regards to this brief overview of missing values, the objective 
knowledge questions resulted in three people stopping the telephone interview 
and a further 110 people refused to answer at least one of six knowledge ques-
tions. This high number of missing values might be explained as reflecting the 
sensitivity of the issue. Some people may want to avoid admitting that they don’t 
know the answer to the question and therefore refuse to answer it instead of 
stating that they do not know the answer, as admitting this might be difficult for 
them. 
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4 Methods 
The methods section describes how theoretical concepts outlined in chapter 2.1 
will be operationalized using the data introduced in the previous chapter. All 
available variables to measure time preferences, procrastination and pension 
literacy will be presented. Furthermore, it will be shown how the hypothesis de-
veloped in chapter 2.1 can be tested. The last part of the method chapter is de-
voted to the estimation technique applied and an assessment of the potential 
problems.  
4.1 Measuring Time Preferences and Procrastination 
Shane, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) point to the difficulties faced by 
attempting to measure pure time preferences. They doubt that there can be a 
stable discount factor that can be applied to all sources of utility. The discount 
rates for money and health for example are only weakly correlated (Chapman, 
Nelson and Hier 1999). Therefore, Shane Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) 
suggest unpacking time preferences into more fundamental concepts. These 
motives are “impulsivity” (the degree to which an individual acts spontaneous, 
unplanned fashion), “compulsivity” (the tendency to make plans and stick with 
them), and “inhibition” (the ability to inhibit the automatic or “knee-jerk” re-
sponse to the appetites and emotions than trigger impulsive behavior)” (Shane, 
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002, 392). They argue that the best way to pre-
dict discount rates for saving behavior is the conventional measure of discount 
rates, but impulsivity and compulsivity may also be significant predictors. Ar-
rondel and Masson (2005) and Arrondel (2009) suggest using question batteries 
with 20 or more questions in order to retain a valid instrument to measure time 
preference. However, because of the limited number of questions which could 
be implemented in the FNA-Survey, it had been decided not to implement an 
extensive question battery to measure time preferences. Instead proxies for time 
preferences have been added that have been used in other surveys such as the 
“German SAVE-Survey” or the “Pension Provision Survey” conducted by the 
Berthelsmann Stiftung.50 
  
 
50 The German-Save-Survey is a stable panel since 2003 and collects detailed information on 
household’s financial structure and socio-psychological aspects. This survey is administered at 
the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging. The “Pension Provision Sur-
vey“ was administered at the Berthelsmann Stiftung in the context of their Retirement-
Provision Report (Vorsorgereport Reifner et al. 2003b) and asked questions about the financial 
situation and individual behavior concerning old-age provision. 
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Procrastination is a concept which is closely related to time preferences since 
procrastination is represented by a hyperbolic discount function in the theory of 
consumption (Laibson 1988). Laibson (1988) assumes that individuals, who 
know that they save too little but do nothing about it, procrastinate in planning 
and saving for retirement because these are unpleasant tasks. 
In the FNA-data several items exist which capture time preferences or procras-
tination. It is likely that these variables are correlated with one another, which 
implies that there could be some redundancy in those variables. There are sev-
eral approaches to encounter this situation. Firstly, it is possible to use only 
some of these variables in the regression analysis, secondly it is possible to cre-
ate an aggregated index by summing measured variables and thirdly it is possi-
ble to created principal component scores. If applicable, principal component 
scores would be the method of choice, since it explains more of the variance 
than the other two methods.  
Table 3: Questions Measuring Time Preferences or Procrastination and Correlation Matrix 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, unweighted.  
The nine questions related to time preferences and the corresponding correla-
tion matrix, are presented in Table 3. Questions 7 to 8 have been introduced 
with the following sentences: “Now we have prepared some statements about 
retirement and retirement provision. How much do you agree with the follow-
ing statements?” Hence financial decisions in the statement, “I procrastinate on 
financial decisions,” are likely (and intended) to be interpreted as indicating the 
decision to prepare for retirement.  
Contrary to what has been expected the correlation between the variables seems 
rather low. Even the highest correlation of 0.50 is no reason to be concerned 
about multicollinearity when using both variables as separate explanatory varia-
bles. This is also supported by the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) which is less 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1
I care only about urgent matter, future problems often resolve 
themselves (0 not true - 10 true) 1.0000
2
Actions with immediate results are more important than actions 
with results far in the future (0 not true - 10 true) 0.3417 1.0000
3
How important is Saving for old age for you individually?                
(0 not important - 10 very important) -0.1201 -0.0603 1.0000
4
How importnat is Saving for care dependency when old for you 
individually? (0 not important - 10 very important) -0.0516 0.0374 0.4988 1.0000
5
How willingly do you deal with financial matters                               
(1 do not like it - 4 like it very much) -0.1408 -0.0806 0.1110 0.0579 1.0000
6
Do you have sufficient time to deal with financial matters             
(1 not at all - 4 yes) -0.0268 0.0143 0.0330 0.0502 0.2346 1.0000
7
I fear that I fall into disuse when retired                                                 
(1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) -0.0530 -0.0524 0.0627 -0.0440 0.0604 0.0607 1.0000
8
I associate aging with illness and care dependency                              
( 1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) 0.0024 -0.0070 0.0058 -0.0767 0.0683 0.0389 0.2978 1.0000
9
I procrastinate on financial decisions                                                       
(1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) -0.2058 -0.1240 0.1122 0.0479 0.3403 0.2245 0.1607 0.1061 1.0000
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than 1.36 in this case. A common rule of thumb is that only VIFs of at least 10 
give a reason of being concerned about multicollinearity (O’Brien 2007). The 
VIF indicates how much the variance of the coefficient estimate is being inflated 
by multicollinearity. As the VIF increases also the standard error increases. 
Hence the coefficient would need to be lager to be significant in the case of high 
VIFs as compared to a low VIF. Larger sample sizes decrease standard errors 
and produce more precise estimates of regression coefficients while adding 
more variables can increase the size of standard errors. More variables increase 
standard errors especially if they do not entail increases in the adjusted 𝑅2. 
Hence there could still be a case to reduce the number of variables if their inclu-
sion in the regression model does not lead to an increase in the adjusted 𝑅2. 
Table 4: Rotated Factor Loadings, Time Preferences 
 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone interview, N=956, iterated principal factor analysis.  
Even though the correlations are lower than expected an iterated principal factor 
analysis (ipf) will be conducted. The variables investigated above are theoretical-
ly closely related concepts. Therefore it might be that the variables presented 
above have some underlying common factors like future orientation or a ten-
dency to procrastinate. Besides the common aspect of for example future orien-
tation, each item also captures a unique aspect that is not addressed by any oth-
er item. Henceforth, the factors will not extract all variance from the variables, 
but only that proportion that is due to the common factor which is shared by 
several variables.51 Generally factor analysis requires metric data hence it re-
quires the ordinal scale of data at hand to be interpreted as interval scale. 
 
51 This implies that the communality will be less than 1. 
    Variable  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness
1
I care only about urgent matter, future problems often resolve 
themselves (0 not true - 10 true)                 0.5986        0.607
2
Actions with immediate results more important than actions 
with results far in the future (0 not true - 10true)                 0.5834        0.650
3 Saving for old age (0 not important - 10 very important) 0.722              0.442
4
Saving for care dependency when old                                                      
(0 not important - 10 very important) 0.7217              0.449
5
How willingly do you deal with financial matters                               
(1 do not like it - 4 like it very much) 0.5812              0.620
6
Do you have sufficient time to deal with financial matters             
(1 not at all - 4 yes) 0.4447              0.772
7
I fear that I fall into disuse when retired                                                 
(1 agree - 4 do not agree at all)                       0.5781 0.636
8
I associate aging with illness and care dependency                              
( 1 agree - 4 do not agree at all)                       0.5376 0.691
9
I procrastinate on financial decisions                                                       
(1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) 0.5383              0.605
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Table 4 shows the rotated factor loadings after ipf analysis. While the factor 
loadings are all very high, the uniqueness is not close to zero. Hence there is 
considerable variability left over after extracting four factors. Extracting one fac-
tor out of this analysis has been suggested by the Kaiser (1960) criterion, which 
recommends retaining factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. Another test, the 
scree test, to decide on the number of factors to be extracted has been proposed 
by Cattell (1966). In this case one has to find the place where the smooth de-
crease of eigenvalues appears to level off to the right of the plot. The scree plot is 
depicted in Figure 6 and suggests the extraction of four factors. In fact four fac-
tors have been chosen. 
Figure 6: Scree Plot Time Preferences 
 
Scree plot after ipf, would suggest three to four factors.  
The second factor retained comprises the variables “like dealing with financial 
matters”, “time to deal with financial matters” and “procrastinating on financial 
matters”. Following the reasoning from Laibson (1988) individuals procrastinate 
because dealing with retirement provision is an unpleasant task. Therefore, in-
dividuals who do not like to deal with financial matters should be more likely to 
procrastinate. Furthermore, it could be that individuals who do not like dealing 
with financial matters also feel that they do not have time for their financial 
matters because they like to spend their time otherwise.  
Another reason which makes private retirement provision an unpleasant task is 
a negative association with old age which according to Leinert (2005) leads to 
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procrastination. Individuals who associate aging with illness, care dependency 
or who think that they will fall into disuse, place less utility on their life during 
retirement. The most robust implication of Becker and Mulligans (1997) model 
on endogenous time preferences is that decreasing future utilities also lower the 
advantage of low discount rates. Hence low future utilities discourage invest-
ments in future orientated capital. Therefore the equilibrium discount rate 
would be higher for someone who has a negative feeling when thinking about 
old-age than for someone who has some positive associations with old-age. On 
theoretical grounds the variables measuring the association with old-age could 
have been assigned to Factor 2 in the case that the negative association entails 
procrastination or it could just influence the general discounting of future 
pleasures in which case it could have also been assigned to Factor 2 or 3. The 
variables measuring the discomfort when thinking about old age, however, are 
classified within factor 4.  
The items “How important is saving for care dependency” and “How important 
is saving for old age” are assigned to Factor 1, while “Care only about urgent 
matters” and “Actions with immediate results more important” are assigned to 
Factor 3. The factor loadings are higher for Factor 1 than for Factor 3 and also 
the uniqueness is smaller. Both factors are intended to measure time prefer-
ences with respect to savings decisions. The questions underlying Factor 3 are 
more general statements about the utility placed on the present as opposed to 
the future while the questions underlying Factor 1 are directly targeted to sav-
ings for old-age. Besides measures which may lead to procrastination of retire-
ment savings like “like dealing with financial matters” or “negative association 
with old-age”, theoretically, a model predicting saving or planning for retire-
ment should also control for some kind of initial time preferences like Factor 1 
or 3. The variable “How important is saving for old age” as well as the variable 
“How important is saving for care dependency” could be answered on a 11 point 
scale from 0 “not important” to 10 “very important”. In both questions the “0” 
can be interpreted as very present orientated while “10” would be very future 
orientated. For both questions most respondents rated the importance with 7 or 
above (78%, 65% respectively, weighted). The questions underlying Factor3 also 
have a 11 point scale from 0 “not true” to 10 “true”. As before, in both questions 
the “0” can be interpreted as very present orientated while “10” would be very 
future orientated.  
The pattern of answers to these two questions is completely different to the one 
of the questions discussed before. The question “Actions with immediate results 
more important” has two peaks at 0 with 18% of responses and at 5 with 17 % of 
the responses. Remaining responses are allocated rather equally over all catego-
ries with two valleys at 1 and 9. “Care only about urgent matters” also has a peak 
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at 5 with 26% of the responses. Furthermore, much more individuals agree with 
the statement (43% values above 5) than not agreeing with the statement (31% 
values below 5).  
Since all four questions are thought to measure time preferences on the same 
scale it is surprising that there is almost no correlation between the variables 
underlying Factor 1 and the variables underlying Factor 3 (Table 3). A reason 
could be that both pairs are not able to measure pure time preferences (Shane, 
Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). There could be other individual consider-
ations which influence answering behavior. Answering behavior to the ques-
tions underlying Factor 3 is likely to be biased towards choosing the middle 
(category 5) and the answers to the questions underlying Factor 1 could suffer 
from interviewer bias and the social desirability to save for retirement and care 
dependency. 
Table 5: Measures for Time Preferences and Procrastination  
 
Note: ipf=iterated principal factor 
Some problems with the factor analysis have been encountered. Firstly, factor 
analysis requires the variables to be metric but they are only ordinal and inter-
preted as interval. Secondly, the correlation between the variables is not ex-
tremely high so the communalities are rather low. And thirdly the allocation of 
items to different factors is not perfectly in line with theoretical considerations. 
Table 5 comprises all variables which could be employed in the empirical analy-
sis following in chapter 6. On theoretical grounds it would be necessary to in-
clude a variable approximating procrastination of retirement saving decisions 
and a variable measuring time preferences with respect to future orientation.  
Procrastination on retirement saving decisions could be approximated by the 
second factor variable, by the direct question if someone procrastinates on fi-
nancial matters or through the inclusion of the variable “like dealing with finan-
cial matters” and one of the variables measuring the negative association with 
old-age. Both an aversion against financial matters and an aversion concerning 
retirement can lead to procrastination (Leinert 2005). An aversion concerning 
retirement, however, could also have an effect on future orientation in general. 
Future orientation could be measured by either of the four variables which are 
timepref_urgent (0 not true - 10 true) I care only about urgent matters, future problems often resolve themselves 
timepref_results (0 not true - 10  true) Actions with immediate results more important than actions with results far in the future 
timepref_old_age (0 not important - 10 very important) Saving for old age
timepref_care (0 not important - 10 very important) Saving for care dependency when old                                                      
likefimatters (1 do not like it - 4 like it very much) How willingly do you deal with financial matters                               
timefimatters (1 not at all - 4 yes) Do you have sufficient time to deal with financial matters            
retire_disuse (1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) I fear that I fall into disuse when retired                                                 
retire_illness ( 1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) I associate aging with illness and care dependency                              
procrastination (1 agree - 4 do not agree at all) I procrastinate on financial decisions                                                      
factor1 (-3.05 - 1.18) ipf comprising timepref_care and timepref_old_age
factor2 (2.07 - 1.37) ipf comprising likefimatters, timefimatters and procrastination
factor3 (-1.89 - 1.93) ipf comprising timepref_urgent and timepref_results
factor4 (-2.10 - 1.27) ipf comprising retire_disuse and retire_illness
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part of Factor 2 or 3 or the factors themselves.52 The concrete decision of which 
variable will be chosen is part of the empirical analyis of chapter 6 considering 
each of the analysed topics separately. These decisions will be based on theoreti-
cal considerations on the one hand and on the Baysian and Akaide information 
criterion (BIC and AIC) on the other hand. The detailed analysis will generally 
be deferred to the Appendix. 
4.2 Measuring Financial and Pension Literacy 
The approach chosen to measure financial literacy depends on the purpose of 
the study. Studies testing financial knowledge may help to formulate or improve 
knowledge-based financial education seminars. Research which instead tries to 
capture skills, perception of knowledge or attitudes might be more useful when 
designing behavioral interventions (Hung et al. 2009). Hung et al. 2009 have 
conducted a study to examine the validity of different measures of financial lit-
eracy. For this research they used the RAND´s American Life Panel (ALP) 
which has filed four surveys assessing financial literacy between the years 2006 
and 2009. The first module was designed by Lusardi and Mitchell and consist of 
five multiple choice basic literacy questions and eight multiple-choice sophisti-
cated financial literacy questions. The second module was written by Hung and 
his colleagues and constituted an experiment on allocating a hypothetical in-
vestment portfolio among four different index funds. Financially literate were 
those individuals who minimized their investment fees by allocating their entire 
portfolio to the lowest fee fund. The third module had been designed by Miles 
Kimball and Robert Willis who asked 70 true/false questions about compound 
interest, portfolio diversification and institutional knowledge like how annuities 
work (Delavande, Rohwedder and Willis 2008). Furthermore, the participants 
were asked to rate how certain they are that their answer to each of those ques-
tions is correct. The fourth and last module employs the questions designed by 
Lusardi and Mitchell as well as five questions on investment markets and prod-
ucts. 
Hung et al. (2009) use Cronbachs alpha, to address the reliability of individual 
measures of financial literacy and Pearson correlations to assess the stability of 
financial literacy across waves and measurement strategy. The three financial 
literacy modules (experiment excluded because alpha could not be computed) 
showed reasonable internal consistency, reflecting a single underlying factor. 
The Pearson correlation between those three measures is high (above 0.60) and 
 
52 To shortly repeat the questions depicted in Table 4, the four variable are: „Care only about 
urgent matters“, „Achtions with immediate results more important“, „Importance of saving for 
old-age“, „Importance of saving for care dependency“. 
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the experimental measure is also significantly correlated with a coefficient of 
0.33. Hung et al. (2009), furthermore, find that financial literacy consistently 
predicts retirement planning behavior but not actual savings in the form of ag-
gregate savings. They conclude: “[…] although these financial literacy measures 
may be strongly predictive of consumers’ intentions, they do not have the same 
predictive power when applied to long-term outcomes. This may reflect that 
contextual and other factors can interfere with translating knowledge and inten-
tion into action.” 
Which questions to choose in a literacy module is a difficult task and also de-
pends on the context to be investigated. In different countries there are different 
institutional frameworks such that the kind of knowledge which is necessary to 
make an informed decision may vary between countries. An important aspect to 
consider is also if individuals have to know everything or is it sufficient to know 
where to get advice. As Oehler (2011; 2012b; WDR 2012) put it, not everybody 
needs to be an economist, it is not necessary that individuals are all-
encompassing informed, instead it is sufficient that individuals are provided the 
relevant information at the time they need it. If individuals would start to gather 
information only at the time they need it, this would mean that the causality 
runs clearly from planning private retirement provision to financial literacy. On 
the other hand there could also be the government or the employer who thinks 
that it is the right time to start saving and therefore providing the individual rel-
evant information. This information may induce people to think about and plan 
for retirement; hence the causality would run from financial literacy to plan-
ning.53 
It might also be possible to divide knowledge into two classes. On the one hand 
there is basic knowledge which is knowledge everyone should possess and on 
the other hand there is more advanced knowledge which could be acquired at 
the time it is needed. Basic knowledge would for example be three of the basic 
knowledge questions chosen by Lusardi and Mitchel (Lusardi and Mitchell 
2006) which have been implemented into several surveys around the world. One 
question tests an understanding of inflation the second tests knowledge on in-
terest compounding and the third question tests the understanding of risk di-
versification. 
Knowledge of compound interest makes individuals aware about the advantages 
of starting to save early in life and the knowledge of inflation is among others 
important with respect to pension entitlements from the statutory pension sys-
 
53 How the causality problem has been encountered in this work will be the subject of chapter 
4.4. 
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tem. A pension entitlement worth 1.000€ today will have a considerably lower 
purchasing power in 20 years than today. This knowledge helps people to esti-
mate their retirement needs and may motivate individuals to think about re-
tirement earlier, than if they would without an understanding of compound in-
terest and inflation. The third questions generally assesses if someone knows 
that risk diversification is usually better than relying only on one product.54 This 
knowledge can directly be transferred to old-age insurance. In this case retire-
ment income is less volatile if it comes from different sources like government 
pension, funded pension and home ownership instead for example only relying 
on government pension. This basic knowledge is necessary to decide when it is 
necessary to acquire more information about for example specific products. 
Table 6: Basic Knowledge Questions (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006) 
1 Compound interest Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the 
interest rate is 20% per year. After five years, how 
much would you have on this account in total: more 
than $200, exactly $200, less than $200? 
2 Inflation Imagine that the interest rate on your savings ac-
count was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per 
year. After one year, would you be able to buy more 
than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the 
money in this account? 
3 Risk diversification Do you think that the following statement is true or 
false? “Buying a single company stock usually pro-
vides a safer return than a stock mutual fund. 
The data employed in this work contains two sources to measure financial and 
pension literacy. These are on the one hand questions which are based on self-
reports to assess knowledge and on the other hand a module which assesses 
knowledge with questions of the kind designed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2006). 
Self-reports are clearly subjective and will be distinguished from knowledge that 
can be judged against a normative standard. I will therefore refer to the self-
 
54 The question on risk diversification has been criticized since there exist also cases in which 
the single company stock has provided a saver return than a stock mutual fund (Oehler 2012b). 
Nevertheless, having a look at all existing company stocks and stock mutual funds, generally it 
is the stock mutual fund which is less risky. 
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reports by talking about subjective or perceived knowledge and when I refer to 
the second set of knowledge questions I will use the term actual knowledge.55  
Many of the questions used to assess pension literacy in the FNA-Survey were 
open questions, but the problem with these questions was that the number of 
individuals able to give the correct answer was very small, and even by extending 
the range of correct answers to “acceptable” answers did not help increase the 
number of correct responses to any extent. In designing the questionnaire for 
the FNA-Survey it was found to be essential to know approximately the contri-
bution rate of the statutory pension system, the amount of pension someone 
receives if he or she has earned an average income throughout his/her life, the 
percentage of pension reduction if someone retires early, and the percentage of 
savings necessary to receive the full “Riester-Subsidy” to be able to make a re-
tirement plan. Surprisingly the number of correct answers was very low even 
though the range of correct answers had been increased. It will now be de-
scribed how financial and pension knowledge has been measured in this survey 
and how one might use this information in regression analysis. Furthermore, it 
will be shown how subjective and objective knowledge vary with demographics 
and other factors. 
4.2.1 Actual Pension Literacy 
Actual knowledge has been measured using six questions. One measures basic 
literacy (Question 4) as decribed by Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011a) and the 
other five questions measure the knowledge of the German pension system. All 
six questions are presented below. Since only one question refers to basic litera-
cy and the remaining to pension knowledge I will refer to all six questions as 
pension knowledge.  
Reading through all six questions makes it easier to recap the degree of difficul-
ty when looking at the figures. For the interpretation of the results it is also im-
portant to know which answers have been counted as correct if an open re-
sponse was required. The correct answer to question 1 is that the pension would 
be reduced by 3.6%. All answers between 3% and 4.1% were counted as correct. 
This interval has been chosen because estimates within this interval seem fairly 
 
55 The second set of questions will be called objective, admitting that even these kind of 
knowledge questions might not be truly objective. Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011) for exam-
ple have shown that changing the order of correct answers or slightly changing the structure of 
the question can have an effect on the answers. Nevertheless, their results proved to be robust 
against these changes. Furthermore, there is the possibility that individuals guess (see also 
Lusardi and Mitchell 2009). 
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realistic and are therefore a good estimate of the pension reduction. Further-
more, 0.6% more or less does not change monthly pension a lot.  
Question 3 asks the respondent to state the percentage of income which has to 
be saved to receive the full “Riester-Subsidy”. The correct answer since 2008 is 
4%. The percentage of savings increased gradually from 1% in 2002 to 4% in 
2008. Any savings rate between 3 and 5% has been rated as being correct. This 
range has been chosen because of the gradual increase of the savings rate. Indi-
viduals may have thought that it is still 3% or that it already increased to 5%. 
Individuals are therefore roughly right and have at least some knowledge about 
the “Riester-Pension”. The next open question is the question concerning the 
contribution rate to the statutory pension system. This question is not easy inso-
far that the contribution rate could change each year. In 2010 the correct answer 
was 19.9% but any estimate between 18.9 and 20.9% was counted as correct. 
Table 7: Questions about Subjective Knowledge 
1 If an individual who is insured by the statutory pension insurance decides 
to retire one year before the statutory pension age, he/she has to face a 
pension reduction. By which percentage would his or her monthly pension 
be reduced? 
(percentage) (don’t know) (refuse) 
2 Do you think the following statement is correct: Everyone, subject to social 
insurance contributions, is entitled for a company pension (deferred com-
pensation) by law. This means, that if an employee wishes to use this sav-
ing mode, the employer has to offer one. 
(yes) (no) (don’t know) (refuse) 
3 Do you know how much as a percentage of income you have to save in or-
der to receive the full “Riester-Subsidy”? 
(percentage) (don’t know) (refuse) 
4 Suppose you have 100 € in a savings account and the interest rate is 20% 
per year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, 
how much would you have on this account in total? 
(more than 200€) (exactly 200€) (less than 200€) (don’t know) (refuse)  
5 How much is the contribution rate to the statutory pension system today 
(2010) for individuals who are subject to social insurance contributions 
(employers’’ plus employees’ share)? If you are not sure about the exact 
contribution rate, please estimate it. 
(contribution rate) (don’t know) (refuse) 
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6 What do you think: how much retirement income does someone receive 
from the statutory pension scheme if he/she worked for 45 years, continu-
ously paid contributions to the pension scheme and always earned an aver-
age income? 
(…€) (don’t know) (refuse)  
 
The last open question asks the respondents to estimate the statutory pension 
someone receives today if he or she fulfils certain criteria. In this case the range 
of correct answers differs depending on the region where the individuals live. 
The reason is that the correct answer for those in the old federal states (west 
Germany) was about 1,224€ and in the new federal states (east Germany) it was 
about 1,085.85€ in 2010. For that reason any estimate between 989€ and 1,185€ 
was regarded as being correct for individuals living in the eastern part of Ger-
many and estimates between 1,124€ and 1,324€ was regarded as being correct 
for those living in western Germany. 
Question 4, assessing if someone recognizes the concept of interest compound-
ing is clearly a question counting to basic literacy which someone should know 
regardless of any specific context. For most of the pension specific questions, 
however, it would be sufficient if individuals received this information when 
they need it. Exceptions would be question 2, testing if individuals know that 
they have a statutory right for obtaining a company pension to take advantage of 
deferred contributions. Company pension is the second pillar of the German 
pension system besides the statutory pension and private pension. Without this 
knowledge individuals may ask for advice and products at banks and insurance 
companies whose financial experts have an incentive to sell their products but 
not company pensions. Knowing approximately the amount of pension some-
one receives who earned an average income and contributed 45 years, is an im-
portant reference to get an idea of how much pension is to be expected, even 
though this reference point is less accurate for young individuals. This is the 
case, because the pension level is allowed to decrease from 46.4% in 2009 to 
43% in 2030 and what individuals can expect after the year 2030 is an open 
question.56  
The question about the pension reduction seems to be too advanced. The 
knowledge that pensions will be reduced if someone retires early and increased 
if someone retires later is an important piece of information, when individuals 
 
56 These figures are net before taxation for someone who always earned an average income and 
contributet 45 years to the statutory pension plan. 
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think about their retirement age and private retirement provision. Nevertheless, 
it is not important to know by how much the pension would be reduced or in-
creased. This kind of knowledge could easily be obtained at the time the deci-
sion is due. Question 5, asks for the contribution rate. This knowledge should 
not be relevant for a decision about retirement planning and saving and the per-
centage of income which has to be saved in order to receive the full “Riester-
Subsidy” should also easily be obtained from banks and insurance companies 
who offer these products. The more surprising is the finding from finanzen.net 
(2012) that many individuals do not take advantage of the full "Riester-Subsidy”. 
To conclude, there is information which would not be provided by financial ad-
visors who work for a bank or insurance company.  
A clear picture about different products which are available for private retire-
ment provision and the extent by which the pension would be reduced if some-
one retires early would only be provided by independent institutions like con-
sumer advice centres, the statutory pension authority or through school educa-
tion. The problem which will be encountered in this and many other works on 
financial literacy is causality. The question is, if knowledge causes planning and 
saving for retirement or the other way round. This problem will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 4.4. 
Figure 7: Answers to six Pension Knowledge Questions in Percentages 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted, N=1016, FNA-Data. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) argue in their empirical analysis that it is important 
to distinguish between “don’t know” (abbreviated DK) and giving an incorrect 
answer. They find that the proportion of DK answers varies according to the 
question. Furthermore they find DK responses vary with education and other 
demographic factors. Another finding is the high correlation between DK re-
sponses. They report a 70% correlation between the DKs resulting from the in-
terest compounding question and the inflation question. In contrast, giving 
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wrong answers have only a correlation of 11%. Hence they suggest that one 
should account for DK in empirical analysis to differentiate between degrees of 
financial knowledge. 
The FNA-Data depicted in Figure 7 shows a very diverse DK pattern ranging 
from 6% (question about statutory right for tax deferred contributions) to 68% 
of respondents who do not know how much savings are necessary to receive the 
full “Riester-Subsidy”. Generally the open questions (no predetermined set of 
answers), with one exception, have a very high rate of DK’s. Similarly scattered 
are the incorrect answers. Only the question about the “Riester-Subsidy” has 
less than 15% incorrect answers all other questions count more than 30% incor-
rect answers. It seems that many people guessed the answers to the open ques-
tion. This is, however, different for the “Riester-Subsidy” question since most 
individuals admitted that they do not know the answer. It remains an open 
question why so many individuals choose the DK option instead of guessing. 
Figure 8: Don't Know (DK) and False (f) Answers to Six Pension Knowledge Questions by 
Gender in Percentages 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted, Number of observations range 
from 951 to 1010, depending on the question.  
The correlation between DK’s had also been examined, with the result that the 
highest correlation is 0.28 which is the correlation between not knowing the 
contribution rate and not knowing the pension reduction. False answers are 
even less correlated with the highest correlation being 0.16. Comparing DK’s 
and false answers across demographics reveals that women more often admit 
that they don’t know than men (Figure 8). Men on the other hand gave generally 
more incorrect answers than women. Hence men seem to be more confident in 
their financial and pension knowledge and are therefore less likely to state that 
they do not know. Analysing answering behavior with respect to education gives 
a very diverse picture (Figure 9). In three out of six questions the number of 
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false answers increases with education and the number of DK’s decreases re-
spectively. The pattern of the remaining three questions is a little bit trickier. 
Generally, a higher percentage of low educated individuals gave a false answer 
than high educated individuals. Additionally the percentage of don’t know an-
swers was higher for the low educated individuals compared to the high educat-
ed. 
In contrast to Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), I do not find a high correlation 
among DK’s.  However, women and low educated are more likely to answer DK 
than men or high educated. It is not quite clear if this is the result from a gen-
eral confidence concerning financial matters or if it reflects knowledge. As a 
result from these findings, multivariate analysis will be carried out without DK’s 
as explanatory variable if they do not add any additional information to analyse 
the effect of financial literacy. The results with DK’s as explanatory variable can 
be found in the Appendix 9.4 and the following. 
Figure 9: Don't Know (DK) and False (f) Answers to six Pension Knowledge Questions by Edu-
cation in Percentages 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. Number of observations range 
from 951 to 1010, depending on the questi on. Low education: no degree, 
Hauptschulabschluss or equal, middle: Realschulabschluss or equal, Abitur or equal.  
Rooij van et al. (2011a, b) employ factor analysis and obtain two factors. One of 
the factors displays basic literacy and the other advanced literacy. They use the 
iterated principal factor method and also account for DK’s in their analysis. The 
factor loadings range from 0.24 to 0.66 for the basic literacy questions and ex-
ceed 0.4 for all advanced literacy questions. 
Following a similar approach, I tried to extract information about common fac-
tors on actual and perceived pension literacy and Don’t know (DK) answers. Ta-
ble 8 shows the results of a principal component analysis. All subjective 
knowledge questions have been assigned to one factor. The actual knowledge 
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questions, however, are allocated to different factors which they share with their 
DK response. Conducting an iterated principal factor analysis shows the same 
picture for actual knowledge but even more factors to which objective 
knowledge and the DK answers are allocated. There seems to be no common 
underlying component among objective knowledge questions, this suggests that 
internal consistency is weak. An explanation for these results could be that fac-
tor analysis requires metric data which the binary variables for objective 
knowledge are not. The subjective knowledge questions are measured on an 
ordinal scale from 1 to 7, hence they are much closer to a metric scale than the 
objective knowledge questions. 
Table 8: Rotated Factor Loadings, Subjective Knowledge, Objective Knowledge, DK (pcf) 
 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone interview, N=880.  
Note: Principal component factor analysis. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) 
and unique variances, blanks represent loading<0.3.  
In Table 9 and Table 10 “DK” responses have not been considered. The first ta-
ble shows the results after principal component factor analysis and the second 
shows the rotated factor loadings after iterated principal factor analysis. Both 
tables subsume all subjective knowledge questions less than one factor, hence 
there is a substantial amount of variance which these variables have in com-
mon. This common variance, which can be interpreted as subjective knowledge 
is the concept of interest. For that reason a factor score for objective knowledge 
will be generated after iterated principal factor analysis.  
For objective knowledge it is not possible to retain a meaningful factor out of 
the iterated principal factor analysis. As mentioned before, the reason might the 
binary character of the variables. Looking at Table 9 (principal component factor 
analysis), the objective knowledge questions are allocated between the three fac-
tors. Factor 2 contains four out of six objective pension knowledge questions. 
The two which are not part of factor 2 are the knowledge that employees have a 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Uniqueness
Financial Matters (S) 0.7539 0.4033
Statutory Pension (S) 0.7304 0.4357
Company Pension (S) 0.6566 0.5172
Capital Life Insurancs (S) 0.7095 0.4758
"Riester-Pension" (S) 0.5484 0.4389 0.4806
Pension Reduction (O) 0.8351 0.2879
Company Pension (O) 0.7921 0.3218
"Riester-Pension" (O) 0.8688 0.2053
Interest (O) -0.8126 0.3221
Contribution Rate (O) -0.8287 0.2750
Statutory Pension (O) -0.7320 0.4357
DK Pension Reduction (O) -0.7380 0.3702
DK Company Pension (O) -0.7772 0.3334
DK "Riester-Pension" (O) -0.8700 0.1867
DK Interest (O) 0.8060 0.3325
DK Contribution Rate (O) 0.7837 0.3139
DK Statutory Pension (O) 0.7284 0.4319
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right for tax deferred contributions in connection with a company pension and 
the knowledge of the amount of pension a representative individual receives 
from the statutory pension system. 
The reason why the company pension is not part of the common factor 2 could 
be that this question was significantly more likely to be answered by the lower 
educated respondents while the remaining questions were more likely to be an-
swered correctly as the level of education among respondents increased.57 On 
the other hand why the question about the statutory pension is not part of factor 
2 remains an open question. One possible reason could be that this question 
was more likely to be answered by older respondents, but this also holds for the 
pension reduction question which is part of factor 2. It has to be considered that 
factor analysis generally requires metrical variables. The objective knowledge 
variables, however, are not even ordinal. 
Table 9: Rotated Factor Loadings, Subjective Knowledge, Objective Knowledge (pcf) 
 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone interview, N=880.   
Note: Principal component factor analysis. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) 
and unique variances, blanks represent loading<0.3.  
Even though iterated principal factor analysis would have been more appropri-
ate to extract information about objective pension literacy, the common underly-
ing idea, I am going to extract a factor after principal component analysis. The 
screeplot depicted in Figure 10 suggests retaining two factors, the first one 
would measure subjective knowledge and the second on objective knowledge. 
Since subjective knowledge has already been retained from the more appropri-
ate ipf analysis, this factor will not be retained here again. 
 
57 See chapter 5.1. 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness
Financial Matters (S) 0,7481              0,4217
Statutory Pension (S) 0,7478              0,4338
Company Pension (S) 0,6631              0,523
Capital Life Insurancs (S) 0,702              0,4683
"Riester-Pension" (S) 0,5802              0,6313
Pension Reduction (O) 0,5573              0,6849
Company Pension (O)             0,9135 0,1629
"Riester-Pension" (O) 0,6343 0,3444        0,4262
Interest (O) 0,3474       -0,3165 0,7533
Contribution Rate (O) 0,6952              0,4646
Statutory Pension (O) 0,9252        0,1385
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Table 10: Rotated Factor Loadings, Subjective Knowledge, Objective Knowledge (ipf) 
 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone interview, N=880, iterated principle factor analysis.  
In chapter 4.2.2 it will be shown that the factor score for subjective knowledge 
(factor 1) is highly correlated with a variable which aggregated the answers over 
all five questions and then divided the sum by 5. Similarly, I will proceed with 
the objective knowledge questions. Even though adding up all questions is not 
supported by the factor analysis this approach will be followed.  
Figure 10: Screeplot for Subjective and Objective Knowledge after pcf 
 
Theoretically, the knowledge of all six questions could influence retirement de-
cisions hence the more questions someone is able to answer the nearer his or 
her savings decisions should be to the optimum. All questions will be aggregat-
ed and will result in a variable which takes on the number of correctly answered 
questions.58 Figure 11 shows the distribution of this index for objective pension 
 
58 Other research using measures for financial literacy in their analysis either include each 
question separately or aggregate all correct answers and sometimes reduce this variable to just 
a dummy taking on the value 1 if financial literacy is good (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi 2010; 
Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a, 2008). 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7 Uniqueness
Financial Matters (S) 0.6753 0.4656
Statutory Pension (S) 0.6835 0.4417
Company Pension (S) 0.5725 0.5594
Capital Life Insurancs (S) 0.5033 0.3113 0.5126
"Riester-Pension" (S) 0.3036 0.6077 0.5243
Pension Reduction (O) 0.3023 0.8762
Company Pension (O) 0.3880 0.8446
"Riester-Pension" (O) 0.3443 0.4005 0.5193
Interest (O) 0.3231 0.8851
Contribution Rate (O) 0.4887 0.7250
Statutory Pension (O) 0.4277 0.8100
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literacy. It can be seen that hardly anyone was able to answer all six questions 
correctly and even answering five questions correctly was unlikely. Consequent-
ly individuals who are able to answer at least four questions correctly will be 
combined. Therefore the financial literacy index can take on five values from 0 
“low pension literacy” to 4 “high pension literay”.  
To make the interpretation of econometric analysis easier it is also conceivable 
to generate an index with only three values, namely, low, middle, and high 
knowledge. In this case the ability to answer none or one question correctly 
would be counted as low knowledge, two questions answered correctly would be 
middle knowledge and three and more correct answers as high literacy. This 
recoding has been chosen so that the number of respondents is evenly distrib-
uted among the categories. Another option would be to use equal spaces, which 
would mean for example taking zero and one correct answers as low knowledge, 
two and three correct answers as middle knowledge and four to six correct an-
swers as high knowledge. 
Figure 11: Percentage of Individuals Answering x Objective Pension Knowledge Questions 
Correctly 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, N=906, weighted.  
Note: Horizontal axis represents number of correct answers (x)  
A correlation coefficient has been calculated for the variables which have been 
created to approximate high, middle and low literacy and the factor score. The 
correlation coefficient is 0.684. Hence there is a high correlation between those 
variables, but still the correlation is not high enough in order to conclude that 
both variables could be used interchangeably without affecting the results. 
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Table 11: Measures for Objective Knowledge 
 
For the analysis in the following chapters the considerations above would have 
as a consequence four ways of including financial literacy as an independent 
variable that could be pursued (Table 11). Firstly, all variables could be included 
separately, secondly, the six category index could be used, thirdly one of the 
three category indexes could be used and lastly the factor variable could be used. 
Furthermore, it will be tested if “Don’t know” answers will add any additional 
information to the models analysed in chapter 6. 
4.2.2 Perceived Pension Literacy 
Subjective knowledge has been assessed using the following question battery. 
The first item of the battery “knowledge regarding financial matters” measures 
financial literacy in general. The other five questions are more concerned with 
old-age provision and therefore measure pension literacy. While the statutory 
pension insurance, company pension, capital life insurance and “Riester-
Pension” all affect individuals subject to social insurance contribution, the “Ba-
sis-Pension/Rürup-Pension” is designed for private retirement provision for the 
self-employed and the pension for civil servants is paid as retirement income by 
the government to its civil servants. 
Table 12: Questions about Subjective Knowledge 
 Imagine a scale from 1 “very low” to 7 “very high”. The values in between 
can be used to grade your opinion. How do you judge your personal 
knowledge on this scale regarding… 
1 …financial matters? 
2 …statutory pension insurance? 
3 …the company pension? 
4 … capital life insurance 
5 …the “Riester-Pension”? 
6 …the “Basis-Pension/Rürup-Pension” 
7 …the pension for public servants (Beamtenpension) 
Pension Reduction binary 0-1 1: individual gave correct answer
Company Pension binary 0-1 1: individual gave correct answer
Riester binary 0-1 1: individual gave correct answer
Interest binary 0-1 1: individual gave correct answer
Contribution Rate binary 0-1 1: individual gave correct answer
Statutory Pension binary 0-1 1: individual gave correct answer
Objknowledge ordinal 0-6 Sum of correct answers
t3_objknowledge ordinal 1-3
recode of tobjwissenneu 0-1 = 1, 2= 2, 3-6= 3, even distribution of 
respondents between categories
t3_objknow_space ordinal 1-3 recode of tobjwissenneu 0-1 = 1, 2-3= 2, 4-6= 3, equal spaces
Factorobjknow continous -1.458-3.662 factor two from iterated principal factor analyis
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Not all information is necessary for everyone to make optimal decisions con-
cerning retirement savings. Knowledge about the contribution rate and 
knowledge about the size of statutory pension might be not be relevant for civil 
servants who have their own pension system. The main group of interest in this 
work are individuals who are subject to social insurance contributions because 
they are directly affected by the declining replacement rate of the statutory pen-
sion system. Among the different knowledge questions, having good knowledge 
about financial matters, the statutory pension system, the company pension, the 
capital life insurance and the “Riester Pension” is important for making an op-
timal retirement saving decision. The group of individuals for whom this 
knowledge is important is composed of blue- and white-collar workers, unem-
ployed and not yet employed. Here it is assumed that the unemployed and not 
yet employed either had a job or will start a job where social insurance contribu-
tions have to be paid. 
Table 13 shows that subjective knowledge variables exhibit correlations which 
range from 0.27 to 0.48. Because of this rather high correlation and because us-
ing one index instead of five variables facilitates the use of subjective knowledge 
in regression analysis, all variables will be combined into one index. For this 
reason two approaches have been chosen. The first one is factor analysis and the 
second is just aggregating the variables to create an index for subjective 
knowledge. Factor analysis has been performed on the five subjective knowledge 
questions as well as on the objective knowledge questions.59 Applying the iterat-
ed principal factor method one factor has been retained with a meaningful in-
terpretation. This factor comprises the five subjective knowledge questions. Fac-
tor loadings range from 0.30 for the “Riester-Pension” to loadings above 0.5 for 
all other variables.  
The second option used to create a single index out of the five subjective 
knowledge questions is sometimes also called the naïve option. In this case the 
index for subjective knowledge has been created by aggregating all five variables 
and then dividing the sum by five so that a variable will evolve which represents 
the average knowledge over the five questions. Looking at the correlation be-
tween the factor retained from the factor analysis and the index as a result from 
the naïve method shows that both are highly correlated with a correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.92. As a result it should not make a huge difference which index will 
be used in regression analysis. 
 
59 The description and analysis concerning objective knowledge can be found in chapter 4.2.1. 
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Table 13: Subjective Knowledge Correlation Matrix 
  F m S p i C p C l i R P 
Financial matters 1.00         
Statutory pension insurance 0.48 1.00       
Company pension 0.40 0.43 1.00     
Capital life insurance 0.40 0.34 0.31 1.00   
"Riester-Pension" 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.37 1.00 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. The number of individuals who 
answered the item battery range from 981 to 1013, depending on the item.  
Instead of including a variable measuring subjective financial knowledge direct-
ly, Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie (2011b) created dummy variables for overconfi-
dence and under confidence with respect to an individual’s financial knowledge. 
They argue that the perception of one’s knowledge could have an effect on fi-
nancial outcomes in addition to objective financial literacy. Rooij, Lusardi and 
Alessie (2011b) construct their relative measure of overconfidence as an as-
sessment of subjective knowledge based on the question: “How would you as-
sess your understanding of economics (on a 7-point scale; 1 means very low and 
7 means very high)?” This self-assessment of financial literacy was contrasted 
with actual literacy, which is a literacy index constructed from five basic literacy 
questions.  
In a first step they grouped both variables into four categories. Respondents 
were ranked from the top category to the lowest. They chose the groups of self-
assessed financial literacy to be about equal size and then divided the literacy 
index so that it mimics the size of the subjective-knowledge groups. In a second 
step the relative rankings of actual versus self-reported knowledge were com-
pared so that individuals with a ranking in self-assessed knowledge which is 
higher than their ranking in actual knowledge were labelled overconfident. On 
the other hand individuals were deemed under confident if their self-reported 
knowledge ranking was lower than their actual knowledge ranking.  
Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie’s (2011b) reasoning has been that the perception of 
one’s knowledge could have an effect on financial outcomes in addition to objec-
tive financial literacy (2011b). They argue that individuals who have a high con-
fidence in their financial knowledge may be less risk averse concerning their 
portfolio choice than individuals who feel less confident.60 On the one hand in-
dividuals may be over-confident and buy products which they do not fully un-
derstand. This could have serious negative consequences. On the other hand 
 
60 The question to assess self-reported knowledge is: „How would you assess your understand-
ing of economics (on a 7-point scale; 1 means very low and 7 means very high)“? 
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individuals who are under-confident about their financial knowledge might be 
reluctant to use new financial products and potentially forego benefits. Rooij, 
Lusardi and Alessie (2011b) find that the coefficient of basic financial literacy 
increases and remains significant when adding the confidence measures into 
the regression estimating total net wealth. The over-confidence measure is nega-
tive but insignificant and the under-confidence measure is significant and nega-
tive. 
Hung et al. (2009) argue that perceived knowledge or confidence had predictive 
ability of its own, above and beyond actual knowledge. Usually individuals do 
not know the extent of their actual knowledge and at the time a decision has to 
be made, they have to decide if collecting additional information is necessary 
based on how much they think they already know (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007b). 
Research found that an accurate confidence about one’s knowledge is an im-
portant determinant of decision-making competence (de Bruine Bruin et al. 
2007, Parker and Fischhoff 2005).  
Hardly any research investigating financial literacy shows the predictive power 
of financial literacy when actual and self-assessed knowledge are considered 
simultaneously. Rooij et al. (2007) estimated the likelihood that individuals par-
ticipate in the stock market. They included both, perceived financial literacy and 
actual basic financial literacy into their regression and found both to be positive 
and significant. Nevertheless, their second measure for actual advanced literacy 
has not been considered in this model. When this working paper appeared in a 
journal in 2011, this regression disappeared completely (Rooij van et al. 2011). 
Lusardi and Mitchel (2007b) show parallel regressions, one with actual financial 
literacy and the other with self-reported economic understanding but no regres-
sion, where both variables have been considered simultaneously.  
Following the approach described above, I will also create a measure for over- 
and under-confidence for the following analysis. The correlation between sub-
jective knowledge and objective knowledge in this work is 0.227 when consider-
ing the correlation between objective knowledge with four categories and sub-
jective knowledge which results from summing up all questions and dividing 
them by five. Measuring the correlation between the other variables, which have 
been suggested for measuring perceived and actual knowledge, yields an even 
lower correlation. Including actual knowledge into the regression is therefore 
likely to add additional information. 
The measure of self-reported knowledge which is used to construct the relative 
measure of overconfidence is the subjective pension knowledge index created by 
aggregating the five knowledge questions and dividing the sum by five as de-
scribed before. The measure for actual knowledge that is used is the index 
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which represents the number of correct answers (Figure 11). Instead of choos-
ing four categories to group both variables, three categories had been chosen 
because of the difficulties many respondents had in answering the pension 
knowledge questions. With four categories it would not have been possible to 
create variables for relative comparison with an approximately equal number of 
respondents in each category. Hence, the variable for subjective knowledge has 
been recoded so that values between 1 to 3.5 are combined to 1 (low self-
assessed knowledge), values between 3.6 to 4.9 are combined to 2 (middle self-
assessed knowledge) and values between 5 to 7 are combined to 3 (high self-
assessed knowledge). 
Figure 12: Percentage of Respondents Assigned to Subjective and Objective Knowledge Rank-
ings 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, N=880.y-axis: percentage of individuals, x -
axis, 1=low knowledge, 2=medium knowledge, 3=high knowledge.  
The objective knowledge index has been recoded so that 0 to 1 is combined to 1 
(low actual knowledge), 2 remains 2 (middle actual knowledge) and 3 to 6 are 
combined to 3 (high actual knowledge). Figure 12 shows the percentage of re-
spondents who are assigned to these categories. The comparison of the relative 
rankings resulted in 313 individuals being classified as overconfident, 222 indi-
viduals as being classified as under confident and 345 individuals with an equal 
ranking for actual and self-reported literacy. 
Table 14: Operationalisation Subjective Pension Literacy 
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Table 14 summarizes the variables which have been generated based on the bat-
teries of self-assessed and actual knowledge questions. These variables will serve 
as proxies for both kinds of knowledge in all subsequent empirical analyses 
based on the FNA-Data.  
4.3 Testing Hypotheses 
In this chapter four hypotheses will be developed based on the theoretical con-
siderations outlined in chapter 2.1. Furthermore, it will be discussed how these 
hypotheses can be tested empirically using the FNA-Data. The first hypothesis 
tackles the question which has been dealt with throughout the literature review 
in chapter 2.3. This is the question about the influence of financial knowledge 
on retirement planning and wealth. Firstly, the theory predicts that financial 
knowledge decreases the effort costs which the planner incurs if he/she tries to 
discipline the doer (Shefrin and Thaler 1981). Secondly, the theory predicts that 
financial literacy is a kind of future orientated capital which makes the future 
less remote (Becker and Mulligan 1993) and thirdly it reduced the costs of re-
tirement planning (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). The first hypothesis can 
therefore be formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: 
If financial literacy reduces the effort costs incurred through retirement planning, then 
(all things being equal) individuals who are financially literate are more likely to plan 
and save for retirement than financially illiterate people.  
Of course, retirement saving does not directly follow from retirement planning but I 
assume that each individual who engages in retirement savings has at least made 
some planning efforts.  
The FNA-Data offers a set of questions testing financial and pension knowledge 
of the respondents. The wording and conceptualization of these variables has 
been discussed in chapter 4.2. In order to test hypothesis 1, a variable measur-
ing the degree of pension knowledge will be included in all regressions with de-
pendent variables which are related to planning and savings for retirement. Var-
iables to be considered as explanatory variables will be discussed in chapter 4.5. 
To verify the hypothesis, the coefficient of the pension knowledge index should 
be positive and significant. For the next hypothesis I will shortly recap the theo-
ry forwarded by Becker and Mulligan (1997) who argue that “even rational peo-
ple may ‘excessively’ discount future utilities, but we assume that they may par-
tially or fully offset this by spending effort and goods to reduce the degree of 
overdiscounting.” (Becker and Mulligan 1997, 730). This spending, they argue, 
increases the “future orientated capital of the individual” which helps them im-
agine the future.  
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Future orientated capital is affected for example by reading newspapers, listen-
ing to the news on TV or participating in a retirement seminar. Hence there is a 
link between financial literacy and time preferences. Individuals who heavily 
discount the future may invest in acquiring financial knowledge or disciplinary 
devices. If they do so it might be possible that financially literate people save for 
retirement despite having a high discount rate. Furthermore, their model as-
sumes that an additional piece of future orientated capital is more effective in 
reducing the discount rate if the initial time preference rate is high. The time 
preference rate, however, should not exceed the rate at which it would be bene-
ficial for the individual not to invest in future orientated capital at all. The impli-
cations for a hypothesis would be as follows:  
Hypothesis 2 
If the discount rate is high but still allows for at least some investment in future orien-
tated capital, then, all other things being equal, an additional amount of future orien-
tated capital would increase the likelihood, for example, of saving for retirement, by a 
greater amount for individuals with an initially high than for an individual with an 
initially low discount rate. 
Figure 13: Hypothesis 2: The Interaction of Time Preferences and Financial Literacy 
 
This hypothesis is depicted in Figure 13 which also shows that for individuals 
who are very future orientated (discount rate near 0) an additional piece of fu-
 121 
ture-orientated capital, which increases pension literacy from say “low” to “mid-
dle,” only marginally increases the likelihood of saving for retirement. 
An interaction between financial literacy and time preferences has already been 
detected in an empirical analysis using an experimental design by Howlett and 
Kees (2008). They conducted an experiment with graduating seniors at a public 
university to measure the effects of self-regulation, future orientation and finan-
cial knowledge on the intention to contribute to a 401(k) plan. Due to the exper-
imental character, endogeneity of financial knowledge was not a problem in this 
setting. The 89 graduating seniors were allocated to one out of eight different 
experimental conditions. Financial knowledge was introduced via the presenta-
tion to the treatment group of a written summary describing how a 401(k) plan 
works. The consideration of future consequences was not manipulated but 
measured by a 12-item measure as described by Strathman et al. (1994). How 
the self-regulatory state was manipulated will not be described here since the 
variable of main interest is financial knowledge and future orientation. 
Figure 14: Moderating Effect of Knowledge on the Consideration of Future Consequences 
 
Source: (Howlett et al.  2008)  
Each of the three effects was found to influence the intention to invest in a 
401(k) plan. Consumers’ financial knowledge and their orientation to the future 
positively influenced the likelihood of investing in a retirement plan. They also 
included an interaction term between financial knowledge and future orienta-
tion, which showed that in the absence of financial knowledge future orienta-
tion did not influence the likelihood to contribute. This is an interesting finding 
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since it validates the interaction effect between financial knowledge and future 
orientation, but it has been found that in the absence of financial knowledge an 
individual’s discount rate has no influence on the likelihood of contributing to a 
401(k) plan. 
Figure 14 is taken from the paper by Howlett and Kees (2008) and shows that 
the likelihood of enrolling in a 401(k) plan decreases for individuals with “low 
consideration of future consequences” (high discount rate). Only for individuals 
who are already future orientated does financial literacy increase the probability 
of enrolling in 401(k) plans. Their hypothesis which they validated with this 
finding is as follows: 
“In the absence of basic financial knowledge, the consumers’ CFC will have little in-
fluence on the likelihood of contributing to a 401(k) plan. However, among partici-
pants with some basic knowledge, consumers with higher levels of CFC will express 
higher likelihood of contributing to a 401(k) plan…” (Howlett et al. 2008). This hy-
pothesis was based on their reasoning that basic financial knowledge is essential 
for making appropriate retirement savings decisions. Furthermore they pro-
posed: “that not only is knowledge about the benefits of sound retirement plan-
ning important but also consumers need to have a future-orientated outlook in 
order to make sound long-term financial decisions. That is, consumers must be 
motivated to put that knowledge to good use.”  
Figure 14 implies that the likelihood of contributing to a 401(k) plan for an indi-
vidual who has “no knowledge” is higher for someone with low consideration of 
the future than for someone with high consideration of the future. Using the 
German SAVE survey, Honekamp (2010) used a similar procedure and found 
evidence that an additional piece of financial literacy is more effective for indi-
viduals with an initially low degree of future orientation than for someone who 
places great weight on the future.  
An interesting result is that the degree of future orientation had almost no effect 
for individuals with the second highest degree of financial literacy and even a 
negative effect for individual with the highest degree of financial literacy. An 
explanation could be that financially literate individuals are less guided by time 
preferences because they tend to base their retirement decisions on facts and 
figures. They calculate their expected pension from the statutory pension insur-
ance, compare investment returns and then compute their optimal savings deci-
sion required to maintain their standard of living when old. Furthermore, fi-
nancially literate people who are very present biased may prefer to invest in oth-
er saving modes to prepare for retirement than the ones from which the de-
pendent variable had been generated (Honekamp 2010).  
 123 
Generally the conclusion contradicts the findings by Howlett, Kees, and Kemp 
(2008) who detected that the orientation towards the future did not influence the 
likelihood of 401(k) participation in the absence of financial knowledge. Such a 
direct comparison should, however, be avoided because the research design of 
the two studies is very different. While Howelett, Kees, and Kemp (2008) con-
ducted in experiment among 89 graduating seniors which could circumvent the 
endogeneity problem of financial literacy, this was not possible based on the 
survey data used by Honekamp (2010). The variables measuring financial litera-
cy and future orientation also differ between both studies which could be an ex-
planation for the different results. Moreover the analysis conducted with the 
SAVE-survey cannot claim that financial literacy is completely absent, even if 
individuals were not able to answer one of the three literacy questions correctly, 
hence the three questions chosen to measure financial literacy might not be suf-
ficient to be a valid instrument of financial literacy.  
Concerning the issue of hypothesis 2 there remains the question of how it can be 
tested for based on the available data in this work. Here a procedure similar to 
the one chosen by Howlett and Kees (2008) will be employed. In each regression 
with dependent variables measuring concepts related to planning and saving for 
retirement, an interaction term between time preferences and pension 
knowledge will be included besides other explanatory variables. If hypothesis 2 is 
correct the predicted probabilities of the interaction variables and the interaction 
term itself should produce a similar picture to the one in Figure 13. Further-
more, these coefficients should be significantly different form zero.  
Hypothesis 3: 
If “procrastination does not arise from present-biased preferences per se, but rather 
from present-biased preferences combined with naïveté” (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1998), then, all other things being equal, sophisticated individuals are equally likely to 
save for retirement regardless of initial time preferences because procrastination only 
arises if present-biased preferences are combined with naïveté. 
Hypothesis 3 (relaxed): 
Interpreting the theory less strictly, Hypothesis 3 could also imply that, all other things 
being equal, individuals who know that their long term self will not act in the interest 
of their present self are more likely to plan and save for retirement than naïve individ-
uals. 
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Figure 15: Hypothesis 3: The Interaction of Future Orientation and Sophistication (light inter-
pretation) 
 
As a result, hypothesis 3 is split into a light and a strict formulation both of 
which can be tested empirically. Figure 15 shows that the probability of plan-
ning and saving for retirement decreases as the discount rate increases. This 
means, that individuals with a high future orientation save more than individu-
als with less future orientation. This effect, however, can be mitigated (light ver-
sion of the hypothesis) if individuals know that they would repeatedly procrasti-
nate on retirement savings decisions.  
Figure 16: Hypothesis 3: The Interaction of Future Orientation and Sophistication (strict inter-
pretation) 
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O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) argued that knowing about future misbehavior 
would increase the perceived cost of current misbehavior and as a result en-
courage the individual to behave in the present. Individuals who possess this 
knowledge will be called sophisticates according to the definition introduced by 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1998). Therefore the predicted probability line is 
marked “sophisticates” and runs parallel to and above the line for “naïves”.  
The strict interpretation of the theory is presented in Figure 16. It can be ob-
served that the probability of engaging in any private retirement activity declines 
with an increasing discount rate for naïve individuals. The predicted probability 
line for sophisticates instead is parallel to the x-axis implying that an increasing 
discount rate does not decrease the probability to plan and save for retirement. 
It would also be conceivable that the predicted probability lines look like the 
ones depicted in Figure 13 describing hypothesis 2. This would mean that being 
a sophisticate and having a high discount rate increases the probability of saving 
for retirement to a greater extent than for someone who has a low discount rate. 
Generally, this reasoning also applies to Figure 16 above, but it would also allow 
the predicted probability line of sophistication to decline as the discount rate 
increases. The sophistication line, however, would need to be less steep than the 
naïve line in order to fit the reasoning that being sophisticated has a greater in-
fluence on high discounters than on low discounters. If such a picture is ob-
served in any of the empirical estimations, then hypothesis 3 would not be veri-
fied. Instead the result implies a solution which is somewhere between the strict 
and the relaxed version of hypothesis 3. 
Table 15: Questions about Saving Commitment 
1 Often it has been suggested that employees should be committed to save 4% 
of their gross income, for additional private retirement provision. Do you 
evaluate such a duty as  
(rather good) (rather bad) (don’t know/don’t mind) (refuse) 
2 Why do you think such a commitment is rather good? (Only individuals who 
chose (rather good) in the previous question received this question. Multiple 
answers allowed.) 
(because otherwise I would not provide for retirement, although I should) 
(because otherwise I would postpone the decision again and again) 
(because everyone would be forced to save for retirement such that less peo-
ple would rely on social assistance when old) 
(other reason, open answer) 
(refusal)  
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3 Why do you think such a commitment is rather bad? (Only individuals who 
chose (rather bad) in the previous question received this question. Multiple 
answers allowed.) 
(because I would like to decide how much save) 
(because I would like to decide how to save) 
(because home ownership is my old-age provision) 
(other reason, open answer) 
(refusal) 
In order to test the hypothesis empirically, the first step is to think about how it 
would be possible to distinguish between naïve and sophisticated consumers. A 
sophisticate consumer knows that his/her future self would not act in the inter-
est of the present self. Individuals in the telephone interview were asked if they 
agree with the statement “I procrastinate on financial decisions”. Does this 
knowledge make them a sophisticate to the extent that they engage in concrete 
retirement planning and translate these plans into action? Or do they interpret 
the question as meaning they only procrastinate today and start saving tomor-
row? In the first telephone interview this variable is the only variable which can 
be used to approximate the sophistication of the consumer. Before the ad-
vantages and disadvantage of using procrastination are discussed in more detail, 
I will present a second variable which might be useful to measure sophistica-
tion. The second measure would be taken from the second telephone interview, 
the drawback is that only about half of the respondents who completed the first 
telephone interview also participated in the second telephone interview. The 
wording of the two questions, taken together, can be considered to be an approx-
imation of sophistication and are presented in Table 15. 
Firstly, Figure 17 shows that slightly more individuals evaluate a duty to save for 
retirement as rather good as compared to rather bad. These and the following 
results are based on the unweighted data because at this stage it is not the aim 
to produce representative results but rather to demonstrate how the responses 
to questions, which will be used as variables in further analysis, emerge.61  
21% of respondents rate mandatory savings as rather good because they other-
wise would not provide for retirement and 11% say that they would repeatedly 
postpone starting saving for retirement if saving were not a duty (Figure 18). 
Both of these statements refer to individuals who know that they would procras-
 
61 Weighting would increase the number of (don’t know/don’t mind) answers and equally de-
crease the number of respondents who answered (rather good) or (rather bad). 
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tinate on retirement savings and for this reason they would be willing to accept 
a law which would commit them to save 4% of gross income for retirement. 
While the variable measuring procrastination in the first telephone interview 
might only be interpreted as postponing a decision now but not in the future, 
these variables can measure repeated procrastination of retirement decisions. 
The sophistication variable generated out of question 2 would then be 1 if the 
respondent either stated that he or she would not provide for retirement without 
this savings device or that he or she otherwise would postpone the decision 
again and again. 
Figure 17: How Do You Evaluate a Duty to Save 4% of Gross Income? 
 
In conclusion the datasets provide two potential means of measuring sophistica-
tion. The use of each of these variables, however, presents problems which are 
likely to bias estimation results. For that reason it is necessary to discuss the 
possible shortcoming of using these variables in a regression now. 
Figure 18: Why is a Commitment to Save Rather Good? 
 
Concerning the variable “I sometimes procrastinate on financial matters” it 
could be that the question has been interpreted such that: “Yes I sometimes de-
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lay decisions to the next day or next week in order to make a decision then.”62 
Against the background theory the measure of sophistication needed to test the 
hypothesis, however, would need a question like the following: “I continously 
delay decisions and may never reaching a decision if nobody forces me to do 
so.” In the case that many indivduals interpreted the question so that they admit 
to procrastination but only once, they are not sophisticated according to the the-
ory, but are still classified as sophisticated in this analysis. Hence the effect of 
being sophisticated will be underestimated.  
Another problem arises with the variable “sophistication.” Someone is coded as 
a sophisticate if he or she is in favor of introducing mandatory private retire-
ment savings and motivates his or her decision with the statement, that other-
wise he or she would not save for retirement or delay the decision again and 
again. Hence that person knows that there is a self-control problem and would 
like to “buy” a savings device to overcome this problem. Being sophisticated in 
this case is therefore well defined. The question would be, if all the remaining 
respondents are naïve. Just because someone is not in favor of the introduction 
of a mandatory savings device does not have to mean that that person is not 
aware of potential self-control problems.  
It could just be the case that he/she found another solution than mandatory sav-
ings to control the problem. Hence it would be necessary in this case to find an-
other way which more explicitly distinguishes between sophisticates and naïves. 
Since such a distinction is not possible given the data at hand, I will refrain 
from using the variable “sophistication” to test hypothesis three in the analysis 
of the following chapters. For hypothesis testing, the variable “I sometimes pro-
crastinate on financial matters” will be used bearing in mind that the effect of 
this variable is likely to be underestimated. 
In order to test the hypothesis that individuals who know that their long run 
selves will not act in the interest of present selves are more likely to plan and 
save for retirement than individuals who are naïve (light hypothesis), it is neces-
sary to include two variables into the regression. These variables are the one 
measuring sophistication and one variable measuring future orientation.63 In 
order to verify the hypothesis sophistication would have to have a significant 
positive influence on retirement planning or saving.  
For the test of the stricter formulation of the hypothesis sophistication and a 
time preference variable alone are not sufficient to test the hypothesis. Similar 
 
62 See also chapter 4.1 Measuring Time Preferences and Procrastination 
63 How time preferences are to be measured has been described in chapter 4.1. 
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to the test for hypothesis two, an interaction term needs to be part of each regres-
sion with dependent variables measuring concepts related to planning and sav-
ing for retirement. In this case, however, the variables of interest are time pref-
erences, sophistication and the interaction term of both. If hypothesis three is cor-
rect the predicted probabilities of the interaction variables and the interaction 
term itself should produce a similar picture as the one in Figure 15 or Figure 16. 
Furthermore, these coefficients should be significantly different form zero. 
Figure 19: Why is a Commitment to Save Rather Bad?  
 
For completeness, Figure 19 shows the reasons why individuals would not 
choose to make savings mandatory. Many individuals like to have more flexibil-
ity about how much to save and where to invest their money. Individuals who 
gave an open answer most often argued that a commitment to save would not 
be a good idea because many individuals would not due to their financial situa-
tion be able to save 4% of gross income. Findings which either verify or falsify 
these hypotheses 2 or 3 could influence the decision if providing information to 
individuals who are present orientated is reasonable and if it is, which kind of 
knowledge should be provided to these individuals. In the case that an addition-
al piece of financial literacy is more effective for individuals with an initially 
high discount rate than these individuals should be a target group of financial 
education seminars in order to increase their future orientation (hypothesis 2). 
If individuals who are aware of their self-control problem, meaning that they 
know that they tend to delay decisions concerning retirement provision, are 
(given their present-biased preferences) at less likely to procrastinate, than re-
tirement information campaigns should also focus on the problem of procrasti-
nation and provide advice and support to overcome procrastination. Such in-
formation increases the awareness of this problem such that it is likely that na-
ïve individuals become sophisticated and try to overcome their problem. The 
fourths hypothesis is about the effectiveness of retirement seminars. Such sem-
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inars can be beneficial at each stage on the path towards private retirement sav-
ings. Looking at retirement seminars from a theoretical point of view, it is to be 
expected that seminars increase future orientated capital (Becker and Mulligan 
1997) and decreases effort costs (Shefrin and Thaler 1992). Individuals who 
joined the seminar are directly confronted with ageing and retirement for 12 
hours such that the ability to imagine the future should increase as compared to 
non-participants. This in turn decreases the discount rate of the future and fos-
ters retirement planning and saving. Effort costs are also reduced for several 
reasons. Firstly, individuals do not have to search for the information them-
selves, which is time consuming and bears the risk of trusting information 
which is in fact advertisement for pension products. Secondly, individuals with 
low education often have problems in searching for relevant information and 
processing this information, course instructors partly do this work for them. 
Course instructors provide all relevant information in a comprehensible way 
such that even the weakest participant can follow. If this would not be the case, 
participants would still have the possibility to ask the instructor for further clari-
fication.  
So far it has been discussed that joining a retirement seminar has the potential 
to increase individual utility and retirement savings. Most people have not treat-
ed retirement issues at school and learning from the experience of parents and 
grandparents is not yet possible because the pension level is only decreasing 
slightly such that there was no necessity for many elderly to save for retirement 
privately. As long as individuals are not provided with the essential knowledge 
of the pension system and the skills to make informed retirement decisions at 
school, it is necessary to provide this sort of information later in their lives. Such 
information could be implemented through different channels. Two of the most 
common channels would be the retirement seminar offered by employers, 
which provides information about retirement in general and company pension 
plans or retirement seminars offered from the adult education centre or others.  
Hypothesis 4: 
If retirement seminars lead to increases in future orientated capital or decreasing effort 
costs incurred through retirement planning, then, all things being equal, individuals 
who join a retirement seminar will be more likely to save for retirement than individu-
als who do not complete the seminar. 
In the FNA-Data individuals have been asked which sources of advice they have 
consulted in order to receive financial and pension specific advice. Participation 
in a retirement seminar is assumed to increase pension knowledge. Instead of 
adding variables measuring actual and perceived pension knowledge, these 
sources of advice have been implemented into regressions which explain, for 
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example, the probability of having capital life insurance, a company pension, 
etc. More details about the sources of advice and the respective analysis to test 
hypothesis 4, can be found in chapter 6.6. 
4.4 Estimation Techniques and Potential Problems 
The aim of this thesis is to analysize the effects of pension knowledge and time 
preferences on different variables concerning retirement planning. Among 
these variables are for example “thought about appropriate retirement income” 
or “saves for retirement.” A detailed description of the dependent variables and 
how they fit into the theoretical model of chapter 2.1 can be found in chapter 6. 
Dependent variables are generally binary and the underlying data is a cross-
section. For that reason the probit regression will be the estimation method of 
choice. 
The problem which could arise when conducting estimations with pension 
knowledge as regressor are already evident. Perceived and actual knowledge 
may entail an endogeneiety problem. Such a problem could arise if the way of 
causality is not clear. In the case at hand it is for example not possible to deter-
mine if a sound perceived or actual pension knowledge leads to planning for 
retirement or if planning improves the understanding of issues concerning re-
tirement and hence entails a better subjective and objective knowledge. Looking 
again at Figure 4, the variable “I plan concrete measures for private retirement 
provision” would take place as step 5. Before step 5 it is necessary to think about 
an appropriate retirement income and to collect and process a great deal of in-
formation in order to calculate a possible pension gap and to determine if actual 
savings may be sufficient to close this gap. Even in this preliminary stage it 
could be that perceived and actual pension knowledge has increased. This im-
provement in pension knowledge is then entailed by the intention to engage in 
concrete retirement planning. The extent of knowledge acquisition varies be-
tween individuals, as some individuals collect a lot of information before com-
ing up with a plan and at the other extreme individuals may have no plan before 
filing a retirement savings contract. If the planning process was successful and 
the individual has reached a decision to save in one of many vehicles for retire-
ment provision, he or she has to compare offers from banks and insurance 
companies. Here again is a point were pension knowledge could be influential 
depending on how conscientiously individuals compare products. 
There are some solutions to mitigate the endogneity problem. Generally, with 
ordinary regression analysis it not possible to account for this problem. There 
are two approved ways of encountering endogeneiety. On the one hand there is 
instrumental variable estimation and on the other hand there is the causal anal-
ysis which resembles an experiment, comparing the behavior of a treatment 
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group with a control group. In the course of the “FNA-Project” to evaluate the 
effectiveness of adult education seminars questionnaires and samples had been 
designed to make a causal analysis possible (Honekamp and Uehleke 2012). 
Causal inference was then possible because each individual who participated in 
the seminar (treatment group) was matched with an individual with similar 
characteristics, who participated in the telephone sample (control group). This 
research design makes it possible to estimate how the seminar participant 
would have changed his or her savings behavior, if he or she had not participat-
ed in the seminar (counterfactual situation). If the individual would not have 
changed his or her savings behavior without participating in the seminar, ob-
served changes in retirement savings behavior after the seminar could be at-
tributed to the course. 
Rather than evaluating the effectiveness of a retirement seminar, the aim of this 
work is to investigate why individuals fail to start saving for retirement. In Fig-
ure 4 the obstacles on the way of private retirement provision have been out-
lined. Each of these obstacles will be analysed in order to find out more about 
the factors which prevent individuals from saving for retirement. For this kind 
of analysis, instrument variable estimation would be the method of choice.  
The intended instrument variables are economics at school which is the same 
variable chosen by Rooij, Alessie and Lusardi (2011a) and a variable which 
measures the ease with which individuals dealt with the currency change from 
the Deutsche Mark to the Euro.64 The questions concerning economics at school 
and the currency change in the FNA-Data are the following: 
Table 16: Questions about Economic Education at School 
1 During your schooldays, did you have economics education at school? 
(Yes) (No) (No Reply) 
2 How much time was spent on this topic during your schooldays? 
(a lot) (quite a lot) (little) (very little) (Don’t know) (No Reply) 
3 In 2002 the Euro has been introduced, which replaced the Deutsch Mark. 
How difficult was it for you to go shopping, to check the account balance 
and to manage your money matters in general?  
(very difficult) (little difficult) (not very difficult) (not difficult at all) 
 
64 Binswanger and Carman (2012) use four instrument variables, being a dummy if an indi-
vidual took economics courses, the number of courses, self-assessed math confidence and if 
they are doing some research when they have to make a decision about health-care. 
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The ease with which individuals dealt with the currency conversion has been 
chosen as an instrument for financial literacy because of the findings of Cattell 
(1941, 1987) and Horn (1988) who did not only find evidence that numeracy and 
general knowledge entails financial literacy but also more general cognitive abil-
ities. How easy it was to deal with the currency conversion is assumed to be de-
pendent on individual cognitive abilities. Furthermore, this variable is thought 
to be a viable instrument because it should not directly influence if someone 
saves for retirement or not, while on the other hand it should be positively relat-
ed to financial and pension knowledge. 
The first of the three questions has been answered by 1,012 out of 1,016 re-
spondents. Half of the respondents stated that they had economics at school. 
About 31% stated that they had quite a lot or a lot of economics education and 
64% stated that they had little or very little economics education. The remaining 
five percent could not remember how much education they had at school. From 
these two variables one variable has been generated which describes the amount 
of economics education an individual received during their time at school. This 
variable has five categories, the 0 “no economics education”, the 1 “very little”, 
the 2 “little”, the 3 “quite a lot” and the 4 “a lot” economics education. 
Table 17: Instrument Variables 
Economics education at school % 
no economics education 52 
very little 15 
little 18 
quite a lot 7 
a lot 9 
Difficulties with currency conver-
sion? 
very difficult 3 
little difficult 13 
not very difficult 23 
not difficult at all 61 
Actual pension knowledge 
 Questions answered correctly 
 0 9 
1 32 
2 35 
3 16 
4 5 
5 2 
6 0 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 1 2 3 
actual knowledge 
(1) 1.000     
currency conver-
sion (2) 0.016 1.000 
 economics at 
school (3) 0.025 0.000 1.000 
Source: 1. FNA-Telephone Interview. Data is neither weighted nor imputed.  
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Table 17 shows the percentages which fall into each of the categories of the in-
strument variables and of the variable which has to be instrumented. The corre-
lation matrix in the same table reveals only a low correlation between the in-
struments and the variable actual pension knowledge. It might be that the prob-
lem of weak instruments emerges in the empirical analysis of chapter 6.  
When the excluded instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous 
variables, IV estimates are biased and may not be consistent (Chao and Swan-
son 2005, Nichols 2006). This would entail significance tests with incorrect size 
and wrong confidence intervals. In chapter 6.1, in which the probability if 
someone has thought about an appropriate retirement income is estimated we 
will have a look at the potential problem of weak instruments again. 
All of the empirical analysis in this work will be conducted with Stata 12.1. One 
emerging problem is that Stata has not yet implemented an official estimation 
procedure which supports IV-estimation within imputed data sets. The Stata 
manual (StataCorp LP 2011) states: "Certain concepts, e.g., likelihood and devi-
ance, do not have clear interpretation within the MI framework. As such, vari-
ous statistical (postestimation) procedures based on these concepts (e.g., likeli-
hood-ratio tests, goodness-of-fit tests) are not directly applicable to MI results." 
In order to circumvent this problem, sometimes, especially, in chapter 6.1, the 
original data has been used to compare results and to obtain test statistics which 
cannot be obtained otherwise. 
There is the potential problem that the instruments are weak, this problem will 
further be analysed in chapter 6.1. For this reason and also as a robustness 
check with another model specification will be estimated for most of the models 
from chapter 6.1 onwards. It might be possible to mitigate the endogneiety of 
pension knowledge by adding appropriate control variable to the regression. 
Two variables are suited to reduce the extent of which pension knowledge could 
have been influenced by the experience from investing money in pension plans 
or other financial products. The first of these variables is the number of differ-
ent assets an individual holds.  
Table 19, describing the main variables to be used, shows that the number of 
different assets an individual holds ranges from 0 assets to 13 different assets 
with a mean of 5 different assets. It will be assumed that individuals who hold 
many different kinds of assets have a greater financial and pension knowledge 
than individuals who only hold a few or no financial assets. Hence the number 
of assets can be interpreted as a measure of experience with financial product. 
This kind of reasoning has also been applied in the research of Leinert (2005) 
who similarly investigated theoretically and empirically private retirement sav-
ings in Germany.  
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The second variable to reduce a potential endogeneiety of pension knowledge 
(both subjective and objective) is the total amount of wealth an individual has 
acquired up to the present. The assumption would again be that the more 
wealth someone has acquired the greater is his or her experience with financial 
products. Acquiring, taking care of and investing a large amount of wealth 
should generally increase financial knowledge by a larger amount than acquir-
ing and managing a small stock of wealth.   
4.5 Model and Variables 
This chapter is comprised of an explanation of the derivation of the empirical 
models which will be estimated and a description of the variables used. Figure 4 
has been developed in chapter 2.1 and is presented here again in order to relate 
each of the empirical models to be calculated to the theoretical model. 
The headlines in Table 18 describe the variables available in the dataset which 
reflect different stages in the path towards private retirement provision. These 
variables will be taken as dependent variables. Each of these variables will be 
analysed in one of the following chapters, while firstly a description is provided 
as to what all five models have in common. 
Figure 4: The Path Towards Private Retirment (chapter 2.1) 
 
There is a basic stock of explanatory variables which will be part of each model. 
Among those variables are demographics, the variables necessary to test the 
three hypothesis and other variables theoretically relevant in determining re-
tirement planning and savings behavior. Among the demographics are the vari-
ables gender, age, marital status, children, education, income and wealth. The 
tests of hypothesis 1 to 3 require a variable measuring objective pension 
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knowledge, a variable measuring time preferences and a variable measuring 
procrastination (interpreted as sophistication). Additionally, interaction terms 
have been created for hypothesis testing.  
Table 18: The Path Towards Private Retirement Provision (dependent variables) 
 
In order to test hypothesis 2 an additional interaction term between time prefer-
ences and objective knowledge is needed and testing the strict formulation of 
hypothesis 3 requires the inclusion of an interaction term between time prefer-
ences and procrastination (proxy for sophistication). A further variable which 
has been implemented into each of the models is subjective knowledge which 
has been transformed in such a way that it measures if someone correctly, over- 
or under- estimates his/her pension knowledge.  
Furthermore occupation dummies are important in this analysis because the 
pension system and entitlements differ between occupational groups. The pen-
sion for public servants for example is still more generous than the pension for 
white- and blue-collar workers and self-employed generally have the sole re-
sponsibility for their old-age provision. It can therefore be expected that white- 
and blue-collar workers as well as self-employed are more likely to save for re-
tirement than public servants. 
Besides the base model also variations of the model will be estimated including 
some further variables. The aim of these estimations which are generally de-
ferred to the Appendix is to prove previous results or to analyse which effect a 
single variable may has as compared to the effect it has as part of a factor varia-
ble. One of these additional variables is the number of different assets an indi-
vidual holds which serves as a proxy for financial experience. The reason why 
the number of assets had been added to the regression is to mitigate the poten-
tial endogeneiety problem of objective pension knowledge.  
A further variable which are part of some models is a factor variable approximat-
ing potential procrastination behavior. The variables which are part of this factor 
are a variable measuring if the individual likes dealing with financial matters, if 
the individual admits that he/she sometimes procrastinates on financial matters 
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and lastly the variable which states if the individual has sufficient time to deal 
with financial matters. 
All models in chapter 6 have in common the fact that the dependent variable is 
binary. The probit model will be chosen to estimate these models. A probit 
model can be derived form an underlying latent variable model. 
𝑦∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝑥
′𝛽 + 𝑒, 𝑦 = 1[𝑦∗ > 0] (7) 
𝑦∗ is an unobserved variable. In the case that 𝑦∗ > 0, y is one and in the case 
that 𝑦∗ < 0, y is zero. It is assumed that the error term e is independent from 
the explanatory variables x and furthermore that e has a standard normal distri-
bution and symmetrically distributed about zero. The response probability of y 
can be derived in the following way: 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝑃(𝑦∗ > 0|𝑥) = 𝑃[𝑒 > −(𝛽0 + 𝑥
′𝛽)|𝑥] =  
1 − 𝐺[−(𝛽0 + 𝑥
′𝛽)] = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥
′𝛽)  (8) 
In order to make sure that the probabilities are between zero and one, the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) will be chosen for G. 
𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥
′𝛽) =  Φ(𝛽0 + 𝑥
′𝛽) = ∫ 𝜙(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
𝛽0+𝑥′𝛽
−∞
 (9) 
One of the assumptions underlying the probit model, however, is likely not to 
be met, since the variable actual pension knowledge is likely to be endogen. In 
order to counteract this problem an instrument variable estimation will be em-
ployed. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) describe the model as follows: 
𝑦
1𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝑦
2𝑖
+ 𝑥1𝑖
′ 𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 (5) 
𝑦
2𝑖
= 𝑥1𝑖
′ 𝜋1 + 𝑥2𝑖
′ 𝜋2 + 𝑣𝑖 (6) 
Here 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, 𝑦2𝑖 is a 1xp vector endogenous variables  𝑥1𝑖, is a 1 × 𝑘1 vector of ex-
ogneous variables and the instrument variables are presented by a 1 × 𝑘2 vector, 𝑥2𝑖. It 
will be assumed that (𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖)~𝑁(0, Σ), where 𝜎11is normalized to one to identify the 
model. The parameters of the structural are the vectors 𝛽 and 𝛾, and the matrices of 
the reduced-form parameters are 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. 𝑦1𝑖
∗  cannot be observed instead the follow-
ing can be observed: 
 𝑦1𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑖
∗ < 0  and 
𝑦1𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑖
∗ ≥ 0  (10) 
It is required that 𝑘2 ≥ 𝑝 because of the order conditions for identification of the struc-
tural parameters. If Σ is not a block diagonal between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖, 𝑦2𝑖  would be endoge-
nous (StataCorp LP 2013). 
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Table 19: Variable Description 
  
Demographic Variables: 
Mean 
  
Min 
  
Max 
  
% of  
Respondents* 
Male 0.388 0 1 39 
Age 44.792 20 60   
Married/cohabiting 0.601 0 1 60 
Children 1.374 0 4   
(0 no kids - 4 four or more kids)         
Education dummies:         
Low (no degree, Hauptschule)   0 1 13 
Middle (Realschule)   0 1 33 
High ((Fach-) Abitur)   0 1 55 
Individual net income dummies:         
Low = 0-<1,500 €   0 1 34 
Middle = 1,500-<3,000 €   0 1 33 
High = >3,000   0 1 33 
Wealth dummies:         
Low =  0-<20,000 €   0 1 40 
Middle =   20,000-<150,000 €   0 1 27 
High =   150,000-… €   0 1 33 
Explanatory Variables:         
Kind of employment dummies         
Unemployed   0 1 19 
Blue- or white collar   0 1 56 
Self employed   0 1 18 
Civil servant   0 1 7 
Actual pension knowledge   0 6   
(0 zero - 6 six questions correct) 1.836       
Future orientation (factor1 variable)** 5 1.95 6.18   
Procrastinate on financial matters (1 agree - 4 not agree) 2.812 1 4   
Correct estimation of knowledge   0 1 39 
Overestimation of knowledge   0 1 36 
Underestimation of knowledge   0 1 25 
Housing equity (household level)   0 1 65 
Number of different assets 5.325 0 13   
Dependent Variables:         
Thought about adequate retirement income   0 1 67 
Planning concrete measures concering retirement provision   0 1 21 
Saves more in existing product since last year   1 2 28 
Filed a new retirement savings contract since last year   1 2 11 
Owning "Riester-Pension"    0 1 35 
Owning other private penison    0 1 34 
Owning capital life insurance   0 1 53 
Owning company pension    0 1 41 
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Dependent Variables: 
Mean 
  
Min 
  
Max 
  
% of  
Respondents* 
Homeownership (household level)   0 1 65 
Taking part in long retirement seminar (1 yes - 3 no) 2.517 1 3   
Taking part in short retirement seminar (1 yes - 3 no) 2.240 1 3   
Other Variables:         
Sufficient time to deal with financial matters  (1 no - 4 yes) 1.728 1 4   
Care only about urgent matters (0 not true - 10 true) 4.076 0 10   
I fear that I fall into disuse when retired      3.309 1 4   
( 1 agree - 4 do not agree at all)         
I associate aging with illness and care dependency  2.637 1 4   
( 1 agree - 4 do not agree at all)         
Savings suffice for adequate retirement live   0 1 58 
Like dealing with financial matters 2.626 1 4   
(1  do not like it - 4 like it very much)         
Importance of saving for retirement  7.911 0 10   
(0 not important - 10 very important)         
Importance of saving for care dependency when old 6.759 0 10   
(0 not important - 10 very important)         
Source: 1. Telephone interview, FNA-data, original data which has neither been imputed 
nor weigthed. *percentage of respondents are given only for dummy variables. ** Factor 
variable has been transformed by adding 5 in order to avoid negative values in this de-
scriptive statistics.  
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5 Pension Knowledge in Germany 
The empirical analysis begins with an overview of the state of pension 
knowledge among the participants in the telephone interview. Results are based 
on the first telephone interview used as part of the FNA-Data. After discussing 
objective and subjective knowledge in this chapter, the main analysis, concen-
trating on the obstacles on the way of private retirement provision, follows in 
chapter 6. 
5.1 Objective Knowledge 
This chapter will investigate how pension literacy is distributed among de-
mographics. Figure 20 shows that more men were able to give a correct answer 
to most of the knowledge questions than women. An exception is the knowledge 
of the statutory right for deferred contributions. This difference between male 
and female is, however, not significant.65 Additionally, the knowledge of the 
contribution rate is not significantly different between women and men. 
Figure 20: Pension Knowledge by Gender, in Per cent 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. Number of observations range 
from 951 to 1,010, depending on the question. 
Objective pension knowledge also varies with age. Figure 21 shows that individ-
uals who are 40 years and older are significantly more likely to know the amount 
of pension someone receives who meets the requirements outlined in question 
6 than younger individuals. A related question, the question about the pension 
reduction if one retires one year before the statutory pension age was answered 
 
65 The test statistic which has been used is the chi square test. 
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correctly significantly more often by individuals who were 50 years and above. 
Older respondents seem to be much more interested in their retirement income 
which could be explained by the proximity of retirement. Hence they search for 
the relevant information necessary to calculate retirement income, which in 
turn makes them more knowledgeable about these two questions. 
Figure 21: Pension Knowledge by Age, in Percentage 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. Number of observations range 
from 951 to 1,010, depending on the question.  
Since 2002 individuals have the statutory right to take advantage of deferred 
contributions when filing for a company pension plan. The number of individu-
als who know the correct answer to this question decreases with age. An expla-
nation could be that older individuals were less likely to notice that the law had 
changed. Younger individuals do not even know that there was a time when 
they had no statutory right for deferred contributions. Another question which 
receives more correct answers among the young is compound interest calcula-
tion. This question can be subsumed under basic financial literacy as there 
seems to be no other explanation as to why younger individuals score better 
than older individuals. For the question about the “Riester-Subsidy” and the 
question about the contribution rate, no clear pattern can be detected. Generally, 
the middle-aged have slightly less problems in answering these questions cor-
rectly than older or younger individuals. 
Figure 22 shows that generally knowledge increases with education. There is, 
however, one exception: individuals with low education are better informed 
about their right to tax deferred contributions than individuals with higher edu-
cation. An explanation for why the lower educated are better informed could be 
that they are more open to new information provided by the employer or trade 
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union about the company pension plan. The more educated may already have 
gathered information elsewhere. 
Figure 22: Pension Knowledge by Education, in Percentage 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. Number of observations range 
from 951 to 1,010, depending on the question. Low education: no degree, 
Hauptschulabschluss or equal, middle: Realschulabschluss or equal, Abitur or equal.  
According to the McNemar test statistic east-Germans are significantly better 
informed about the right to tax deferred contributions and are more often cor-
rect in their responses to the compound interest calculation task (Figure 23). 
They are also more knowledgeable about the pension entitlement of the repre-
sentative individual and they are significantly better informed about the savings 
necessary to receive the “Riester-Subsidy”. West-Germans on the contrary score 
better on the question about the contribution rate and pension reduction. 
Figure 23: Pension Knowledge by Region, in Percentage 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. Number of observations range 
from 951 to 1010, depending on the question.  
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Even though all knowledge questions are very interesting, it might be worth 
looking at the question concerning pension entitlements in more detail first. 
There is the possibility that individuals who overestimate the statutory pension 
entitlement of a representative individual also overestimate their own pension 
entitlements. The result would be that they do not engage in sufficient retire-
ment saving and therefore reach retirement with less wealth and retirement in-
come than they expected. 
The data reveals that 54% underestimate the pension entitlement of the repre-
sentative individual, 28% overestimate it and the remaining 18% is about right. 
On average individuals living in the new federal states overestimate the pension 
entitlement by 320€ and individuals living in the old federal states overestimate 
by 380€. A multivariate logit estimation to find out which individual characteris-
tics influence the likelihood of estimating the pension right or wrong has been 
conducted. There are two models for the likelihood of giving a correct estima-
tion, two models for having overestimated the entitlement and two models for 
having underestimated the entitlement. The first model in each case uses the 
raw data, dropping all observations which have at least one missing value on 
one of the model variables. The other model uses the multiply imputed data. In 
each case the index for objective knowledge has been generated by adding the 
number of correct answers in all the knowledge questions, leaving out the ques-
tion concerning the pension entitlement, which is the dependent variable.  
Table 20 shows that over all models age has a significant effect. Age increases 
the likelihood of giving a correct answer but also the likelihood of overestimat-
ing the pension entitlement. Underestimating the pension level is less likely as 
individual’s age. An explanation for this observation could be the same as the 
one stated in connection with the descriptive analysis. Which is that older indi-
viduals are more interested in their retirement income for the statutory pension 
system. Men are significantly more likely to know the pension entitlement and 
also more likely to underestimate the pension compared to women. This sup-
ports findings from other studies which find that men are more knowledgeable 
concerning financial matters (e.g. Rooij van et al. 2011a, Lusardi and Mitchell 
2008). Education has also a significant influence in most models. With educa-
tion, on the one hand, the probability of knowing the correct answer increases 
but, on the other hand, the probability of overestimating the pension entitle-
ment also increases. Since research has shown that the better educated are more 
likely to plan for retirement and to accumulate wealth, one does not have to be 
concerned about this finding. It would have been more problematic if fewer ed-
ucated people overestimated the pension, but instead they are more likely to un-
derestimate the pension entitlement of the representative individual.  
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Neither subjective nor objective knowledge seem to have a significant influence. 
Only in the models based on the raw data does subjective knowledge decrease 
the probability of overestimating the pension and increases the probability of 
underestimating it. However, these results are not supported by the analysis 
with imputed data, which makes the results less robust compared to the results 
presented earlier.  
Table 20: Determinants of Estimating the Pension of a Representative Individual 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Correct  
 
imputed 
Overes-
timation 
imputed 
Underes-
timation 
imputed 
Correct  Overes-
timation  
Underes-
timation 
Male 0.44** 0.09 0.09 0.44** 0.13 -0.47** 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) 
Age 0.02** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** -0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married or 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.35* 0.00 -0.23 
living together (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) 
Education (low, 0.16 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.37** 0.35*** -0.57*** 
middle, high) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) 
Individual net 
income (low, 
0.10 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.14 -0.14 
middle, high) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
Objective 
knowledge 
0.08 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Subjective 
knowledge 
0.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.17** 0.14** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Blue- or white  -0.22 -0.04 -0.04 -0.31 0.13 0.13 
collar (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) 
Self-employed -0.30 0.17 0.17 -0.65* 0.41 0.07 
 (0.29) (0.25) (0.25) (0.35) (0.32) (0.31) 
Public servant -0.44 0.16 0.16 -0.46 -0.04 0.38 
 (0.41) (0.35) (0.35) (0.46) (0.42) (0.41) 
Living in East 
Germany 
0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.02 -0.12 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.24) (0.23) 
_cons -2.90*** -2.55*** -2.55*** -3.15*** -2.33*** 2.52*** 
 (0.53) (0.48) (0.48) (0.64) (0.57) (0.54) 
N 990 993 990 668 671 668 
Prob>F  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, imputed data: coefficients  are the mean of 
ten imputed datasets  
Note: Logit Model. The first three models have been estimated with imputed data and 
the last three with the non-imputed raw data. According to a likelihood -ratio test, treat-
ing education as an interval variable does no t lead to a loss of information. The LR-test 
compared a model with only education to a model that included education and all but 
two of the indicator (dummy) variables (Long and Freese 2006).  
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The dependent variables are the knowledge of financial matters, the statutory 
pension, company pension, capital life insurance and the “Riester-Pension”. 
The “Basis-/Rürup-Pension” and the pension for public servants will not be in-
vestigated in more detail because this knowledge is not relevant for individuals 
subject to social insurance contributions. This group of people is most affected 
by the pension reforms and the following decline of the replacement rate of the 
statutory pension system. Individual responsibility concerning old-age provision 
is rising and therefore, the main interest in this work is to analyse the savings 
behavior of people who are subject to social insurance contributions. Since all 
the dependent variables can take on values between 1 and 7 and ordered logit 
model will be estimated. Explanatory variables for the analysis of subjective 
knowledge are the same as the ones employed in the analysis of objective 
knowledge in the previous chapter. The aim of this analysis is to grasp which 
individuals are most likely to rate their pension knowledge as good. 
Table 21: Determinants of Actual Pension Knowledge for six Knowledge Questions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Riester Interest Contribu-
tion rate 
Pension 
reduct. 
Company 
Pension 
Statutory 
Pension 
Male 0.77*** 0.66*** 0.03 0.56*** -0.07 0.47*** 
 (0.23) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) 
Age -0.01 -0.01** 0.01 0.04*** -0.02*** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married or 0.15 0.18 -0.20 0.02 0.10 0.22 
living together (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20) (0.14) (0.17) 
Education 0.29* 0.29*** 0.33** -0.05 -0.27*** 0.17 
(low, middle, high) (0.16) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.12) 
Individual net income -0.13 0.10 0.09 0.11 -0.05 0.11 
(low, middle, high) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) 
Subjective knowledge 0.62*** 0.09 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.11** 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
Blue- or white collar 1.03*** -0.11 0.28 0.33 -0.17 -0.22 
 (0.37) (0.21) (0.26) (0.31) (0.19) (0.23) 
Self-employed 0.80* -0.18 0.32 0.31 -0.09 -0.29 
 (0.43) (0.27) (0.31) (0.37) (0.23) (0.29) 
Public servant 0.59 -0.55 -0.21 0.86* -0.32 -0.46 
 (0.60) (0.37) (0.46) (0.45) (0.33) (0.41) 
Living in East  0.36 -0.24 -0.15 0.06 0.12 0.03 
Germany (0.27) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.18) (0.22) 
Cons -5.80*** 0.14 -4.02*** -5.45*** 0.92** -2.83*** 
 (0.75) (0.44) (0.58) (0.70) (0.41) (0.53) 
N 948 1001 986 990 1007 990 
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, imputed data, coefficients are the mean of 
ten imputed datasets  
Note: Logit Model. According to a likelihood-ratio test, treating education as an interval 
variable does not lead to a loss of information. The LR -test compared a model with only 
education to a model that included education and all but two of the indicator (dumm y) 
variables (Long and Freese 2006).  
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The next step is to expand the analysis to the other knowledge questions. From 
now on only the results based on imputed data will be shown and discussed. In 
Table 21 outcomes from logit regressions on the six objective pension 
knowledge questions are presented. Unlike the models in Table 20, this time the 
actual knowledge questions have not been included as explanatory variables this 
time. The analysis of the pension entitlement above has shown that actual 
knowledge was never significant.  
Table 21 shows that male are significantly more likely to know the correct an-
swers to the “Riester”, the “Interest compounding”, the “Pension reduction” 
and the “Statutory pension entitlement” Questions. This again supports find-
ings from related research (e.g. Rooij van et al. 2011a; Lusardi and Mitchell 
2008). Existing research has also proposed a positive relationship between edu-
cation and financial knowledge (eg. Lusardi and Mitchell 2010, 2011, Monticone 
2010, Rooij van et al. 2007). The analysis of this work also found that individu-
als’ actual knowledge of the “Riester-Pension”, interest compounding and the 
contribution rate, increased with education. Individuals with a low educational 
degree, however, were better informed about the statutory right for deferred 
contributions in the form of a company pension plan than high educated. An 
explanation for why lower educated people are better informed could be that 
they are more open to information from their employer or the trade union con-
cerning the company pension plan. In this case they do not have to exert any 
effort to gather information themselves, instead the employer provides them 
with the relevant information. High educated may already provide for retire-
ment privately and have turned for advice to the internet, journals, or advisors at 
banks or insurance companies. 
Coppola and Gasche (2011) find that many individuals do not even know that 
they are eligible to join a “Riester-Pension” plan or that a certain amount of sav-
ings is necessary to receive the full “Riester-Subsidy”. This lack of knowledge is 
especially high among those most in need, which are individuals with low in-
come. The result of this research, however, does not find income to be a signifi-
cant predictor of “Riester-Pension” knowledge. The reason could be that the 
questions about the “Riester-Pension” were different in both surveys. While the 
question in Coppola and Gasche (2011) was about the eligibility criteria and the 
subsidy, the question in the FNA-survey was about the percentage which has to 
be saved in order to receive the full “Riester-Subsidy”. 
Older individuals have a higher perceived and actual knowledge concerning the 
statutory pension and they also feel more confident in dealing with capital life 
insurance than younger respondents. The proximity to retirement could be a 
reason why they know more about the statutory pension. As retirement ap-
proaches, the perceived utility of an appropriate income increases which makes 
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an investments in future orientated capital more likely (Becker and Mulligan 
1997). Furthermore, older individuals will be confronted with retirement issues 
more often. Friends may retire, the employer provides information about partial 
retirement and from the age of 54 the statutory pension insurance starts to send 
out pension information letters which contains much more information than 
the pension information an individual receives before this age (Drechsler 2006). 
As retirement approaches, the perceived utility of an appropriate income in-
creases which makes an investment in future orientated capital more likely. 
From the age of 27 each individual receives brief pension information which 
also states how much pension an individual could expect if he retires at the stat-
utory pension age. Drechsler (2006) found that 31% of the respondents of a sur-
vey conducted among individuals who received pension information found that 
the information is a very valuable source of information and 58% found that it is 
at least of some use. It is therefore likely that the pension information is not ef-
fective in encouraging individuals to think about retirement.  
This finding has been previously discussed whereby the young are less likely to 
know how much pension an individual receives when old and also less likely to 
know by how much pension will be reduced for early retirement. At least the 
amount of pension to be expected is an important determinant of retirement 
income. Wrong information about the statutory pension system could therefore 
lead to suboptimal savings decisions. Older individuals also seem to be more 
familiar with the capital life insurance than younger respondents. The capital 
life insurance is a product which has been on the market for a long time and 
which has widely been used as an instrument to provide for retirement. Young 
individuals on the other hand are better informed about the “Riester-Penison” 
than old respondents. In contrary to the older generations, the young have 
grown up with the “Riester-Pension”. 
The probability of knowing the pension reduction when retiring one year early, 
and the pension of a representative individual, increases with age. This supports 
the descriptive findings which have already been discussed above. Being a blue- 
or white-collar worker or even being self-employed or a freelancer compared to 
someone who is unemployed or not employed, increases the knowledge about 
the “Riester-Subsidy”. Financial resources of individuals who are not unem-
ployed or receiving a need orientated basic income support are a restraint. Some 
may even have taken on a credit such that private retirement provision is a topic 
with a very low priority for these individuals. This lack of financial resources is 
likely to be the reason why the unemployed and not yet employed are signifi-
cantly less knowledgeable than the occupational groups with which they were 
compared. 
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Individuals who rate their subjective pension knowledge as high do indeed 
know more about pensions than individuals who rate their subjective knowledge 
as lower. To be more exact, the knowledge of the “Riester-Subsidy”, the contri-
bution rate, the pension reduction and the right for deferred contribution in a 
company pension plan increases with higher assessments of subjective pension 
knowledge. The correlation coefficient of indexes for objective and subjective 
knowledge, which have been created in this work, is 0.23. Hung, Parker and 
Yoong (2009) reviewed literature measuring financial literacy and found that 
actual and perceived knowledge regularly correlate but the correlation is often 
moderate at best (0.10 to 0.78).  
5.2 Subjective Knowledge 
The FNA-Data contains several questions to assess subjective knowledge, the 
exact wording of the question can be found in Table 7. In this chapter the aim is 
to provide more information about how subjective knowledge concerning dif-
ferent areas of retirement provision is distributed among the respondents. For 
this reason a multivariate analysis will be conducted which is similar to the one 
which has been conducted for objective knowledge. The first item of the battery 
to be analysed is the “knowledge regarding financial matters” which is a meas-
ure of financial literacy in general. The other five questions are more concerned 
with old-age provision and therefore measure pension literacy.  
Figure 24: Subjective Knowledge by Type of Employment 
 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, weighted. The number of individuals who 
answered the item battery range from 981 to 1013, depending on the item. Don’t know 
answers has been counted as (1) very low. Answers ranged from (1) very low knowledge 
regarding the product to (7) very good knowledge regarding the product.  
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While the statutory pension insurance, company pension, capital life insurance 
and “Riester-Pension” all affect individuals subject to social insurance contribu-
tion, the “Basis-Pension/Rürup-Pension” is designed for private retirement pro-
vision for the self-employed and the Pension for public servants is paid as re-
tirement income by the government to his public servants.  
About 15% of the respondents are self-employed or freelancers, 4% are public 
servants, 25% are not employed or unemployed and the remaining individuals, 
56% are blue or white collar worker who are subject to social insurance contri-
butions. Analysing subjective knowledge differentiating between these groups 
reveals that public servants know significantly more about the Pension for pub-
lic servants than the others do.66 On the contrary public servants know signifi-
cantly less about the statutory pension insurance and company pensions. This is 
to be expected since public servants are the only occupation group that receives 
retirement income from the pension for public servants.67 They do not receive 
income from the statutory pension and it is also very unlikely that public serv-
ants own company pensions, consequently the knowledge of these kinds of re-
tirement income is low as compared to the other employees. This picture is ex-
actly the other way round for blue- and white-collar workers who know signifi-
cantly more about company pension and statutory pension but less about the 
pension for public servants. 
Looking at self-employed and freelancers, the test statistic reveals that they as-
sess their knowledge concerning financial matters, capital life insurance and the 
“Basis-/Rürup-Rente” as significantly higher than the other respondents. This 
underlines the high responsibility with respect to retirement provision the gov-
ernment conferred to the self-employed. This responsibility forces the self-
employed to engage in personal financial matters and to collect information on 
suitable vehicles for retirement provision. Individuals who are self-employed, 
freelancer, unemployed or not employed know significantly less about company 
pensions than the other respondents. The explanation for this finding would be 
that these individuals generally have no opportunity to save in the form of com-
pany pensions. Further determinants influencing subjective knowledge have 
been investigated in Table 22. 
 
 
66 The test used to analyse if there is a significant difference between two groups, is the two-
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. 
67 Each individual could, however, start working as public servant and then he would be enti-
tled for the Pension for public servants. 
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Table 22: Determinants of Subjective Knowledge (separate for each question) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Financial 
Matters  
Statutory 
Pension 
Company 
Pension 
Capital 
Life Ins. 
“Riester-
Pension” 
Male 0.10 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.34** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.01* -0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married or living  0.16 -0.19 0.18 0.09 -0.09 
together (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Number of children -0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.17*** 
(max. 3 or more) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Education low . . . . . 
 . . . . . 
Education middle 0.22 0.34* 0.05 0.43** 0.27 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
Education high -0.07 -0.00 -0.25 0.29 0.07 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Individual net income 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.56*** 0.54*** 0.22** 
(low, middle, high) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Objective knowledge 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.31*** 0.14** 0.32*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Unemployed . . . . . 
 . . . . . 
Blue- or white collar -0.14 0.11 0.51*** -0.34* -0.17 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Self-employed -0.07 -0.26 -0.59** -0.20 -0.35 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Public servant -0.45** -1.46*** -1.61*** -0.54* 0.09 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) 
Living in east Germany 0.06 0.11 -0.29* -0.04 0.22 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
_cons 3.77*** 2.63*** 2.20*** 2.72*** 4.87*** 
 (0.25) (0.30) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) 
N 1012 1012 1012 1012 1012 
Adjusted R^2 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.07 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, imputed data, coefficients are the mean of 
ten imputed datasets  
Note: OLS-Regression. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. The dependent variables can take on values between 1 “very low” and 7 “very hi gh” 
and will be treated as continuous. There is no reason to believe that that a movement 
from 1 to 2 is different from a movement from 3 to 4. This reasoning is also confirmed 
by running an ordinal logit model which yields similar results (Appendix 9). According 
to a likelihood-ratio test, treating education as an interval variable would lead to a loss of 
information, therefore dummy variables for education have been used. The LR-test com-
pared a model with only education to a model that included education and all but two of 
the indicator (dummy) variables (Long and Freese 2006).  
The adjusted R^2 has been calculated via the user written command “mibeta” in STATA 
12. “mibeta” calculates the adjusted R^2 as suggested by Harel (2009). The model has 
been estimated and the adjusted R^2 calculated in each of the imputed datasets. Then 
the square-root of each adjusted R^2 has been taken in order to tran sform it into a corre-
lation (r).  Then each of the r values has been transformed into a z value via Fisher’s z 
transformation. Lastly, the average z across all imputations has been calculated and 
transformed back into an adjusted R^2.  
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The dependent variables are the knowledge of financial matters, the statutory 
pension, company pension, capital life insurance and the “Riester-Pension”. 
The “Basis-/Rürup-Pension” and the pension for public servants will not be in-
vestigated in more detail because this knowledge is not relevant for individuals 
subject to social insurance contributions. This group of people is most affected 
by the pension reforms and the following decline of the replacement rate of the 
statutory pension system. Individual responsibility concerning old-age provision 
is rising and therefore, the main interest in this work is to analyse the savings 
behavior of people who are subject to social insurance contributions. Since all 
the dependent variables can take on values between 1 and 7 and ordered logit 
model will be estimated. Explanatory variables for the analysis of subjective 
knowledge are the same as the ones employed in the analysis of objective 
knowledge in the previous chapter. The aim of this analysis is to grasp which 
individuals are most likely to rate their pension knowledge as good. 
Older individuals are significantly more likely to judge their knowledge of the 
statutory pension and the capital life insurance as very good, compared to their 
younger counterparts. They, however, judge their knowledge of the “Riester-
Pension” worse than young individuals do. An explanation would be that the 
older an individual is, the nearer retirement, and the more likely it is that the 
individual is concerned with his retirement income. Therefore these individuals 
are better informed concerning the statutory pension which makes up the lion 
share of retirement income. The capital life insurance is a product which has 
been on the market for a long time, since many older people know this product 
or even use it as a savings vehicle. Younger individuals on the other hand are 
grown up with the “Riester-Pension”. It could be that young individual’s prefer 
to save in a “Riester-Pension” which could lead to a substitution of savings away 
from capital life insurances. 
An interesting result is that men do not judge their knowledge significantly bet-
ter than women. On the contrary, women are significantly more likely to judge 
their knowledge of the “Riester-Pension” as very good compared to men. One 
consideration would be that men are objectively more knowledgeable than 
women and by including objective knowledge in the analysis takes away the pos-
itive effect of being male. To trace this thought the same model had been esti-
mated but by leaving out objective knowledge as the explanatory variable. In this 
case the p-value from being male changed from 0.005 to 0.076 but it is still sig-
nificant and negative. Hence women are still more confident about their 
knowledge of the “Riester-Pension” than men. Another positive effect on the 
subjective knowledge of the “Riester-Pension” is the number of children. As the 
number of children increases so the likelihood of judging subjective knowledge 
as very good increases. These are two positive results since the “Riester-
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Pension” is among others targeted at women and families with children. Never-
theless as an individual’s income increases also the likelihood of having a good 
subjective Riester-Pension” knowledge increases. The “Riester-Pension” itself 
has, however, been designed especially for individuals with low incomes to the 
extent that these individuals are entitled to the full “Riester-Subsidy” if they con-
tribute 60€ per year themselves. 
A higher individual net income and a higher objective knowledge index are as-
sociated with a higher subjective knowledge over all questions.68 Above income 
and objective knowledge, having a middle education compared to low education, 
increases the probability of judging the knowledge of capital life insurance and 
the statutory pension system as very good. The kind of occupation has also sig-
nificant effects on judging own knowledge with respect to several areas. The 
reference group are individuals who are unemployed or not employed. Public 
servants declare that they know significantly less than this group with respect to 
financial matters, statutory pension and company pension. But they know more 
about capital life insurance. While the lack of knowledge about the statutory 
pension and company pension is understandable it is less clear why they rate 
their knowledge about financial matters worse than the reference group. It 
could be that public servants are more conservative, rely more on the state and 
have more trust in their pension, which makes them less likely to engage in fi-
nancial transactions. Hence they feel less confident in dealing with financial 
matters. Against this reasoning is the fact that they feel more confident in deal-
ing with capital life insurance than the reference group and the blue- or white 
collar workers. As expected, blue and white collar workers feel more confident 
about matters concerning company pensions than the other occupational 
groups. 
 
 
68 The objective knowledge index represents the number of correct answers to the six objective 
knowledge questions (Chapter 4.2.1). 
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6 The Path towards Private Retirement Provision 
In chapter 2.1 a decision model describing the path towards private retirement 
provision has been developed based on theoretical considerations. This model 
will be the background for the following empirical analysis (Figure 4). Dealing 
with financial matters is costly in terms of time and effort required to think 
about retirement, to collect information and to make a retirement plan. Per-
ceived effort costs are especially high for individuals who dislike dealing with 
financial matters. External factors like too much information or too many prod-
ucts could also increase effort costs. Everything that helps individuals to imag-
ine the future, like reports in the media or retirement seminars, decreases effort 
costs. Some individuals may also have a high preference for the present and do 
not care about the future. If these individuals do not realize that they excessively 
discount the future, they are likely to find themselves at retirement age having 
an insufficient retirement income. Such individuals who do not realize that they 
have present biased preferences have a self-control problem and continuously 
procrastinate retirement savings decisions (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1998). 
At each point in the path towards retirement individuals have to overcome their 
potential self-control problems (Laibson et al. 1998, Thaler 1994, Thaler and 
Shefrin 1981). Many individuals may not be able to follow through and leave the 
path towards private retirement provision before actual saving starts. In this 
analysis each step towards private retirement provision will be analysed in order 
to find out, which factors there are, preventing individuals saving for retirement. 
6.1 Thinking about an appropriate retirement income 
Taking time to think about old-age provision and the desired life during retire-
ment is the first step towards private retirement provision (Figure 4). Some-
where between the first and the second step, the respondent has to think about 
his/her desired retirement income. This is an activity which requires some ef-
fort which many individuals are not willing to make. About 38% of the respond-
ents completing the first telephone interview had not yet thought about the in-
come they would need to live an adequate life during retirement.  
Starting to think about retirement is for many individuals the first obstacle to 
private retirement savings. As discussed in connection with the theoretical 
model “Towards Private Retirement Provision” at the end of chapter 2.1, think-
ing about retirement is costly, especially in terms of time since time is a scarce 
resource for many individuals. If individuals dislike dealing with financial mat-
ters or old-age in general, the effort costs are especially high.  
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Table 23: Thinking about Retirement Income (Question) 
1 Have you ever thought about how much money you would need to live an 
adequate life during retirement? 
(yes) (no) (refuse) 
The question of interest would then be: who has thought about retirement and 
who did not. The dependent variable is therefore the one depicted in Table 23 
and the explanatory variables are the ones already described in the previous 
chapter. This first step, thinking about an appropriate retirement income, is the 
first analysis on the path towards private retirement provision. Within this anal-
ysis the estimation results of the imputed data and the original data will be con-
trasted with each other to show how imputation may effect coefficients and 
hence significance levels. All of the following analysis will generally be based 
only on the imputed data. 
Table 24 presents eight models which have been estimated. The data underlying 
model 6.1(1) to 6.1(4) is the original data and for model 6.1(5) to 6.1(8) the im-
puted data has been used for the estimations. All models have been estimated 
via the instrumental variable approach and conventional as a probit regression 
model. A further variation between the models is that half of the models have 
been estimated without the interaction terms and the other models consider the 
interaction terms.69 
The first thing evident in Table 24 is that the standard errors for pension 
knowledge and being overconfident about that knowledge increases considera-
bly from 0.05 to 0.49 and 0.11 to 0.44 respectively, when IV estimation has been 
conducted (model 6.1(5) compared to model 6.1(6)). This implies a huge effi-
ciency loss compared to the ordinary probit estimation. 
The Wald test for exogeneity, testing 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0, implying that u and v are not 
correlated, results in p-values above 0.7 for all models estimated by IV, so that 
𝐻0 is not rejected at conventional levels. 
𝑦1𝑖
∗ = 𝛽𝑦2𝑖 + 𝑥1𝑖
′ 𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 (5) 
  
 
69 The interactions terms are the interaction between future orientation and procrastination 
and the interaction between future orientation and pension knowledge. Both of these interac-
tions have been included in order to test the hypotheses outlined in chapter 4.3. 
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Table 24: Determinants of Having Thought About an Appropriate Retirement Income 
 6.1(1) 6.1(2) 6.1(3) 6.1(4) 6.1(5) 6.1(6) 6.1(7) 6.1(8) 
 Probit IV-Prob Probit 
int. 
IV-Prob 
int. 
Imput-
ed 
Probit 
Imput-
ed 
IV-Prob 
Imput-
ed 
Probit 
int. 
Imput-
ed IV-
Prob int 
         
Male -0.11 -0.16 -0.11 -0.15 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 
 (0.14) (0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Children -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Middle Educationa -0.35 -0.40 -0.34 -0.38 -0.11 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 
 (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.25) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
High Educationa -0.17 -0.20 -0.17 -0.19 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.08 
 (0.22) (0.29) (0.22) (0.29) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
Middle Individual net 
Incomeb 
0.39** 0.40** 0.39** 0.41** 0.36*** 0.34** 0.37*** 0.35** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
High Individual net In-
comeb 
0.47** 0.49** 0.48** 0.50** 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.19 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) 
Middle Wealthc 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.12 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.17) (0.26) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18) 
High Wealthc -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.01 
 (0.17) (0.27) (0.17) (0.29) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar 
Workerd 
-0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.14 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Self-employedd -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 0.28* 0.29* 0.28* 0.29* 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Civil Servantd -0.39 -0.37 -0.40 -0.39 -0.35* -0.27 -0.35* -0.27 
 (0.31) (0.39) (0.31) (0.39) (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.28) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.23*** 0.37 0.23*** 0.36 0.21*** 0.39 0.22*** 0.39 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.08) (0.82) (0.08) (0.87) (0.05) (0.42) (0.05) (0.42) 
Future Orientation 0.30*** 0.28** 0.15 0.00 0.16*** 0.15** 0.02 -0.01 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.08) (0.13) (0.28) (0.37) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.19) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07* 0.06 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.13 -0.25 -0.12 -0.23 -0.15 -0.29 -0.13 -0.27 
 (0.17) (0.64) (0.17) (0.65) (0.13) (0.35) (0.13) (0.35) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.46*** 0.60 0.46*** 0.60 0.34*** 0.49 0.35*** 0.51 
 (0.16) (0.75) (0.17) (0.83) (0.11) (0.37) (0.11) (0.37) 
Procrastinate*Future 
Orient. 
  0.04 0.06   0.03 0.03 
(interaction term)   (0.08) (0.08)   (0.05) (0.05) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future 
Orie. 
  0.02 0.05   0.04 0.04 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.11)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant -1.06** -1.17 -1.08** -1.21 -1.53*** -1.74*** -1.54*** -1.76*** 
 (0.42) (1.17) (0.42) (1.29) (0.30) (0.55) (0.30) (0.56) 
Wald testf  -0.12  -0.11  -0.16  -0.17 
  (0.72)  (0.76)  (0.40)  (0.40) 
N 512.00 512.00 512.00 512.00 984 984 984 984 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education,       b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. )Wald test of exogeneity, testing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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𝑦
2𝑖
= 𝑥1𝑖
′ 𝜋1 + 𝑥2𝑖
′ 𝜋2 + 𝑣𝑖 (6)
70 
In this specific case, where the aim is to measure the influence of pension 
knowledge on thinking about an appropriate retirement income, endogeneity 
might not be a huge problem and probit estimation results should not be differ 
much compared to IV estimation results. 
A test for the strength of the instruments has been conducted. Regressing the 
endogenous variable “pension knowledge” on all exogenous variables from 
model 6.1(6) and the instruments (first stage regression Table 25) reveals that 
the variable measuring the problems Germans might have had by the change of 
their currency from the “Deutsche Mark” to the “Euro” is not significant. The 
variable measuring the extent of economics education at school, however, is 
significant at the 1% level. One of the chosen instruments can be classified as a 
weak instrument for “pension knowledge”. Instead of using both instruments to 
estimate the probability of thinking about an appropriate retirement income 
(over-identified model), model 6.1(5) has also been estimated with “economics 
education at school” as sole instrument (just identified model). Comparing both 
models does not show any differences in coefficients or standard errors.71  
In each of the following chapters analysing a specific step on the way towards 
private retirement savings, the first results which will be outlined, are those 
concerning the variables which make it possible to test the first three hypothe-
ses. The fourth hypothesis will be tested later in chapter 6.6. In a simplified way, 
hypothesis one states that individuals who have a sound pension knowledge are 
more likely to think about an appropriate retirement income than individuals 
with a lack of pension knowledge. In order to prove this hypothesis, the variable 
approximating actual pension knowledge needs to be significant and positive. 
The results in Table 24 indicate that the coefficient of actual pension knowledge 
is positive but the significance of this variable disappears as soon as potential 
endogeneity of actual pension knowledge is controlled for via IV-estimation. 
Hence there is, if at all, only weak evidence supporting hypothesis 1.  
 
70 Here 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, 𝑦2𝑖 is a 1xp vector endogenous variables  𝑥1𝑖, is a 1 × 𝑘1 vector of ex-
ogneous variables and the instrument variables are presented by a 1 × 𝑘2 vector, 𝑥2𝑖. It will be 
assumed that (𝑢𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖)~𝑁(0, Σ), where 𝜎11is normalized to one to identify the model. The pa-
rameters of the structural are the vectors 𝛽 and 𝛾, and the matrices of the reduced-form pa-
rameters are 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. 𝑦1𝑖
∗  cannot be observed instead the following can be observed: 
𝑦1𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑖
∗ < 0  and 𝑦1𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑖
∗ ≥ 0  (10) 
It is required that 𝑘2 ≥ 𝑝 because of the order conditions for identification of the structural 
parameters. If Σ is not a block diagonal between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖, 𝑦2𝑖 would be endogenous 
(StataCorp LP 2013). 
71 Regression results see Appendix 9.4, Table 50. 
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Table 25: First Stage Regression for Model 6.1(6) 
First stage regression    Model 6.1(6) Pension Knowledge 
Male 0.27*** 
 (0.07) 
Age 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.03 
 (0.07) 
Children -0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.03) 
Middle Educationa 0.15 
 (0.11) 
High Educationa 0.16 
 (0.11) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.06 
 (0.09) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.15* 
 (0.09) 
Middle Wealthc 0.22*** 
 (0.08) 
High Wealthc 0.29*** 
 (0.09) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.09 
 (0.08) 
Self-employedd -0.05 
 (0.10) 
Civil Servantd -0.35** 
 (0.15) 
Future Orientation 0.06 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.04) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.20*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.04) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.81*** 
 (0.08) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.90*** 
 (0.07) 
Econ. Education at School 0.07*** 
(0=no – 4 a lot of) (0.02) 
Euro Conversion -0.00 
(1=difficult – 4 not difficult) (0.04) 
Constant 1.40*** 
 (0.24) 
N 984.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education,       b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Hypothesis 2 states that an additional amount of future orientated capital (actual 
pension knowledge) affects individuals with different rates of future orientation 
differently. More specifically, if an individual with a high initial preference for 
the present acquires an additional amount of pension knowledge, than this ad-
ditional pension knowledge increases his/her probability of thinking about an 
appropriate retirement income by a greater amount that it would increase the 
probability for someone who is already highly future orientated. In order to veri-
fy this hypothesis, the variables approximating future orientation, actual pen-
sion knowledge and the interaction term between these variables should be sig-
nificant and the predicted probabilities should resemble Figure 13 from chapter 
4.3. As can be seen in model 6.1(8), none of these variables is significant. Hence 
hypothesis 2 cannot be verified. 
Hypothesis 3 is split into a strict and a relaxed version. The strict version implies 
that present biased preferences do not necessarily result in procrastination of 
thinking about an appropriate retirement income. If individuals are aware about 
their tendency to procrastinate, they can take measures to overcome procrastina-
tion. As a result these individuals may not be less likely to think about an ap-
propriate retirement income than individuals who are future orientated. Empir-
ically this would mean that the coefficients of future orientation, procrastination 
and the interaction of those variables should be significant and the predicted 
probabilities should look like the ones in Figure 16 from chapter 4.3. The re-
laxed version of the hypothesis would only require the variable approximating if 
someone is aware of his/her potential procrastination behavior to be negative 
and significant. Having a look at model 6.1(8) none of these variables signifi-
cantly influences the probability to think about an appropriate retirement in-
come. Hence hypothesis 3 cannot be verified.  
The interaction terms are neither on their own nor jointly significant. When 
compared to the model without interaction terms, they, nevertheless, often 
change the size and significance of the coefficients from which they are con-
structed considerably. In order to avoid this distortion, the following results are 
taken from IV-estimation in model 6.1(6) which does not consider the interac-
tion terms.  
The variable which now becomes significant is future orientation. The positive 
and significant sign implies that future orientated individuals are more likely to 
think about an appropriate retirement income than individuals who are present 
orientated. In the Appendix a model variation has been estimated, replacing the 
variable which measures if someone procrastinates on financial matters with a 
factor variable consisting of several variables which are thought to influence 
procrastination behavior (Appendix 9.4, Table 48). The factor variable is signifi-
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cant and positive in all probit models but not in the IV estimations. Hence there 
is weak evidence that individuals who do not procrastinate are more likely to 
think about an appropriate retirement income. Variables which are part of the 
factor variable are: not procrastinating on financial matters, having sufficient 
time to deal with financial matters and if the individual likes dealing with finan-
cial matters. Investigating these variables further by including each of them 
separately into the estimation model, it turns out that the variable with the 
greatest predictive power is if the individual likes dealing with financial mat-
ters.72  
The probability of thinking about the required retirement income to live an ade-
quate life during retirement also increases with age. This result is as expected 
since retirement inevitably approaches as one gets older. As the day of retire-
ment comes closer it becomes easier to imagine future retirement life. Friends 
or relatives file private pension savings contracts, become homeowner or partial-
ly or fully retire. Talking about retirement with friends and relatives may be-
come more important than it was before. Another significant predictor of think-
ing about retirement over all model specifications is income. Individuals with a 
low income are less likely to think about retirement income than individuals 
with a medium income. Earning a high income significantly increases the prob-
ability of thinking about retirement income in the models based on the original 
data but not in the models with imputed data. Self-employed individuals are 
significantly more likely to have thought about an appropriate retirement in-
come than not employed individuals in all models based on the imputed data. 
In the case that endogeneity of pension knowledge has been controlled for via 
instrumental variables, the significance of the variable indicating if someone 
overestimates his/her pension level disappears. This is a similar result to the 
one with the variable approximating actual pension knowledge, which has al-
ready been noted before. Since sometimes the significance of the coefficients 
varies between probit and IV estimation, even though the results should be sim-
ilar because of the not rejected exogeneity test another attempt will be made in 
order to account for the potential endogeneity of actual pension knowledge. For 
that reason a robustness check will be conducted examining how the signifi-
cance of the coefficients may change when a variable measuring the experience 
with financial products will be included as explanatory variable. In the absence 
of appropriate instruments this method has been chosen by Leinert (2005) in 
order to encounter endogeneity. 
 
72 Estimation results can be found in the Appendix 9.4. Table 48. 
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Table 26: Probit Estimation Controlling for Experience (Thinking About Retirement Income) 
 6.1(9) 6.1(10) 6.1(11) 6.1(12) 
 Probit Probit Imputed 
Probit 
Imputed 
Probit 
Male -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.04 -0.06 -0.14 -0.16 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) 
Children -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.04 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Middle Educationa -0.34 -0.34 -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) 
High Educationa -0.13 -0.13 0.14 0.13 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.38** 0.35** 0.36** 0.32** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.46** 0.42** 0.21 0.16 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.15) (0.15) 
Middle Wealthc 0.13 0.08 0.14 0.09 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14) 
High Wealthc -0.04 -0.11 0.03 -0.05 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.13) (0.14) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd -0.08 -0.10 0.05 0.03 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.13) 
Self-employedd -0.00 -0.05 0.27* 0.23 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) 
Civil Servantd -0.39 -0.40 -0.33 -0.35* 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.21) (0.21) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
Future Orientation 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.20** 0.19** 0.18*** 0.17*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.11 -0.09 -0.14 -0.12 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.12) (0.12) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.03  0.04* 
(no. of different assets)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
_cons -0.82** -0.92** -1.26*** -1.39*** 
 (0.39) (0.40) (0.28) (0.29) 
N 512.00 512.00 984.00 984.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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The variable measuring experience with financial products has been created by 
summing up the number of different assets an individual holds. This would 
mean that only someone who owns a checking account is coded as one and 
someone else, who for example holds a checking account, a “Riester-Pension” 
and stocks, is coded as three. 
For that reason a robustness check will be conducted examining how the signif-
icance of the coefficients may change when a variable measuring the experience 
with financial products will be included as explanatory variable. In the absence 
of appropriate instruments this method has been chosen by Leinert (2005) in 
order to encounter endogeneity. The variable measuring experience with finan-
cial products has been created by summing up the number of different assets an 
individual holds. This would mean that only someone who owns a checking ac-
count is coded as one and someone else, who for example holds a checking ac-
count, a “Riester-Pension” and stocks, is coded as three.  
The results of these estimations are shown in Table 26. Even though the varia-
ble approximating experience with financial products has been added to the 
model, pension knowledge remains a positive and significant predictor. In the 
model with imputed data, experience with financial products has a positive and 
significant influence on the probability of thinking about an appropriate retire-
ment income above and beyond the effect of pension literacy. 
6.1.1 Discussion 
Lusardi and Mitchel (2007c) investigated the effect of financial literacy on a vari-
able measuring if someone is a planner. The underlying question in Lusardi 
and Mitchel (2007c) survey is: “Did you try to figure out how much to save for 
retirement”. This question had been interpreted so that individuals who agreed 
to this question were seen as being planners. They found that the financial liter-
acy index which has been derived after principal component analysis positively 
influenced the probability to plan. Lusardi and Mitchel (2011) also affirm these 
results. They found that the knowledge of risk diversification concerning stock 
risk increased the likelihood of developing a plan. 
The question investigarted by Lusardi and Mitchel (2007c) is similar to the one 
examined in this chapter. Here it was found that pension literacy though a posi-
tive coefficient can be observed, ceases to be significant as soon as one controls 
for the potential endogeneity of pension knowledge. It has to be noted that the 
definition of planning can vary and depends on the underlying question. In the 
FNA-Data also a question about planning had been asked but this question does 
not asked individuals if they have planned for retirement, rather it asked, if indi-
viduals plan concrete changes in retirement behavior. The results retrieved from 
analysing this question can therefore not be compared to the results discussed 
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here. The individual characteristics which influence whether someone plans 
concrete changes in retirement savings behavior will be analyzed in the next 
chapter (6.2). 
Individuals are also more likely to think about retirement income when they like 
to deal with financial matters compared to individuals who do not like dealing 
with financial matters.73 For individuals who like dealing with financial matters, 
the psychological costs of thinking about and appropriate retirement income are 
lower than for individuals who do not like to deal with financial matters (Leinert 
2005). This makes individuals less likely to procrastinate. Self-employed have 
always been solely responsible to provide for their retirement while the respon-
sibility for, for example, blue and white collar workers started as recently as 2001 
when the “Riester” pension reform was coming into effect. This responsibility is 
also reflected in the estimation results which suggests that self-employed are 
significantly more likely to think about an appropriate retirement income than 
not employed individuals. 
The estimations have also shown that dealing with desired retirement income is 
among others a matter of age. As individuals get older, they are more likely to 
deal with this problem. This finding is consistent with theoretical findings. As 
retirement approaches individuals are confronted with a lot of information pro-
vided by the statutory pension insurance, the employer or just retired friends. 
This information directly increases future orientated capital, which in turn re-
duces the discount rate (Becker and Mulligan 1997). Furthermore, the proximity 
of retirement is likely to increase the perceived utility of retirement income, 
which makes it more likely that individuals invest resources on thinking about 
an appropriate retirement income. A discussion about why older individuals are 
better informed about issues concerning the statutory pension can be found in 
chapter 5.1, where financial and pension knowledge have been investigated. 
According to the theory of Becker and Mulligan (1997) investment in future ori-
entated capital and henceforth future orientation increases as future utility in-
creases. On the one hand individuals with medium and high incomes can invest 
more for retirement than individuals with a low income and they are likely to 
invest in more complex products which taken together might lead to a greater 
return on investment than saving in a savings account. It might be rational if 
individuals, who do not have much money left to save, do not invest time learn-
ing about complex and potentially risky savings products. On the other hand, 
 
73 The variable measuring if someone likes dealing with financial matters had been added to 
the model in the Appendix 9.4, Table 48. This variable is positive significant at the one per cent 
level in the probit estimation but not in the IV estimation. 
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the costs of investment in future orientated capital also increases with income. 
The higher the hourly income the higher the opportunity costs of thinking 
about how much retirement income is needed to live an adequate life during 
retirement. 
The empirical results have shown that for individuals with medium income 
compared to low income, thinking about retirement needs is still costly in terms 
of effort and time to be invested, but the utility gained from investing the money 
wisely outweighs the cost. For individuals with a high income, on the other 
hand, the potential utility gained form an investment in thinking about an ap-
propriate retirement income does not outweigh the cost. Besides the high op-
portunity costs it could also be that the additional future utility gained for this 
investment is low due to the assumption of a diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption. High income earners may prefer to hire a professional financial 
planner and/or already save sufficient money in stocks, housing equity or other 
types of investment such that additional savings are not necessary. Further-
more, they will receive a higher pension from the statutory pension insurance 
because pensions among others depend on life-time earnings up to a ceiling. 
There is also an argument for why individuals with low income are significantly 
less likely to think about an appropriate retirement income than medium in-
come earners. Individuals with a low income often also expect a low statutory 
pension entitlement hence they regard retirement with a much more negative 
feeling than someone with a high income. Henceforth, thinking about future 
retirement income for individuals with high income is more pleasant than for 
individuals with a low income. Reports in the media that private pensions like 
the “Riester-Pension” will be offset by the need-orientated basic income support, 
additionally reduces the utility from retirement savings for this group of people 
(Welt Online 2008).74 
6.2 Planning Concrete Changes in Retirement Savings Behavior 
Planning concrete changes in retirement savings behavior are especially im-
portant if someone thinks that present saving efforts will not be sufficient to live 
an adequate life during retirement. Of course individuals, who are already sav-
ing enough, to the extent that sufficient wealth would be accumulated before 
reaching retirement, could also plan concrete changes in retirement saving be-
havior. New information concerning profitable investments or new retirement 
 
74 Individuals who are not able to acquire sufficient pension claims from the statutory pension 
insurance, such that their pension would be below a certain threshold, receive the need-
orientated basic income support. 
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savings rules passed by the government may lead to individuals shifting wealth 
from one savings vehicle to another in order to maximize returns on invest-
ment. It is important to note, that the resulting variable does not measure if 
someone is a planner or not but only if someone plans any changes at the time 
the telephone interview took place.  
The FNA-Data offers three variables related to this context which are depicted in 
Table 27. Question 3 has been directly asked after question 2 and question 1 has 
been asked several questions before the other two. From question 1 a dummy 
variable has been generated, being 1 if someone should provide more for re-
tirement and zero otherwise. Comparing this variable with the answers to ques-
tion 2 which also asks if someone should save more, shows that 72% of the re-
spondents’ answers are consistent which means that they state they should pro-
vide/save more for retirement in both questions. From the remaining respond-
ents, 18% say that actual savings are not sufficient for an adequate life during 
retirement (question 2) but at the same time they think that they should not 
save more for retirement (question 1). The remaining 10% say that they should 
save more (question 1), contradicting their statement that actual savings are suf-
ficient (question 2).  
Table 27: Questions - Saving Sufficient and Planning for Retirement 
1 Actually I should provide more for retirement than I do at present. 
(totally agree) (agree) (not agree) (absolutely not agree) (refused) 
2 What do you think, will the amount you save to date, plus retirement income 
from other sources, like for example the statutory pension, suffice for an ad-
equate life during retirement? 
(yes) (no, I should save more) (don’t know) (refuse) 
3 Do you plan (further) concrete measures to provide for old-age? 
(yes) (no) (refuse) 
 
This comparison shows that several respondents interpreted these two similar 
questions differently. From 887 respondents who answered both questions, 375 
said that their savings to date would not be sufficient for an adequate life during 
retirement in question 2, but only 303 respondents thought that they should 
save more for retirement according to question 1. Question 2 in contrast asks 
more specifically if retirement savings plus income from other sources would 
suffice for an adequate retirement life. It might be that the surrounding context 
of Question 2 made the respondents think more thoroughly about their actual 
retirement savings and as a result they realized that their current savings would 
not be sufficient if they did not change their savings behavior. Questions direct-
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ly preceding question 2 asked for the savings vehicles an individual owns and 
for the amount of money put aside each month for retirement provision. The 
conclusion would be that some individuals are at first glance optimistic concern-
ing their retirement income, but when they are forced to think more precisely 
about their retirement savings they realize that their current savings would not 
suffice. The conclusion to this discussion is that question 2 is more accurate and 
therefore more reliable than question 1. Hence question 2 will be the variable of 
choice in successive analyses. 
The next step is to investigate if individuals who say that they should save more 
also plan concrete (further) measures concerning their old-age provision. In 
question 2 about 42% (N=899) said that their retirement savings they regularly 
put aside would not suffice to live an adequate retirement life. From these indi-
viduals only 30% plan concrete changes in their retirement savings behavior, 
even though question 2 was directly followed by question 3 (Table 28). For ques-
tion 1 the picture is similar although there were several questions in between 
question 1 and question 3. “I should save more” was stated by 36% (N=996) of 
the respondents but only 29% of these individuals plan to change their retire-
ment savings behavior. 
Table 28: Cross Tabulation - Saving Sufficiency and Planning for Retirement 
Q3: does  Q2: savings suffice 
 
Q3: does Q1: should save more 
plan No Yes Total 
 
plan No  Yes Total 
No 266 446 712  
 
No 532 247 779  
  70.18 86.77 79.73  
 
  84.04  70.11 79.33  
Yes 113 68 181  
 
Yes 101  102 203  
  29.82 13.23 20.27  
 
  15.96  29.23 20.67  
Total 379 514 893  
 
Total 633    349 982  
  100 100 100 
 
  100 100 100 
 
Table 28 also shows that several respondents who think that they already save 
sufficient still plan concrete measures concerning their retirement savings. The 
aim of the following analysis is to investigate who plans concrete changes in 
retirement savings behavior. The model of most interest, namely the model in-
vestigating individuals who indicated they should save more, is based on only 
368 observations instead of 1,016 (total sample size). 
Table 29 analyzes the probability of planning concrete changes in retirement 
savings behavior for individuals who already save sufficient and Table 30 esti-
mates the same model for individuals who think that their present savings 
would not suffice. The data underlying all models is the imputed data. All mod-
els have been estimated via the instrumental variable approach and conventional 
as a probit regression model.  
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Table 29: Planning Concrete Changes if Savings Suffice75 
 
 
 
75 Besides theoretical considerations the AIC and BIC have been employed in order to decide 
which time preferences, procrastination and actual knowledge variable should go into the 
mode (see Appendix) 
 6.2(1) 6.2(2) 6.2 (3) 6.2(4) 6.2(2a) 
Planning concrete 
changes 
if savings suffice 
Probit IV-Probit Probit 
Interac-
tion 
IV-Probit 
Interac-
tion 
IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
      
Male 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.09 
 (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) (0.26) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.27) 
Children -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.06 
(0 no – 4 four or more 
kids) 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) 
Middle Educationa 0.56 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.27 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.43) 
High Educationa 0.80** 0.73* 0.81** 0.73* 0.77* 
 (0.36) (0.42) (0.36) (0.42) (0.43) 
Middle Individual net 
Incomeb 
-0.42* -0.42* -0.42 -0.42* -0.21 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) 
High Individual net 
Incomeb 
-0.24 -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.39 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.35) 
Middle Wealthc -0.24 -0.32 -0.23 -0.31 0.09 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.22) (0.27) (0.37) 
High Wealthc -0.34 -0.41 -0.34 -0.40 -0.22 
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.26) (0.37) 
Blue- or White Collar 
Workerd 
-0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 0.02 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.36) 
Self-employedd 0.48* 0.52* 0.49* 0.53* 0.53 
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.51) 
Civil Servantd -0.29 -0.14 -0.29 -0.15 -0.11 
 (0.36) (0.52) (0.36) (0.51) (0.59) 
Actual Pension 
Knowledge 
-0.05 0.36 -0.06 0.34 -0.65 
(0 = zero – 6 = six ques-
tion correct) 
(0.14) (1.01) (0.14) (0.99) (1.10) 
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Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Referenc e 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference g roup is cor-
rect estimation of pension knowledge. f)  Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypoth-
esis 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
Table 30: Planning Concrete Changes if Savings do not Suffice 
 6.2(5) 6.2(6) 6.2(7) 6.2(8) 6.2(6a) 
Planning concrete changes 
if savings do not suffice 
Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit 
Interac-
tion 
IV-Probit 
Interac-
tion 
IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
Male 0.40** 0.20 0.40** 0.21 0.34* 
 (0.17) (0.35) (0.17) (0.36) (0.20) 
Age -0.03*** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.02 -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.46** -0.37 -0.48** -0.39 -0.18 
 (0.19) (0.28) (0.19) (0.29) (0.29) 
Children 0.22*** 0.19 0.23*** 0.19 0.14 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.09) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) 
Middle Educationa 0.43 0.28 0.44 0.28 0.20 
 (0.28) (0.38) (0.28) (0.39) (0.34) 
High Educationa 0.70*** 0.55 0.69** 0.54 0.50 
 (0.27) (0.41) (0.27) (0.42) (0.47) 
 6.2(1) 6.2(2) 6.2 (3) 6.2(4) 6.2(2a) 
Planning concrete 
changes 
if savings suffice 
Probit IV-Probit Probit 
Interac-
tion 
IV-Probit 
Interac-
tion 
IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
Future Orientation 0.16 0.14 0.40 0.50 0.24 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.11) (0.13) (0.45) (0.50) (0.18) 
Procrastinate on Fi-
nancial Matters 
0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.09 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13) 
Underestimate 
Knowledgee 
-0.06 -0.31 -0.05 -0.31 0.59 
 (0.23) (0.64) (0.23) (0.64) (0.75) 
Overestimate 
Knowledgee 
-0.09 0.24 -0.09 0.22 -0.65 
 (0.21) (0.83) (0.21) (0.80) (0.93) 
Procrastinate*Future 
Orient. 
  -0.11 -0.12  
(interaction term)   (0.11) (0.12)  
A.P.Knowledge*Future 
Orie. 
  0.04 0.01  
(interaction term)   (0.14) (0.16)  
Constant 0.18 -0.48 0.13 -0.52 1.03 
 (0.62) (1.74) (0.63) (1.73) (2.01) 
Wald testf  -0.24  -0.23 0.29 
  (0.61)  (0.59) (0.69) 
N 511.00 511.00 511.00 511.00 269 
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 6.2(5) 6.2(6) 6.2(7) 6.2(8) 6.2(6a) 
Planning concrete changes 
if savings do not suffice 
Probit IV-Probit Probit 
Interaction 
IV-Probit 
Interaction 
IV-Probit Original 
Data 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.09 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 0.11 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.27 -0.33 -0.28 -0.33 -0.14 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.40) 
Middle Wealthc 0.17 0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.23 
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.23) (0.30) (0.24) 
High Wealthc 0.45* 0.12 0.43* 0.10 0.71*** 
 (0.25) (0.53) (0.25) (0.53)  
Blue- or White Collar Workerd -0.04 -0.15 -0.02 -0.14 (1) 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.23)  
Self-employedd 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 (1) 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)  
Civil Servantd -0.09 0.11 0.02 0.20 (1) 
 (0.53) (0.57) (0.53) (0.55)  
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.05 0.95 -0.04 0.96 -1.30* 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.14) (1.13) (0.14) (1.15) (0.73) 
Future Orientation 0.22** 0.10 -0.11 -0.31 0.35** 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.10) (0.21) (0.37) (0.39) (0.14) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.15 -0.91 -0.14 -0.89 0.84 
 (0.24) (0.85) (0.24) (0.85) (0.64) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.13 0.59 0.13 0.61 -0.41 
 (0.20) (0.51) (0.21) (0.54) (0.61) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.15 0.14  
(interaction term)   (0.10) (0.10)  
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   -0.03 0.04  
(interaction term)   (0.14) (0.15)  
Constant 0.27 -1.26 0.33 -1.25 2.34* 
 (0.50) (1.85) (0.51) (1.92) (1.29) 
Wald testf  -0.66  -0.66 0.83 
  (1.00)  (1.02) (0.80) 
N 368.00 368.00 368.00 368.00 206 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge .   f) Wald test of exogeneity, testing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
(1) These variables have been omitted in the estimation based on the original data be-
cause some of them predict planning behavior perfectly. This is owing to the small sam-
ple size.  
A further variation between the models is that half of the models have been es-
timated without the interaction terms and the other models consider the interac-
tion terms. Looking at Table 30 it stands out that all variables which are signifi-
cant predictors of planning concrete changes in retirement savings behavior in 
the probit model, cease to be significant, when the model is estimated via IV. 
The size and sign of the coefficients rarely changes but the standard errors in-
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crease sharply as the model switches from probit to instrumental variable esti-
mation. This implies a huge efficiency loss compared to the ordinary probit es-
timation. Because of the extensive difference between model 6.2(5) and 6.2(6), 
the latter model has also been estimated with the original data instead of the 
imputation. The results can be found in the same table, model 6.2(6a). Even 
though the sample size decreases from 368 to 206 it can be seen that the results 
are much closer to model 6.2(5) estimated with an ordinary probit regression 
than to the corresponding IV results. The reason could be that Stata encounters 
problems when conducting IV estimation for a binary choice model on imputed 
data when the sample size is small.76 Interestingly, pension knowledge becomes 
significant in model 6.2(6a) and school education is not significant anymore. 
The reason might be that the IV is “time spent on economics at school” which 
influences the variable measuring school attainment. 
The Wald test for exogeneity, testing 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0 results in p-values above 0.5 for 
all models estimated by IV, so that 𝐻0 is not rejected at conventional levels. In 
this specific case, where the aim is to measure the probability of planning con-
crete changes in savings, endogeneity might not be a huge problem and the size 
and coefficients of the explanatory variables should not vary between probit and 
IV-estimation.  
The idea that the results of the IV estimation in Table 29 varies from the probit 
results because of the small sample size is supported by the finding that this 
variation was not observed in Table 29, where the models only included individ-
uals who said they would already save sufficient. The reason for this observation 
could be the variation in the sample size, 368 in the case that individuals think 
that savings suffice and 511 in the case that individuals think that their savings 
do not suffice. Therefore it is likely that the sample size matters for an IV esti-
mation with imputed data. The observation shows that the greater the sample 
size, the closer are the results from probit and IV. This makes an interpretation 
of Table 30, based on a small sample size, difficult. According to the IV estima-
tion based on the imputed data none of the coefficients has a significant influ-
ence on planning concrete changes for retirement for individuals whose savings 
do not suffice this is different when the estimation is based on the original data. 
For that reason the same robustness check will be conducted as in Chapter 6.1. 
It will be examined to see how the significance of the coefficients may change 
when a variable measuring the experience with financial products is included as 
an explanatory variable.  
 
76 For potential problems of IV estimation with imputed data see chapter 4.4, Estimation 
Techniques and Potential Problems. 
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Table 31 shows that experience with financial products does not significantly 
influence planning behavior. However, in the models based on individuals who 
think that they should save more (model 6.2(9) and 6.2(10)), a high amount of 
wealth is not significant anymore when experience is an additional right hand 
sight variable. The reason is that someone with a lot of different financial prod-
ucts is also likely to be wealthier than someone with say only one product. For 
individuals who already save sufficiently the variable of self-employed loses its 
significance which might be explained by the number of different assets (model 
6.2(11) and model 6.2(12)). The self-employed are likely to hold a greater num-
ber of different assets than other employees because they need to hold some 
financial products, on the one hand, to finance their business and, on the other 
hand, to provide for retirement. The remaining variables do not change due to 
the inclusion of the number of different assets.  
In order to compare the results between individuals who think they should save 
more (Table 30) and individuals who think they do not need to save more (Table 
29), the coefficients of most importance are those that are significant in the pro-
bit as well as in the IV model based on the imputed data. However, because of 
potential problems IV estimation may have in small samples in an imputed data 
set, I consider the IV results based on the original data 6.2(6a) for the sample 
which is based on the individuals who think they should save more. 
The results will now be examined in order to test hypothesis one to three. In a 
simplified way, hypothesis one states that individuals who have a sound pension 
knowledge are more likely to think about an appropriate retirement income 
than individuals with a lack of pension knowledge. In order to prove this hy-
pothesis, the variable approximating actual pension knowledge needs to be sig-
nificant and positive. 
The results in Table 29 indicates that the coefficient of actual pension 
knowledge is not significant. Hence actual pension knowledge does not influ-
ence the probability of making concrete plans to change retirement savings for 
individuals who already save sufficient. Table 30 investigates the influence of 
actual pension knowledge for individuals who should save more. In some of the 
models the coefficient is negative and in others it is positive. The variable is sig-
nificant, however, only in the model in which the IV-estimation is based on the 
original data 6.2(6a). The negative and significant coefficient contradicts the hy-
pothesis because it would imply that individuals with less pension knowledge 
are more likely to plan concrete changes in their retirement behavior. 
Hypothesis 2 states that an additional amount of future orientated capital (actual 
pension knowledge) affects individuals with different rates of future orientation 
differently. 
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Table 31: Probit Estimation Controlling for Experience (Planning Concrete Changes) 
 6.2(9) 6.2(10) 6.2(11) 6.2(12) 
 Savings do not 
suffice 
Savings 
do not 
suffice 
Savings 
suffice 
Savings 
suffice 
Male 0.40** 0.40** 0.18 0.19 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.46** -0.48** -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Children 0.22*** 0.22*** -0.00 -0.01 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.43 0.44 0.56 0.55 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.37) (0.37) 
High Educationa 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.80** 0.78** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.36) (0.36) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.09 -0.11 -0.42* -0.44* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.26) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.27 -0.30 -0.24 -0.29 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) 
Middle Wealthc 0.17 0.14 -0.24 -0.27 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.23) 
High Wealthc 0.45* 0.39 -0.34 -0.40* 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
Self-employedd 0.02 0.00 0.48* 0.44 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.29) 
Civil Servantd -0.09 -0.10 -0.29 -0.30 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.36) (0.36) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Future Orientation 0.22** 0.21** 0.16 0.16 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.00 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.15 -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.13 0.11 -0.09 -0.11 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.03  0.04 
(no. of different assets)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Constant 0.27 0.20 0.18 0.08 
 (0.50) (0.52) (0.62) (0.63) 
N 368.00 368.00 511.00 511.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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More specifically, if an individual with a high initial preference for the present 
acquires an additional amount of pension knowledge, than this additional pen-
sion knowledge increases his/her probability of thinking about an appropriate 
retirement income by a greater amount that it would increase the probability for 
someone who is already highly future orientated. In order to verify this hypothe-
sis, the variables approximating future orientation, actual pension knowledge 
and the interaction term between these variables should be significant and the 
predicted probabilities should resemble Figure 13 from chapter 4.3. As can be 
seen in Table 29 and Table 30 in the models in which the interaction term has 
been added, none of the relevant variable is significant. Hence hypothesis 2 
cannot be verified. 
Hypothesis 3 is split into a strict and a relaxed version. The strict version implies 
that present biased preferences do not necessarily result in procrastination of 
thinking about an appropriate retirement income. If individuals are aware about 
their tendency to procrastinate, they can take measures to overcome procrastina-
tion. As a result these individuals may not be less likely to plan concrete changes 
than individuals who are future orientated. Empirically this would mean that the 
coefficients of future orientation, procrastination and the interaction of those 
variables should be significant and the predicted probabilities should look like 
the ones in Figure 16 from chapter 4.3. The relaxed version of the hypothesis 
would only require the variable approximating if someone is aware of his/her 
potential procrastination behavior is negative and significant. Having a look at 
Table 29 and Table 30 none of these variables significantly influences the prob-
ability to plan concrete changes. Hence hypothesis 3 cannot be verified.  
The interaction terms are neither on their own nor jointly significant. They nev-
ertheless often change the size and significance of the coefficients from which 
they are constructed considerably. In order to avoid this distortion, the following 
results are taken from the models that do not consider the interaction terms. 
There are several differences in the results of the model making use of sample 
comprising only of individuals who already save sufficiently, and the model 
which analyses only those individuals who stated that they should save more for 
retirement. The first one is the variable future orientation which has a positive 
and significant coefficient if interaction terms are not included into the model 
based on individuals who should save more. This would imply that individuals 
who are future orientated are more likely to plan concrete changes than individ-
uals who are present orientated. The second difference can be observed when 
looking at the variable measuring an individual’s net income. The amount of 
income someone earns does not influence the probability to plan for individuals 
who should save more for retirement. In other words this implies that there is 
no significant difference between the planning behavior of individuals with low 
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and high income. This is different when looking at the sample containing only 
individuals who stated that they already save sufficient. Earning a middle in-
come compared to low income is negatively associated with planning for re-
tirement. The third difference is the amount of wealth someone possesses. The 
variable has a significant effect on retirement planning only for individuals who 
should save more for retirement. The positive and significant coefficient implies 
that individuals who already acquired some stock of wealth are more likely to 
make concrete plans to increase retirement savings, if they think that present 
savings do not suffice.  
From all individuals who think that savings already suffice, self-employed indi-
viduals are significantly more likely to plan concrete changes in their savings 
behavior compared to not employed individuals. This might be explained by the 
high responsibility the self-employed have to take concerning their retirement 
provision and henceforth the need to optimize retirement savings. Being male is 
significantly positively associated with concrete retirement planning if savings 
do not suffice. This implies that men are more likely to start planning concrete 
changes, if they think that their savings up to date will not suffice for an ade-
quate retirement life. Theoretically planning costs are lower for individuals who 
are highly educated and for individuals who possess a good knowledge of pen-
sions. The degree of school education significantly influences the likelihood of 
planning concrete changes in retirement savings behavior for individuals who 
think that their savings suffice. The higher the education of the individual the 
less effort someone has to put into processing information and converting it 
into concrete plans. Age is also significant in both models. The effect is nega-
tive, which implies that with age the probability of planning concrete changes 
declines. 
6.2.1 Discussion 
Neither actual pension knowledge nor confidence in ones knowledge seems to 
be relevant in increasing the probability of engaging in retirement planning 
when individuals know that they should save more. In the case of individuals 
who know that they should save more but do nothing about it, it can be as-
sumed that they procrastinate in their plans because the perceived costs of 
planning exceed its expected utility (e.g. Laibson et al. 1998).77 Considering this 
assumption in the light of the empirical results, it could be that providing finan-
 
77 Costs can be psychological costs like engaging in the search for information and processing 
it. Furthermore costs could be the opportunity costs. Each hour spend on retirement planning 
cannot be spend for leisure activities or work. 
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cial and retirement knowledge alone is not sufficient to inducing these individ-
uals to plan for retirement.  
Women who are one of the groups most at risk emerging retirement with low 
pension claims from the statutory pension insurance are less likely to plan 
changes even though they do not save sufficient. A reason could be that women 
are more cautious when they have to make concrete retirement plans or they 
rely on their partner to make plans. Here retirement seminars or counseling 
sessions at consumer advice centers could be designed to motivate women to 
participate. These institutions would assist women in coming up with a concrete 
retirement savings plan.  
Income has not been found to be a significant predictor of planning if individu-
als think that they should save more. In the event that individuals think their 
savings suffice, however, individuals with low income are more likely to plan 
concrete changes than individuals with a medium or high income. The theoreti-
cal implication of this result would be that for medium and high income earners 
it is more likely that the opportunity cost of forgone income due to the time 
spent on planning changes is higher than the corresponding increases of utility 
from changing savings behavior. Since the considered respondents already save 
sufficient for retirement it is likely that there is no or only a low additional utility 
to be gained from making concrete plans to change retirement savings behavior. 
For Individuals with low income there might be a greater need for optimizing 
the savings strategy while high income individuals already have optimized their 
savings strategy. 
According to the theory of Becker and Mulligan (1997) an investment in the 
time spent to make concrete plans for retirement it is likely to result in higher 
utility for someone with a high amount of wealth than for someone with a low 
amount of wealth. Individuals with a high amount of wealth can invest more for 
retirement than individuals with a low income and they are likely to invest in 
more complex products which taken together might lead to a greater return on 
investment than saving a small amount in a savings account. Hence future utili-
ty increases although with diminishing marginal utility. This additional utility, 
however, does not outweigh the planning costs for individuals who already save 
sufficiently for retirement hence the wealth coefficient is not significant. 
The likelihood of planning concrete changes decreases with age. As individuals 
age changes in retirement savings would have less effect on the outcome than 
changes which have been made when young. Hence the potential utility gained 
from planning concrete changes declines with age. Most individuals have al-
ready completed their planning of the necessary savings required for an ade-
quate retirement life and think it is too late to make any changes to those plans. 
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6.3 Translating Plans into Action 
The FNA-telephone interview had been conducted as a short panel. In the first 
interview respondents were asked if their savings for retirement suffice and if 
they plan changes concerning their retirement savings behavior. Previous re-
search has shown that many individuals who make a plan do not translate their 
plan into action (Frommert 2008). For that reason a second telephone interview 
was conducted one year after the first interview. From 1,016 individuals who 
took part in the first telephone interview, 565 individuals also completed the 
second telephone interview. This chapter initially discusses some descriptive 
findings from the first telephone interview and then relates these results to the 
descriptive findings based on the second telephone interview. All of the follow-
ing descriptive findings will be weighted. Following the descriptive statistics, a 
multivariate regression will be carried out analysing who actually changed his or 
her retirement behavior and who did not. 
Figure 25: Intention to Start with (Additional) Retirement Savings 
 
Source: 1. Telephone interview, FNA-Data, N=183, weighted.  
In the first telephone interview about 48% of the respondents said that their sav-
ings would not suffice for an adequate retirement life. Of these individuals a 
mere 13% planned to change their retirement savings behavior within a year. 
Looking at the results for individuals who already save sufficiently reveals that 
8% plan to change their savings behavior within a year. Of those individuals 
who plan to start or to increase their retirement savings only 22% plan to do so 
during the following six months (Figure 25). Most individuals plan to start re-
tirement savings later, which carries the potential hazard that during this long 
time span things could happen which deter the respondents from starting sav-
ings as intended. They might therefore be more likely to procrastinate in their 
decision to save than individuals who plan to start savings very soon. 
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A year later respondents were asked if they had filed an additional contract to 
save for retirement or if they saved more in an existing contract since the last 
interview (Table 32). Overall 8% had filed a contract during the past year and 
27% said that they save more through an existing contract. In Figure 26 individ-
uals who either save more in an existing contract or filed a contract are de-
scribed as having changed their savings behavior. Looking at this variable re-
veals that there are no significant differences between individuals who claimed 
that they should save more and individuals who stated that savings suffice. Indi-
viduals who intended to start saving in the following year also not significantly 
more often changed their savings behavior than individuals who did not plan to 
do so. 
Table 32: Questions about Translating Plans into Action 
 Since the last interview in June, do you have… 
1 … acquired an additional product to provide for old age?  
(yes) (no) (refuse) 
2 … saved more in an existing contract? 
(yes) (no) (refuse) 
While these observations are based on the combined changes: saving more and 
filing a new contract, the results are slightly different when investigating who 
filed a new contract. In this case individuals who planned to change their sav-
ings behavior during the next year significantly more often file a new contract 
than individuals who did not state that they would change their savings behavior 
during the following year. These findings confirm previous findings which re-
vealed that there are large discrepancies between planning to change savings 
behavior and actual behavior (e.g. Clark et al. 2006). There is no easy explanation 
of why individuals do not translate their plans into action. The following para-
graphs will focus on shedding some light on the reasons for the large gap be-
tween plans and actions.  
All individuals, regardless of having planned to change their savings behavior or 
not, were asked why their savings behavior did not change. The main reason 
which 35% of the individuals stated was that they already provide for retirement 
adequately and a further 27% of the respondents said that they do not have suf-
ficient money to increase retirement savings. Looking only at individuals who 
intended to start (additional) retirement saving during the next year, 32% said 
that they do not have sufficient money and 16% said that their actual savings 
suffice. This last reason would mean that individuals adjusted their assessment 
of their retirement savings from being insufficient to being sufficient. Concen-
trating on the whole sample again, not having sufficient time and not finding an 
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appropriate product was the reason not to save more or not to file a contract dur-
ing the past year for 5% and 4% of the individuals respectively. Only 2% of the 
respondents indicated that they did not change their savings behavior because 
the savings decision was too complicated. Another 2% did not change their sav-
ings behavior because they were too old or had only a few years before they re-
tired. 
Figure 26: Planned vs Actual Behavior 
 
Source: 1. and 2. Telephone interview FNA-Data. N: 513-560 
In order to get a clearer picture of who saved more and who does not, a probit 
and an IV estimation will be conducted. On the one hand the underlying sample 
will be everyone who took part in the second telephone interview (Table 33) and 
on the other hand only individuals who said they should save more (Table 34) in 
the first telephone interview. The dependent variable is binary stating if some-
one obtained a new product or increased savings during the last year or not. The 
Wald test for exogeneity, testing 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0 results in p-values above 0.3 for all 
models estimated by IV, so that 𝐻0 is not rejected at conventional levels. In this 
specific case, where the aim is to measure changes in retirement savings behav-
ior, endogeneity might not be a huge problem and results between probit and 
IV estimates should be similar. In this chapter the same small sample size prob-
lem occurs as with the model in the previous chapter. Estimation results from 
Table 34 are based on only 191 observations. For that reason model 6.3(6a) of 
this table presents the IV estimation results which are based on the original in 
addition to the results based on the imputed data. 
The first step is again to look at the three hypotheses. In a simplified way, hy-
pothesis one states that individuals who have a sound pension knowledge are 
more likely to think about an appropriate retirement income than individuals 
with a lack of pension knowledge. In order to prove this hypothesis, the variable 
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approximating actual pension knowledge needs to be significant and positive. 
The results in Table 33 and Table 34 indicate that the coefficient of actual pen-
sion knowledge is not significant. Hence there is no evidence in support of hy-
pothesis one.  
Hypothesis two states that an additional amount of future orientated capital (ac-
tual pension knowledge) affects individuals with different rates of future orien-
tation differently. More specifically, if an individual with a high initial prefer-
ence for the present acquires an additional amount of pension knowledge, than 
this additional pension knowledge increases his/her probability of thinking 
about an appropriate retirement income by a greater amount that it would in-
crease the probability for someone who is already highly future orientated. In 
order to verify this hypothesis, the variables approximating future orientation, 
actual pension knowledge and the interaction term between these variables 
should be significant and the predicted probabilities should resemble Figure 13 
from chapter 4.3. As can be seen in all models considering the interaction effect, 
none of these variables is significant (Table 33, Table 34). Hence hypothesis 2 
cannot be verified. 
Hypothesis 3 is split into a strict and a relaxed version. The strict version implies 
that present biased preferences do not necessarily result in procrastination of 
thinking about an appropriate retirement income. If individuals are aware about 
their tendency to procrastinate, they can take measures to overcome procrastina-
tion. As a result these individuals may not be less likely to think about an ap-
propriate retirement income than individuals who are future orientated. Empir-
ically this would mean that the coefficients of future orientation, procrastination 
and the interaction of those variables should be significant and the predicted 
probabilities should look like the ones in Figure 16 from chapter 4.3. The re-
laxed version of the hypothesis would only require the variable approximating if 
someone is aware of his/her potential procrastination behavior is negative and 
significant. Looking at Table 33 and Table 34, none of these variables signifi-
cantly influence the probability of thinking about an appropriate retirement in-
come. Hence hypothesis 3 cannot be verified.  
The interaction terms are neither on their own nor jointly significant. They nev-
ertheless often change the size and significance of the coefficients from which 
they are constructed considerably. In order to avoid this distortion, the following 
results are taken from probit and IV-estimation which do not consider the inter-
action terms.   
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Table 33: Determinants of Translating Intentions into Action (Complete Sample) 
 6.3(1) 6.3(2) 6.3(3) 6.3(4) 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit Interaction IV-Probit Interaction 
Male 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.16 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa 0.31 0.35* 0.31 0.35* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Educationa 0.27 0.32 0.26 0.33 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.27 0.30* 0.27 0.30* 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.50** 0.56*** 0.51** 0.57*** 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Middle Wealthc 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) 
High Wealthc 0.22 0.35 0.23 0.37* 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.14 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.15 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Self-employedd -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd -0.02 -0.23 0.00 -0.23 
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.27) (0.33) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.04 -0.42 0.04 -0.46 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.49) (0.07) (0.47) 
Timepreference Results 0.11 0.14* 0.06 0.22 
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.08) (0.26) (0.28) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.08 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.17 0.21 -0.17 0.23 
 (0.17) (0.44) (0.17) (0.41) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.10 -0.40 0.09 -0.45 
 (0.15) (0.54) (0.15) (0.52) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.06 0.02 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.08) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   -0.07 -0.08 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant -0.89** -0.12 -0.87** -0.03 
 (0.43) (0.97) (0.43) (0.94) 
Wald testf  0.43  0.47 
  (0.51)  (0.49) 
N 533.00 533.00 533.00 533.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. and 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, testing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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Table 34: Determinants of Translating Intentions into Action (Should Save More) 
 6.3(5) 6.3(6) 6.3(7) 6.3(8) 6.3(6a) 
 Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 -0.26 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.34) 
Age 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.22 0.01 -0.24 0.02 0.21 
 (0.27) (0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (0.36) 
Children -0.19 -0.20 -0.18 -0.21* -0.25 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.25) 
Middle Educationa 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.27 
 (0.36) (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.50) 
High Educationa 0.18 -0.04 0.16 -0.03 -0.25 
 (0.35) (0.40) (0.35) (0.38) (0.45) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.29 0.20 0.30 0.20 1.02** 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.27) (0.30) (0.44) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.92** 0.78 0.94** 0.78 1.63 
 (0.39) (0.63) (0.39) (0.61) (1.09) 
Middle Wealthc -0.22 -0.05 -0.23 -0.01 -0.28 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.33) (0.36) (0.43) 
High Wealthc 0.46 0.60 0.45 0.64 0.21 
 (0.37) (0.43) (0.37) (0.40) (0.72) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.22 0.34 0.22 0.33 -0.89 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.58) 
Self-employedd 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.18 -0.54 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.51) 
Civil Servantd 0.54 0.19 0.57 0.15 0.04 
 (0.60) (0.77) (0.61) (0.79) (0.75) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.09 -0.91 0.10 -0.91 1.25 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.13) (0.91) (0.14) (0.86) (1.02) 
Timepreference Results 0.14 0.20 -0.06 0.62 -0.58 
(Table 5) (0.13) (0.13) (0.44) (0.70) (0.90) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.11 -0.06 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.25) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.11 0.81 0.12 0.75 -0.64 
 (0.30) (0.62) (0.31) (0.53) (1.04) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.41 -0.74 0.44 -0.77 1.71* 
 (0.32) (1.16) (0.32) (1.16) (0.90) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.06 -0.10  
(interaction term)   (0.13) (0.19)  
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   0.01 -0.10  
(interaction term)   (0.14) (0.16)  
Constant -1.23* 1.03 -1.23* 1.05 -2.97** 
 (0.71) (2.46) (0.73) (2.35) (1.21) 
Wald testf  1.16  1.11 -0.61 
  (1.94)  (1.70) (1.19) 
N 191.00 191.00 191.00 191.00 119.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. and 2. Telephone Interview. Sample consits only of individuals 
who stated that they should save more in the first telephone interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. Wald test of exogeneity, testing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Considering the complete sample, Table 33 reveals that individuals with a high 
net income (>=2,000€) are significantly more likely to have adjusted their sav-
ings behavior in the direction of increased retirement provision compared to 
individuals with a low net income (<1,000€). This result is also true for the 
models estimated only with individuals who stated that they should save more 
in the previous year (Table 34). There is also weak evidence that individuals with 
medium education are more likely to have changed their savings behavior than 
respondents with a low degree and also future orientation might be important 
(Table 33). Model 6.3(4) confirms a positive and significant effect of future ori-
entation on translating plans into action. 
6.3.1 Discussion 
In the first telephone survey individuals were asked if they plan concrete chang-
es in retirement savings behavior and during which period they plan these 
changes. One year later individuals were asked if they followed their plan 
through. Weak evidence has been found that individuals who are overconfident 
concerning their knowledge of financial and pension matters are more likely to 
start saving when they previously acknowledged that they should save more. 
While the confidence in one’s own knowledge did not have an influence on the 
likelihood to plan, it has a weak positive effect on translating plans into action. 
For individuals who feel very confident in dealing with pension issues the effort 
costs incurred by inviting offers for pension plans from different providers in 
counselling sessions will be much lower than for someone who believes that he 
is not well informed. The results suggest that the confidence in one’s own 
knowledge is more important than actual knowledge when translating retire-
ment plans into action. 
One year after the individuals indicated that they planned to change their sav-
ings behavior within the upcoming year, they were also asked directly about why 
they did not follow their plan through. 16% argued that their savings would al-
ready suffice for an adequate retirement life. This would imply that during the 
year after the first interview these individuals received new information.78 Con-
sidering this new information they recalculated their optimization problem and 
reasoned that it was not necessary to change their savings strategy (Clark et al. 
2006). Further 32% argued that they did not change their behavior as intended 
because they do not have sufficient financial resources. In this case it could be 
that external circumstance led to a decrease of household income or wealth. 
 
78 New information could for example be: increase in housing prices, increase in the return on 
investment, change in pension law, financial crises, inheritance, better understanding of the 
pension system, (private) pension statement about the expected pay-out/pension.  
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Such circumstances could for example be the loss of a job, an increase of the 
electricity rate or a divorce. Furthermore, it is possible that they had planned to 
change their savings behavior but within this year they discovered that there is 
not money left to save because they spend more on other goods. This reasoning 
also explains why a high individual income compared to a low income is posi-
tively associated with translating the plan into action. For individuals who have a 
high income, external shocks like an increase in fuel or electricity prices, can be 
absorbed more easily. This is also supported by the empirical analysis since in-
come positively influences the likelihood of saving more for retirement. If 
someone translates his/her plans into action therefore depends on income 
while planning concrete changes (analysed in the previous chapter) for individ-
uals who should save more not.  
A retirement seminar or a counselling session at a consumer advice centre 
might increase the number of individuals who translate their plans into action if 
they show that already small monthly contributions can increase retirement in-
come considerably. Information about the “Riester-Subsidy” or the reduction of 
taxable income by the contributions to a company pension plan (may be coupled 
with an employer match) could motivate low income individuals to start saving 
for retirement. These incentives may not only attract individuals with low in-
come to start saving but may also be effective for individuals with medium or 
high income whereby the drawback of financial incentives are windfall gains. 
This means that individuals who apply for the subsidy would also have saved 
without this subsidy or now save less in other retirement savings vehicles.79 
6.4 Saving for retirement 
Ideally individuals who started to save for retirement in one of many different 
savings vehicles have passed through all stages within the path towards retire-
ment. Individuals having not much time to deal with financial matters, who are 
boundedly rational or who discount the future at a high rate, may refrain from 
planning a great deal and just choose the product which the financial advisor 
offers (e.g. Leinert 2005, Thaler 1990, 1994). In the following analysis the focus 
is on individual characteristics which determine if someone saves for retirement 
and which savings product he or she has chosen. Furthermore, it will be inves-
tigated whether there is any evidence that individuals omit the planning process 
preceding retirement savings. The analysis does, however, not allow saying any-
thing about the amount of savings, the adequacy of savings to provide for re-
 
79 Studies who examined potential windfall gains concerning the „Riester-Pension“ are for 
example  Börsch-Supan et al. (2007), Börsch-Supan et al. (2008), Corneo et al. (2008) or Pfarr 
and Schneider Udo (2010). 
 183 
tirement nor is it possible to assess if the product chosen is suited for the indi-
vidual. While all these aspects are very interesting it is not possible to investigate 
their relevance in the scope of this research.  
Figure 27: Owning Different Kinds of Assets 
 
Source: 1. telephone interview, FNA-Data, N=977 
In order to analyse who provides for retirement and who does not, several in 
depth analyses will be conducted. The assets chosen to be analysed are the as-
sets which were the most popular vehicles to provide for retirment. According to 
Figure 27 these assets are: the “Riester-Pension”, other private pension, capital 
life insurance, company pension and Homeownership. Furthermore, it will be 
analysed who saves for retirement in one of the following contracts: “Riester-
Pension”, “Basis-/Rürup-Pension”, other private pension, capital life insurance 
or company pension. This analysis will be conducted on the individual level. 
The generated variables will be called “private retirement provision individual”. 
All remaining analyses, with an exeption of homeownership which will be in-
vestigated at the household level, will be investigated at the individual level. 
Homeownership has been chosen to be evaluated at the household level because 
housing equity is generally seen as a retirement provision for both spouses. In 
each case probit regressions and IV-estimations will be performed with a fixed 
set of variables which consist of the same variables used in the previous analy-
sis. New variables which have been implemented into the models to predict if 
someone saves for retirement in one of the products are:  
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Homeownership  
For many individuals housing equity is a form of retirement provision. Owning 
a house can lead to a rent free life during old-age and has therefore the same 
effect as a “Riester-Pension” from which retirees receive an annuity. Housing 
equity is generally financed on credit which requires monthly payments from 
the debtor. It is expected that individuals who own a house are less likely to own 
the other forms of retirement provision which would also require regular pay-
ments. 
Age squared 
Generally it could be expected that the number of savers in one of the private 
retirement provision vehicles increases with age. If individuals are young they 
care less about retirement, have many other priorities such as their career or 
family and also have less disposable income. However, since the pension level is 
only decreasing slightly, it might not be necessary for older individuals (e.g. 55 
years and upwards) to acquire private pension wealth. This theoretical consider-
ation, however, can only be applied to the cohort who is now 55 years and older. 
In future generations those who are 55 years and older should have some kind 
of private retirement savings. As a result the probability to save for retirement 
should increase up to a certain age, say 55, and then decrease. It is exactly this 
reasoning which would be represented by adding age squared to the regression. 
The detailed estimation results can be found in the Appendix 9.7.80 Here only 
the IV-estimation without considering the interaction effects will be presented 
for each savings vehicle. Endogneity of pension knowledge is one major prob-
lem in the empirical research examining the influence of financial literacy on 
planning or wealth. This problem has also been encountered in this analysis. It 
is not clear if the causality runs from pension knowledge to old-age provision or 
the other way round. In order to investigate the potential endogeneity problem 
further, a statistical test will be conducted, which has also been applied in the 
preceding chapters. The test for exogeneity tests the hypothesis 𝐻0 that the cor-
relation between u and v is zero. This hypothesis has only been rejected in one 
of the six models estimated. This means that endogeneity of pension knowledge 
is a major problem in the model estimating the likelihood of owning a house. In 
 
80 In the Appendix 9.7 (Table 75 and the following tables) the results from the 
probit regression, the interaction terms, estimations based on the original data, 
estimations including a factor variable for procrastination and a regressions in 
which the factor variables are implemented separately. 
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all other models, like the probability of owning a “Riester Pension” or a capital 
life insurance, this hypothesis was not rejected at conventional levels. 
Table 35: Determinants of Owning Different Vehicles to Provide for Retirement 
Owning a  6.4(1) 6.4(2) 6.4(3) 6.4(4) 6.4(5) 6.4(6) 
 Riester 
Pension  
Capital 
Life In-
surance 
Com-
pany 
Pension 
Other 
Private 
Pension 
Hous-
ing 
Equity 
Private  
Saving 
Male -0.16 -0.22* -0.08 -0.28** -0.13 -0.06 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.21) 
Age 0.10** 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01* 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 -0.00  -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.48** 0.03 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.21) (0.14) 
Children 0.25*** -0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.17*** 0.08 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Middle Educationa 0.12 -0.19 -0.43*** 0.16 0.13 0.04 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) 
High Educationa 0.11 -0.07 -0.27* 0.05 0.13 -0.03 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.09 0.05 0.47*** 0.15 -0.00 0.41** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.10 0.15 0.49** 0.43* -0.14 0.47* 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.16) (0.26) 
Middle Wealthc 0.17 0.08 0.42* 0.11 0.35 0.45* 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.22) (0.20) (0.25) (0.26) 
High Wealthc -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.06 1.09** 0.32 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.51) (0.31) 
Housing Equity -0.03 0.32** 0.16 0.01  0.26 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)  (0.17) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.11 0.20 0.62*** 0.07 0.06 0.41** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) 
Self-employedd -0.15 0.48*** -0.29 0.46*** 0.52** 0.28 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd 0.11 0.33 -0.59 0.07 1.01*** 0.01 
 (0.30) (0.25) (0.36) (0.31) (0.27) (0.38) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.11 0.55 0.67* 0.52 0.80*** 0.55 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.45) (0.35) (0.37) (0.48) (0.28) (0.55) 
Future Orientation 0.22*** 0.14* 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.16* 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.19*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.21 -0.48 -0.74** -0.53 -0.81*** -0.65 
 (0.39) (0.30) (0.31) (0.40) (0.23) (0.47) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.11 0.69** 0.72** 0.47 0.55* 0.81* 
 (0.41) (0.29) (0.33) (0.43) (0.30) (0.45) 
Constant -2.11** -2.20*** -1.81** -1.78** -2.80*** -1.52 
 (0.85) (0.73) (0.81) (0.77) (0.38) (0.95) 
Wald testf 0.08 -0.42 -0.36 -0.41 -0.86* -0.27 
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.41) (0.53) (0.47) (0.57) 
N 901.00 951.00 951.00 951.00 951.00 9515.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  The coefficients which are highlighted in grey are significant when estimating 
the same specification via an ordinary probit model instead of IV.  
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Table 35 presents the IV-results for all six models. The coefficients which are 
highlighted in grey are significant when estimating the same specification via 
an ordinary probit model instead of IV. In the case that the coefficient which is 
earmarked by a star and highlighted in grey it can be concluded that the results 
are especially robust since they are significant regardless of estimating the mod-
el by probit or instrumental variables. Estimations based on original data have 
been conducted in order to robustify previous IV-results because IV estimation 
on imputed data is no official stata application and may result in wrong stand-
ard errors and test statistics. 
Firstly the results will be evalutated concerning the three hypotheses. In a sim-
plified way, hypothesis one states that individuals who have a sound pension 
knowledge are more likely to think about an appropriate retirement income 
than individuals with a lack of pension knowledge. In order to prove this hy-
pothesis, the variable approximating actual pension knowledge needs to be sig-
nificant and positive. The results in Table 35 indicate that the coefficient of ac-
tual pension knowledge is positive over all models but a significant predictor it 
is only for company pension and housing equity. Hence for these two savings 
vehicles, hypothesis 1 has been verified. 
Hypothesis 2 states that an additional amount of future orientated capital (actual 
pension knowledge) affects individuals with different rates of future orientation 
differently. More specifically, if an individual with a high initial preference for 
the present acquires an additional amount of pension knowledge, than this ad-
ditional pension knowledge increases his/her probability of thinking about an 
appropriate retirement income by a greater amount that it would increase the 
probability for someone who is already highly future orientated. In order to veri-
fy this hypothesis, the variables approximating future orientation, actual pen-
sion knowledge and the interaction term between these variables should be sig-
nificant and the predicted probabilities should resemble Figure 13 from chapter 
4.3.  
It has been found that the interaction terms between future orientation and 
pension literacy and future orientation and procrastination are usually not sig-
nificant.81 One exception is the model estimating the probability of having hous-
ing equity. In this case the interaction between future orientation and pension 
literacy is significant, as well as the variable pension literacy itself. This result 
deserves some further investigation since the significance of the interaction 
term makes it possible to test hypothesis 2 which states that if the discount rate 
 
81 Appendix 9.7,Table 76 and the following tables. 
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is high but still allows for at least some investment in future orientated capital, 
then, all other things being equal, an additional amount of future orientated 
capital would increase the likelihood of saving for retirement by a greater 
amount for an individual with an initially low future orientation than for an in-
dividual with an initially high future orientation. 
Figure 28: Probability of Having Housing Equity, Interactioneffect of Pension Knowledge and 
Future Orienation 
 
Note: 1. FNA-Telephone interview, orignial data, predicted probabilities after ivprobit.   
Figure 28 shows the predicted probabilities for the variables which are part of 
the interaction term holding all other variables at their means. The underlying 
data is the original data because it was not possible to retrieve the predicted 
probabilities when the data was imputed. Comparing the result based on the 
imputed data and the results retrieved from the original data shows that the co-
efficient of actual pension knowledge is almost of the same size and significant 
at the one per cent level. The variable approximating future orientation is not 
significant in both models and the interaction term is significant at the 10 per 
cent level with the imputed data and at the 1 per cent level in the original data. 
The size of the coefficient is greater in the original data model. Besides these 
small differences I expect the predicted probabilities of the imputed model to be 
similar to the ones retrieved from the original model.  
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Table 36 presents the standard errors, p-values and confidence intervals for each 
of the estimated probabilities based on the original data. What is evident from 
Figure 28 is that hypothesis two cannot be verified. In fact pension knowledge 
has a greater positive influence on owning housing equity for future orientated 
individuals than for present orientated individuals. Retirement seminars which 
increase pension knowledge would therefore be most effective in increasing 
homeownership if the participants exhibit at least some future orientation and 
have a low initial pension knowledge. For individuals who are already well in-
formed about pension matters (being able to answer four questions correctly) an 
additional amount of pension knowledge does not significantly increase the 
probability of owning a house. The remaining models estimating the probability 
of owning other retirement savings vehicles do not show any positive or nega-
tive effects of the interaction terms. Hence hypothesis 2 can also not be verified 
in the other models.  
Hypothesis 3 is split into a strict and a relaxed version. The strict version implies 
that present biased preferences do not necessarily result in procrastination of 
thinking about an appropriate retirement income. If individuals are aware about 
Table 36: Delta-Method 
1._at  pension knowledge = 0 
       future orientation = -3.050625 
2._at  pension knowledge = 0 
       future orientation = -1.050625 
3._at  pension knowledge = 0 
       future orientation = 0.949375 
4._at  pension knowledge = 2 
       future orientation = -3.050625 
5._at  pension knowledge = 2 
       future orientation = -1.050625 
6._at  pension knowledge = 2 
       future orientation = 0.949375 
7._at  pension knowledge = 4 
       future orientation = -3.050625 
8._at  pension knowledge = 4 
       future orientation = -1.050625 
9._at  pension knowledge = 4 
       future orientation = 0.949375 
10._at pension knowledge = 6 
       future orientation = -3.050625 
11._at pension knowledge = 6 
       future orientation = -1.050625 
12._at pension knowledge = 6 
 
future orientation = 0.949375 
 
_at   Margin   Std. Err P>|z| 
 
 
 
95% Conf. 
Intervall 
1 0.44 0.21 0.03 0.04 0.84 
2 0.21 0.13 0.11 -0.04 0.46 
3 0.07 0.06 0.28 -0.06 0.20 
4 0.63 0.06 0.00 0.52 0.75 
5 0.63 0.03 0.00 0.57 0.69 
6 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.52 0.72 
7 0.80 0.16 0.00 0.49 1.11 
8 0.93 0.05 0.00 0.84 1.03 
9 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.96 1.00 
10 0.91 0.17 0.00 0.57 1.26 
11 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.98 1.01 
12 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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their tendency to procrastinate, they can take measures to overcome procrastina-
tion. As a result these individuals may not be less likely to think about an ap-
propriate retirement income than individuals who are future orientated. Empir-
ically this would mean that the coefficients of future orientation, procrastination 
and the interaction of those variables should be significant and the predicted 
probabilities should look like the ones in Figure 16 from chapter 4.3. The re-
laxed version of the hypothesis would only require the variable approximating if 
someone is aware of his/her potential procrastination behavior is negative and 
significant. Looking at Table 35 reveals that the interaction term is not signifi-
cant in any of the models. The variable procrastination is negative and signifi-
cant in the model estimating if someone is engaged in any kind of private re-
tirement saving. The light version of hypothesis 3 has therefore been veriefied 
for one of the six models. 
The interaction terms are generally neither on their own nor jointly significant. 
They nevertheless often change the size and significance of the coefficients 
from which they are constructed considerably. In order to avoid this distortion, 
the overview of the results in Table 35 does not consider the interaction terms. 
Providing for retirement privately is often more important for women than for 
men because women’s pension claims are generally lower than the pension 
claims of men. Table 35 reveals that women indeed are more likely to own other 
private retirement products. The savings vehicles “Riester-Pension” and capital 
life insurance are only significant in either the probit or the IV specification. 
Hence the positive effect of being a woman owning these products is less ro-
bust. 
Age is a significant predictor of saving for retirement with the “Riester-Pension” 
and also, while less robust, for owning a capital life insurance. The assumption 
made previously that the probability would increase with age up to a certain age 
and then decrease again is supported by the data. The coefficient for age is posi-
tive and age squared negative. Owning a home might be differently motivated 
than filing a pension contract, and even a hundred years ago, before pension 
reforms took place, individuals built houses. Therefore, the assumption that the 
probability of homeownership decreases again after a certain age might not be 
appropriate. Indeed dropping age squared from the model leads to a positive 
and significant coefficient for homeownership. The marital status which in this 
analysis is 1 if someone is married or cohabiting has a significant effect on 
housing equity but not on the other variables. Often the idea to buy or build a 
house only arises in a strong partnership with the shared intention to have chil-
dren in the future. Singles on the other hand may prefer to be flexible to focus 
on their career. With the number of children also the probability of owning a 
house or to have a “Riester-Pension” increases. The educational level itself has a 
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significant and robust influence only on the possession of company pension 
plans. The reference group are individuals with low education. Compared to the 
reference group middle educated and high educated are less likely to save for 
retirement via a company pension plan. Actual pension knowledge is closely 
related to education. Possessing pension knowledge decreases the effort costs of 
gathering and processing new information. Furthermore, pension knowledge 
facilitates imagining future retirement life. The coefficient of actual pension 
knowledge is positive in two of the models estimated by instrumental variables 
which are the models estimating the probability of having a company pension 
and housing equity. Estimating the model without instrumenting actual pen-
sion knowledge leads to significant coefficients for almost all models with one 
exception which is housing equity. A very robust result is therefore that individ-
uals with a higher degree of actual pension knowledge are more likely to own a 
company pension. 
Another set of variables analysed is subjective pension knowledge which entered 
the regression in a transformed way. A set of dummy variables measures if 
someone estimated his/her subjective knowledge approximately as good as 
his/her actual knowledge, better as his/her actual knowledge or worse. The 
model specifications analysed, generally display a significant positive coefficient 
for overestimating ones pension knowledge with an exception of the two savings 
vehicles “Riester-Pension” and “other private pension” were the coefficient is 
not significant. Underestimating or being under confident concerning ones 
pension knowledge reduces the probability of owing a company pension in 
both, the IV and the probit model. A negative influence of underestimating ones 
pension knowledge can also be observed for the savings vehicles “Riester-
Pension” and private savings in general in the probit model and for housing 
equity in the IV estimation only. Here it is evident again that an individual’s 
feeling about how well he is informed about retirement issues, even being more 
confident than the objective measure would suggest, is positively related to the 
probability of owning private retirement provision. Underestimating one’s 
knowledge on the other hand would lead individuals to abstain from filing for a 
savings contract. 
The amount of an individual’s net income plays an important role in owning a 
company pension and other private pension. The more someone earns the more 
likely he/she is to own one of these savings vehicles. The data, however, reveals 
that a high income is not always positively related to retirement savings. An in-
dividual’s net income for example has no significant influence on owning a 
“Riester-Pension”, a house or a capital life insurance. Wealth has a positive and 
significant effect on possessing company pension and housing equity. The es-
pecially high association between wealth and housing equity could be due to 
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possible endogeneiety of wealth because housing equity is a component of 
wealth. Housing equity has been added to the stock of wealth and therefore di-
rectly influences the explanatory variable. The higher the stock of wealth, the 
more an individual can invest in his/her retirement plan and increase his/her 
return on investment. Another argument which might be much more important 
is that retirement is not the only motive why individuals save. Individuals gen-
erally also engage in precautionary savings such that they can afford to fix the 
washing machine or the car if it breaks. In the case where an individual has 
built a certain stock of wealth for precautionary reasons, additional money 
earned could be saved for retirement purposes. A high stock of wealth therefore 
frees money to be invested in retirement provision.  
In all models with the exception of the model estimating the probability of own-
ing a house, housing equity was added as explanatory variable in order to find 
out if individuals who own a house are less likely to other retirement savings 
vehicles. Homeownership is seen as a form of retirement provision for many 
people (Figure 27 see also Versicherungskammer Bayern 2009). Since most in-
dividuals have to repay the mortgage it is likely that these individuals have less 
money left to save for retirement in other savings devices. This presumption, 
however, has not been confirmed by the data. Instead house owners are more 
likely to also own a capital life insurance than individuals who do not own a 
house.  
This positive relationship might be explained by risk aversion. Buying a house 
entails a great financial burden for many couples and families. In the case of the 
death of one partner it might not be possible to pay back the housing loan. A 
capital life insurance would then decrease the financial burden for the remain-
ing partner and also reduce the pressure to sell the house. Another reason why 
many house owners also have a capital life insurance could be that this instru-
ment was an attractive house financing tool 10 to 20 years ago because of high 
interest rates and an exemption from taxation for out-payments. 
Theoretically, it is expected that individuals with a low future orientation are less 
likely to save for retirement. This effect, however, is significant only for owning 
“Riester-Pension” and capital life insurance. It has also been investigated if the 
kind of employment effects old age provision. The reference group are individu-
als who are unemployed or not employed for other reasons. The analysis shows 
that the self-employed are more likely to own a capital life insurance, other pri-
vate pensions or a house. White- and blue collar-workers are more likely to own 
a company pension plan than not employed individuals and public servants are 
even more likely to own a house than self-employed. A company pension is 
connected with the work contract, hence individuals who are not employed may 
not have excess to a company pension plan, the same holds for self-employed. 
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Nevertheless, it could be that not employed and self-employed have some com-
pany pension entitlements because they have been employees in the past. While 
public authorities offer company pensions to their blue- and white-collar work-
ers, civil servants generally are not offered a company pension, which explains 
the significant negative coefficient for public servants in the probit estimation.  
Homeownership is more likely for public servants and for self-employed as 
compared to individuals who are not employed. Since public servants have a 
secure job generally for their whole life, they can take on credits without having 
to fear that they suddenly get unemployed and being unable to repay the credit. 
Their job also makes it easier to get a housing credit than for anyone else. An 
explanation of why self-employed are more likely to own a house could be inher-
itance. Often being self-employed, owning a company or the like has been 
passed on from generation to generation. In this respect it could also be that 
housing equity has been inherited.    
6.4.1 Discussion 
Individuals who do not like to deal with financial matters are less likely to think 
about an appropriate retirement income before they start to save for retirement 
but on the contrary are not less likely to save for retirement.82 For these individ-
uals the effort costs of dealing with retirement provision are especially high, to 
the extent that these costs are higher than the utility to be gained from retire-
ment planning. For that reason they may prefer to skip the first stages of the 
path towards retirement and start saving immediately. Leinert (2005) suggests a 
similar behavior if heuristics are available which both propose saving a certain 
amount and the product to be chosen. Individuals might not be able to solve a 
dynamic optimization problem before starting to save for retirement, or indi-
viduals do not want to spend much time to think about retirement. Individuals 
with limited intellectual capabilities who may not be able to arrive at an optimal 
solution are also called boundedly rational (Thaler 1990, 1994). 
If heuristics are available, they reduce the effort costs of planning for retirement 
and may induce people to save for retirement which would otherwise never have 
started. An example for a heuristic would be the “Riester-Subsidy”. Everyone 
saving at least four per cent of is gross yearly income in a certified “Riester-
Product” is entitled to the full subsidy. Four per cent could therefore be inter-
preted as optimal savings from individuals who decide to use the heuristic in-
 
82 For the results see Appendix 9.4, Table 48 for analysing the likelihood that an individual’s 
thinks about an appropriate retirement income and Appendix 9.7 Table 76 and the following 
for estimating the probabilitiy that someone owns a retirement savings product.  
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stead of solving a dynamic maximisation problem. Heuristics are not the best 
initial solution for maximizing life time utility but they have the potential to im-
prove the financial situation of individuals who would otherwise never start to 
save for retirement.83 Individuals who apply a heuristic, which suggests how 
much to save and where to invest, decide not to think about an appropriate re-
tirement income and investment. For them the effort costs outweigh the poten-
tial utility gained from dealing with retirement provision themselves.  
Figure 29: Percentage of Individuals Who Have Not Thought about Retirement Income but 
still Own a Retirement Savings Vehicle 
 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone-interview, weighted, in percentage 
Figure 29 shows the percentage of individuals who own one of the depicted sav-
ings devices but have never thought about the amount of retirement income 
they would need to live an adequate life during retirement. While most of the 
respondents use these savings devices to save for retirement, generally about 
30% of those individuals never thought about how much income is actually 
needed during retirement. These descriptive results suggest that many individ-
uals have used heuristics which simplified their decision about how much to 
contribute. Individuals owning a company pension seem to be most engaged in 
thinking about retirement income while individuals owning a “Riester-Pension” 
are least likely to have thought about retirement income. 
It is likely that the pension plan information provided by the employers through 
written material or seminars encourages people to think more thoroughly about 
retirement. In chapter 6.6 it will be shown that several respondents attended a 
company based retirement seminar and in chapter 5.1 it has been shown that 
 
83 For more information about heuristics and their effect on retirement saving see chapter 2.1. 
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low educated are especially well informed about the company pension. It is like-
ly that these low educated individuals not only know that they have the right to 
deferred contributions but that they are also better informed about the company 
pension in general. Evidence presented from Bayer et al. (2009) has shown that 
a better knowledge of the company pension plan is likely to increase participa-
tion rates in the pension plan especially for non-highly compensated workers. 
The multivariate regression conducted in this chapter shows that education has 
a significant influence on the possession of company pension plans in the FNA-
Data. The reference group are individuals with low education. Compared to the 
reference group, the middle and higher educated are less likely to save for re-
tirement via a company pension plan. It could be that lower educated individu-
als are more open to pension plan information provided by trade unions or the 
staff association. For low educated individuals searching for information, pro-
cessing it and consulting different pension plan provider bears higher effort 
costs than for highly educated individuals, hence, they are pleased if some 
trustworthy organization brings the information to them. This reasoning also 
provides a theoretical explanation, as to why low educated individuals are more 
likely to be informed about the company pension and more likely to file a com-
pany pension than middle and high educated individuals. 
Besides education, income is also a significant predictor of the possession of a 
company pension plan. The higher an individual’s net income the greater the 
probability of owning a company pension plan. This finding is in line with 
Leinert (2003) who also found that individuals with high incomes are more like-
ly to have a company pension plan than individuals with low incomes. The 
“Riester-Pension” in contrast attracts individuals earning a low income. Coppola 
and Reil-Held (2009) calculated the “Riester-Subsidy” as a fraction of total con-
tributions to the “Riester-Pension” plan. They state that the “Riester-Subsidy” 
often constitutes 50% of total contributions for individuals with low income or 
families with children. Hence the incentive for individuals who have a low in-
come or many children to file a “Riester-Pension” is high. The results from the 
empirical estimations show that this monetary incentive indeed is effective. It 
can be observed that the likelihood of owning a “Riester-Pension” plan is signif-
icantly higher as the number of children increases. 
Compared to the company pension and the other retirement savings vehicles, 
the “Riester-Pension” has the advantage that it attracts savings from the group 
of people for which private savings are most important. These are women, fami-
lies with children and people with a low income. However, according to the data 
many “Riester-Savers” have not thought about an appropriate retirement in-
come before starting to save (Figure 29). This number is larger than for the oth-
er savings vehicles. It is likely that the heuristics provided by the government 
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with respect to the “Riester-Pension” are attractive such that many decide to 
start saving right away, without any retirement planning. Problems which could 
arise due to the choice of a specific savings rate have been discussed in chapter 
2.3.5. Saving 4% of gross income might not be an appropriate savings rate for 
everyone. Actually, a savings rate of 4% for someone who is expecting a high 
statutory pension, has housing equity and other savings contracts, might be too 
high. On the other hand for someone expecting a low statutory pension and hav-
ing no other sources of wealth, a savings rate of 4% is likely to be too low. 
Owning a “Riester-Pension”, a house or a capital life insurance is not dependent 
on income. A reason could be that home equity is for many people in Germany 
the first choice of providing for retirement (Versicherungskammer Bayern 
2009). Hence individuals start to save, for example in a building savings contract 
or a capital life-insurance, to build a house in the future regardless of their actu-
al income. In this case, the building contract is due and they start building their 
house. Income is also not a significant predictor for owning a capital life insur-
ance. In this case it could be that financial advisors from banks and insurance 
companies were able to convince consumer that a capital life insurance is either 
a good vehicle to finance home equity or a necessary insurance to protect the 
family from financial problems in the case of death. Furthermore, before the 
pension reforms in 2001 and 2004, capital life insurances were an attractive, tax 
exempt, savings vehicle to accumulate wealth for retirement which made it easi-
er for financial advisors to convince consumers that having a capital life insur-
ance would be beneficial, regardless of earnings.  
In order to be able to judge if the product presented by an advisor from a bank 
or insurance company is suitable for an individual it is necessary that individu-
als have a basic knowledge about differnet savings products. Furthermore, if 
individuals feel confident in dealing with financial products the barrier to talk to 
financial advisors and choose a product is much lower than for someone who 
does not feel confident. It has been found that being overconfident is generally 
associated with a higher probability of saving for retirement while being under 
confident decreases the probability of owning one of the retirement savings 
products analysed in Table 35. A problem which overconfidence might entail is 
that individuals choose a product which might not be optimal for their personal 
circumstances. It will, however, be assumed that the mistake has less negative 
effects on future utility than abstaining from retirement savings completely. 
Choosing the wrong savings product is less likely when individuals are actually 
well informed about the available savings products. The influence of actual pen-
sion knowledge has also been found to be positively related to two of the retire-
ment savings products when IV estimation had been conducted. It would there-
fore be likely that retirement seminars which increase actual pension knowledge 
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and the confidence in the participants own knowledge can foster actual retire-
ment savings. Furthermore, retirement seminars may help individuals to 
choose the product and amount of saving which accords best with his/her indi-
vidual needs. 
An interesting result in this respect is that individuals who like to deal with fi-
nancial matters are not significantly more likely to own one of the five retire-
ment savings products (Appendix 9.7, Table 76 and the following). It might be 
that individuals feel obliged to save for retirement because they understand that 
there is a necessity to insure for retirement privately even though they do not 
like to deal with financial matters. Each day individuals are confronted with re-
ports which argue that the statutory pension entitlements will not suffice to 
keep the standard of living high when old. These reports increase the psycholog-
ical costs connected with doing nothing in terms of private old-age provision. 
Another explanation for the insignificance of the preference to deal with finan-
cial matters could be that individuals who do not like to deal with financial mat-
ters skip the planning stages and start saving for retirement without having 
thought a great deal. This is in line with the finding in chapter 6.1 that individu-
als who do not like to deal with financial matters are less likely to think about an 
appropriate retirement income. 
In chapter 5.1 it has been found that older individuals seem to be more familiar 
with the capital life insurance than younger respondents. The capital life insur-
ance is a product which has been on the market for a long time and which has 
widely been used as an instrument to provide for retirement. Young individuals 
on the other hand are better informed about the “Riester-Pension” than old re-
spondents. In contrary to the older generations, the young have grown up with 
the “Riester-Pension”.  
Besides the reason that younger individuals have grown up with the “Riester-
Pension” and are therefore more familiar with this concept there could also be 
another reason of why the capital life insurance is less attractive for younger co-
horts. Figure 27 has shown that many individuals own a capital life insurance in 
order to provide for retirement. In 2001 the government introduced the “Riester-
Pension” and provides lump sum subsidy for each individual owning a “Riester-
Pension” and an additional subsidy for each child.84 Furthermore, the govern-
ment passed a law, the Alterseinkünftegesetz, which abolished the tax exemp-
tion for capital gains within capital life insurance for all new contracts filed after 
31.12.2005. For new contracts, 50% of the capital gains will be taxed if individu-
 
84 A detailed description of the “Riester-Pension” can be found in chapter 2.2. 
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als hold the contract at least 12 years and choose not to pay-out the capital before 
the age of 60. Otherwise 100% of the capital gains would be subject to taxation. 
Hence the government has directed demand toward the “Riester-Pension”.  
Figure 30: Capital Life Insurance and "Riester-Pension" According to Age 
 
Compared to capital life insurance the “Riester-Pension” has many features 
which should according to the findings from behavioral economics increase the 
participation rate.85 Firstly, fixing the amount to be eligible to receive the full 
“Riester-Subsidy” decreases effort costs. Individuals do not have to invest time 
and money to think about an appropriate savings rate. Secondly, the subsidy 
itself increases future utility of saving within a “Riester-Pension” plan. Thirdly, 
the certification of “Riester-Products” makes the impression that these kinds of 
products are trustworthy. The fourth and last point is that the “Riester-Pension” 
has been formulated by the government which could be interpreted as a signal 
of adequacy concerning the rate of savings and the product itself. As a result of 
the different incentive structure of the “Riester-Pension” and capital life insur-
ance it could be that young individuals prefer to save in a “Riester-Pension” 
which could lead to a substitution of savings away from capital life insurances 
towards “Riester-Pension plans” in the future. 
The FNA-Data provides evidence for this assumption. Figure 30 shows that for 
the cohort between 50 and 60 years, the capital life insurance is the savings ve-
hicle of choice. However, the healthy margin of capital life insurances is fading 
away as cohorts become younger. In the cohort of 20-29 years old, the “Riester-
Pension” even outperforms the capital life insurance. Age also remains a signif-
 
85 Theoretical discussion in chapter 2.1 and empirical evidence in chapter 2.3.4 and 2.3.5. 
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icant factor influencing the owning of a “Riester-Pension” if many other varia-
bles are taken into account. This is different to owning capital life insurance 
were age is not a significant predictor when other variables are added. 
6.5 Joining a Retirement Seminar 
Joining a retirement seminar like “Altersvorsorge macht Schule” could be bene-
ficial at each stage on the path towards retirement. Theoretically, retirement 
seminars promise to improve and increase savings behavior. The extent to 
which seminars are effective depends on the individuals taking part in the sem-
inar. If participants are generally interested in retirement issues and may al-
ready have a private pension plan than the effect of the course in terms of behav-
ior change will be smaller than if the participants were not previously engaged 
in any form of retirement provision (e.g. Bernheim and Garrett 2003).  
Table 37: Questions about Participation in a Retirement Seminar 
1 Would you participate in a 12-hour retirement seminar, which is extended 
over several weeks and provided at your place of work or adult education 
center that provides the information in cooperation with the German statu-
tory pension insurance? 
(Of course) (Probably) (Rather not) 
2 Would you participate in a 90-minute retirement seminar, provided at your 
place of work or adult education center that provides the information in co-
operation with the German statutory pension insurance? 
(Of course) (Probably) (Rather not) 
The literature reviewing their effectiveness has shown that they can lead to ad-
justments in retirement behavior, like the amount of savings or the retirement 
age, which would increase individual utility (Bayer et al. 2009, Honekamp et al. 
2012). Many individuals plan to change their aspired retirement age, retirement 
income or plan to save more or to start saving for retirement. The positive ef-
fects have often been mitigated by the low percentage of individuals who actual-
ly translate their plans into action (Clark et al. 2006, Duflo and Saez 2003). In 
the second telephone interview of the FNA-Data, respondents received the two 
questions depicted in Table 37. 
In the cases where individuals answered that they would “rather not” participate 
in the seminar, the question about why they would not participate followed. The 
answers to all three questions are depicted in Figure 32 and Figure 31. Figure 31 
shows that the willingness to participate in the seminar is greater for the 90-
minutes seminar than for the 12-hours seminar. This difference can possibly be 
explained by a lack of time which many people stated as a reason for not partici-
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pating in the seminar (Figure 32). Overall about 35% of respondents would “of 
course” or “probably” take part in the 12-hours course (intensive course). In the 
90-minute course (introductory course) more than half of the respondents, 53%, 
would be likely to participate in the course.  
Figure 31: Potential Participation in Retirement Seminars 
 
Source: Second telephone interview FNA-Data, N=560, weighted. 
The main reason why individuals would “rather not” participate in the intensive-
course was a lack of time. This reason for not participating was followed by the 
belief that such a course would not be of any assistance for the retirement plan-
ning of the individual, that the individual is already well informed or that they 
are already well prepared for retirement. Comparing the reasons for not partici-
pating between the intensive- and the introductory course it is evident that on 
the one hand the lack of time argument is a greater problem for the intensive 
than for the introductory course but on the other hand the introductory course 
is more often assessed as being of no assistance for the retirement planning of 
the individual. 
A similar argument is also reflected in the open answers (“other reasons” Figure 
32), in that some individuals rate the introductory course as too short. Further-
more, some individuals stated that they are already well informed about retire-
ment issues, that the partner is responsible for financial issues, that there are 
plenty of other sources of information, that the respondent will soon retire, that 
the respondent does not believe that these seminars provide objective infor-
mation, that they prefer an individual counselling and/or that they already re-
ceive individual counselling. Finding out more about why individuals are not 
willing to participate in retirement seminars is important for the design of those 
seminars. Knowing why individuals are reluctant to participate can help to in-
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crease the number of participants by reshaping existing seminars or introducing 
new seminars which meet the requirements of individuals. 
Figure 32: Reasons for Not Participating in a Retirement Seminar 
 
Source: Second telephone interview FNA-Data, N=560, weighted. 
Table 38 and Table 39 provide information about further factors influencing the 
decision to participate in either the intensive or the introductory course. Gener-
ally, the explanatory variables constitute the base variables which have already 
been discussed and which also have been used in all previous analysis in con-
nection with the path towards private retirement saving.  
Additional model-specific explanatory variables are age squared and a variable 
measuring if regular savings up to date already suffice to live an adequate re-
tirement live. It will be assumed that individuals’ interest in retirement issues 
generally increases with age. Nevertheless, individuals who have only a few 
years until they approach retirement, may think that a retirement seminar 
would not pay of anymore, since there is not much time to save for retirement 
left. As individuals reach a certain age, the probability of participating in a sem-
inar is going to decline again. To account for this age effect, the variable age 
squared has been implemented into the model. 
The other model specific variable is if individuals think that their savings al-
ready suffice. It is expected that individuals who are already saving sufficient are 
less likely to attend a retirement seminar. Optimizing the savings strategy or 
just receiving the confirmation that the chosen savings strategy is correct could, 
however, also be an incentive for some individuals to participate, even though 
actual savings would already suffice. Nevertheless, the expected relationship be-
tween “savings suffice” and “participation” is expected to be negative because it 
is assumed that most individuals would not invest the time and effort for the 
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seminar if they already save adequately. Table 38 presents the results from four 
different model specifications estimating the probability of joining a 12 hour 
intensive retirement course. The specifications vary by the method of estimation 
which are probit or instrument variable estimation. Furthermore, the explanato-
ry variables vary. Two of the models are estimated without the interaction terms 
and the other two models with interaction terms.86 Table 39 is similarly struc-
tured but here the probability to join a 90 minutes introductory course has been 
investigated. The potential endogenous variable is again pension literacy. How-
ever, intuitively it does not seem likely that someone would be willing to join a 
seminar is more financially literate because of his/her willingness to join.  
This assumption has also been supported by the Wald test for exogeneity, test-
ing 𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0 results in p-values of about 0.6 for the intensive course and about 
0.2 for the introductory course. Henceforth 𝐻0 has not been rejected at conven-
tional levels. As in the chapter before the variables objective knowledge, time 
preferences and procrastination are deemed theoretically relevant for the deci-
sion to join a retirement seminar. Therefore I will start by presenting the results 
concerning the three hypotheses. In a simplified way, hypothesis one states that 
individuals who have a sound pension knowledge are more likely to save for re-
tirement than individuals with a lack of pension knowledge. The reasoning of 
this hypothesis however, cannot be applied when analysing the probability of 
joining an introductory or an intensive retirement course because in this case it 
is to be expected that individuals who already have a sound knowledge of pen-
sion matters are less likely to join these courses. 
Indeed Table 38 and Table 39 indicate that individuals with a high degree of ac-
tual pension knowledge are significantly less likely to join an introductory re-
tirement seminar but there is no significant effect for joining the intensive 
course. Hypothesis two states that an additional amount of future orientated 
capital (actual pension knowledge) affects individuals with different rates of fu-
ture orientation differently. More specifically, if an individual with a high initial 
preference for the present acquires an additional amount of pension knowledge, 
than this additional pension knowledge increases his/her probability of owning 
a retirement product by a greater amount that it would increase the probability 
for someone who is already highly future orientated. Similarly to hypothesis 
one, this hypothesis cannot be applied to joining a retirement seminar. 
 
86 Further variations for the model can be found in the Appendix 9.8. On the one hand a factor 
variable approximating procrastination on financial and retirement issues has been imple-
mented and on the other hand the variables which were part of the factor variable have been 
implemented into the model. One of these variables is the variable procrastination which is 
also part of the analysis in this chapter. 
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Table 38: Determinants of Potential Retirement Seminar Participation, Intensive Course 
Would you join the Intensive  6.5(1) 6.5(2) 6.5(3) 6.5(4) 
Course (1:yes, 0:no) Probit IV-Probit Probit Interaction IV-Probit Interaction 
Male -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.07 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18) 
Age 0.11** 0.11* 0.11** 0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Age Squared -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.24* -0.25* -0.24* -0.25* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) 
High Educationa 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.16 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.17 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.10 -0.14 -0.09 -0.14 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.21) (0.26) 
Middle Wealthc -0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.27 
 (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23) 
High Wealthc -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.18 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.20 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
Self-employedd -0.55** -0.51* -0.55** -0.51* 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.22) (0.27) 
Civil Servantd 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.22 
 (0.27) (0.44) (0.27) (0.43) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.05 0.29 0.05 0.29 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.68) (0.07) (0.68) 
Future Orientation 0.14* 0.11 0.07 -0.01 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.08) (0.12) (0.25) (0.35) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.14** -0.15** -0.14** -0.15** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.05 -0.23 -0.04 -0.22 
 (0.16) (0.54) (0.16) (0.53) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.14 0.39 0.15 0.39 
 (0.16) (0.71) (0.16) (0.71) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.02 0.03 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.08) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   0.01 0.02 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.08) 
Constant -2.29** -2.49** -2.27** -2.46** 
 (1.10) (1.19) (1.10) (1.18) 
Wald testf  -0.22  -0.22 
  (0.67)  (0.66) 
N 542.00 542.00 542.00 542.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, testing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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Table 39: Determinants of Potential Retirement Seminar Participation, Introductory Course 
Would you join the Introductory  6.5(5) 6.5(6) 6.5(7) 6.5(8) 
Course (1:yes, 0:no) Probit IV-Probit Probit Interaction IV-Probit Interaction 
     
Male -0.22 -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.18) 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.13 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Children 0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Middle Educationa -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.09 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
High Educationa 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.31* 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.13 -0.02 -0.13 -0.02 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.30 -0.04 -0.30 -0.04 
 (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.28) 
Middle Wealthc -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.10 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) 
High Wealthc 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.22 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.30* 0.28* 0.31* 0.28* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Self-employedd -0.13 -0.18 -0.12 -0.18 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd -0.04 -0.43 -0.03 -0.43 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.32) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.15** -0.88*** -0.15** -0.90*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.34) (0.07) (0.31) 
Future Orientation 0.06 0.12* -0.09 0.20 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.07) (0.25) (0.26) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.23*** -0.11 -0.23*** -0.11 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.06 0.63** 0.07 0.64** 
 (0.16) (0.31) (0.16) (0.29) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.13 -0.89** -0.12 -0.92** 
 (0.16) (0.38) (0.16) (0.36) 
Actual Savings Suffice 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.05 -0.01 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.07) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   0.01 -0.03 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant 1.40 1.90* 1.45 1.89* 
 (1.07) (0.98) (1.07) (0.97) 
Wald testf  0.86  0.90 
  (0.67)  (0.66) 
N 542.00 542.00 542.00 542.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, testing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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Table 38 and Table 39 also reveal that the interaction effect does not significant-
ly influence the probability to join a retirement seminar. In contrast to the first 
two hypothesis, the third hypothesis is applicable in this setting. The hypothesis 
is split into a strict and a relaxed version. The strict version implies that present 
biased preferences do not necessarily result in procrastination. If individuals are 
aware about their tendency to procrastinate, they can take measures to overcome 
procrastination. As a result these individuals may not be less likely to join a re-
tirement seminar than individuals who are future orientated. Empirically this 
would mean that the coefficients of future orientation, procrastination and the 
interaction of those variables should be significant and the predicted probabili-
ties should look like the ones in Figure 16 from chapter 4.3. The relaxed version 
of the hypothesis would only require the variable approximating if someone is 
aware of his/her potential procrastination behavior is negative and significant. 
Having a look at Table 38 and Table 39 it can be observed that the interaction 
terms are not significant. Hence there is no evidence for the strict version of 
hypothesis three to be true. The variable procrastination on its own is, however, 
significant and negative in all model specifications estimating the probability of 
joining the intensive course. This is evidence in favor of the light version of hy-
pothesis three. 
The interaction terms are neither on their own nor jointly significant. They nev-
ertheless often change the size and significance of the coefficients from which 
they are constructed considerably. In order to avoid this distortion, the following 
results are taken from the estimations which do not consider the interaction 
terms. For the intensive course the predicted age effect is supported by the data. 
Furthermore married or cohabiting individuals are less likely to be willing to 
join an intensive course than not married or cohabiting individuals. A signifi-
cant and negative coefficient can also be observed for self-employed, who are, 
compared to the control group of individuals who are not employed, less willing 
to join an intensive course. Individuals who stated that they sometimes procras-
tinate on financial matters are more likely to participate in the seminar than in-
dividuals who state that they are rather less likely to procrastinate.  
Table 39 shows that for the introductory course blue- and white-collar workers 
are significantly more likely to join such a course than unemployed individuals. 
The variable approximating actual pension knowledge has a significant and 
negative sign, which implies that individuals who have a good understanding of 
pension matters are less likely to be willing to join the seminar than individuals 
who were not able to answer many of the pension related questions correctly. As 
in the previously discussed model concerning the intensive course, people who 
state that they sometimes procrastinate on financial matters are more willing to 
attend the introductory seminar than individuals who state that they do not pro-
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crastinate on financial matters. This finding is, however, less robust than the 
previous results, while the sign is the same over all models, the coefficients are 
only significant in the probit models but not in the instrument variable estima-
tions. There are also two variables which are significant in the instrument varia-
ble estimation but not in the probit specification. These are the variables meas-
uring the tendency to under- or overestimate ones pension level. Individuals 
who underestimate their pension as compared to individuals, who estimate 
their knowledge correctly, are more likely to join the introductory course and 
individuals who overestimate their pension level are less likely to join the 
course. 
The results of Table 94 and Table 95 of the appendix which add several variables 
to the model which are connected with procrastination, point to a weak negative 
relationship between having time to deal with financial matters and the willing-
ness to join one of the seminars.87 This would mean that individuals who state 
that they have sufficient time to deal with financial matters are less likely to join 
the seminar than individuals who state that they do not that much time to deal 
with financial matters. This finding somehow contradicts the previous descrip-
tive finding that many individuals stated they would not participate because they 
do not have time. It could be that the time to deal with financial matters is in-
terpreted differently for some this might imply checking the account balance 
regularly and for others this might imply finding the investment product with 
the highest return on investment. This finding can therefore not neglect the 
importance of having sufficient time when deciding to join a seminar. Another 
weak finding from the results of Table 94 and Table 95 is that individuals who 
like to deal with financial matters are more likely to join a retirement seminar.  
6.5.1 Discussion 
Knowing the reasons why individuals refrain from joining a retirement seminar 
can help to increase participation rates in the future. Existing seminars could be 
reshaped and new seminars could be introduced such that they meet the re-
quirements of individuals who would otherwise rather not participate. Retire-
ment seminars are often targeted at specific groups of people. If it is not possi-
ble to get these individuals to participate in the seminar, the seminar could be 
rated as not effective. Target groups of retirement seminars are generally indi-
viduals who are expected to acquire only low statutory pension claims. These are 
 
87 A weak relationship or weak finding in this paragraph means that the variable is only signif-
icant in either the probit or the instrument variable estimation and not in both. 
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people with low income, low education and women (Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales 2008b).  
The analysis of the FNA-Data has shown that there is no evidence that the 
courses are more likely to attract individuals with low income or education. Nei-
ther is there strong evidence that women are more willing to participate than 
men. Indeed the coefficient “male” is always negative, suggesting that women 
are more likely to participate. This finding, however, is not robust, since the 
negative coefficient is only significant in one of the model specifications esti-
mating the probability to join an introductory course in the appendix (Table 95). 
It might be possible to increases the number of women participating in semi-
nars, if introductory seminars were especially targeted at women. Within this 
seminar women have to be motivated to deal with their private retirement provi-
sion in order to increase the number of women who decide to join an intensive 
course afterwards. Increasing the financial education of women is necessary 
because women have generally been found to be less well informed about finan-
cial matters than men (e.g. Honekamp and Schwarze 2010, Lusardi and Mitch-
ell 2008, Rooij van et al. 2011a). Moreover, women are more likely to face a pen-
sion gap than men because they often work part-time after the birth of their first 
child, which reduces their pension entitlement from the statutory pension sys-
tem. 
An important result is, that individuals with a low degree of pension knowledge 
are significantly more likely to join an introductory seminar that individuals 
with a high degree of financial knowledge. The reason might be that individuals 
who already know a lot about retirement provision think that a 90 minutes sem-
inar would not provide any new information. A similar reasoning can be put 
forward when explaining why individuals who overestimate their pension 
knowledge would rather not participate in the introductory course while indi-
viduals who underestimate their knowledge are more likely to participate in the 
introductory course.  
When comparing this result from the introductory course with the results from 
the intensive course, a different picture appears. Indeed the following results are 
not significant but a tendency can be observed. The coefficients of actual pen-
sion knowledge as well as the coefficient of overestimating ones pension level 
are positive and the coefficients of underestimation are negative, indicating that 
the more confident and knowledgeable individuals are, more likely to join the 
intensive course. For the design of an introductory course it should therefore be 
taken into account that the participants are likely to know less about pensions 
and also have low confidence in their knowledge. The introductory course can 
work on both and increase knowledge and confidence to the extent that they also 
follow the intensive course afterwards.    
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The variable measuring whether someone admits that he or she tends to pro-
crastinate on financial matters, significantly influences the decision to partici-
pate in both of the seminars. Individuals who know that they are prone to pro-
crastination can invest in resources to overcome their self-control problem 
(Becker and Mulligan 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1998). In this case the in-
vestment would be participating in the seminar. People who are prone to pro-
crastination may evaluate the seminar as an opportunity to stop procrastination. 
The seminar could then also serve as a commitment device, committing the in-
dividual to start saving for retirement after the course because otherwise the 
course would have been a waste of time and effort.  
Individuals who are naïve, which means that they have not realized that they 
procrastinate on financial matters in contrast, will be less likely to participate in 
the seminar. In this thesis it is not possible to investigate if these individuals 
will be successful in translating their plans into action after the seminar.88 It 
could well be that they start to procrastinate again and never start to save for re-
tirement. This reasoning would be supported by the empirical evidence which 
found that many individuals do not translate their intentions into action after 
the seminar (e.g. Choi et al. 2006, Duflo and Saez 2003, Frommert 2008, Hon-
ekamp et al. 2012). 
Besides the problem of naïveté which prevents individuals from joining a re-
tirement seminar a problem which must not be neglected is time. Having not 
sufficient time was the main reason why individuals would rather not partici-
pate in any of the seminars. This problem was more prevalent in the case of the 
intensive course than in the introductory course. It would therefore be necessary 
to think about a structure of seminars which fits into the life of individuals 
without taking too much time. Suggestions about how existing seminars could 
be adjusted in order to meet the requirements of the participants in the light of 
the empirical findings will be provided in the conclusion. Besides attracting 
women, individuals with low income and education, a further goal for a retire-
ment seminar would be to target individuals who procrastinate, who do not like 
to deal with financial matters and who are not well informed about pension is-
sues.   
 
88 Nor is it possible to investigate if individuals who state that they rather not procrastinate 
truly do not procrastinate on financial matters or if they are not aware about their procrastina-
tion. If individuals do not procrastinate they may already have obtained all relevant infor-
mation such that a seminar is not necessary. 
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6.6 The Effectiveness of Retirement Seminars and Other Infor-
mation 
The evidence on the effectiveness of retirement seminars so far has been mixed 
(Hathaway and Khatiwada 2008). Participation is selective so that outcomes are 
likely to vary depending on the characteristics of the participants. Conclusions 
can therefore only be drawn for the specific group of people which has been in-
vestigated. Generalizations about how a seminar would affect individuals who 
do not have these characteristics are not possible. Another problem with study-
ing the effect of seminars is that right after the seminar many individuals plan 
to change their retirement behavior but when asked several months later the 
number of individuals who have followed through their plans is very low. Con-
ducting an interview right after the seminar is therefore not sufficient to rate the 
effectiveness of the seminar. The FNA-Data provides the opportunity to assess 
the effect of retirement seminars and other sources of information while con-
trolling for the characteristic that some individuals like to deal with financial 
matters and others do not. The two underlying questions are as follows: 
Table 40: Questions About the Use of Different Kinds of Information 
1 Which sources have you used to receive information about financial mat-
ters and retirement provision? 
No information 
Colleagues 
Friends, relatives, neighbours 
Stiftung Warentest89 
Internet 
Retirement seminar at the company 
Other retirement seminar 
German Pension Insurance 
Consumer Advice Centre 
Advisor, bank or insurance company 
Independent financial advisor 
2 How willingly do you deal with financial matters? 
(1 do not like it – 4 like it very much) 
 
89 Stiftung Warentest is a journal which tests and compares products. A special issue, the “Fi-
nanztest” focuses on financial products and regularly also on private retirement provision. 
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Figure 33: Sources of Information 
 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone interview=896 
Note: Stiftung Warentest regularly evaluates products concerning certain characteristics. 
Among others they regularly test financial products.  
Figure 33 shows that financial advisors working for banks or insurance compa-
nies are the source of information which is most popular. About 62% of the re-
spondents have consulted these advisors to receive information about financial 
matters and retirement provision. Friends, relatives and neighbours (43%) and 
the internet (37%) are also frequently consulted for information. For the empiri-
cal analysis the sources of advice have been assigned to one of the following four 
categories:  
Figure 34: Sources of Information Categorized 
  % 
Seminars 15 
Advisor from Bank or Insurance 
Company 62 
Independent Financial Advisor 33 
Neutral Advice 26 
Informal Information 51 
Information Media 42 
Note: Seminars:  Retirement seminar and other seminars; Neutral Advice : German Pen-
sion Insurance or Consumer Advice Centre; Informal Information :  Friends, relatives, 
neighbours, colleagues; Information Media:  Internet and Stiftung Warentest.  
These sources of information will now be implemented into the models estimat-
ing the probability of owning one of the five measures to provide for retirement.  
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Table 41: The Effect of Different Sources of Information on Saving for Retirement 
Owning one of the following 6.6(1) 6.6(2) 6.6(3) 6.6(4) 6.6(5) 
retirement savings vehicles Riester-
Pension 
Company 
Pension 
Other Pen-
sion 
Capital Life 
Insurance 
Home Equi-
ty 
Male -0.15 0.05 -0.16 -0.05 0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) 
Age 0.09** -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age Squared -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.18* 0.66*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Children 0.22*** -0.03 -0.12** -0.05 0.18*** 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa 0.11 -0.43*** 0.21 -0.08 0.35* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.18) 
High Educationa 0.10 -0.30** 0.09 0.05 0.31 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.09 0.56*** 0.13 0.04 0.12 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.08 0.68*** 0.49*** 0.20 0.03 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.19) 
Middle Wealthc 0.13 0.58*** 0.10 0.18 0.72*** 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) 
High Wealthc -0.01 0.17 0.06 0.25 1.76*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) 
Home Equity 0.03 0.23* 0.07 0.33***  
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)  
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.07 0.66*** 0.13 0.29** 0.05 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.16) 
Self-employedd -0.24 -0.40** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.48** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd 0.01 -0.91*** -0.14 0.15 0.82*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.31) 
Future Orientation 0.21*** 0.06 0.09 0.19*** 0.08 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Like Dealing with Fin. Matters 0.07 -0.00 0.10* 0.03 0.05 
(1: do not like it – 4 like it very 
much) 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Information through Media 0.11 0.08 0.11 -0.19* 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
Independent Finan. Advisor 0.16* -0.10 0.43*** 0.28*** 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) 
Advis. Bank or Ins. Company 0.31*** -0.01 0.10 0.23** 0.32** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
Neutral Advice -0.16 0.01 0.11 0.07 -0.27* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) 
Informal Advice 0.00 0.04 0.25** 0.10 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
Finan.- / Retirememtseminar 0.07 0.46*** 0.02 -0.17 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) 
Constant -2.29*** -1.12 -1.65** -2.16*** -3.51*** 
 (0.78) (0.79) (0.79) (0.75) (0.93) 
N 959.00 959.00 959.00 959.00 959.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Because the acquisition of knowledge by consulting one of these sources of ad-
vice influences financial literacy and knowledge, the variables measuring finan-
cial literacy as well as the variables mapping the over and under confidence con-
cerning financial knowledge have been omitted from the model. Otherwise the 
model specification is the same as the one used in chapter 6.4. 
Since most of the results of the model have already been presented before, I will 
concentrate only on the variables of interest in this chapter. These are the varia-
bles mapping the sources of advice an individual has used. The reference group 
is individuals who have not used any source of advice yet. Table 41 reveals that 
individuals who have joined a retirement seminar are more likely to have a 
company pension plan. In contrast individuals who have consulted an advisor at 
their insurance company or bank are more likely to own a “Riester-Pension”, a 
capital live insurance or to have housing equity. Individuals who instead asked 
an independent advisor for advice are more likely to own other private pension 
products, the “Riester-Pension” and capital life insurance. Participants who have 
searched for information in the internet or read the journal provided by Stiftung 
Warentest are significantly less likely to own a capital life insurance. Further-
more, individuals who turned to the German Pension Insurance or a consumer 
advice centre are less likely to have housing equity. The last source of advice 
which has been investigated is informal advice from friends, relatives or col-
leagues. If someone received informal advice he/she is more likely to own a re-
tirement savings vehicle other than the ones explicitly examined (see model 
6.6(3)). 
Table 42: Interest in Financial Matters and Participation Decision 
How much do you like dealing  Individuals who 
with financial matters? participated in seminar 
  N % 
Don't like it at all (N=109) 12 12 
Don't like it (N=336)  38 13 
Like it (N=374) 66 19 
Like it very much (N=180) 74 27 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone interview.  
One problem of measuring the effectiveness of financial information and educa-
tion is the selectivity of the participants. The variable which measures if some-
one likes to deal with financial matters has been used to mitigate this problem.  
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Table 43: The Effect of Different Sources of Information on Saving for Retirement (interaction) 
Having a 6.6(6) 
 Company Pension 
  
Male 0.06 
 (0.11) 
Age -0.00 
 (0.04) 
Age Squared 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.14 
 (0.12) 
Children -0.03 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) 
Middle Educationa -0.43*** 
 (0.15) 
High Educationa -0.30** 
 (0.15) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.56*** 
 (0.13) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.68*** 
 (0.15) 
Middle Wealthc 0.58*** 
 (0.15) 
High Wealthc 0.17 
 (0.15) 
Home Equity 0.23* 
 (0.13) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.66*** 
 (0.14) 
Self-employedd -0.39** 
 (0.17) 
Civil Servantd -0.89*** 
 (0.24) 
Future Orientation 0.05 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.01 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) 
Like Dealing with Fin. Matters 0.02 
(1: do not like it – 4 like it very much) (0.06) 
Information through Media 0.08 
 (0.11) 
Independent Finan. Advisor -0.10 
 (0.10) 
Advis. Bank or Ins. Company -0.01 
 (0.11) 
Neutral Advice 0.01 
 (0.11) 
Informal Advice 0.03 
 (0.11) 
Finan.- / Retirememtseminar 0.88** 
 (0.40) 
Like Deal. Fin.Mat.*Seminar -0.15 
(interaction term) (0.13) 
_cons -1.20 
 (0.80) 
N 959.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Furthermore, research has found that the effect of a retirement seminar differs 
depending on the general interest in retirement issues (Bernheim, Garrett 
2003). Looking at individuals who participated in a retirement seminar, Table 42 
reveals that a higher percentage of individuals who like dealing with financial 
matters participated in the seminars than individuals who do not like dealing 
with financial matters.  
In order to prove the findings from Bernheim and Garrett (2003) that the semi-
nar is more effective for individuals who are not interested in retirement issues, 
an interaction variable has been integrated into the model estimating the proba-
bility of owning a company pension. Owning a company pension has been cho-
sen as the dependent variable, on the one hand because the seminars seem to be 
significant only for company pensions and on the other hand because most of 
the seminars considered have been conducted within the company, and hence 
concentrate on the specific features of the company’s pension plan. The interac-
tion variables will be “seminar” and “like dealing with financial matters”. 
Table 43 provides the results of the model with interaction term. The interaction 
term, however, is not significant at conventional levels. The F-test of joint signif-
icance concerning the two interacted variables and the interaction term con-
firms the significance of all three variables on the 1% level. For an easier inter-
pretation of the results, the predicted probabilities of owning a company pen-
sion have been estimated and depicted in Table 44 and Figure 35 respectively.  
Table 44: Delta Method 
1._at  like financial matters = 1 
       seminar participation = 0 
2._at  like financial matters = 1 
       seminar participation = 1 
3._at  like financial matters = 2 
       seminar participation = 0 
4._at  like financial matters = 2 
       seminar participation = 1 
5._at  like financial matters = 3 
       seminar participation = 0 
6._at  like financial matters = 3 
       seminar participation = 1 
7._at  like financial matters = 4 
       seminar participation = 0 
8._at  like financial matters = 4 
       seminar participation = 1 
 
_at   Margin 
  
 Std. Err P>|z| 
 
 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
1 0.31 0.08 0.00 0.15 0.47 
2 0.31 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.61 
3 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.33 
4 0.59 0.13 0.00 0.35 0.84 
5 0.24 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.36 
6 0.41 0.10 0.00 0.21 0.60 
7 0.30 0.08 0.00 0.15 0.45 
8 0.33 0.10 0.00 0.13 0.52 
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The only significant difference can be observed between seminar participation 
and no seminar participation for individuals who do not like to deal with finan-
cial matters rated with value 2. Concerning these individuals who do not like to 
deal with financial matters very much, seminar participation raises the probabil-
ity of owning a company pension plan from about 0.22 to 0.59. For individuals 
who dislike dealing with financial matters even more (value 1) no significant 
difference between seminar participation and no participation can be observed. 
For individuals who like dealing with financial matters, the effect of seminar 
participation decreases as compared to the individuals who dislike dealing with 
financial matters rated by a value of 2.  The most likely reason for this observa-
tion is that individuals who are interested in financial matters have already been 
engaged in private retirement provision before the seminar. Hence individuals 
who like to deal with financial matters are less likely to choose the company 
pension to provide for retirement due to the seminar. 
Figure 35: Adjusted Predictions of Interaction Term between Seminar Particiaption and Like 
Dealing with Financial Matters 
 
6.6.1 Discussion 
An interesting finding is that the source of advice seems to have an important 
influence on the outcome. Individuals who participated in a seminar, which are 
mainly company based seminars are more likely to own a company pension. 
The information in these seminars is centered around the different retirement 
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1=Does not like dealing with financial matters - 4=Does like it
Did not participate Participated
Predicted Probability
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savings opportunities offered within the company. Information about other sav-
ings vehicles like the “Riester-Pension”, housing equity or capital life insurance 
will not be discussed in a company based information seminar. Employers gen-
erally offer these retirement seminars during working hours and they have a 
vested interest that many employees file for a company pension plan. Contribu-
tions to a company pension plan are deducted from gross income, such that on-
ly the remaining salary (after deducting the contribution) is subject to social in-
surance contributions and taxation. Since the employer also pays a part of the 
social insurance contributions for the employee, the employer can decrease 
these costs if employees file company pension contracts. Company based semi-
nars are therefore not always independent sources of advice. They instead tend 
to steer the employees towards a company pension plan. 
Banks and Insurance companies always have an interest to sell their own prod-
ucts and even independent advisors (depending on the composition of their 
sources of income) are unlikely to provide neutral information on all available 
retirement savings vehicles. For that reason products like the “Riester-Pension” 
plan and capital life insurances will be chosen if the consumer decides to con-
sult these kinds of individual advisors. The German Pension Insurance or Con-
sumer Advice Centres are more likely to provide independent information. 
However, only a small fraction of individuals consulted a Consumer Advice 
Centre or the German Pension Insurance compared to the number of individu-
als who received advice from their bank or insurance company. Receiving advice 
neither positively nor negatively influenced the probability of owning one or the 
other savings vehicle, with one exception. Individuals who consulted the Ger-
man Pension Insurance or a consumer advice centre are less likely to have 
home equity.  
The explanation for this significant negative effect could simply be that on the 
one hand individuals who do consult these sources of advice are not interested 
in building or buying a house. Instead they would like to have a general advice 
about appropriate ways to provide for retirement. On the other hand, individu-
als, who would like to purchase a house, are interested in getting a cheap loan. 
The first source they would turn to for advice is a bank. The analysis above also 
confirmed that receiving advice from a bank or insurance company increases 
the likelihood of having home equity. 
Individuals who search for advice in the internet or journals are significantly 
less likely to own a capital life insurance. Searching for advice themselves with-
out consulting a financial expert is a demanding task. In the case that individu-
als are able to find independent information and to process this information, 
their action will be less biased by third parties than the actions taken by individ-
uals relying on other sources of information. Using this kind of information 
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does not lead these individuals to choose a specific retirement savings product. 
It could however be shown that they are less likely to choose the capital life in-
surance. People relying only on their own ability when making financial deci-
sions are likely to be experts themselves so that they may choose other retire-
ment savings vehicles from the ones presented in this analysis. 
In Table 43 an interaction term has been added to the model estimating the like-
lihood of owning a company pension plan. This term makes it possible to test if 
seminar participation differently affects individuals who like to deal with finan-
cial matters compared to individuals who do not like to deal with financial mat-
ters. Indeed it was found that the seminar participation had a much greater ef-
fect on individuals who do not like to deal with financial matters. Individuals 
who do not like to deal with financial matters are unlikely to search for infor-
mation about retirement issues themselves because their perceived costs of in-
formation seeking and processing them is very high compared to individuals 
who like to deal with financial matters. It is therefore important to decrease the 
costs of information gathering for individuals who do not like to deal with fi-
nancial matters. 
 217 
7 Discussion and Conclusion 
Several pension reforms have led to a decreasing replacement rate of the statu-
tory pension. The decreasing replacement rate and work histories with times of 
unemployment or part time work make it difficult to accumulate sufficient pen-
sion claims to live adequately after leaving the labour force. This responsibility 
is new and many individuals may not have sufficient knowledge or do not have 
the intellectual capability to make optimal savings decisions. 
The aim of this thesis was to find out more about individual retirement savings 
behavior. An empirical analysis has been conducted in order to examine why 
many individuals know that they should save more but still fail to start saving. 
Different steps on the way towards private retirement provision, like thinking 
about future retirement income, planning for retirement and actual saving for 
retirement, have been investigated. The underlying data had especially been de-
signed to investigate retirement savings behavior and the effect of pension liter-
acy on the savings decision. The problem in this research is that pension 
knowledge might not be endogenous to the chosen variables to be investigated. 
If the aim is to analyse the effect of pension literacy on owning a company pen-
sion for example it could be that someone decided to file a company pension 
contract because of his/her knowledge about retirement issues. It could, howev-
er, also be that the individual is interested in a retirement plan and because of 
this interest he/she gathers information and then decides to participate in the 
plan. Hence the direction of causality is not clear. In order to deal with this 
problem, an instrumental variable estimation had been conducted.  
The first question which is of particular interest is the question whether finan-
cial literate people are better able to provide for retirement than individuals who 
lack financial literacy.90 Not only in Germany is this question relevant but also 
in many other countries in which the importance of private retirement provi-
sion, combined with greater individual responsibility, is increasing. The review 
of the theoretical literature on savings behavior ranged from the psychological 
motives of saving over the classical life cycle model of saving to behavioral and 
institutional economics. Theoretically there seems to be a consensus that finan-
cial literacy should at least have some effect on retirement savings. Individuals 
with conflicting selves, namely the planner who would like to save for retire-
ment and the doer who would like to spend his/her money immediately, will 
find it less costly to discipline the doer to save for retirement if he/she is finan-
cial literate as compared to someone who is not financially literate (Shefrin and 
 
90 This reasoning has been accommodated into hypothesis 1, chapter 4.3. 
218 
Thaler 1981). Generally it has been argued that financial knowledge reduces the 
costs of retirement planning and makes it easier for the individual to imagine 
the future (Becker and Mulligan 1993, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999).     
Based on the FNA Data employed in this work the effect of pension literacy on 
owning a specific retirement savings product has been analysed. When endoge-
neity is controlled for via IV estimation it has been found that the degree of pen-
sion knowledge positively influences the likelihood of owning a company pen-
sion and having housing equity. In none of the other models investigating for 
example planning behavior, could a positive effect of pension knowledge be ob-
served when accounting for endogeneity.  
The success of retirement seminars which increase pension knowledge would 
according to these findings be effective in fostering company pension plans or 
housing equity but increasing pension knowledge would not be sufficient to 
make people think about an appropriate retirement income, to induce people to 
make concrete savings plans and to increase the number of individuals who 
translate these plans into action. 
Behavioral and new institutional economic researches suggest that financial ed-
ucation might not be the best solution to combat a lack of financial capability 
(e.g. Chater and Huck 2010, de Meza and Irlenbusch 2008). Instead they point 
to cognitive biases which limit financial capability. Biases or anomalies just 
mean that behavior is not in line with the assumptions and predictions of the 
traditional life-cycle model of saving. It has been observed that individuals gen-
erally prefer to stick with their current position even though a better alternative 
may exist. Choosing another alternative, however, does entail effort costs which 
the individual wants to avoid (status quo bias chapter 2.1.3). Another very im-
portant bias for retirement savings decisions is choice overload (chapter 2.1.3). 
Individuals who face too much choice or information about pension products 
may, in the worst case, not make a decision at all, procrastinate, or fall back on 
heuristics to simplify decisions. Lyengar and Kamenica (2006) argue that the 
benefit of information would decrease as the information load and complexity 
increases. 
Chater et al. (2010) state that individuals are more likely to reveal biased behav-
ior if they do not possess the necessary knowledge and skills. They even argue 
that it could be that there are no deviations from rational behavior if individuals 
possess the necessary knowledge and skills. In this thesis it has been assumed 
that present orientated preferences are a deviation from rational behavior which 
can be mitigated through pension knowledge. Theoretically, this reasoning has 
been supported by Becker and Mulligan (1997) who argue that individuals who 
know that they excessively discount future utilities can invest in future orientat-
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ed capital in order to reduce their discount rate. Furthermore, their model im-
plies that additional pension information is more effective in decreasing the dis-
count rate for individuals who have an initially high discount rate than for indi-
viduals who are already future orientated. 
The empirical analysis of the FNA data did generally neither confirm nor reject 
this effect of pension knowledge coupled with future orientation which also has 
been formulated in the second hypothesis. A different picture than the one pre-
dicted could be observed for housing equity. In fact pension literacy was more 
effective to increase housing equity for the individuals who were medium or 
highly future orientated as opposed to individuals with a very low degree of fu-
ture orientation. I am curious, however, about these results. It could be that the 
variables chosen to approximate initial future orientation were not appropriate. 
Time preferences have been measured by a variable generated out of two ques-
tions which measure how important it is for an individual to save for retirement 
and how important it is to save for care dependency. It is likely that information 
received before the interview had been conducted already changed the mind of 
the individual to the extent that the measured time preference is not truly initial 
but instead influenced by information received before the interview. Further-
more, respondents might have been affected by the interviewer bias, answering 
in a socially desirable way. In this case the effect of the interaction effect would 
be underestimated which would then explain why it is not significant in most 
regressions.  
Even though there is no clear evidence which supports the hypothesis that pen-
sion knowledge influences time preferences it can also not be rejected. It was 
not possible to proof that financial literacy does decrease other behavioral biases 
in any way based on the data at hand. Nevertheless I assume that basic pension 
knowledge does not lead to an information overload but instead increases the 
likelihood that the individual chooses the correct heuristic and that he/she does 
not rely on default settings if these settings are not an optimal choice for 
him/her (see also Chater et al. 2010). Based on the FNA-Data, evidence has been 
found that individuals own retirement products but at the same time state that 
they have never thought about how much money they would need to live ade-
quately during retirement. This suggests that individuals started to save without 
any a priori planning concerning the amount of money necessary to achieve a 
certain retirement income. In this respect it could be assumed that several sav-
ers relied on heuristics when deciding to join a retirement plan.  
Indeed the theory of savings and its psychological refinements suggest that in-
dividuals will engage in retirement planning when expected utility gained from 
planning outweighs the psychological and monetary costs of planning. Leinert 
(2005) argues that individuals for whom the costs of planning are higher than 
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the potential utility gain from planning may skip the whole planning process 
and start saving for retirement right away. The prerequisite for skipping the 
whole planning process is the availability of heuristics.91 Heuristics simplify de-
cisions such that the costs of applying them are very low. Heuristics are an op-
portunity to get people to start saving, who, in the absence of heuristics, would 
otherwise never have started to save for retirement. 
In Germany several heuristics have been supplied by the government and other 
heuristics just derive without any intervention from the government. A legiti-
mate question would be if we have to be concerned about the widespread use of 
heuristics. The use of heuristics is indisputably only a second best solution and 
it is likely that utility could be increased if individuals would engage in retire-
ment planning. This utility gain, however, would not outweigh the costs indi-
viduals would face if planning for retirement. Hence using heuristics is a ra-
tional choice. But problems of heuristics could be that the savings rate is too 
high or too low or that it directs individuals towards savings devices which are 
not optimal for the individual. Individuals might not be capable of foreseeing 
the future consequences of applying the heuristic.92 The utility loss incurred by 
using the heuristic might be much greater than estimated by the individual at 
the time the individual retires. To avoid savings decisions based on heuristics 
which may entail a great utility loss, it is important that individuals at least are 
cursorily involved in retirement planning. In order to get more people to think 
about retirement and to plan it is necessary to decrease the costs of planning 
and/or to increase future utility of income (e.g. Becker and Mulligan 1997, Tha-
ler and Shefrin 1981). Planning costs could for example be reduced if savings 
products would be less complex and easier to compare. Oehler (2009) suggests 
increasing comparability and decreasing complexity of financial products (see 
also Leinert 2005, Oehler 2012c, 2013).  
Not only do the financial products themselves lack transparency but also the 
statutory regulations concerning subsidies and the tax benefit for retirement 
plans are unclear. Coppola and Gasche (2011) conclude for example that the cir-
culation and the acceptance of the “Riester-Pension” could be increased by 
providing more information and by simplifying the rules of eligibility, the sub-
 
91 Information about which kinds of heuristics are available in the course of retirement savings 
see chapter 2.3.5. 
92 The same argument which has been put forward would also hold for the introduction of 
opting out company pension plans. Opting out reduces the costs of the decision to join a re-
tirement plan even more than heuristics. The problems which could arise if individuals’ are 
not well informed about the company pension plans regulation are similar to the ones which 
could arise after the use of heuristics. 
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sidy and the tax treatment. At present there are several “Riester-Pension” con-
tracts possible. One is the classical “Riester-Pension” as introduced in 2004, the 
second would be the so-called “Housing-Pension,” and a third variant would be 
the “Company-Riester”.93 Each of these “Riester-Plans” has its own rules about 
the tax treatment or the rules to be applied differ when drawing on the accumu-
lated capital. In addition to these savings opportunities there is also the compa-
ny pension. Within the company pension employees have the right for deferred 
contributions. Hence there is scope for the government to simplify and to har-
monize rules. 
Chapter 6.4 deals with different retirement savings vehicles and the determi-
nants influencing the decision to save in one of these products. It has been 
found that women and individuals with children are more likely to have a 
“Riester-Pension” plan than men and individuals without children. Hence the 
monetary incentives set with the “Riester-Pension” are effective in in this re-
spect.94 Individual income has not been found to influence the likelihood of 
owning a “Riester-Pension. The company pension in contrast is more likely to 
be chosen from individuals with a medium or high income. This supports the 
finding from Leinert (2003) who also detected that the opting in company pen-
sion plans in Germany are less likely to be chosen from individuals with low 
income and women.  
Interestingly, the empirical results have shown that lower educated individuals 
were better informed about the right for deferred contributions and they were 
also more likely to own a company pension plan than middle and higher edu-
cated individuals. Employees who joined a retirement seminar were also more 
likely to join the company pension plan than individuals who did not participate 
in a seminar.95 Low educated employees have to exert more effort in gathering 
and processing information concerning retirement savings than high educated 
employees. For that reason low educated employees may welcome retirement 
seminars as they would not have to search for information themselves because 
the seminar offers all the relevant information. Higher educated individuals 
may already have searched for information themselves and are therefore less 
open for new information about for example a pension plan. Furthermore, these 
individuals may already save for retirement within an alternative retirement sav-
ings vehicle. 
 
93 A detailed description of the “Riester-Pension” can be found in chapter 2.2. 
94 Nevertheless, it could be that these individuals in fact own a „Riester Pension“ but that they 
do not take advantage of the full „Riester-Subsidy“. 
95 Confirms hypothesis 4, chapter 4.3. 
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Furthermore it has been shown that many individuals hold a retirement plan 
without having thought about an appropriate retirement income before. This, 
lack of planning, is more prevalent for individuals owning “Riester-Pension” 
than for individual owning a company pension plan. The empirical evidence 
suggests that company pension plan owners are better informed than individu-
als who own a “Riester-Pension” which could be attributed to the information 
provided by employers. The “Riester-Pension”, however, has the advantage of 
attracting women and individuals with children.  
Within the existing pension system it would be possible to combine the ad-
vantage of both pension plans because it is also possible to obtain a “Company-
Riester” plan. “Company Riester” plans, however, have an important disad-
vantage compared to the classical “Riester-Pension” at the time the pension is 
due to be paid. This disadvantage is, that individuals have to pay health insur-
ance contributions based on their income received from the “Company-Riester” 
plan despite having contributed to the plan out of their income after taxes and 
social insurance contributions. If the government would change the regulations 
for “Company-Riester” such that it is the same as for the “Riester-Pension” it 
might be possible to increase the number of “Riester-Savers” within the domain 
of the company and additionally to increase the knowledge about the “Riester-
Pension” such that less “Riester-Savers” start saving without having spent any 
time to think about retirement provision. 
A problem of providing seminars is the selectivity of participants. Often indi-
viduals who are most in need to receive information and to save for retirement 
are not among the participants. Honekamp and Uehleke (2012) have shown that 
low educated, low income and young individuals are underrepresented in the 
adult education seminar “Old-Age provision goes to School” (see also Frommert 
2008, Oehler and Wilhelm-Oehler 2009, 2011). Furthermore, the research in 
this thesis indicated that the most important factor for not participating in the 
seminar is time. In order to attract more individuals and especially those who 
are most in need to join the seminar it might be necessary to make retirement 
seminars the standard, a seminar which every adult should attend at least once 
during his or her working life.  
Attaining such a spread of seminars requires extended networks between for 
example employers, the statutory pension insurance, trade unions, consumer 
advice centres, debt advisors, and job centres. Such an extension of partnerships 
with existing organizations has also been suggested by Oehler and Werner 
(2008). Furthermore, they propose the targeting of individuals in their environ-
ment at different stages in an individual’s life. Such stages could be, when start-
ing to work for a company, when getting married or at the birth of a child. Ac-
cording to Whitehouse (2000), individuals who are just at the beginning of a 
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new stage in their life are especially open to advice and willing to make changes. 
The advertisement for a course which is targeted at a specific group is, accord-
ing to Whitehouse, also more effective than advertising a course for an unspeci-
fied target group.  
Oehler and Wilhelm-Oehler (2009, 2011) advanced these ideas, results and con-
clusions analyzing the data from „Altersvorsorge macht Schule” („retirement 
planning goes school”).96 They recommend a practice-oriented, case-based fi-
nancial education as well as a „meta education” to improve the „meta literacy” 
as shown by Oehler (2004, 2009, 2011, 20112a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b). „Meta litera-
cy” in this sense means that it is more important to know methods or people 
who can solve the problem than acquiring a lot of information to be able to solve 
each potential problem (Oehler and Wilhelm-Oehler 2009, 2011, Oehler 2011, 
2012a, 2012d-e, 2013a-b). 
Another solution investigated by Oehler (WDR 2012) is providing information 
about specific financial topics in the form of a radio broadcast, television and the 
internet. He argues that it is important to provoke individual consternation fol-
lowed by practical advice which helps to solve the specific problem. Construct-
ing information after the concept of “Meta Bildung” would therefore avoid an 
information overload and encourage individuals to continue dealing with the 
specific topic. 
A radio or television broadcast would be able to attract the attention of private 
old-age provision even for individuals who haven’t thought about it before. 
These individuals may be deterred from dealing with this topic because of be-
havioral biases like a high degree of present orientation, information overload or 
status quo bias.97 There are, however, also individuals who are not in the situa-
tion that they come across such information. For them it is important to know 
when it is time to look out for more information. Starting retirement planning 
just before someone retires would for example be too late. Hence individuals 
either need some basic knowledge which enables them to decide when it is time 
to gather more information or there needs to be a benevolent third party which 
provides the relevant information at the time it is needed.    
The retirement seminar “Old-Age Provision goes to School” could also be re-
vised and provide more specific information concentrating only on one topic 
instead of providing a bulk of information which is thought to be necessary for 
everyone. In the light of time constraints which many individuals indicated 
 
96 See also Frommert 2008 
97 For a description of behavioral biases see chapter 2.1.3. 
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when asked if they would participate in the intensive course, a shorter more 
specific course might attract the interest of more individuals. Some of the indi-
viduals in the FNA-Survey also stated that such a course would not be of any 
help to them. These individuals might also revise their statement if the course 
were organized as to meet their individual needs.  
Company-based seminars could be targeted at newly hired employees, catching 
especially young individuals which were underrepresented in the course “Old-
Age Provision goes to School”. A further advantage of providing an employer 
based seminar is the potential peer effect which has been described in the litera-
ture review (e.g. Duflo and Saez 2003). In the case that key employees who are 
the role models for many other employees can be convinced that company pen-
sion plans are a good choice then they will follow and the number of individuals 
filing a company pension plan can be increased considerably.98  
The downside of company based seminars is, however, that they generally focus 
on company pension plans and therefore direct demand towards these plans. 
The seminars therefore do not necessarily contribute to an informed decision of 
the individual based on independent information about all available savings ve-
hicles. A solution to this problem would be that an independent organisation 
like the German pension insurance provides this information, similar to the 
course “Old-Age Provision goes to School”.99 
Seminars offered to the unemployed in job centres could be targeted at individ-
uals with low income and lower education, and seminars offered from debt ad-
visors could be targeted at individuals who have to repay consumer credits or 
other forms of debt. Furthermore the seminar “Old-Age-Provision goes to 
School” could also address specific life-stages. Honekamp and Uehleke (2012) 
suggest targeting young families by providing seminars with a child minder to 
look after the children while the parents learn more about old-age provision. 
The advantages of targeted seminars such as the ones discussed above are two-
fold. Firstly, they are more effective in transferring information: Participants 
would have the same interests and questions concerning retirement. The com-
plexity and difficulty of the seminar can be adjusted to meet the needs of the 
participants. Individuals may be less prone to ask questions in a homogenous 
group and they are likely to be more enthusiastic if they can readily apply the 
information which is provided. Furthermore, providing information in this 
 
98 I am grateful to Pension Solutions, a company offering retirement seminars for companies 
and administering their pension plans, for sharing this information with me. 
99 If companies are interested, referees from the statutory pension insurance already provide 
information about retirement provision on a company level. 
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form is more likely to entail a discussion among participants about their finan-
cial experience which increases the intensity with which individuals deal with 
their retirement issues. The second advantage is that it is possible to solve the 
time problem in most cases. Employer based seminars may take place during 
working time, the unemployed have to take part in measures provided by the job 
centre and young parents would have to look after their children anyway.  
The research conducted in this thesis provides even more evidence which can be 
used to develop measures to foster retirement planning and to increase the 
number of individuals participating in retirement seminars. The groundwork 
underlying these findings is one of the hypotheses, which states that individuals 
who know that they tend to procrastinate on financial matters (sophisticates) are 
more likely to plan and save for retirement than individuals who do not realise 
that they procrastinate (naïve). 
It has been found that individuals who are aware of their self-control problem, 
meaning that they know that they tend to delay decisions concerning retirement 
provision, are (given their present-biased preferences) more likely to plan join-
ing a retirement seminar than naïve individuals. It has been argued that a re-
tirement seminar might serve as a commitment device, committing the individ-
ual to attend and to start saving afterwards. Nevertheless research has shown 
that most individuals who plan changes in their retirement behavior do not 
translate these plans into action (e.g. Choi et al. 2006, Clark et al. 2006, Hon-
ekamp and Uehleke 2012). One reason could be that the retirement seminars 
were not effective in committing the participants to start saving. Further expla-
nations for the discrepancy between planning and action could be unexpected 
events which had not been taken into account in retirement planning. This 
could for example include situations such as becoming unemployed or divorced, 
but also changes in the pension system or a financial crisis could deter individ-
uals from translating their plans into action.  
If the reason lies in the individuals who, even though they know that they 
should save for retirement delay the implementation of their plans again, it 
might be worthwhile looking at the seminar content more closely. Seminars 
provide information about retirement provision but no information about how 
to combat procrastination. Procrastination is a problem which not only arises in 
connection with retirement planning and saving. Instead procrastination is 
widespread. Students procrastinate in their course works and bachelor theses, 
smokers procrastinate in stopping smoking, and unathletic people procrastinate 
joining the gym, and so forth (Rabin Bui 2007, O'Donoghue and Rabin 2008, 
Wilkinson and Sherman 1991). Implementing a short module on how to over-
come procrastination in retirement seminars might be effective in increasing 
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the number of individuals who actually start saving after the seminar. After im-
plementing such a module it is necessary to find out if the information provided 
does indeed lead to the expected outcome. A course evaluation comparing sem-
inars with and without a procrastination module would therefore be necessary. 
Further evaluating the problem that many individuals do not act according to 
their plan after the retirement seminar, empirical results suggest that the confi-
dence in one’s own knowledge is more important than actual knowledge when 
translating retirement plans into action. In this respect measures could be taken 
in order to increase the confidence of individuals. The measures which will be 
suitable to increases confidence will also decrease the costs of planning and sav-
ing for retirement for the individual and hence reduce the number of individu-
als who will procrastinate. Confidence can be increased through practice. With-
in a seminar individuals could receive the task to invite offers for an artificial 
individual with specific characteristics (Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Jus-
tiz und für Verbraucherschutz und Bayerischer Volkshochschulverband e.V. 
2012; Oehler 2013). Within the next seminar session offers can be discussed 
and individuals can share their experiences with each other. Furthermore, sim-
ple and standardized products make it easier to compare products for everyone 
hence the confidence in dealing with retirement products will increase. A fur-
ther measure to increase confidence would be to provide a manual, describing 
as briefly as possible the most important things to be considered during the 
process of finding an appropriate product. Such a manual has already been pro-
vided on the homepage of the course “Old-Age Provision goes to School” (Old-
Age Provision goes to School 2009). However, an evaluation of the usefulness of 
this manual or its effectiveness has not yet taken place. 
Empirical evidence has also shown that the level of pension knowledge and the 
confidence in dealing with pension issues alone are not sufficient to induce 
people to make concrete plans for retirement even though they know that they 
should save more. Individuals therefore procrastinate on planning concrete 
changes regardless of financial knowledge and confidence. This finding and the 
finding that sophisticated individuals are more likely to join a retirement semi-
nar than naives can also be used to rethink information campaigns. Such cam-
paigns are on the one hand designed to provide general information about pen-
sion provision and appeal to the need for private retirement provision, and on 
the other hand campaigns that advertise retirement seminars. Making individu-
als’ sensitive not only to retirement issues but also with respect to procrastina-
tion could lead to an increased awareness of the problem. If such campaigns are 
successful then naïve individuals would become sophisticated and try to over-
come their problem. This would, according to the empirical findings increase 
participation in retirement seminars. 
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Without a sound knowledge about the pension system and the factors to be con-
sidered when making savings decisions even the best heuristic may lead to an 
unexpected result in the end. It is essential that individuals know that they are 
eligible to receive a savings subsidy either in the form of a lump sum or tax de-
ferral. Furthermore, it is important to know that consumer credits are expensive 
and that it is unlikely that the return on any investment could outweigh these 
costs. This basic financial and pension knowledge can attenuate the problems 
which could be entailed through the application of heuristics. Heuristics and 
simplifications in retirement provision are important to foster retirement sav-
ings but this should not be done at the costs of educating people about pension 
matters. 
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9.1 Questionnaire CATI 1 
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9.2 Questionnaire CATI 2 
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9.3 Objective Pension Knoweldge 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Financial 
Matters  
Statutory 
Pension 
Company 
Pension 
Capital 
Life Ins. 
“Riester-
Pension” 
Male 0.13 -0.07 -0.00 0.02 -0.33*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Age 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.01** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married or living  0.25* -0.19 0.15 0.11 -0.10 
together (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Number of children -0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.16*** 
(max. 3 or more) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Education low .ref . . . . 
Education middle 0.30 0.38** 0.05 0.42** 0.22 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Education high -0.15 0.02 -0.21 0.25 0.03 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Individual net income 0.47*** 0.24*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.22** 
(low, middle, high) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Objective knowledge 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.13** 0.30*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Unemployed .ref . . . . 
Blue- or white collar -0.26 0.11 0.45*** -0.34** -0.16 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Self-employed -0.10 -0.27 -0.56** -0.19 -0.29 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) 
Public servant -0.63** -1.72*** -1.55*** -0.51* 0.08 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) 
Living in east Germany 0.06 0.12 -0.27 -0.06 0.22 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
Cut1_cons -2.66*** -0.89*** 0.09 -0.49 -2.46*** 
 (0.39) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) 
Cut2_cons -1.69*** 0.17 0.64* 0.11 -1.89*** 
 (0.36) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Cut3_cons -0.35 1.03*** 1.15*** 0.73** -1.33*** 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Cut4_cons 0.86** 1.91*** 1.80*** 1.44*** -0.65* 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Cut5_cons 2.38*** 3.13*** 2.68*** 2.34*** 0.31 
 (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) 
Cut6_cons 3.58*** 4.08*** 3.56*** 3.37*** 1.30*** 
 (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) 
N 1010 1010 1010 1010 1010 
Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: FNA-Data, first telephone interview, imputed data,  coefficients are the mean of ten im-
puted datasets 
Note: Ordered-Logit. This model serves as a comparison with the OLS alternative in Table 22 .  
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9.4 Thinking about an appropriate retirement income (Ch. 6.1) 
In chapter 4.1 and 4.2 several variables have been discussed which measure 
time preferences, procrastination and pension knowledge. The variables meas-
uring actual pension knowledge are summarized in Table 11 and the variable 
measuring time preferences and procrastination are summarized in Table 5 of 
the respective chapter. In order to discriminate between models using different 
of these measures, the Baysian and the Akaide information criteria (BIC and 
AIC) will be used. The models to be compared are not nested in each other for 
that reason using the likelihood-ratio test would not be appropriate here. Stata 
12 uses the following scaling of the two measures: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −3𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 2𝑘 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2𝑙𝑛𝐿 + 𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑁 
Smaller values of these criteria are preferred, because higher log likelihood is 
preferred. Penalties for model size are the quantities 2k and klnN respectively 
with k, the number of estimated parameters and N, the sample size. 
The results in Table 45 indicate that “Actual Pension Knowledge”, which is the 
variable summing up the correct answers from all knowledge questions, has the 
lowest BIC and AIC. This variable will therefore be chosen in all models esti-
mating the likelihood of having thought about an appropriate retirement in-
come. Furthermore, it has been tested if the variable measuring how often 
someone stated that he/she does not know the correct answer to the pension 
literacy question, adds anything in explaining the dependent variable. As can be 
seen in model 9.1(6), the coefficient of SumDk is not significant and the BIC 
and AIC are higher than in model 9.1(1) and (2).  The likelihood-ratio test, test-
ing the hypothesis that the coefficient of SumDk is zero cannot be rejected. The 
corresponding p-value is 0.71. 
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Table 45: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Ch. 6.1) 
Having thought about an appropri-
ate retirement income 
9.4(1) 9.4(2) 9.4(3) 9.4(4) 9.4(5) 9.4(6) 
Male -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 -0.32 -0.34 -0.33 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Educationa -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.17 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.28* 0.28* 0.26* 0.28* 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.30* 0.29 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Middle Wealthc 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Wealthc -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.18 -0.13 0.00 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.06* 0.06* 0.08** 0.06** 0.06* 0.06* 
(no. of different assests) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.33***      
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.11)      
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.23***    0.22*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct)  (0.07)    (0.08) 
Factor Actual Knowledge   0.09    
   (0.07)    
Actual Pension Knowledge    0.36***   
(0=low – 2= high, equal space)    (0.13)   
Pension Reduction     0.27  
(question correct)     (0.19)  
Company Pension     0.28**  
(question correct)     (0.14)  
Riester     0.25  
(question correct)     (0.20)  
Interest     0.12  
(question correct)     (0.14)  
Contribution Rate     0.18  
(question correct)     (0.17)  
Statutory Pension     0.33**  
(question correct)     (0.16)  
No. Don’t’ Know Answers      -0.02 
      (0.06) 
Constant -
1.29*** 
-1.10*** -0.75** -1.35*** -1.05*** -1.03** 
 (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.42) (0.40) (0.43) 
N 531.00 531.00 531.00 531.00 531.00 531.00 
AIC 608.61 608.13 616.50 610.08 616.67 609.99 
BIC 672.73 672.25 680.63 674.20 702.17 678.39 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
254 
Table 46 and Table 47 show the estimations whith variing variables measuring 
time preferneces and procrastination. On theoretical grounds it would be neces-
sary, to include a variable approximating procrastination of retirement saving 
decisions and a variable measuring time preferences with respect to future ori-
entation.  
Table 46: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (1) (Ch. 
6.1) 
Having thought about an      
appropriate retirement income 
9.4(7) 9.4(8) 9.4(9) 9.4(10) 9.4(11) 9.4(12) 
Male -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.14 -0.12 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa -0.32 -0.36* -0.39* -0.37* -0.33 -0.33 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Educationa -0.16 -0.19 -0.26 -0.24 -0.17 -0.18 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.33** 0.30** 0.30** 0.30** 0.28* 0.27* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.35* 0.32* 0.32* 0.34* 0.27 0.29 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Wealth -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.48*** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.04 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06** 
(no. of different assests) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Future Orientation 0.28***      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.08)      
Procrastination  0.20**     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.09)     
Future Orientation   -0.11    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.09)    
Procrastination    0.00   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.09)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.03  
(Table 5)     (0.02)  
Timepreference Results      -0.01 
(Table 5)      (0.02) 
Constant -1.04*** -0.94** -0.99** -1.00*** -0.99** -1.09*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) 
N 520.00 520.00 520.00 520.00 531.00 530.00 
AIC 586.07 593.50 597.15 598.64 606.94 607.95 
BIC 649.88 657.30 660.96 662.45 671.06 672.05 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Deciding on behalf of the AIC and BIC, factor1 should be chosen to measure 
time preferences and factor2 to measure procrastination. Using a factor using 
the information from several variables measuring procrastination is, however, 
problematic, when testing hypothesis 3. 
Table 47: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (2) (Ch. 
6.1) 
Having thought about an      
appropriate retirement income 
9.4(13) 9.4(14) 9.4(15) 9.4(16) 9.4(17) 9.4(18) 9.4(19) 
Male -0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa -0.29 -0.31 -0.35* -0.31 -0.35* -0.33 -0.32 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
High Educationa -0.12 -0.16 -0.20 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.14 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.29* 0.31** 0.30** 0.28* 0.29* 0.28* 0.29* 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.29 0.31* 0.30* 0.31* 0.31* 0.28 0.27 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Wealth -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.49*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.05 0.05 0.06* 0.06* 0.06** 0.07** 0.05 
(no. of different assests) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Actual Pension Knowledge (0 =  0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 
zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
Timepreference 0.11***       
(saving for old age Table 5) (0.03)       
Timepreference (saving for  0.06**      
long-term care Table 5)  (0.02)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   0.02     
(Table 5)   (0.07)     
Retire Disuse    0.05    
(Table 5)    (0.08)    
Retire Illness     -0.03   
(Table 5)     (0.07)   
Procrastination      0.08  
(Table 5)      (0.06)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       0.19*** 
(Table 5)       (0.07) 
Constant -
1.95*** 
-1.50*** -
1.15*** 
-1.25*** -1.04** -1.31*** -1.58*** 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.41) (0.41) (0.43) 
N 530.00 528.00 530.00 530.00 528.00 530.00 528.00 
AIC 595.69 599.82 606.98 607.06 606.78 606.33 598.12 
BIC 659.79 663.85 671.08 671.16 670.82 670.42 662.15 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education,       b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Table 48: Factor Variable "Procrastination" vs Orignial Variables (Ch. 6.1) 
Having thougt about an 9.4(20) 9.4(21) 9.4(22) 9.4(23) 
appropriate retirement Income Imputed 
Probit 
Imputed IV-
Probit 
Imputed 
Probit 
Imputed IV-
Probit 
Male -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.09 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.10) (0.17) 
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.15 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Children 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Middle Educationa -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.14 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) 
High Educationa 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.10 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.36*** 0.35** 0.36*** 0.35** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) 
Middle Wealthc 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.12 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.18) 
High Wealthc 0.03 -0.00 0.05 0.00 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Self-employedd 0.22 0.22 0.27* 0.28* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.29) 
Civil Servantd -0.34 -0.29 -0.34* -0.28 
 (0.21) (0.29) (0.21) (0.28) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.20*** 0.32 0.20*** 0.35 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.05) (0.52) (0.05) (0.49) 
Future Orientation 0.16*** 0.15** 0.16*** 0.15** 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.03 0.03   
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05)   
Like Deal. Fin. Matters 0.18*** 0.16   
(Table 5) (0.06) (0.10)   
Time Deal. Fin. Matters -0.05 -0.06   
(Table 5) (0.05) (0.06)   
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.16 -0.25 -0.15 -0.27 
 (0.13) (0.43) (0.13) (0.40) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.33*** 0.42 0.31*** 0.44 
 (0.12) (0.46) (0.11) (0.44) 
Procrastinate (Factor Variable)   0.18*** 0.14 
   (0.06) (0.13) 
Constant -1.76*** -1.84*** -1.24*** -1.46* 
 (0.33) (0.49) (0.28) 0.74 
Wald testf  -0.10  -0.14 
  (0.48)  (0.46) 
N 984.00 984.00 984 984 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.    
For this hypothesis variable needs to indicate if individuals are aware of their 
procrastination behavior. This requirement is only fulfilled by the variable pro-
crastination. From the other two variables, measuring if someone likes dealing 
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with financial matters or if someone has time to deal with financial matters, it is 
not possible to deduce if someone knows that he/she procrastinates on financial 
decisions or not. Hence it is important to consider both variables, on the one 
hand factor and on the other hand the variable procrastination. 
Table 49: Test for Weak Instruments (Ch. 6.1) 
 9.4(24) 
Imputed 
9.4(25) 
Original 
 Pension 
knowl. 
Pension 
knowl. 
Male 0.27*** 0.28*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
Age 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.04 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.10) 
Children -0.05 -0.02 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.03) (0.04) 
Middle Educationa 0.15 0.17 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
High Educationa 0.16 0.26** 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.07 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.11) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.16* 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.12) 
Middle Wealthc 0.23*** 0.18* 
 (0.08) (0.10) 
High Wealthc 0.30*** 0.23** 
 (0.09) (0.10) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.10 0.18 
 (0.08) (0.11) 
Self-employedd -0.05 0.07 
 (0.10) (0.14) 
Civil Servantd -0.34** -0.26 
 (0.15) (0.19) 
Future Orientation 0.06 0.08 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.04) (0.05) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
0.20*** 0.15** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.04) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.81*** 0.76*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.90*** -0.93*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) 
Economics at school 0.07*** 0.05* 
(0 none – 4 a lot) (0.02) (0.03) 
Euro conversion  -0.00 -0.02 
(0 easy- 4 hard)) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant 1.39*** 1.43*** 
 (0.25) (0.28) 
N 1016.00 504.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Table 50: Overidentified vs just Identified Model (Ch. 6.1) 
Having thougt about an 9.4(26) 9.4(27) 
appropriate retirement income Imputed IV-Probit 
cveridentif. 
Imputed IV-Probit just identif. 
Male -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Age 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.15 -0.15 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Children 0.05 0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.05) 
Middle Educationa -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
High Educationa 0.10 0.10 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.35** 0.35** 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.18 0.18 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Middle Wealthc 0.12 0.12 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
High Wealthc 0.00 0.00 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.04 0.04 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
Self-employedd 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.29) (0.16) 
Civil Servantd 0.15 -0.28 
 (0.67) (0.29) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.35 0.35 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.49) (0.49) 
Future Orientation 0.15** 0.15** 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.07) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.14 0.14 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.13) (0.14) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.27 -0.27 
 (0.40) (0.41) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.44 0.44 
 (0.44) (0.44) 
Constant -1.46* -1.46 
 0.74 0.75 
Wald testf -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.46) (0.46) 
N 984 984 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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9.5 Planning Concrete Changes (Ch. 6.2) 
The results in Table 51 indicate that t3_objwissen, which is the variable which 
categorizes actual knowledge into three categories with in even distribution of 
respondents within each category has the lowest BIC an AIC. The categories 
range from low knowledge (1) over medium knowledge (2) to high knowledge 
(3). This variable will therefore be chosen in all models estimating the likelihood 
of having thought about an appropriate retirement income. Furthermore, it has 
been tested if the variable measuring how often someone stated that he/she 
does not know the correct answer to the pension literacy question, adds any-
thing in explaining the dependent variable. The likelihood-ratio test, testing the 
hypothesis that the coefficient of SumDk is zero cannot be rejected. The corre-
sponding p-value is 0.8. 
Table 52 and Table 53 show the estimations whith variing variables measuring 
time preferneces and procrastination. On theoretical grounds it would be neces-
sary to include a variable approximating procrastination of retirement saving 
decisions and a variable measuring time preferences with respect to future ori-
entation. Deciding on behalf of the AIC and BIC, factor1 should be chosen to 
measure time preferences and factor2 to measure procrastination. Using a fac-
tor which is composed of the information from several variables measuring pro-
crastination is, however, problematic, when testing hypothesis 3. For this hy-
pothesis the variable needs to indicate if individuals are aware of their procrasti-
nation behavior or not. This requirement is only fulfilled by the variable procras-
tination. From the other two variables, measuring if someone likes dealing with 
financial matters or if someone has time to deal with financial matters it is not 
possible to deduce if someone knows that he/she procrastinates on financial 
decisions or not. Hence it is important to consider both variables, on the one 
hand that of factor and on the other hand the variable of procrastination. 
The estimation results in chapter 6.2 will only consider the variable procrastina-
tion because the main purpose is to test the hypothesis. In this Appendix, the 
models will have also been estimated on the one hand with the factor2 variable 
for procrastination and on the other hand by including each of the variable into 
the estimation which are part of factor2. The results in Table 54 show that the 
only variable which is significant is the variable measuring how much an indi-
vidual likes dealing with financial matters. This variable has a positive influence 
on concrete retirement planning for individuals who think they already save 
enough. 
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Table 51: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Ch. 6.2) 
Planning Concrete Changes 9.5 (1) 9.5 (2) 9.5 (3) 9.5(4) 9.5 (5) 
Male 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.20 -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
Children 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
High Educationa 0.51** 0.51** 0.52** 0.50** 0.50** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Middle Wealthc -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
High Wealthc -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.46*** -0.46*** -0.46*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.11 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.09** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 
(no. of different assests) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.13     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.12)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  -0.02    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.08)    
Factor Actual Knowledge   -0.09   
   (0.08)   
Actual Pension Knowledge    -0.01  
(0=low – 2= high, equal space)    (0.14)  
Pension Reduction     -0.17 
(question correct)     (0.22) 
Company Pension     0.02 
(question correct)     (0.15) 
Riester     -0.01 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Interest     -0.01 
(question correct)     (0.16) 
Contribution Rate     -0.11 
(question correct)     (0.19) 
Statutory Pension     0.20 
(question correct)     (0.18) 
Constant 0.08 -0.09 -0.16 -0.09 -0.14 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.46) (0.45) 
N 489.00 489.00 489.00 489.00 489.00 
AIC 482.99 484.20 483.01 484.26 491.71 
BIC 550.07 551.28 550.09 551.34 579.75 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  
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Table 52: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (1) (Ch. 
6.2) 
Planning Concrete 9.5(6) 9.5 (7) 9.5(8) 9.5 (9) 9.5 (10) 9.5 (11) 
Changes       
       
Male 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.10 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.20 -0.18 -0.20 -0.19 -0.21 -0.19 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
Children 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.16 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.07 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
High Educationa 0.60** 0.48* 0.48* 0.52** 0.48* 0.49* 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.27 -0.29 -0.32 -0.30 -0.28 -0.28 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Wealth -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.45*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.46*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.07* 0.09** 0.08** 0.08** 0.07* 0.08** 
(no. of different assests) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Future Orientation 0.26**      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.10)      
Procrastination  -0.10     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.10)     
Future Orientation   -0.14    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.10)    
Procrastination    0.12   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.10)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.04  
(Table 5)     (0.02)  
Timepreference Results      -0.03 
(Table 5)      (0.03) 
Constant -0.07 -0.13 -0.08 -0.05 0.12 0.06 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) 
N 481.00 481.00 481.00 481.00 489.00 488.00 
AIC 470.66 476.50 475.48 476.58 482.31 483.01 
BIC 537.48 543.31 542.30 543.89 549.39 550.05 
N1     481.00 481.00 
AIC1     475.64 476.08 
BIC1     542.46 542.89 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observatio ns (N=481) does not 
lead to a different conclusion.  
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Table 53: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (2) (Ch. 
6.2) 
Planning Concrete 9.5 (12) 9.5 (13) 9.5 (14) 9.5(15) 9.5 (16) 9.5 (17)  9.5(18) 
Changes        
        
Male 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.18 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
Children 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.09 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
High Educationa 0.53** 0.63** 0.51** 0.52** 0.51** 0.50** 0.50* 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Middle Individual net In-
comeb 
-0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net In-
comeb 
-0.25 -0.26 -0.29 -0.26 -0.27 -0.25 -0.28 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Wealth -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.48*** -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.45*** -0.46*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.11 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.07* 0.07* 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 
(no. of different assests) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Timepreference Old Age 0.07*       
(Table 5) (0.04)       
Timepreference Old Age  0.08**      
(Table 5)  (0.03)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   -0.12     
(Table 5)   (0.07)     
Retire Disuse    0.07    
(Table 5)    (0.09)    
Retire Illness     0.12   
(Table 5)     (0.08)   
Procrastination      -0.05  
(Table 5)      (0.07)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       -0.00 
(Table 5)       (0.08) 
Constant -0.53 -0.66 0.25 -0.31 -0.33 0.02 -0.07 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.51) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47) 
N 488.00 488.00 489.00 489.00 486.00 488.00 487.00 
AIC 480.97 476.77 482.04 483.89 480.69 483.56 480.02 
BIC 548.01 543.82 549.11 550.97 547.67 550.61 547.03 
N1 481.00 481.00 481.00 481.00 481.00 481.00 481.00 
AIC1 474.31 470.68 476.50 476.81 476.68 477.07 477.38 
BIC1 541.13 537.50 543.31 543.63 543.84 543.88 544.20 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations (N=481) does not 
lead to a different conclusion.   
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Table 54: Factor Variable "Procrastination" vs Orignial Variables (Savings Suffice (1)) 
 9.5 (19) 9.5 (20) 9.5 (21) 9.5 (22) 
Planning concrete changes 
if savings suffice 
Probit IV-Probit Probit 
Factor-Var. 
IV-Probit 
Factor-Var. 
     
Male 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.19) (0.26) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Children 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Middle Educationa 0.60 0.57 0.56 0.54 
 (0.38) (0.40) (0.37) (0.39) 
High Educationa 0.88** 0.80* 0.85** 0.81* 
 (0.37) (0.47) (0.37) (0.45) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.42* -0.42* -0.35 -0.36 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.27 -0.28 -0.23 -0.24 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
Middle Wealthc -0.26 -0.33 -0.28 -0.33 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.23) (0.30) 
High Wealthc -0.39* -0.43* -0.39 -0.42 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd -0.13 -0.14 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) 
Self-employedd 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.50 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.29) (0.31) 
Civil Servantd -0.31 -0.18 -0.25 -0.16 
 (0.37) (0.54) (0.37) (0.56) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.13 0.28 -0.11 0.19 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.15) (1.19) (0.15) (1.32) 
Future Orientation 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.15 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.05 -0.06   
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.09) (0.10)   
Like Deal. Fin. Matters 0.21** 0.15   
(Table 5) (0.11) (0.22)   
Time Deal. Fin. Matters -0.00 -0.02   
(Table 5) (0.10) (0.11)   
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.02 -0.24 -0.02 -0.20 
 (0.24) (0.76) (0.24) (0.82) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.16 0.17 -0.17 0.07 
 (0.22) (0.98) (0.22) (1.08) 
Procrastinate (Factor Variable)   0.17 0.10 
   (0.12) (0.31) 
Constant -0.05 -0.56 0.14 -0.41 
 (0.66) (1.59) (0.62) (2.51) 
Wald testf  -0.24  -0.17 
  (0.69)  (0.76) 
N 511.00 511.00 511.00 511.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 55: Factor Variable "Procrastination" vs Orignial Variables (Savings do not Suffice (2)) 
 9.5 (23) 9.5 (24) 9.5 (25) 9.5 (26) 
Planning concrete changes 
if savings do not suffice 
Probit IV-Probit Probit Fac-
tor-Var. 
IV-Probit 
Factor-Var. 
     
Male 0.36** 0.18 0.40** 0.18 
 (0.17) (0.38) (0.18) (0.37) 
Age -0.03*** -0.02 -0.03*** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.52*** -0.42 -0.54*** -0.39 
 (0.19) (0.34) (0.20) (0.34) 
Children 0.22** 0.18 0.24*** 0.18 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) 
Middle Educationa 0.50* 0.32 0.45 0.24 
 (0.28) (0.46) (0.28) (0.42) 
High Educationa 0.76*** 0.58 0.71*** 0.51 
 (0.27) (0.51) (0.27) (0.46) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.12 -0.15 -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.32 -0.37 -0.27 -0.31 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) 
Middle Wealthc 0.19 0.05 0.20 0.02 
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.23) (0.31) 
High Wealthc 0.46* 0.12 0.45* 0.09 
 (0.25) (0.62) (0.25) (0.53) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd -0.08 -0.21 -0.08 -0.22 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) 
Self-employedd -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 -0.23 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) 
Civil Servantd -0.14 0.07 -0.15 0.08 
 (0.53) (0.61) (0.54) (0.58) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.05 0.94 -0.02 1.07 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.14) (1.39) (0.14) (1.12) 
Future Orientation 0.22** 0.10 0.21** 0.07 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.10) (0.25) (0.10) (0.22) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.13 -0.11   
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.08) (0.10)   
Like Deal. Fin. Matters 0.15 0.08   
(Table 5) (0.10) (0.16)   
Time Deal. Fin. Matters -0.07 -0.11   
(Table 5) (0.08) (0.10)   
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.16 -0.91 -0.16 -0.98 
 (0.24) (1.03) (0.24) (0.81) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.14 0.60 0.15 0.67 
 (0.20) (0.63) (0.20) (0.53) 
Procrastinate (Factor Variable)   -0.02 -0.11 
   (0.11) (0.13) 
Constant 0.11 -1.14 -0.08 -1.76 
 (0.56) (1.85) (0.48) (1.75) 
Wald testf  -0.65  -0.74 
  (1.22)  (1.06) 
N 368.00 368.00 368.00 368.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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9.6 Translating Plans into Action 
The results in Table 56 indicate that objknowledge, which is the variable sum-
ming up the correct answers from all knowledge questions, has the lowest BIC 
an AIC. Table 57 and Table 58 show the estimations whith variing variables 
measuring time preferences and procrastination. On theoretical grounds it 
would be necessary, to include a variable approximating procrastination of re-
tirement saving decisions and a variable measuring time preferences with re-
spect to future orientation. Deciding on behalf of the AIC and BIC, “timeprefer-
ence results” should be chosen to measure time preferences and factor2 to 
measure procrastination. Using a factor which is composed of the information 
from several variables measuring procrastination is, however, problematic, 
when testing hypothesis 3. For this hypothesis the variable needs to indicate if 
individuals are aware of their procrastination behavior or not. This requirement 
is only fulfilled by the variable procrastination. From the other two variables, 
measuring if someone likes dealing with financial matters or if someone has 
time to deal with fi-nancial matters it is not possible to deduce if someone 
knows that he/she procrasti-nates on financial decisions or not. Hence it is im-
portant to consider both variables, on the one hand factor and on the other hand 
the variable procrastination. 
Counter intuitive the favoured time preferencs variable has a positive coeffi-
cient, which would mean that indi-viduals are more likely to have changed their 
savings behavior during the year if they care more about urgent matters because 
future problems often resolve themselves and if they think that actions with 
immediate results are more important than actions with results far in the fu-
ture. This is surprising, since taking action in the form of sav-ing for retirement 
would entail results only far in the future, at the point of retirement. 
The estimation results in chapter 6.3 will only consider the variable procrastina-
tion because the main purpose is to test the hypothesis. In this Appendix, how-
ever, the models have been estimated twice, on the one hand with the factor2 
variable for pro-crastination and on the other hand by including each of the var-
iables into the estima-tion which are part of factor2. 
The results in Table 59 show that the only variable which is significant is the 
variable measuring how much an individual likes dealing with financial matters 
in the instrument variable estimation. This variable has a positive influence on 
changing retirement savings behavior. 
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Table 56: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Ch. 6.3) 
Started to Save more for 9.6(1) 9.6(2) 9.6(3) 9.6(4) 9.6(5) 
Retirement      
Male 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
High Educationa 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.38* 0.38* 0.38* 0.39* 0.36* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.54** 0.54** 0.53** 0.54** 0.55** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Middle Wealthc -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
High Wealthc 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.22 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.17 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.18 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.16 0.23 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 
(no. of different assests) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.15     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.13)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.11    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.09)    
Factor Actual Knowledge   0.02   
   (0.09)   
Actual Pension Knowledge    0.10  
(0=low – 2= high, equal space)    (0.15)  
Pension Reduction     0.27 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Company Pension     0.09 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Riester     0.21 
(question correct)     (0.23) 
Interest     0.03 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Contribution Rate     -0.16 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Statutory Pension     0.26 
(question correct)     (0.20) 
Constant -1.49*** -1.41*** -1.23** -1.39** -1.39** 
 (0.56) (0.54) (0.52) (0.57) (0.55) 
N 322.00 322.00 322.00 322.00 322.00 
AIC 426.88 426.66 428.12 427.76 433.20 
BIC 487.27 487.06 488.51 488.15 512.46 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.   
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Table 57: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (1) (Ch. 
6.3) 
Started to Save more for 9.6(6) 9.6(7) 9.6(8) 9.6(9) 9.6(10) 9.6(11) 
Retirement       
Male 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Children 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.35 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.38 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
High Educationa 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Middle Individual net In-
comeb 
0.38* 0.38* 0.39* 0.39* 0.37* 0.38* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.58** 0.58** 0.60** 0.58** 0.54** 0.57** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) 
Wealth 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Actual Savings Sufice -0.25 -0.27 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.21 -0.20 -0.23 -0.21 -0.14 -0.17 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.22 0.25 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.09** 0.08** 0.09** 0.09** 0.10** 0.10** 
(no. of different assests) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.13 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Future Orientation 0.01      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.10)      
Procrastination  0.10     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.12)     
Future Orientation   0.19*    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.11)    
Procrastination    -0.03   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.11)   
Timepreference Urgent     0.01  
(Table 5)     (0.03)  
Timepreference Results      0.08*** 
(Table 5)      (0.03) 
Constant -1.48*** -1.40** -1.43*** -1.49*** -1.44*** -1.78*** 
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.55) 
N 316.00 316.00 316.00 316.00 322.00 321.00 
AIC 417.41 416.64 414.39 417.35 427.13 416.29 
BIC 477.50 476.73 474.49 477.44 487.53 476.63 
N1     316.00 316.00 
AIC1     417.34 410.45 
BIC1     477.43 470.54 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  N1 ,  AIC1 and BIC1  shows that basing the estimations on 
a similar number of observations  favours the variable Timepreference Results over factor3 
to estimate time preferences.  
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Table 58: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Var. (2) (Ch. 6.3) 
Started to Save more for 9.6(12) 9.6(13) 9.6(14) 9.6(15) 9.6(16) 9.6(17) 9.6(18) 
Retirement        
Male -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.00 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.31 0.37 0.32 0.33 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
High Educationa 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.38* 0.41** 0.35* 0.38* 0.36* 0.37* 0.39* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.52** 0.57** 0.51** 0.53** 0.53** 0.53** 0.55** 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Wealth 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.21 -0.20 -0.22 -0.22 -0.25 -0.24 -0.23 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.15 -0.18 -0.14 -0.13 -0.17 -0.13 -0.17 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.20 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.10** 0.08* 0.09** 0.10** 0.09** 0.09** 0.08* 
(no. of different assests) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Timepreference Old Age -0.03       
(Table 5) (0.04)       
Timepreference Old Age Need 
of Care 
 0.02      
(Table 5)  (0.03)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   -0.08     
(Table 5)   (0.08)     
Retire Disuse    -0.06    
(Table 5)    (0.10)    
Retire Illness     0.05   
(Table 5)     (0.08)   
Procrastination      0.05  
(Table 5)      (0.08)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       0.11 
(Table 5)       (0.09) 
Constant -1.13* -1.57*** -1.21** -1.21* -1.53*** -1.50*** -1.61*** 
 (0.61) (0.58) (0.57) (0.62) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
N 321.00 321.00 322.00 322.00 320.00 322.00 320.00 
AIC 425.86 423.62 426.47 427.00 424.44 426.97 422.44 
BIC  486.20 483.96 486.87 487.39 484.74 487.36 482.73 
N1 481.00 316.00 316.00 316.00 316.00 316.00 316.00 
AIC1 474.31 416.89 416.72 416.87 417.06 417.23 415.52 
BIC1 541.13 476.98 476.81 476.96 477.15 477.32 475.61 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.  N1 ,  AIC1 and BIC1  shows that basing the estimations on 
a similar number of observations does not lead to a different conclusion.  
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Table 59: Factor Variable "Procrastination" vs Orignial Variables 
Started to Save more for 9.6(19) 9.6(20) 9.6(21) 9.6(22) 
Retirement Probit Factor procr. IV-Probit Factor procr. Probit IV-Probit 
Male 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.16 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa 0.33 0.37* 0.30 0.34* 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Educationa 0.29 0.37* 0.27 0.34 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.29 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.47** 0.52** 0.50** 0.55*** 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Middle Wealthc 0.05 0.17 0.05 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
High Wealthc 0.22 0.36* 0.22 0.36* 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
Savings suffice -0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.17 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
Self-employedd -0.10 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd -0.03 -0.26 -0.01 -0.24 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.04 -0.55 0.03 -0.53 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.54) (0.07) (0.52) 
Future Orientation 0.09 0.13* 0.11 0.15** 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters 0.05 0.05   
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.06)   
Like Deal. Fin. Matters 0.08 0.16*   
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.10)   
Time Deal. Fin. Matters -0.07 -0.03   
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.08)   
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.16 0.31 -0.17 0.29 
 (0.17) (0.47) (0.17) (0.46) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.10 -0.53 0.09 -0.52 
 (0.15) (0.59) (0.15) (0.58) 
Procrastinate (Factor Variable)   0.08 0.19 
   (0.08) (0.12) 
Constant -0.87* -0.12 -0.71* 0.36 
 (0.45) (0.89) (0.41) (1.12) 
Wald testf  0.55  0.54 
  (0.61)  (0.58) 
N 533.00 533.00 533.00 533.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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9.7 Saving for retirement 
The results in Table 60 to Table 64 indicate that in two of these models ob-
jknowledge, which is the variable summing up the correct answers from all 
knowledge questions, has the lowest BIC an AIC. In another two models the 
variable where pension knowledge is combined to three categories with equal 
spaces has the lowest BIC and AIC. Since objknowledge is the variable of choice 
in the models of previous chapters, this variable will also be chosen here. An-
other advantage of this variable with seven categories instead of three is, that it 
can be treated as continous endogenous variable in an IV estimation setting.  
Table 60: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Riester) 
“Riester Pension” 9.7(1) 9.7(2) 9.7(3) 9.7(4) 9.7(5) 
      
Demographics and other + + + + + 
control variables      
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.30***     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.11)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.22***    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.07)    
Actual Pension Knowledge   0.28**   
(0=low – 2= high, equal 
space) 
  (0.12)   
Factor Actual Knowledge    0.16**  
    (0.07)  
Pension Reduction     -0.13 
(question correct)     (0.19) 
Company Pension     0.28** 
(question correct)     (0.13) 
Riester     0.82*** 
(question correct)     (0.19) 
Interest     0.09 
(question correct)     (0.14) 
Contribution Rate     0.00 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Statutory Pension     0.14 
(question correct)     (0.16) 
Constant -2.81*** -2.63** -2.88*** -2.39** -2.28** 
 (1.06) (1.06) (1.07) (1.07) (1.09) 
N 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
ll -298.97 -298.23 -300.69 -300.51 -290.43 
AIC 639.94 638.46 643.38 643.01 632.86 
BIC 728.99 727.50 732.42 732.06 743.11 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Furthermore, it has been tested if the variable measuring how often someone 
stated that he/she does not know the correct answer to the pension literacy 
question, adds anything in explaining the dependent variable. The likelihood-
ratio test, testing the hypothesis that the coefficient of SumDk is zero cannot be 
rejected in all models but the model estimating the probability of owning a 
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“Riester Pension”.100 In this model the p-value is 0.0074 and the likelyhood of 
owning a “Riester Pension” decreases with the number of questions someone 
answered with don’t know. In order to allow a comparison between all models, 
the variable SumDK will not be considered as explanatory variable. 
Table 61: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (other private pension) 
Other private pension 9.7(6) 9.7(7) 9.7(8) 9.7(9) 9.7(10) 
      
Demographics and other + + + + + 
control variables      
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.31***     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.10)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.20***    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.07)    
Actual Pension Knowledge   0.36***   
(0=low – 2= high, equal 
space) 
  (0.12)   
Factor Actual Knowledge    0.10  
    (0.07)  
Pension Reduction     -0.02 
(question correct)     (0.18) 
Company Pension     0.26** 
(question correct)     (0.13) 
Riester     0.19 
(question correct)     (0.19) 
Interest     0.09 
(question correct)     (0.14) 
Contribution Rate     0.41** 
(question correct)     (0.16) 
Statutory Pension     0.20 
(question correct)     (0.16) 
Constant -1.96*** -1.73*** -2.02*** -1.47*** -1.77*** 
 (0.52) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) (0.52) 
N 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
ll -293.96 -294.48 -294.26 -297.28 -292.34 
AIC 627.91 628.96 628.52 634.56 634.68 
BIC 712.72 713.76 713.32 719.37 740.68 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 60 to Table 74 show the estimations whith variing variables measuring 
time preferneces and procrastination. On theoretical grounds it would be neces-
sary to include a variable approximating procrastination of retirement saving 
decisions and a variable measuring time preferences with respect to future ori-
entation. The two factors approximating time preferences are factor1 and factor3 
and the other two factors, factor2 and factor4 approximate procrastination. De-
 
100 Likelyhood-ratio test for sumDK: other penison p-value 0.57, capital life insurance p-value 
0.66, company pension p-value 0.71, home equity p-value 0.23. 
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ciding on behalf of the AIC and BIC, all models but the model estimating the 
probability of owning a company pension would favor factor1 as the variable of 
choice to approximate time preferences. For that reasons factor2 will be chosen 
to approximate time preferences in all models estimated in chapter 6.4. Con-
cerning the approximation of procrastination, factor2 is favored over factor4 in 
three out of four models. 
Table 62: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Capital Life Insurance) 
Capital  Life Insurance 9.7(11) 9.7(12) 9.7(13) 9.7 (14) 9.7(15) 
Demographics and other + + + + + 
control variables      
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.19*     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.10)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.13*    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.07)    
Actual Pension Knowledge   0.16   
(0=low – 2= high, equal 
space) 
  (0.12)   
Factor Actual Knowledge    0.05  
    (0.07)  
Pension Reduction     -0.07 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Company Pension     0.27** 
(question correct)     (0.13) 
Riester     0.05 
(question correct)     (0.18) 
Interest     0.24* 
(question correct)     (0.14) 
Contribution Rate     0.25 
(question correct)     (0.16) 
Statutory Pension     -0.08 
(question correct)     (0.15) 
Constant -0.71 -0.59 -0.68 -0.43 -0.81* 
 (0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48) 
N 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
AIC 667.26 667.03 668.87 670.07 670.52 
BIC 752.06 751.83 753.68 754.88 776.53 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
As described before, using a factor which is composed of the information from 
several variables measuring procrastination is, however, problematic when test-
ing hypothesis 3. For this hypothesis the variable needs to indicate if individuals 
are aware of their procrastination behavior or not. This requirement is only ful-
filled by the variable procrastination. From the other two variables, measuring if 
someone likes dealing with financial matters or if someone has time to deal 
with financial matters it is not possible to deduce if someone knows that he/she 
procrastinates on financial decisions or not. Hence it is important to consider 
both variables, on the one hand, that of factor and on the other hand the variable 
procrastination. 
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Table 63: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Company Pension) 
Company Pension 9.7(16) 9.7(17) 9.7(18) 9.7(19) 9.7(20) 
      
Demographics and other + + + + + 
control variables      
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.46***     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.11)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.29***    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.07)    
Actual Pension Knowledge   0.60***   
(0=low – 2= high, equal 
space) 
  (0.13)   
Factor Actual Knowledge    0.14*  
    (0.07)  
Pension Reduction     0.30 
(question correct)     (0.19) 
Company Pension     0.58*** 
(question correct)     (0.14) 
Riester     0.20 
(question correct)     (0.20) 
Interest     0.15 
(question correct)     (0.15) 
Contribution Rate     0.26 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Statutory Pension     0.17 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Constant -2.02*** -1.66*** -2.18*** -1.25** -1.84*** 
 (0.53) (0.51) (0.54) (0.49) (0.53) 
N 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 513.00 
AIC 576.74 579.06 573.54 591.02 582.15 
BIC 661.55 663.86 658.35 675.82 688.15 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In this Appendix the models have been estimated twice, on the one hand with 
the factor2 variable for procrastination and on the other hand by including each 
of the variables into the estimation which are part of factor2. The results can be 
found from Table 76 onwards. The factor variable is negative and significant 
only in the model estimating the probability of owning a capital life insurance 
(Table 79). The variable which is the driving force is the variable measuring if 
someone has sufficient time to deal with financial matters. The results indicate 
that individuals who have sufficient time to deal with financial matters are sig-
nificantly less likely to have a capital life insurance than individual who do not 
have sufficient time. 
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Table 64: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Housing Equity) 
Housing Equity 9.7(21) 9.7(22) 9.7(23) 9.7(24) 9.7(25) 
      
Demographics and other + + + + + 
control variables      
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.18     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.13)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  0.14    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
 (0.09)    
Actual Pension Knowledge   0.34**   
(0=low – 2= high, equal 
space) 
  (0.17)   
Factor Actual Knowledge    0.11  
    (0.09)  
Pension Reduction     0.36 
(question correct)     (0.23) 
Company Pension     0.11 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Riester     0.18 
(question correct)     (0.25) 
Interest     -0.10 
(question correct)     (0.18) 
Contribution Rate     0.15 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Statutory Pension     0.24 
(question correct)     (0.20) 
Constant -2.16*** -2.04*** -2.37*** -1.85*** -1.88*** 
 (0.60) (0.57) (0.61) (0.57) (0.59) 
N 514.00 514.00 514.00 514.00 514.00 
AIC 411.93 411.36 409.47 412.35 417.82 
BIC 492.53 491.96 490.08 492.95 519.64 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
A similar result can be dectected in the model estimating the probability of own-
ing a house (Table 85). In this case the factor variable is not significant but the 
variable measuring if some has sufficient time is negative and significant. This 
would again suggest that individuals who have sufficient time are less likely to 
have home equity than someone who does not have sufficient time. In this case, 
the causality could go both ways. It might be that individuals who are house 
owners are busy with gardening, repairs and other things which have to be con-
sidered when owning a house and hence there is less time for financial matters.   
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Table 65: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Riester 1) 
“Riester Pension” 9.7(26) 9.7 (27) 9.7(28) 9.7(29) 9.7(30) 9.7(31) 
       
Demographics 
and other 
+ + + + +         + 
control variables       
Future Orientation 0.29***      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.08)      
Procrastination  0.02     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.09)     
Future Orientation   -0.11    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.09)    
Procrastination    -0.11   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.09)   
Timepreference 
Urgent 
    -0.05**  
(Table 5)     (0.02)  
Timepreference 
Results 
     -0.00 
(Table 5)      (0.02) 
_cons -0.22 -0.12 -0.11 -0.17 0.12 -0.12 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) 
N 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 517.00 516.00 
AIC 626.29 638.92 637.23 637.35 644.56 646.63 
BIC 702.37 714.99 713.30 713.43 721.03 723.06 
N1     506.00 506.00 
AIC1     638.31 643.16 
BIC1     714.60 719.45 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.  
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Table 66: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Riester 2) 
“Riester-Pension” 9.7(32) 9.7(33) 9.7(34) 9.7(35) 9.7(36) 9.7(37) 9.7(38) 
        
Demographics and other + + + + +         + + 
control variables        
Timepreference Old Age 0.09***       
(Table 5) (0.03)       
Timepreference Old Age  0.08***      
(Table 5)  (0.02)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   -0.03     
(Table 5)   (0.07)     
Retire Disuse    -0.09    
(Table 5)    (0.07)    
Retire Illness     -0.03   
(Table 5)     (0.06)   
Procrastination      -0.02  
(Table 5)      (0.06)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       0.06 
(Table 5)       (0.07) 
Constant -0.84* -0.78* -0.01 0.16 -0.04 -0.06 -0.26 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) 
N 516.00 514.00 516.00 516.00 514.00 516.00 514.00 
AIC 639.88 637.21 649.00 648.25 646.97 649.36 646.93 
BIC 716.31 713.57 725.43 724.68 723.33 725.79 723.29 
N1 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 
AIC1 633.96 633.46 643.07 641.03 642.99 642.85 642.40 
BIC1 710.25 709.75 719.36 717.32 719.28 719.14 718.69 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.  
Table 67: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Other Private Pension 
1) 
Other private pension 9.7(39) 9.7(40) 9.7(41) 9.7 (42) 9.7(43) 9.7(45) 
       
Demographics and other + + + + +         + 
control variables       
Future Orientation 0.17**      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.08)      
Procrastination  0.13     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.09)     
Future Orientation   -0.07    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.09)    
Procrastination    0.11   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.09)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.02  
(Table 5)     (0.02)  
Timepreference Results      -0.01 
(Table 5)      (0.02) 
_cons -1.61*** -1.55*** -1.56*** -1.51*** -1.47*** -1.53*** 
 (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.42) 
N 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 517.00 516.00 
AIC 617.73 620.05 621.35 620.55 632.26 631.48 
BIC 693.80 696.13 697.42 696.63 708.72 707.91 
N1     506.00 506.00 
AIC1     625.39 626.24 
BIC1     701.68 702.53 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.   
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Table 68: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Other Private Pension 
2) 
Other private 
pension 
9.7(46) 9.7(47) 9.7(48) 9.7(49) 9.7(50) 9.7(51) 9.7(52) 
Demographics 
and other 
+ + + + +         + + 
control variables        
Timepreference 
Old Age 
0.07**       
(Table 5) (0.03)       
Timepreference 
Old Age 
 0.03      
(Table 5)  (0.02)      
Time Deal. Fin. 
Matters 
  0.09     
(Table 5)   (0.07)     
Retire Disuse    0.14*    
(Table 5)    (0.08)    
Retire Illness     0.02   
(Table 5)     (0.06)   
Procrastination      0.02  
(Table 5)      (0.06)  
Like Deal. Fin. 
Matters 
      0.10 
(Table 5)       (0.07) 
Constant -2.12*** -1.81*** -1.83*** -1.97*** -1.61*** -1.61*** -1.85*** 
 (0.48) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.42) (0.43) (0.45) 
N 516.00 514.00 516.00 516.00 514.00 516.00 514.00 
AIC 627.57 627.06 631.27 628.88 631.67 633.08 625.47 
BIC 704.00 703.42 707.70 705.31 708.03 709.51 701.83 
N1 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 
AIC1 620.61 624.71 624.56 623.45 626.24 626.25 624.14 
BIC1 696.90 701.00 700.85 699.74 702.53 702.54 700.43 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.  
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Table 69: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Capital Life Insurance 
1) 
Captital life insurance (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) 
Demographics and other + + + + +         + 
control variables       
Future Orientation 0.19**      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.08)      
Procrastination  -0.01     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.09)     
Future Orientation   -0.08    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.09)    
Procrastination    0.06   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.09)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.03  
(Table 5)     (0.02)  
Timepreference Results      -0.01 
(Table 5)      (0.02) 
_cons -1.08*** -1.00*** -0.99*** -0.97** -0.89** -0.96** 
 (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) 
N 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 517.00 516.00 
AIC 646.40 651.37 651.50 651.86 670.24 671.27 
BIC 722.48 727.44 727.58 727.94 746.71 747.70 
N1     506.00 506.00 
AIC1     650.61 652.21 
BIC1     726.68 728.29 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.  
Table 70: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Capital Life Insurance 
2) 
Capital Life Insurance 9.7(59) 9.7(60) 9.7(61) 9.7(62) 9.7(63) 9.7(64) 9.7(65) 
Demographics and other + + + + +         + + 
control variables        
Timepreference Old Age 0.06**       
(Table 5) (0.03)       
Timepreference Old Age  0.05**      
(Table 5)  (0.02)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   0.01     
(Table 5)   (0.07)     
Retire Disuse    0.09    
(Table 5)    (0.07)    
Retire Illness     0.02   
(Table 5)     (0.06)   
Procrastination      -0.04  
(Table 5)      (0.06)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       -0.00 
(Table 5)       (0.07) 
Constant -1.51*** -1.43*** -1.05** -1.26*** -1.09*** -0.92** -0.99** 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.39) (0.40) (0.42) 
N 516.00 514.00 516.00 516.00 514.00 516.00 514.00 
AIC 666.59 665.26 671.66 668.77 662.82 671.66 667.75 
BIC 743.02 741.62 748.09 745.20 739.18 748.09 744.11 
N1 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 
AIC1 648.09 648.27 652.22 651.20 652.31 652.21 652.38 
BIC1 724.16 724.35 728.30 727.28 728.39 728.28 728.46 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.   
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Table 71: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Company Pension 1) 
Company pension 9.7(66) 9.7(67) 9.7(68) 9.7(69) 9.7(70) 9.7(71) 
Demographics and other + + + + +         + 
control variables       
Future Orientation 0.03      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.08)      
Procrastination  0.04     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.09)     
Future Orientation   -0.13    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.09)    
Procrastination    0.10   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.09)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.02  
(Table 5)     (0.02)  
Timepreference Results      -0.05* 
(Table 5)      (0.03) 
_cons -1.86*** -1.85*** -1.86*** -1.80*** -1.73*** -1.59*** 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) 
N 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 517.00 516.00 
AIC 574.12 573.02 572.18 573.18 578.56 575.56 
BIC 650.20 649.09 648.26 649.26 655.03 651.99 
N1     506.00 506.00 
AIC1     573.78 570.55 
BIC1     649.86 646.63 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations would suggest to 
choose the variable “Timepreference  Results” instead of “factor3”.  
Table 72: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Company Pension 2) 
Company pension 9.7(72) 9.7(73) 9.7(74) 9.7(75) 9.7(76) 9.7(77) 9.7(78) 
Demographics and other + + + + +         + + 
control variables        
Timepreference Old Age (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
(Table 5) 0.02       
Timepreference Old Age (0.03)       
(Table 5)  0.00      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters  (0.02)      
(Table 5)   0.11     
Retire Disuse   (0.07)     
(Table 5)    0.04    
Retire Illness    (0.08)    
(Table 5)     0.06   
Procrastination     (0.07)   
(Table 5)      0.05  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters      (0.07)  
(Table 5)       -0.04 
Constant       (0.07) 
_cons -1.99*** -1.84*** -2.16*** -1.93*** -1.92*** -1.93*** -1.73*** 
 (0.48) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43) (0.44) (0.46) 
N 516.00 514.00 516.00 516.00 514.00 516.00 514.00 
AIC 577.96 577.02 575.61 577.77 577.78 578.41 576.83 
BIC 654.39 653.38 652.04 654.20 654.14 654.84 653.19 
N1 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 506.00 
AIC1 573.74 574.23 571.92 573.88 573.20 573.77 573.99 
BIC1 649.82 650.31 648.00 649.96 649.28 649.85 650.06 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations  does not lead to 
a different conclusion.  
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Table 73: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Housing Equity 1) 
Housing Equity 9.7(79) 9.7(80) 9.7(81) 9.7(82) 9.7(83) 9.7(84) 
       
Demographics and other + + + + +         + 
control variables       
Future Orientation 0.12      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.10)      
Procrastination  0.02     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.11)     
Future Orientation   -0.12    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.11)    
Procrastination    -0.07   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.11)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.03  
(Table 5)     (0.03)  
Timepreference Results      -0.02 
(Table 5)      (0.03) 
_cons -2.37*** -2.32*** -2.32*** -2.36*** -2.30*** -2.33*** 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49) 
N 507.00 507.00 507.00 507.00 518.00 517.00 
AIC 403.38 404.75 403.50 404.34 415.37 416.27 
BIC 475.26 476.64 475.39 476.23 487.61 488.48 
N1     507.00 507.00 
AIC1     401.98 404.62 
BIC1     473.87 476.51 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations would suggest to 
choose the variable “Timepreference Urgent” instead of “factor1”.  
Table 74: AIC and BIC Time Preferences and Procrastination Variable (Housing Equity 2) 
Housing Equity 9.7(85) 9.7(86) 9.7(87) 9.7(89)  9.7(90) 9.7(91) 9.7(92) 
        
Demographics and other + + + + +         + + 
control variables        
Timepreference Old Age 0.03       
(Table 5) (0.04)       
Timepreference Old Age  0.04      
(Table 5)  (0.03)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   0.03     
(Table 5)   (0.08)     
Retire Disuse    0.04    
(Table 5)    (0.09)    
Retire Illness     -0.08   
(Table 5)     (0.08)   
Procrastination      -0.05  
(Table 5)      (0.08)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       0.05 
(Table 5)       (0.09) 
Constant -2.63*** -2.68*** -2.45*** -2.57*** -2.26*** -2.30*** -2.48*** 
 (0.55) (0.55) (0.53) (0.54) (0.49) (0.50) (0.52) 
N 517.00 515.00 517.00 517.00 515.00 517.00 515.00 
AIC 416.80 408.23 412.63 416.28 414.00 416.60 410.85 
BIC 489.02 480.38 484.85 488.50 486.15 488.81 483.00 
N1 507.00 507.00 507.00 507.00 507.00 507.00 507.00 
AIC1 404.49 402.63 404.72 404.74 403.86 404.49 404.46 
BIC1 476.37 474.51 476.61 476.63 475.74 476.37 476.35 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. N1 , AIC1 and BIC1  
shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observations does not lead to a 
different conclusion.   
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Table 75: Determinants of Owning Different Vehicles to Provide for Retirement (probit) 
Probit estimation  9.7(93) 9.7(94) 9.7(95) 9.7(96) 9.7(97) 9.7(98) 
Owning a Riester 
Pension  
Capital 
Life  
Compa-
ny Pen-
sion 
Other 
Private 
Housing 
Equity 
Private  
Saving 
       
Male -0.19* -0.11 0.03 -0.19* 0.10 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) 
Age 0.09** 0.06* -0.01 0.03 0.02*** 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00* 0.00 -0.00  -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.72*** 0.03 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) 
Children 0.25*** -0.06 -0.01 -0.11** 0.18*** 0.07 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa 0.11 -0.15 -0.42*** 0.23 0.31* 0.08 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
High Educationa 0.10 -0.01 -0.23 0.12 0.32* 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.08 0.10 0.54*** 0.20 0.10 0.45*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.11 0.26 0.60*** 0.55*** 0.02 0.53*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) 
Middle Wealthc 0.15 0.18 0.52*** 0.20 0.71*** 0.54*** 
 (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18) 
High Wealthc -0.05 0.23 0.10 0.18 1.81*** 0.44** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
Home Equity -0.03 0.37*** 0.19 0.04  0.29* 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)  (0.15) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.10 0.25* 0.69*** 0.11 0.16 0.45*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) 
Self-employedd -0.14 0.46*** -0.36* 0.45*** 0.61*** 0.27 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd 0.15 0.15 -0.80*** -0.13 0.95*** -0.12 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) (0.29) (0.25) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.19*** 0.12** 0.31*** 0.11** 0.04 0.28*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
Future Orientation 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.03 0.12** 0.09 0.18*** 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.10* -0.18*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.28** -0.13 -0.45*** -0.20 -0.24 -0.43*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.18 0.34*** 0.42*** 0.11 -0.16 0.58*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) 
Constant -2.18*** -2.01*** -1.61** -1.58** -2.48*** -1.38 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.81) (0.78) (0.38) (0.90) 
N 901.00 951.00 951 951.00 951.00 951.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge.   
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Table 76: Owning a "Riester-Pension" (1) 
Owning a “Riester-Pension” 9.7(99) 9.7(100) 9.7(101) 9.7(102)  9.7(103) 9.7(104) 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male -0.19* -0.16 -0.16 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17) (0.27) (0.27) 
Age 0.09** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) 
Children 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Middle Educationa 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.24 0.24 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.23) 
High Educationa 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.18 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.27) (0.27) 
Middle Individual net  0.08 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.10 
Incomeb (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.06 -0.21 -0.20 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) 
Middle Wealthc 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.04 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Wealthc -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) 
Home Equity -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20) (0.22) 
Blue- or White Collar  0.10 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.14 
Workerd (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) 
Self-employedd -0.14 -0.15 -0.22 -0.24 -0.20 -0.21 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.25) (0.25) 
Civil Servantd 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.07 
 (0.22) (0.30) (0.22) (0.31) (0.40) (0.41) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.19*** 0.11 0.21*** 0.02 0.17 0.16 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.05) (0.45) (0.05) (0.48) (0.75) (0.79) 
Future Orientation 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.15 0.17 0.27*** 0.22 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.07) (0.20) (0.21) (0.10) (0.37) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.28** -0.21 -0.24* -0.08 -0.24 -0.23 
 (0.13) (0.39) (0.13) (0.42) (0.60) (0.60) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.18 0.11 0.21* 0.05 0.16 0.15 
 (0.12) (0.41) (0.12) (0.44) (0.71) (0.78) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.03 0.03  0.03 
(interaction term)   (0.06) (0.06)  (0.08) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   0.00 -0.01  -0.01 
(interaction term)   (0.05) (0.06)  (0.12) 
Constant -2.18*** -2.11** -2.26*** -2.07** -2.66** -2.61* 
 (0.76) (0.85) (0.79) (0.95) (1.26) (1.37) 
Wald testf  0.08  0.16 0.03 0.04 
  (0.40)  (0.42) (0.63) (0.66) 
N 901.00 901.00 901.00 901.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.    
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Table 77: Owning a "Riester-Pension" (2) 
Owning “Riester-Pension” 9.7(105) 9.7(106) 9.7(107) 9.7(108) 9.7(109)  9.7(110) 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
Male -0.19* -0.15 -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.19) (0.32) (0.31) 
Age 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10*** 0.13** 0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.15) 
Children 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.28 0.24 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.26) (0.25) 
High Educationa 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.20 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.33) (0.31) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.08 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.22 -0.22 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Middle Wealthc 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.03 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) (0.20) 
High Wealthc -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) 
Home Equity -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.15 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.22) 
Self-employedd -0.16 -0.18 -0.22 -0.24 -0.26 -0.20 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.25) (0.24) 
Civil Servantd 0.15 0.08 0.10 -0.00 0.03 0.07 
 (0.22) (0.32) (0.22) (0.33) (0.45) (0.43) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.19*** 0.03 0.20*** -0.04 0.06 0.13 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.05) (0.54) (0.06) (0.56) (0.99) (0.90) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.28** -0.15 -0.24* -0.03 -0.16 -0.21 
 (0.13) (0.46) (0.13) (0.49) (0.79) (0.72) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.17 0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.07 0.12 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.12) (0.49) (0.12) (0.51) (0.92) (0.86) 
Future Orientation 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 
(factor1) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.02 -0.02   -0.07  
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.07)  
Like Dealing with Fin.Matters 0.06 0.08   0.13  
(1 do not like it – 4 like it) (0.06) (0.09)   (0.18)  
Time for Financial Matters -0.01 0.00   -0.03  
(1 not time – 4 yes have time) (0.05) (0.07)   (0.08)  
Procrastination   0.05 0.09  0.03 
(factor2)   (0.07) (0.13)  (0.17) 
Constant -2.33*** -2.28*** -2.30*** -2.03* -2.86** -2.73** 
 (0.78) (0.81) (0.77) (1.05) (1.19) (1.37) 
Wald testf  0.14  0.21 0.11 0.06 
  (0.47)  (0.49) (0.82) (0.75) 
N 901.00 901.00 862.00 862.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 78: Owning "Capital Life Insurance" (1) 
Owning “Capital Life  9.7(111) 9.7(112) 9.7(113) 9.7(114) 9.7(115) 9.7(116) 
Insurance” Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male -0.11 -0.22* -0.11 -0.22* -0.24 -0.25 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.21) (0.20) 
Age 0.06* 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.26 0.26 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) 
Children -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.12 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Middle Educationa -0.15 -0.19 -0.15 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) 
High Educationa -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.23) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.26 0.15 0.27* 0.16 0.34 0.34 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.25) (0.26) 
Middle Wealthc 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.22 0.22 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.24) (0.25) 
High Wealthc 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.10 0.04 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) 
Home Equity 0.37*** 0.32** 0.38*** 0.32** 0.39 0.38 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.27) (0.30) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.25* 0.20 0.25** 0.21 0.14 0.14 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.23) (0.23) 
Self-employedd 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.46* 0.45* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.25) (0.25) 
Civil Servantd 0.15 0.33 0.16 0.34 0.10 0.11 
 (0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.24) (0.37) (0.37) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.12** 0.55 0.12** 0.55 0.67 0.69 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.05) (0.35) (0.05) (0.35) (0.55) (0.57) 
Future Orientation 0.18*** 0.14* -0.00 -0.06 0.12 0.06 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.07) (0.18) (0.19) (0.12) (0.36) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.13 -0.48 -0.12 -0.48 -0.58 -0.59 
 (0.12) (0.30) (0.13) (0.30) (0.43) (0.41) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.34*** 0.69** 0.33*** 0.69** 0.94** 0.96** 
 (0.12) (0.29) (0.12) (0.29) (0.44) (0.48) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.08 0.07  0.02 
(interaction term)   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   -0.02 -0.00  -0.00 
(interaction term)   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.11) 
Constant -2.01*** -2.20*** -1.95*** -2.15*** -1.44 -1.43 
 (0.75) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73) (0.97) (1.01) 
Wald testf  -0.42  -0.43 -0.52 -0.55 
  (0.39)  (0.39) (0.64) (0.67) 
N 951.00 951.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.    
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Table 79: Owning Capital Life Insurance" (2) 
Owning “Capital Life 9.7(117) 9.7(118) 9.7(119) 9.7(120) 9.7(121) 9.7(122) 
Insurance” Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male -0.11 -0.23* -0.11 -0.23* -0.27 -0.28 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) 
Age 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.26 0.25 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.17) 
Children -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.11 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) 
Middle Educationa -0.14 -0.19 -0.15 -0.20 -0.23 -0.21 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) 
High Educationa -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.11 -0.19 -0.16 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.26) (0.24) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.08 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.14 0.31 0.31 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.27) (0.26) 
Middle Wealthc 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.20 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.27) (0.24) 
High Wealthc 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.02 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.23) (0.21) 
Home Equity 0.37*** 0.30** 0.38*** 0.31** 0.34 0.34 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.31) (0.30) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.23* 0.16 0.24* 0.18 0.12 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (0.24) 
Self-employedd 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.45* 0.42 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.26) (0.26) 
Civil Servantd 0.14 0.32 0.14 0.33 0.16 0.15 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.37) (0.36) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.12** 0.63* 0.12** 0.64* 0.83 0.81 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.05) (0.36) (0.05) (0.36) (0.55) (0.51) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.13 -0.54* -0.13 -0.55* -0.70* -0.69* 
 (0.12) (0.31) (0.12) (0.31) (0.42) (0.39) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.35*** 0.77*** 0.35*** 0.77*** 1.05*** 1.05*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.12) (0.30) (0.12) (0.29) (0.40) (0.38) 
Future Orientation 0.18*** 0.13 0.18*** 0.13 0.10 0.10 
(factor1) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.02 -0.02   -0.01  
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.07)  
Like Dealing with Fin.Matters -0.01 -0.08   -0.14  
(1 do not like it – 4 like it) (0.05) (0.07)   (0.12)  
Time for Financial Matters -0.06 -0.09*   -0.02  
(1 not time – 4 yes have time) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.07)  
Procrastination   -0.08 -0.18**  -0.16 
(factor2)   (0.06) (0.09)  (0.11) 
Constant -1.87** -1.77** -2.08*** -
2.30*** 
-1.02 -1.55* 
 (0.77) (0.78) (0.74) (0.71) (0.98) (0.90) 
Wald testf  -0.50  -0.51 -0.71 -0.69 
  (0.44)  (0.43) (0.79) (0.72) 
N 951.00 9515.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.    
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Table 80: Owning a "Company Pension" (1) 
Owning “Company Pension” 9.7(123) 9.7(124) 9.7(125) 9.7(126) 9.7(127) 9.7(128) 
 Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.08 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15) (0.31) (0.29) 
Age -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.40** 0.37* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) 
Children -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Middle Educationa -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.41*** -0.43*** -0.56* -0.51 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.31) (0.34) 
High Educationa -0.23 -0.27* -0.24 -0.28* -0.12 -0.08 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.31) (0.31) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.35* 0.35* 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.60*** 0.49** 0.61*** 0.50** 0.65*** 0.66*** 
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.17) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) 
Middle Wealthc 0.52*** 0.42* 0.52*** 0.42* 0.59*** 0.59*** 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.22) (0.18) (0.17) 
High Wealthc 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.20 0.22 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
Home Equity 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.26 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.69*** 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.62*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) (0.22) 
Self-employedd -0.36* -0.29 -0.36** -0.29 -0.35 -0.36 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) 
Civil Servantd -0.80*** -0.59 -0.80*** -0.59 -1.09*** -1.11*** 
 (0.24) (0.36) (0.24) (0.36) (0.37) (0.33) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.31*** 0.67* 0.31*** 0.67* 0.01 -0.16 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.06) (0.37) (0.06) (0.37) (0.93) (0.92) 
Future Orientation 0.03 0.00 -0.11 -0.15 0.02 -0.08 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.07) (0.20) (0.20) (0.11) (0.41) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.02 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.45*** -0.74** -0.45*** -0.73** -0.24 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.31) (0.15) (0.31) (0.76) (0.75) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.42*** 0.72** 0.41*** 0.72** 0.17 -0.01 
 (0.13) (0.33) (0.13) (0.33) (0.90) (0.94) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.06 0.05  0.07 
(interaction term)   (0.06) (0.06)  (0.08) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   -0.01 0.00  -0.04 
(interaction term)   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.12) 
Constant -1.61** -1.81** -1.57* -1.78** -0.62 -0.37 
 (0.81) (0.81) (0.82) (0.81) (1.39) (1.50) 
Wald testf  -0.36  -0.36 0.23 0.37 
  (0.41)  (0.41) (0.78) (0.81) 
N 951.00 951.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 81: Owning "Company Pension" (2) 
Owning “Company Pension” 9.7(129) 9.7(130) 9.7(131) 9.7(132) 9.7(133) 9.7(134) 
 Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male 0.03 -0.07 0.03 -0.08 0.20 0.16 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16) (0.28) (0.31) 
Age -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.35 0.36 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.28) (0.23) 
Children -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Middle Educationa -0.43*** -0.45*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.42 -0.46 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.51) (0.43) 
High Educationa -0.24 -0.29* -0.23 -0.28* 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.40) (0.37) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.47*** 0.30 0.31 
 (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.25) (0.22) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.61*** 0.50** 0.60*** 0.49** 0.60* 0.61** 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.17) (0.24) (0.33) (0.27) 
Middle Wealthc 0.51*** 0.41* 0.52*** 0.42* 0.54** 0.57*** 
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.17) (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) 
High Wealthc 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.22 0.23 
 (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) 
Home Equity 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.24 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.71*** 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.61*** 0.80** 0.80*** 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.20) (0.36) (0.25) 
Self-employedd -0.33* -0.26 -0.36* -0.29 -0.28 -0.33 
 (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.25) (0.27) 
Civil Servantd -0.79*** -0.58 -0.81*** -0.59 -1.06*** -1.09*** 
 (0.24) (0.38) (0.24) (0.38) (0.37) (0.34) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.30*** 0.69* 0.31*** 0.69* -0.42 -0.29 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.06) (0.42) (0.06) (0.42) (1.00) (1.00) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.45*** -0.75** -0.45*** -0.75** 0.14 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.34) (0.15) (0.34) (0.89) (0.88) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.41*** 0.74** 0.41*** 0.74** -0.26 -0.13 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.13) (0.37) (0.13) (0.37) (1.01) (1.01) 
Future Orientation 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.04 
(factor1) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) 
Procrastinate on Finan. Matters -0.02 -0.03   0.00  
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.07)  
Like Dealing with Fin.Matters -0.02 -0.08   0.04  
(1 do not like it – 4 like it) (0.06) (0.08)   (0.20)  
Time for Financial Matters 0.06 0.02   0.12  
(1 not time – 4 yes have time) (0.05) (0.07)   (0.08)  
Procrastination   -0.01 -0.09  0.09 
(factor2)   (0.07) (0.12)  (0.17) 
Constant -1.67** -1.64* -1.66** -1.90** -0.57 -0.28 
 (0.84) (0.84) (0.80) (0.80) (1.20) (1.46) 
Wald testf  -0.38  -0.38 0.62 0.49 
  (0.48)  (0.47) (1.03) (0.94) 
N 951.00 9515.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 82: Owning "Other Private Pension" (1) 
Owning “Other Private 9.7(135) 9.7(136) 9.7(137) 9.7(138) 9.7(139) 9.7(140) 
Pension” Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male -0.19* -0.28** -0.19* -0.28** -0.46*** -0.45*** 
 (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.11** -0.07 -0.11** -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.12 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) 
High Educationa 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.26) (0.27) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.18 0.20 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.55*** 0.43* 0.55*** 0.43* 0.57* 0.60** 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.14) (0.24) (0.29) (0.31) 
Middle Wealthc 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
High Wealthc 0.18 0.06 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.16) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Home Equity 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.20) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.22) 
Self-employedd 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.50** 0.49** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.25) (0.25) 
Civil Servantd -0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.06 -0.09 -0.13 
 (0.21) (0.31) (0.21) (0.31) (0.41) (0.43) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.11** 0.52 0.11** 0.52 0.71 0.68 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.05) (0.48) (0.05) (0.49) (0.53) (0.60) 
Future Orientation 0.12** 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.10 -0.22 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.06) (0.08) (0.19) (0.21) (0.12) (0.32) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.20 -0.53 -0.20 -0.53 -0.67* -0.62 
 (0.13) (0.40) (0.13) (0.40) (0.40) (0.43) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.11 0.47 0.11 0.46 0.55 0.53 
 (0.12) (0.43) (0.12) (0.43) (0.55) (0.63) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.01 0.01  0.09 
(interaction term)   (0.06) (0.05)  (0.09) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   -0.01 0.01  0.04 
(interaction term)   (0.05) (0.05)  (0.10) 
Constant -1.58** -1.78** -1.57** -1.78** -1.60 -1.58 
 (0.78) (0.77) (0.78) (0.78) (1.00) (1.06) 
Wald testf  -0.41  -0.40 -0.51 -0.47 
  (0.53)  (0.53) (0.63) (0.67) 
N 951.00 951.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 83: Owning "Other Private Pension" (2) 
Owning “Other Private 9.7(141) 9.7(142) 9.7(143) 9.7(144) 9.7(145) 9.7(146) 
Pension” Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-Probit IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male -0.20* -0.23 -0.19* -0.23 -0.44** -0.45** 
 (0.10) (0.22) (0.10) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) 
Age 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.14 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) 
Children -0.11** -0.09 -0.11** -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
Middle Educationa 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.10 0.11 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19) (0.30) (0.27) 
High Educationa 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.15) (0.21) (0.36) (0.32) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.54*** 0.48* 0.54*** 0.49** 0.61* 0.59* 
 (0.14) (0.25) (0.14) (0.24) (0.31) (0.30) 
Middle Wealthc 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.22) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
High Wealthc 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.04 
 (0.16) (0.25) (0.16) (0.24) (0.25) (0.23) 
Home Equity 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.07 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.24) (0.24) 
Self-employedd 0.43*** 0.43** 0.45*** 0.45** 0.54** 0.51* 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.16) (0.19) (0.26) (0.27) 
Civil Servantd -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.21) (0.39) (0.21) (0.37) (0.48) (0.46) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.10* 0.28 0.10* 0.30 0.62 0.65 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.05) (0.81) (0.05) (0.75) (0.80) (0.70) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.20 -0.34 -0.20 -0.35 -0.60 -0.62 
 (0.13) (0.67) (0.13) (0.62) (0.60) (0.53) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.27 0.46 0.48 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.12) (0.72) (0.12) (0.66) (0.79) (0.71) 
Future Orientation 0.12** 0.10 0.12** 0.10 0.11 0.11 
(factor1) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) 
Procrastinate on Finan. Matters -0.03 -0.03   -0.02  
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.07)  
Like Dealing with Fin.Matters 0.08 0.05   0.01  
(1 do not like it – 4 like it) (0.06) (0.13)   (0.19)  
Time for Financial Matters -0.01 -0.02   0.06  
(1 not time – 4 yes have time) (0.05) (0.08)   (0.08)  
Procrastination   0.04 -0.00  0.02 
(factor2)   (0.06) (0.17)  (0.18) 
Constant -1.80** -1.75** -1.63** -1.73* -1.72 -1.60 
 (0.80) (0.85) (0.77) (0.95) (1.09) (1.02) 
Wald testf  -0.17  -0.19 -0.42 -0.45 
  (0.80)  (0.73) (0.83) (0.76) 
N 951.00 9515.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 84: Owning "Housing Equity" (1) 
Owning “Housing Equity” 9.7(147) 9.7(148) 9.7(149) 9.7(150) 9.7(151) 9.7(152) 
 Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
IV-Probit 
Original 
Data 
       
Male 0.10 -0.13 0.12 -0.12 -0.36*** -0.33*** 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13) 
Age 0.02*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.72*** 0.48** 0.72*** 0.48** 0.28 0.28 
 (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.14* 0.13 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.31* 0.13 0.31* 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
High Educationa 0.32* 0.13 0.31 0.12 -0.22 -0.21 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.10 -0.00 0.10 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.02 -0.14 0.02 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Middle Wealthc 0.71*** 0.35 0.70*** 0.34 0.12 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.25) (0.13) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) 
High Wealthc 1.81*** 1.09** 1.82*** 1.09** 0.75 0.71 
 (0.18) (0.51) (0.18) (0.52) (0.53) (0.54) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.16 0.06 0.17 0.06 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
Self-employedd 0.61*** 0.52** 0.60*** 0.51** 0.46 0.45 
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.30) (0.30) 
Civil Servantd 0.95*** 1.01*** 0.97*** 1.02*** 1.05** 1.03** 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.41) (0.42) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.04 0.80*** 0.05 0.81*** 1.12*** 1.14*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.07) (0.28) (0.07) (0.27) (0.12) (0.11) 
Future Orientation 0.09 0.01 -0.22 -0.26 -0.03 -0.31 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.07) (0.23) (0.20) (0.08) (0.25) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
0.10* 0.02 0.10* 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.24 -0.81*** -0.21 -0.79*** -1.00*** -0.97*** 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.17) (0.23) (0.14) (0.14) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.16 0.55* -0.13 0.58** 0.95*** 1.05*** 
 (0.15) (0.30) (0.15) (0.29) (0.20) (0.19) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.04 0.03  -0.05 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.06)  (0.07) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   0.11* 0.10*  0.21*** 
(interaction term)   (0.06) (0.05)  (0.07) 
Constant -2.48*** -2.80*** -2.52*** -2.83*** -2.59*** -2.71*** 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.48) (0.51) 
Wald testf  -0.86*  -0.87* -1.39** -1.43** 
  (0.47)  (0.48) (0.54) (0.56) 
N 951.00 951.00 951.00 951.00 499.00 499.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
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Table 85: Owning "Housing Equity" (2) 
Owning “Housing Equity” 9.7(153) 9.7(154) 9.7(155) 9.7(156) 9.7(157) 9.7(158) 
 Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
       
Male 0.10 -0.15 0.10 -0.15 -0.35*** -0.37*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) 
Age 0.02*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.70*** 0.43** 0.72*** 0.45** 0.27 0.26 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.12) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) 
Children 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.12 0.13 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.32* 0.10 0.32* 0.11 -0.09 -0.06 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
High Educationa 0.33* 0.07 0.34* 0.08 -0.29 -0.26 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.09 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.01 -0.14 0.02 -0.13 -0.09 -0.10 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Middle Wealthc 0.71*** 0.30 0.71*** 0.31 0.08 0.11 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.13) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) 
High Wealthc 1.81*** 0.98* 1.81*** 0.99* 0.62 0.66 
 (0.18) (0.51) (0.18) (0.51) (0.56) (0.54) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.15 0.01 0.17 0.03 -0.11 -0.13 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Self-employedd 0.59*** 0.46** 0.62*** 0.49** 0.42 0.40 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.31) (0.30) 
Civil Servantd 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.95** 0.98** 
 (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.43) (0.42) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.04 0.88*** 0.03 0.87*** 1.16*** 1.14*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) (0.11) (0.11) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.24 -0.86*** -0.24 -0.85*** -1.01*** -1.01*** 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.14) (0.14) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.16 0.64** -0.16 0.64** 0.99*** 0.98*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.15) (0.27) (0.15) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) 
Future Orientation 0.08 -0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 
(factor1) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
0.09 0.05   0.00  
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.05)   (0.06)  
Like Dealing with Fin.Matters 0.05 -0.08   -0.16**  
(1 do not like it – 4 like it) (0.07) (0.07)   (0.07)  
Time for Financial Matters -0.03 -0.09*   -0.01  
(1 not time – 4 yes have time) (0.06) (0.05)   (0.06)  
Procrastination   0.11 -0.10  -0.15* 
(factor2)   (0.08) (0.10)  (0.08) 
Constant -2.49*** -2.37*** -2.21*** -2.74*** -2.12*** -2.63*** 
 (0.42) (0.52) (0.34) (0.33) (0.65) (0.49) 
Wald testf  -1.00**  -0.99** -1.56** -1.51** 
  (0.50)  (0.49) (0.66) (0.62) 
N 951.00 9515.00 951.00 951.00 499.00 499.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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Table 86: Private Saving for Retirement" (1) 
Owning “Private Saving 9.7(159) 9.7(160) 9.7(161) 9.7(162) 9.7(163) 9.7(164) 
for Retirement” Probit IV-Probit Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.06 0.29 0.29 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.13) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
Age 0.08* 0.07 0.08* 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.12 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 -0.00 -0.00 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.33 0.30 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) 
High Educationa 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.25 0.25 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.45*** 0.41** 0.45*** 0.41** 0.19 0.17 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.53*** 0.47* 0.53*** 0.47* 0.50* 0.47 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.20) (0.26) (0.30) (0.29) 
Middle Wealthc 0.54*** 0.45* 0.54*** 0.45* 0.58** 0.56** 
 (0.18) (0.26) (0.18) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
High Wealthc 0.44** 0.32 0.44** 0.33 0.62** 0.60** 
 (0.18) (0.31) (0.18) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) 
Home Equity 0.29* 0.26 0.29* 0.25 0.34* 0.35* 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.45*** 0.41** 0.46*** 0.41** 0.63** 0.61** 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.29) (0.30) 
Self-employedd 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.05 0.04 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.25) 
Civil Servantd -0.12 0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.41 -0.41 
 (0.25) (0.38) (0.25) (0.38) (0.34) (0.32) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.28*** 0.55 0.28*** 0.55 -0.54 -0.62 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.08) (0.55) (0.08) (0.55) (0.70) (0.63) 
Future Orientation 0.18*** 0.16* 0.10 0.06 0.29** 0.52* 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.09) (0.22) (0.25) (0.12) (0.30) 
Procrastinate on Financial 
Matters 
-0.18*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -
0.19*** 
-0.27 -0.25 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.20) (0.19) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.43*** -0.65 -0.43*** -0.64 0.29 0.34 
 (0.16) (0.47) (0.16) (0.47) (0.63) (0.55) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.58*** 0.81* 0.59*** 0.81* -0.16 -0.29 
 (0.18) (0.45) (0.18) (0.46) (0.87) (0.82) 
Procrastinate*Future Orient.   0.01 0.02  -0.02 
(interaction term)   (0.06) (0.06)  (0.08) 
A.P.Knowledge*Future Orie.   0.02 0.03  -0.09 
(interaction term)   (0.07) (0.07)  (0.10) 
Constant -1.38 -1.52 -1.39 -1.53 -0.11 0.11 
 (0.90) (0.95) (0.91) (0.96) (1.36) (1.35) 
Wald testf  -0.27  -0.26 0.84 0.94 
  (0.57)  (0.57) (0.85) (0.85) 
N 951.00 9515.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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Table 87: "Private Saving for Retirement" (2) 
Owning “Private Saving 9.7(165) 9.7(166) 9.7(167) 9.7(168) 9.7(169) 9.7(170) 
for Retirement” Probit IV-
Probit 
Probit IV-
Probit 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
IV-Probit 
Original Data 
Male 0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 0.33** 0.26 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.13) (0.22) (0.16) (0.27) 
Age 0.08* 0.06 0.08* 0.06 0.07 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) 
Children 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.00 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
Middle Educationa 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.33 0.29 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) 
High Educationa -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.33 0.18 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.31) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.45*** 0.38* 0.46*** 0.39* 0.13 0.18 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
High Individual net Incomeb 0.54*** 0.46 0.55*** 0.46 0.38 0.48 
 (0.20) (0.28) (0.20) (0.28) (0.33) (0.33) 
Middle Wealthc 0.55*** 0.43 0.54*** 0.42 0.48 0.56** 
 (0.18) (0.29) (0.18) (0.28) (0.30) (0.28) 
High Wealthc 0.46** 0.31 0.45** 0.30 0.53 0.60** 
 (0.18) (0.33) (0.18) (0.33) (0.32) (0.29) 
Home Equity 0.28* 0.23 0.27* 0.23 0.29 0.33 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.42*** 0.36* 0.43*** 0.36* 0.51 0.67** 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.15) (0.21) (0.35) (0.30) 
Self-employedd 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.25 -0.01 0.10 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) 
Civil Servantd -0.14 0.01 -0.14 0.02 -0.43 -0.34 
 (0.26) (0.39) (0.26) (0.38) (0.28) (0.40) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.29*** 0.63 0.29*** 0.65 -0.81 -0.40 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question 
correct) 
(0.08) (0.61) (0.08) (0.58) (0.57) (1.02) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.44*** -0.72 -0.45*** -0.73 0.53 0.16 
 (0.16) (0.51) (0.16) (0.48) (0.54) (0.90) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.61*** 0.89* 0.59*** 0.89* -0.50 -0.05 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.18) (0.49) (0.17) (0.47) (0.76) (1.18) 
Future Orientation 0.18*** 0.15 0.17** 0.14 0.24* 0.28** 
(factor1) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) 
Procrastinate on Finan. Matters -0.16** -0.15**   -0.23  
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.07)   (0.19)  
Like Dealing with Fin.Matters -0.03 -0.08   0.15  
(1 do not like it – 4 like it) (0.07) (0.11)   (0.11)  
Time for Financial Matters -0.09 -0.12   0.01  
(1 not time – 4 yes have time) (0.07) (0.08)   (0.07)  
Procrastination   -0.25*** -0.31***  -0.22 
(factor2)   (0.08) (0.12)  (0.36) 
Constant -1.11 -1.08 -1.85** -2.03** -0.22 -0.96 
 (0.94) (0.94) (0.89) (0.93) (1.06) (1.97) 
Wald testf  -0.35  -0.37 1.24 0.69 
  (0.66)  (0.64) (1.09) (1.07) 
N 951.00 9515.00 951.00 951.00 498.00 498.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 1. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.    
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9.8 Joining a Retirement Seminar 
The results in Table 88 and Table 89 measuring the probability of joining an 
intensive and an introductory course respectively indicate that the factor variable 
which contains four out of six knowledge questions has a slightly lower AIC and 
BIC than the actual knoweldge variable which can take on seven values, from 0 
correct answers to 6 correct answers. The variables which are not part of the fac-
tor approximating actual pension knoweldge are the question about the statuto-
ry right for deferred contribuitons in the form of a company pension and the 
question about the amount of retirement pension someone receives who retires 
today with a working history of 45 contribution years and an average wage.  
Furthermore, it has been tested if the variable measuring how often someone 
stated that he/she does not know the correct answer to the pension literacy 
question, adds anything in explaining the dependent variable. The likelihood-
ratio test, testing the hypothesis that the coefficient of SumDk is zero cannot be 
rejected in both models.101 Therefore the variable SumDK will not be considered 
as explanatory variable. 
  
 
101 Likelyhood-ratio test for sumDK: intensive course p-value 0.74, introductory course p-value 
0.69 
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Table 88: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Intensive Course) 
Intensive Course 9.8 (1) 9.6(2) 9.6(3) 9.6(4) 9.6(5) 
Male -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.12 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.13 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
High Educationa 0.48* 0.49* 0.48* 0.48* 0.45 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Wealthc 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.20 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.10 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) 
Future Orientation -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Procrastinate on Finan. Matters -0.14* -0.14* -0.14* -0.15* -0.13 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 
(no. of different assests) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Actual Savings Suffice -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.18 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Self-employedd -0.65** -0.65** -0.65** -0.63** -0.64** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
Civil Servantd -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.02     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.13)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  -0.05    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct)  (0.09)    
Factor Actual Knowledge   -0.05   
   (0.16)   
Actual Pension Knowledge    -0.06  
(0=low – 2= high, equal space)    (0.09)  
Pension Reduction     -0.32 
(question correct)     (0.22) 
Company Pension     0.05 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Riester     0.13 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Interest     -0.14 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Contribution Rate     -0.01 
(question correct)     (0.22) 
Statutory Pension     0.00 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Constant -3.81** -3.83** -3.77** -3.90** -3.83** 
 (1.54) (1.54) (1.55) (1.55) (1.56) 
N 314.00 314.00 314.00 314.00 314.00 
AIC 419.06 418.76 419.01 418.61 425.11 
BIC 497.80 497.50 497.74 497.35 522.59 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10,  ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0 .01.  a)  Reference group is 
low education, b)  reference group is low income, c)  reference group is low wealth, d)  reference 
group is not employed/unemployed and e)  reference group is correct estimation of pension 
knowledge. 
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Table 89: AIC and BIC for Choosing Actual Knowledge Variable (Intro. Course) 
Introductory Course 9.6(6) 9.6(7) 9.6(8) 9.6(9)  9.6(10) 
Male -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.22 -0.24 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.30 -0.30 -0.31* -0.32* -0.30 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
High Educationa 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.36 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.38* -0.38* -0.39* -0.40* -0.39* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.51** -0.51** -0.52** -0.49* -0.45* 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Wealthc 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.16 0.20 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 -0.11 -0.19 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) 
Future Orientation -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.24*** 
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Experience Fin. Matters  -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(no. of different assests) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Actual Savings Suffice 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.19 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.51** 0.53** 0.52** 0.55** 0.52** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Self-employedd -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) 
Civil Servantd -0.06 -0.10 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.16     
(0 = low – 2 = high) (0.13)     
Actual Pension Knowledge  -0.20**    
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct)  (0.09)    
Factor Actual Knowledge   -0.18   
   (0.16)   
Actual Pension Knowledge    -0.20**  
(0=low – 2= high, equal space)    (0.09)  
Pension Reduction     -0.56*** 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Company Pension     -0.15 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Riester     0.25 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Interest     -0.14 
(question correct)     (0.17) 
Contribution Rate     -0.21 
(question correct)     (0.21) 
Statutory Pension     -0.05 
(question correct)     (0.20) 
Constant 2.12 2.01 2.21 1.80 1.96 
 (1.49) (1.49) (1.50) (1.50) (1.52) 
N 314.00 314.00 314.00 314.00 314.00 
AIC 437.50 434.10 437.55 433.74 437.34 
BIC 516.24 512.84 516.28 512.48 534.83 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10,  ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0 .01.  a)  Reference group is 
low education, b)  reference group is low income, c)  reference group is low wealth, d)  reference 
group is not employed/unemployed and e)  reference group is correct estimation of pension 
knowledge. 
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The following tables show the estimations whith variing variables measuring 
time preferneces and procrastination. On theoretical grounds it would be neces-
sary to include a variable approximating procrastination of retirement saving 
decisions and a variable measuring time preferences with respect to future ori-
entation. The two factors approximating time preferences are factor1 and factor3 
and the other two factors, factor2 and factor4 approximate procrastination. De-
ciding on behalf of the AIC and BIC, the model estimating the probability to 
join the introductory course favors factor3 over factor1 and the model estimating 
the probability to join the intensive course favors factor1 over factor3. In order to 
make the results of both models comparable, it is necessary to choose the same 
variable for both models. Since factor1 was the variable of choice in most of the 
previous models, this variable will also be chosen here. The variable approximat-
ing procrastination is in both models factor2. 
As described before, using a factor which is composed of the information from 
several variables measuring procrastination is, however, problematic, when test-
ing hypothesis 3. For this hypothesis the variable needs to indicate if individuals 
are aware of their procrastination behavior or not. This requirement is only ful-
filled by the variable procrastination. From the other two variables, measuring if 
someone likes dealing with financial matters or if someone has time to deal 
with financial matters it is not possible to deduce if someone knows that he/she 
procrastinates on financial decisions or not. Hence it is important to consider 
both variables, on the one hand that of factor and on the other hand the variable 
of procrastination. 
The estimation results in chapter 6.5 will only consider the variable procrastina-
tion because the main purpose is to test the hypothesis. In this Appendix, how-
ever, the models have been estimated twice, on the one hand with the factor2 
variable for procrastination and on the other hand by including each of the vari-
ables into the estimation which are part of factor2. The results in Table 59 show 
that the only variable which is significant is the variable measuring how much 
an individual likes dealing with financial matters in the instrument variable es-
timation. This variable has a positive influence on changing retirement savings 
behavior. 
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Table 90: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (Intensive 
Course 1)  
Intensive Course 9.6(11) 9.6(12) 9.6(13) 9.6(14) 9.6(15) 9.6(16) 
Male -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age 0.18** 0.19*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age Squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
Children -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.11 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
High Educationa 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.48* 0.47* 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.16 -0.17 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Wealth 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.18 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.06 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Experience Fin. Matters  -0.20 -0.17 -0.20 -0.19 -0.24 -0.23 
(no. of different assests) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.35 0.34 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Self-employedd -0.61** -0.61** -0.61** -0.60* -0.56* -0.54* 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
Civil Servantd -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.26 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Future Orientation 0.07      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.10)      
Procrastination  -0.13     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.12)     
Future Orientation   0.00    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.11)    
Procrastination    -0.05   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.12)   
Timepreference Urgent     -0.00  
(Table 5)     (0.03)  
Timepreference Results      -0.01 
(Table 5)      (0.03) 
Constant -4.01*** -4.15*** -4.00*** -4.05*** -3.90*** -3.94*** 
 (1.48) (1.49) (1.48) (1.48) (1.48) (1.47) 
N 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 316.00 315.00 
AIC 412.77 411.96 413.23 413.08 421.14 420.26 
BIC 483.76 482.95 484.23 484.07 492.50 491.56 
N1     310.00 310.00 
AIC1     413.23 413.19 
BIC1     484.22 484.19 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10,  ** p  < 0.05, *** p < 0 .01.  a)  Reference group is 
low education, b)  reference group is low income, c)  reference group is low wealth, d)  reference 
group is not employed/unemployed and e)  reference group is correct estimation of pension 
knowledge. N1, AIC 1 and BIC 1 shows that basing the estimations on a similar number of observa-
tions does not lead to a different conclusion.   
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Table 91: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (Intensive 
Course 2)  
Intensive Course 9.6(17) 9.6(18) 9.6(19) 9.6(20) 9.6(21) 9.6(22) 9.6(23) 
        
        
Male -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Age 0.18** 0.18** 0.19*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age Squared -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Children -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.13 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
High Educationa 0.47* 0.49* 0.50* 0.48* 0.47 0.48* 0.47 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.16 -0.15 -0.19 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Wealth 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.19 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.09 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Experience Fin. Matters  -0.25 -0.22 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.21 -0.23 
(no. of different assests) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.34 0.35 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.32 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Self-employedd -0.55* -0.59* -0.63** -0.56* -0.58* -0.57* -0.62** 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) 
Civil Servantd -0.20 -0.24 -0.24 -0.21 -0.24 -0.19 -0.23 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Timepreference Old Age -0.00       
(Table 5) (0.04)       
Timepreference Old Age  0.03      
(Table 5)  (0.03)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   -0.16*     
(Table 5)   (0.09)     
Retire Disuse    -0.03    
(Table 5)    (0.10)    
Retire Illness     0.01   
(Table 5)     (0.08)   
Procrastination      -0.13  
(Table 5)      (0.08)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       0.04 
(Table 5)       (0.09) 
Constant -3.84** -4.07*** -3.67** -3.82** -4.04*** -3.72** -4.01*** 
 (1.51) (1.48) (1.48) (1.49) (1.48) (1.48) (1.49) 
N 315.00 315.00 316.00 316.00 314.00 316.00 314.00 
AIC 420.13 419.23 417.80 421.04 418.46 418.77 417.63 
BIC 491.43 490.53 489.16 492.40 489.70 490.13 488.87 
N1 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 
AIC1 413.23 412.14 410.55 412.97 413.15 411.14 413.11 
BIC1 484.23 483.14 481.55 483.96 484.15 482.14 484.10 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. N 1 , AIC1 and BIC1  shows that basing the estimations 
on a similar number of observations does not lead to a different conclusion.  
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Table 92: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (Intro. 
Course 1) 
Introductory Course 9.6(24) 9.6(25) 9.6(26) 9.6(27) 9.6(28) 9.6(29) 
       
Male -0.25 -0.24 -0.26 -0.29* -0.24 -0.27 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.33* -0.29 -0.32* -0.30 -0.35* -0.36* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) 
High Educationa 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.39 0.44 0.46* 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.34 -0.32 -0.33 -0.33 -0.37* -0.35* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.51** -0.50** -0.50** -0.51** -0.50** -0.51** 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Wealth 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.19 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.31 -0.22 -0.29 -0.28 -0.26 -0.29 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.14 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.08 0.12 
(no. of different assests) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.54** 0.50** 0.53** 0.56** 0.55** 0.55** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
Self-employedd 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Civil Servantd -0.17 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.22** -0.17* -0.22** -0.21** -0.22** -0.23** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Future Orientation 0.04      
(factor1 Table 5) (0.10)      
Procrastination  -0.32***     
(factor2 Table 5)  (0.12)     
Future Orientation   0.10    
(factor3 Table 5)   (0.11)    
Procrastination    -0.20*   
(factor4 Table 5)    (0.11)   
Timepreference Urgent     0.01  
(Table 5)     (0.03)  
Timepreference Results      0.03 
(Table 5)      (0.03) 
Constant 1.24 0.98 1.25 1.03 1.38 1.37 
 (1.41) (1.43) (1.41) (1.42) (1.42) (1.41) 
N 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 316.00 315.00 
AIC 433.51 426.08 432.84 430.61 440.63 437.61 
BIC 504.50 497.07 503.84 501.61 511.99 508.91 
N1     310.00 310.00 
AIC1     433.40 432.86 
BIC1     504.40 503.76 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge .  N1 ,  AIC1 and BIC1  shows that basing the estimations 
on a similar number of observations does not lead to a different conclusion.  
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Table 93: AIC and BIC for Choosing Time Preference and Procrastination Variable (Intro. 
Course 2) 
Introductory Course 9.6(30) 9.6(31) 9.6(32) 9.6(34) 9.6(35) 9.6(36) 9.6(37) 
        
Male -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.27 -0.25 -0.22 -0.23 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.35* -0.35* -0.39** -0.33* -0.32* -0.31* -0.33* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Children 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.07 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) 
High Educationa 0.46* 0.44 0.48* 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.42 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.36* -0.36* -0.41* -0.35 -0.36* -0.38* -0.36* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.51** -0.50** -0.53** -0.51** -0.49* -0.50** -0.48* 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) 
Wealth 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.20 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.30 -0.26 -0.24 -0.27 -0.25 -0.20 -0.24 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Experience Fin. Matters  0.09 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.09 
(no. of different assests) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.56** 0.54** 0.49** 0.56** 0.55** 0.54** 0.54** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) 
Self-employedd 0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
Civil Servantd -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.14 -0.09 -0.15 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.23** -0.22** -0.20** -0.22** -0.21** -0.21** -0.21** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Timepreference Old Age 0.01       
(Table 5) (0.04)       
Timepreference Old Age  -0.00      
(Table 5)  (0.03)      
Time Deal. Fin. Matters   -0.19**     
(Table 5)   (0.09)     
Retire Disuse    -0.19*    
(Table 5)    (0.10)    
Retire Illness     -0.05   
(Table 5)     (0.08)   
Procrastination      -0.24***  
(Table 5)      (0.08)  
Like Deal. Fin. Matters       -0.05 
(Table 5)       (0.09) 
Constant 1.27 1.48 1.84 1.95 1.47 1.92 1.62 
 (1.44) (1.41) (1.43) (1.44) (1.41) (1.43) (1.43) 
N 315.00 315.00 316.00 316.00 314.00 316.00 314.00 
AIC 438.03 440.52 436.00 437.15 439.48 431.49 439.14 
BIC 509.33 511.82 507.36 508.51 510.71 502.85 510.38 
N1 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 310.00 
AIC1 433.52 433.64 428.14 429.94 433.05 424.62 432.98 
BIC1 504.52 504.63 499.14 500.93 504.05 495.62 503.98 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. N 1 , AIC1 and BIC1  shows that basing the estimations 
on a similar number of observations does not lead to a different conclusion . 
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Table 94: Factor Variable "Procrastination" vs Orignial Variables (Intensive Course)  
Joining Intensive Course 9.6(38) 9.6(39) 9.6(40) 9.6(41) 
 Probit IV-Probit Probit Interaction IV-Probit Interaction 
Male -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.14) (0.18) 
Age 0.13** 0.12* 0.13** 0.12* 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
Age Squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.29* -0.28* -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
Children 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) 
Middle Educationa -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 
 (0.20) (0.24) (0.21) (0.22) 
High Educationa 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.10 
 (0.20) (0.33) (0.20) (0.26) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.22 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.15 -0.18 -0.05 -0.09 
 (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) 
Middle Wealthc -0.22 -0.25 -0.23 -0.26 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) 
High Wealthc -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.16 
 (0.21) (0.28) (0.21) (0.29) 
Home Equity 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.09 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.11 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.21) 
Self-employedd -0.63*** -0.60* -0.60*** -0.57** 
 (0.22) (0.34) (0.22) (0.27) 
Civil Servantd 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.13 
 (0.27) (0.50) (0.27) (0.45) 
Actual Pension Knowledge 0.04 0.22 0.06 0.29 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.96) (0.08) (0.81) 
Underestimate Knowledgee -0.03 -0.17 -0.07 -0.24 
 (0.16) (0.73) (0.17) (0.63) 
Overestimate Knowledgee 0.13 0.32 0.12 0.35 
 (0.16) (1.00) (0.16) (0.87) 
Savings Suffice -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.18 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Future Orientation 0.13* 0.11 0.13* 0.10 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.15** -0.15**   
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.07)   
Like Deal. Fin. Matters 0.15* 0.11   
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.23)   
Time Deal. Fin. Matters -0.12* -0.13   
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.08)   
Procrastinate on Financial Matters   -0.10 -0.15 
(1 agree – 4 not agree)   (0.09) (0.20) 
Constant -2.54** -2.56** -2.93*** -3.17** 
 (1.11) (1.20) (1.11) (1.34) 
Wald testf  -0.17  -0.20 
  (0.91)  (0.75) 
N 542.00 542.00 522.00 522.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.  
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Table 95: Factor Variable "Procrastination" vs Orignial Variables (Introductory Course)  
Would you join the Introductory  9.6(42) 9.6(43) 9.6(44) 9.6(45) 
Course (1:yes, 0:no) Probit IV-Probit Probit Interaction IV-Probit Interaction 
Male -0.23* 0.01 -0.26* -0.01 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.14) (0.19) 
Age 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married/Cohabiting -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Children 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
(0 no – 4 four or more kids) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Middle Educationa 0.00 0.12 -0.04 0.06 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
High Educationa 0.28 0.34* 0.25 0.29 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) 
Middle Individual net Incomeb -0.16 -0.04 -0.08 0.04 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) 
High Individual net Incomeb -0.33 -0.03 -0.29 0.02 
 (0.22) (0.30) (0.22) (0.27) 
Middle Wealthc -0.07 0.12 -0.03 0.13 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
High Wealthc 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.31* 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) 
Home Equity -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.05 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
Blue- or White Collar Workerd 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) 
Self-employedd -0.18 -0.21 -0.15 -0.14 
 (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) 
Civil Servantd -0.07 -0.46 -0.11 -0.49* 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) 
Actual Pension Knowledge -0.14** -1.00*** -0.12* -1.02*** 
(0 = zero – 6 = six question correct) (0.07) (0.32) (0.07) (0.27) 
Underestimate Knowledgee 0.07 0.72** 0.03 0.73*** 
 (0.16) (0.29) (0.17) (0.27) 
Overestimate Knowledgee -0.11 -1.02*** -0.14 -1.10*** 
 (0.16) (0.37) (0.16) (0.31) 
Savings Suffice 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) 
Future Orientation 0.05 0.11* 0.05 0.12* 
(factor1, Table 5) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Procrastinate on Financial Matters -0.22*** -0.12   
(1 agree – 4 not agree) (0.06) (0.11)   
Like Deal. Fin. Matters 0.02 0.19**   
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.09)   
Time Deal. Fin. Matters -0.12* -0.02   
(Table 5) (0.07) (0.09)   
Procrastinate on Financial Matters   -0.29*** 0.06 
(1 agree – 4 not agree)   (0.08) (0.20) 
Constant 1.47 1.38 0.33 1.53 
 (1.09) (1.03) (1.07) (0.99) 
Wald testf  1.13  1.17 
  (0.96)  (0.85) 
N 542.00 542.00 522.00 522.00 
Source: FNA-Data, 2. Telephone Interview.  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Reference 
group is low education, b) reference group is low income, c) reference group is low 
wealth, d) reference group is not employed/unemployed and e) reference group is correct 
estimation of pension knowledge. f) Wald test of exogeneity, tesing the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0.   
In Germany the ageing population, an increasing number of 
temporary work contracts and more individuals who work part-
time or in jobs not subject to social insurance contributions have 
led to several reforms of the German pension system.
Individuals now have to decide if they start to provide for retire-
ment privately, how much they are going to save and where to 
invest. Such decisions require a sound knowledge of the German 
pension system and general financial knowledge in order to ap-
proximate retirement needs and to compare financial products. 
In this Book survey data from 1016 individuals sheds light on the 
knowledge and savings decisions of these individuals.
Several findings from behavioral economics have been supported 
by the German data. Using heuristics was widespread among 
individuals owning a “Riester-Pension” and providing informa-
tion about retirement provision was found not to be sufficient 
to induce people think about an appropriate retirement income. 
Time constraints and procrastination are often reasons for in-
dividuals not to start any activity concerning retirement provisi-
on. However, individuals who are aware of their procrastination 
behavior are more likely to state that they would participate in a 
retirement seminar - may be to overcome their procrastination.
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